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Note on Transliteration and Conventions 
I maintain the common spelling of proper nouns.  I also maintain the common spelling of 
Persian or Arabic words and phrases that are familiar to most English speakers.  For 
everything else, I use a simplified version of the transliteration system used by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).  For short vowels, I use “e” and “o” 
(instead of “i” and “u”).  I also drop all diacritical marks except for ‘ayn („) and hamzeh (‟).  
For most quotations, I leave the original system of transliteration intact.  For quotations of 
translations, I occasionally apply my own system of transliteration to avoid needlessly 
confusing the reader.  I also try to prevent reader confusion by “translating” telegrams and 










This study offers a revisionist take on the history f early Shi'ite nationalism in Iran.  It 
asks why it is that the Shi’ite ulama (clergy) were among the Shah’s most loyal 
supporters during the 1953 coup that restored him to power, yet a decade later clerical 
activists had largely abandoned royalism and a significa t number had become so 
alienated from the regime that they espoused an early form of Shi'ite nationalism.  This 
problem is insufficiently addressed in the existing literature, with clerical opposition in 
the early 1960s often explained in terms of Shi’isms supposedly revolutionary nature, 
reaction against the government’s attempt at land reform, Khomeini’s leadership, or other 
factors that undervalue the historical processes that led to this shift.   
In this study, I take a different approach, treating the oppositional clerical culture 
of the early 1960s as a cultural artifact and exploring the ways in which it was historically 
produced in the two decades between the 1941 abdication of Reza Shah and the uprising 
of June 1963.  In this reevaluation, I have looked not only at Persian primary sources but 
also at previously unexplored British and American archival documents.  Based on this 
material, I propose that the religious nationalism of the early 1960s was the result of the 
reorientation of cultural transformations that had been occurring over the preceding two 
decades.  These cultural productions were catalyzed and shaped by a number of 
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developments, including an ongoing clerical campaign ainst the Baha’i minority1 and 
British and American intervention in Iran’s domestic religious policy (first to patronize 
the Shi’ite ulama and affiliated Islamic organizations as a bulwark against Communism, 
and then to pressure the Shah to discipline these “fanatics” when they came to be seen as 
a liability).  These factors are discussed in connection with their role in the imagining of 
the “limits” and “sovereignty” of the Shi’ite “nation” in Iran.2  
My subheading (Marking and Unmarking Shi’ism in Pahlavi Iran) concerns the 
idea that the relationship between Shi’ism and the nation was actively contested by a 
variety of actors during the period in question.  Although the discourse on the naturalness 
of Shi’ism as a basis for national identity became hegemonic before the Revolution of 
1979, Shi’ism was very much a marked category in the media and the public sphere 
during most of the Pahlavi period (1925-79).  This was vigorously challenged by the 
Shi’ite clergy and by Islamic organizations in the years after the 1941 abdication of Reza 
Shah, as attempts were made to remove this marker and to recast Shi’ite identity as the 
defining characteristic of the unmarked national self.  This unmarking of Shi’ism was a 
necessary prerequisite for the “return to self” that became an obsession in the 1960s, 
since the Shi’ism that was being “returned” to was not traditional Shi’ism, but rather the 
contemporaneous, national refashioning of the religion that had been produced an  
disseminated in the period after 1941. 
The most heated early episode in this generally cold nflict over the constituency 
of the national self occurred in 1955 when the ulama initiated a pogrom against the 
                                                      
1 Baha’is are the largest non-Muslim religious minorty in Iran. They are discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. 
2 This study uses Benedict Anderson’s definitions of “imagining,” “nation,” “limit,” and “sovereignty.” His 
ideas are discussed later in this chapter (see note 33). 
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Baha’is with the support of the Iranian government.  This pogrom collapsed almost 
immediately, at the insistence of the Shah’s British and American patrons, but was 
followed by an intense anti-clerical campaign (which I am the first to discuss) that was 
mandated and managed by the British and American governments, causing an irreparable 
rift between Muhammad Reza Shah and the ulama.  The anti-Baha’i pogrom also resulted 
in a strategic shift in Western attitudes vis-à-vis the ulama.  In the 1940s and early 1950s, 
Shi’ite clerics were patronized and empowered to ac as a bulwark against Communism.  
After the embarrassing and destabilizing 1955 pogrom, however, the clergy became 
associated with disorder, fanaticism, and medievalism.  The Shah was pressured to turn 
against them and to discipline them as his father had done, with the “object lesson” of his 
use of machine guns to massacre clerical forces in Mashhad in 1935.3  The Shah was 
initially hesitant to turn against this political base that had helped him to regain power in 
1953, and had to be coerced into breaking his ties w th the ulama.  But, by 1963, he had 
internalized and naturalized his patrons’ attitudes and, on his own initiative, engaged in 
public massacres to crush clerical opposition to his reform efforts.4  It was this public 
bloodshed, and its accompanying series of “anti-Islamic” initiatives, that led to the 
nascent Shi’ite nation’s early articulation of an alternate “sovereignty.”  This claim of 
sovereignty, although triggered by the events of the early 1960s, was dependent on the 
earlier imagining of both the nature of the “nation” a d its “limits.” 
 
                                                      
3 For the Reza Shah period, see Appendix II and III.  For the British suggestion that the Shah should 
emulate his father’s atrocities, see TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 19 / 55, FO to Stevens, May 20, 1955. 
4 I am focusing on the clerical opposition, but there were, of course, many other groups involved in 
opposition to the Shah in this period.  These other currents are beyond the scope of the present study. 
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A “Golden Age” 
The existing literature on the clerical opposition n the early 1960s—although valuable in 
many respects—pays insufficient attention to the histor cal processes responsible for the 
transformation in clerical attitudes between 1953 and 1963.  Although a few scholars, 
like Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, have tried to establish historically-grounded 
explanations that treat the clerical opposition of 1963 as the product of larger historical 
processes, this has not been the typical approach.5  Instead, many explain this 
development by resorting to romantic essentialisms about Shi’ism, Great Man narratives 
that focus on the personal influence of figures like Ayatollah Khomeini, or economic 
explanations that focus on the threat that the Shah’s reforms posed for the clergy.   
Scholars who offer economic explanations for 1963 are generally not interested in 
the specific cultural history of the ulama, or the cultural transformations that they were 
experiencing in this period.6  Early Shi’ite nationalism is instead treated as a response to 
the Shah’s economic policies and a symptom of the socio-economic stresses of the 
1960s—one opposition thread among many.  Although this explanation is useful up to a 
point, and these immediate causes are certainly important, they seem to be over-valued.  
Moreover, too strong an emphasis on contemporaneous causes tends to reify the idea that 
                                                      
5 In the conclusion of his pioneering article on anti-Baha’ism, Tavakoli-Targhi insightfully links the 
uprising of 1963 to a clerical turn against the Shah that began with the collapse of the anti-Baha’i pogrom 
of 1955 (Mohammad Tavakkoli-Targhi, “Baha’i-setizi va Islam-gara’i dar Iran,” Iran Nameh vol. 19, no. 
1–2 (2001): pp. 79–124).  In many ways, this study builds on the foundation laid by Tavakoli-Targhi and I 
am indebted to him for his pioneering work. 
6 Ervand Abrahamian is the most prominent neo-Marxist historian of the Pahlavi period.  In his major 
work, on Iranian history between the Constitutional Revolution and the Revolution of 1979, he devotes 
three chapters to the Tudeh party while no chapters are devoted to the ulama or Shi’ism; there is a smll 
sub-section devoted to “clerical opposition (1963-1977),” which occupies just over six of the book’s 561 
pages.  See: Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1982), pp. 281-415, 473-479. 
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Shi’ite nationalism is reactionary and instinctual rather than a discourse that was 
produced, staged, and negotiated over an extended period by reasoned and capable actors.   
Cultural historians, on the other hand, sometimes fall into essentialisms, 
teleology, or both when discussing the political history of the ulama in this period. The 
essentialists, best exemplified by Hamid Algar, see th  ulama as the “natural” voice of 
the nation vis-à-vis the royalist state, against which they are supposedly in constant 
opposition.  In this type of historiography, the ulama are always at the forefront of Iranian 
nationalism’s touchstone moments, perpetually enacti g their role as the culturally 
authentic vanguard leading the struggle against an inauthentic, usurping Court.7   
This approach is, in part, the product of a wider teleology, in which historical 
events are skewed to create the illusion of movement towards the Islamic Revolution.  
This later event overwhelms most narratives to the point that it leads to a false sense of 
inevitability and adds an air of triumphalism to the early stages of the Islamic movement 
that is completely inapplicable to the actual events on the ground.  When one examines 
contemporary sources, instead of triumphalism and inevitability, one encounters among 
the Shi’ite leaders a sense of betrayal, desperation, and an intense desire to just survive in 
the face of the secular, leftist, and radical onslaught.  With the aid of hindsight, it is easy 
                                                      
7 Hamid Algar is the most prominent advocate of the view that the ulama were naturally and consistently 
opposed to the Court.  This position is best expressed in his Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The 
Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) and is further 
outlined in "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran," in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: 
Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500, ed. Nikki Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1972), pp. 231-255.   Algar’s work accepts and promotes the main premises and mythical history of the 
Shi’ite nationalist movement.  He claims that the ulama were the “de facto leaders of the nation” (Religion 
and State in Iran, pp. 87, 137, 203, 216) and that they “came to express and enforce the will of the Iranian 
nation” (p.82).  In this largely apologetic work, the ulama are always at the head of the opposition, 
embodying the national will and representing the natio  vis-à-vis the state.  Over the last thirty years,  
number of studies have discredited the idea that the ulama have maintained an oppositional stance vis-à- i  
the state.  This re-evaluation of Algar’s narrative began with Willem Floor, "The Revolutionary Character 
of the Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality," in Religion and Politics in Iran, ed. Nikki Keddie (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 73-97. 
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to forget the fact that there was a very real fear among the religious classes of being 
relegated to obsolescence.   
It is also a teleological reading of this period that as caused key events like the 
anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955 to be either ignored completely or to be briefly discussed as 
an early clerical victory, a stepping stone in the ulama’s march towards their ultimately 
successful confrontation with the state.  In his main work on this period, Arjomand does 
not mention the anti-Baha’i pogrom.8  Keddie is equally silent in her major study of 
modern Iran.9  Afkhami’s massive biography of the Shah also fails to discuss this 
pogrom.10  Abrahamian ignores the pogrom in his recent history of modern Iran, while in 
his more substantial study of the period he refers tangentially to the pogrom in one 
sentence.11  Chehabi also spends one sentence on the pogrom.12  Ansari allots four 
sentences to the anti-Baha’i pogrom,13  while Fischer devotes a paragraph to the 
episode.14 
There are many factors that have contributed to this silence regarding the 1955 
pogrom.  Some of it can be attributed to difficulty incorporating the episode into the 
standard narrative that leads to the Islamic Revolution, but there is also the taboo against 
discussing the Baha’is (more than tangentially) while writing mainstream Iranian 
                                                      
8 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
9 Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
10 Gholam Reza Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 
11 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and 
Iran between Two Revolutions, p. 421. 
12 Houshang Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under 
the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 133. 
13 Ali Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After (London: Longman, 2003), p. 144. 
14 Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), p. 187. 
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history.15  This taboo has been actively challenged in recent d cades, but many of the key 
works on the Pahlavi period were written in the 1980s, when few were willing to mention 
the Baha’is in Iran, let alone incorporate them into mainstream Iranian history.16  
Akhavi offers the only extended academic treatment of the anti-Baha’i pogrom in 
English.17  In his major study of clergy-state relations in the Pahlavi period, he spends 
about a dozen pages discussing the anti-Baha’i pogrom.  In his view, “Nowhere… does 
the clergy-state relationship articulate itself so sharply as in the issue of the anti-Baha’i 
campaign.”  Despite this assessment, he treats it in isolation, without explaining the 
movement that led up to it or discussing its consequences.  He feels it unnecessary to 
problematize the context and politics behind anti-Baha’ism, acting as if an explanation 
that the religion is a universalist heresy is sufficient context.  In short, although 
acknowledging the occurrence and importance of a major event, he treats it, in 
                                                      
15 For a useful discussion of this taboo, see Ismael Velasco, “Academic Irrelevance or Disciplinary Blind-
Spot?: Middle Eastern Studies and the Baha'i Faith Today,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 35:2 
(Winter 2001): pp. 188-98.   
16 According to Juan Cole, many Iranian historians were noticeably uncomfortable when he openly 
discussed the Baha’is of Iran at an academic confere c  in 1988.  Things have changed since then, to some 
extent.  Discussing the Baha’is in Iran will no longer raise eyebrows in academic circles, but few will go so 
far as to incorporate the Baha’is into their treatments of the mainstream history of Iran.  Some of this 
hesitancy is based on pragmatism rather than prejudic , since writing on the Baha’is could cause one to be 
marked as sympathetic to them, which could lead to problems for those who regularly engage in research 
in Iran (where the Baha’is have been persecuted since the Revolution of 1979).  At UCLA in 1998, for 
example, I heard one professor say that he could not put his name on a petition against the persecution of 
Baha’is in Iran (that was being circulated at the time) because he traveled to Iran regularly and did not want 
to create problems for himself by making his sympathy for the plight of the Baha’is public.  This concern 
with being incorrectly marked as “Baha’i” can also be seen in Houchang Chehabi’s important and brave 
discussions of Baha’i topics, in which he repeatedly feels the need to include footnotes that make it clear to 
the reader that he is not a Baha’i himself (Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), p. 20 n70; and Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice: Reflections on Secular 
anti-Baha’ism in Iran,” in The Baha'is of Iran: Socio-historical Studies, d. Seena Fazel and Dominic 
Brookshaw (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 196 n4).   
17 Recently, Bahram Choubine has written an informed essay on this subject that  is included in the 
appendices of Ahang Rabbani’s edited translation of Choubine’s Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq va Baha’ian 
(Los Angeles: Ketab Corp., 2009). 
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teleological fashion, as an anomaly that is useful only for showing early clerical 
resistance vis-à-vis the state.18   
Besides these sorts of presentist readings of suppoed anomalies like the anti-
Baha’i pogrom, little is said about Court-clergy relations in the late 1950s except that it 
was a period of quietude.  In this interpretation, it was Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi—the 
“passive” leader of the ulama from the late 1940s until his death in 1961—who prevented 
the clerics under him from engaging in politics and e forced quietism.  In this hegemonic 
narrative, it was Borujerdi’s death, in 1961, that freed the ulama to return to the 
oppositional role that they had supposedly played in earlier periods.  Mehrzad Boroujerdi, 
for example, claims that Ayatollah Borujerdi “promoted aloofness from political 
involvement.”19  Keddie basically treats Borujerdi as a nonentity, only mentioning him in 
passing to say that he “was not unfriendly to the sah and his only important anti-regime 
fatwa [binding religious opinion concerning an issue of Islamic law] came in opposition 
to the land-reform proposal of 1960.”20  Arjomand describes him as “apolitical” and an 
advocate of “political quietism.”21  Chehabi describes him as “a scholarly man with no 
political ambitions” who, after the removal of Mosaddeq, “had congratulated the Shah 
upon his return to Iran” and under whom “relations between the Shah’s regime and the 
ulama were courteous and positive in the 1950s.”  This relationship was utterly 
“harmonious” because of Borujerdi’s “lofty indiffernce to politics.”22  Akhavi says that 
Borujerdi “maintained a cool aloofness from political involvement… an aloofness from 
                                                      
18 Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy State Relations in the Pahlavi 
Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 76-90. 
19 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1996), p. 80. 
20 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 146. 
21 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, p. 84. 
22 Chehabi, Iranian Politics, pp. 115, 132-3, 170, 176. 
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which he deviated only at the end of his life over the question of land reform.”  It was his 
practice to “stay out of the public policy arena.”  He was “cozy” with the Court and 
engaged in “cooperation with the state during the 1953-59 period,” which was “a ‘golden 
age’ for them.”23  Abrahamian, likewise, refers to Borujerdi as “a st unch royalist,” “the 
epitome of the archconservative cleric who bolstered th  status quo,” and a “highly 
apolitical cleric” who “claimed to be apolitical but in fact bolstered the royalist regime” 
through “the Ha’eri-Borujerdi tradition of keeping the faithful out of politics.”24  
Abrahamian also explains the “problem” of Khomeini’s quietism in the 1950s by blaming 
the “restraining hand of his patron, Borujerdi, who continued throughout the 1950s to 
give valuable support to the shah.”25  Several others make the same claim.26 
Most of these treatments of Borujerdi are not only brief and tangential, but often 
lack citation and generally seem derivative. When his role is analyzed, it is almost always 
in connection with his supposed restraining influence on Khomeini, who was his student 
and junior colleague in this period.  In 1943, Khomeini had published Kashf al-Asrar 
(Secrets Unveiled), an unsigned tract that is critical of Reza Shah and supposedly 
establishes the early date of Khomeini’s anti-regime credentials.27  In the two decades 
between that unsigned tract and his public attacks on the regime in the 1960s, Khomeini 
generally maintained a “quietist” approach that was supposedly against his revolutionary 
personality.  This “problem” of Khomeini’s quietism is explained by transferring 
                                                      
23 Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 24, 102. 
24 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Revolution (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), pp. 8, 107. 
25 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, p. 425.  A slight variation of the same idea is expr ssed by 
Abrahamian in Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin (London: IB Tauris, 1989), pp. 20-21. 
26 See, for example, Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 412-13; Roy Mottahedeh, The 
Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 244. 
27 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p. 21. 
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responsibility to Ayatollah Borujerdi, who was the supreme marja’-e taqlid (source of 
emulation) in this period.  Due to his religious obligation to follow Borujerdi’s guidance, 
Khomeini is said to have dutifully restrained his desire to oppose the tyranny of the state.  
In other words, Borujerdi loses his historicity and becomes nothing more than a narrative 
device to explain the inconsistencies of Khomeini’s activism.  This approach made its 
way from the hagiographies of Khomeini’s supporters o the early scholarly literature on 
the Revolution.  It has continued to be repeated in derivative literature to the point that it 
is now accepted as obvious that Borujerdi was apolitical, cozy with the shah, and forced 
the ulama out of politics during the period of his leadership.  This is a largely inaccurate 
portrayal of the Borujerdi period, as this study will demonstrate. 
A lot of the problems in the existing literature occur because many of the major 
studies of this period are outdated.  Akhavi has provided the most comprehensive study 
of ulama-state relations in the period between 1953 and 1963, but his study is more than 
thirty years old and—as a result of the limited materi l available at the time—almost all 
of his primary sources for the Borujerdi period areextracts from Ettela’at.  This semi-
official newspaper was censored heavily, and present d a government-approved image of 
ulama-state relations, which accounts for Akhavi’s characterization of this period as a 
“Golden Age.”28  Newly-available and heretofore unexplored archival sources, however, 
completely repudiate this idea.  British archival sources, for example, have extensive 
discussions of how government press agents were able to completely block press 
coverage, domestic and foreign, of major incidents including a massacre of religious 
protestors.29  Events such as this were, of course, not covered in sources subject to 
                                                      
28 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 102. 
29 See Chapter V. 
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governmental oversight, and are only available through archival materials that were not 
available to Akhavi and the other standard treatmens of Iran that emerged in the years 
immediately after 1979. 
In terms of Persian sources, newspapers and magazines from this period are 
problematic, for the reasons discussed above.  The publications of Islamic organizations 
from this period are a more useful resource, however, as they were not as heavily 
censored as the mainstream press.  More recently, important clerics like Hojjat al-Islam 
Falsafi and Grand Ayatollah Montazeri have written memoirs and historians in Iran, like 
Rasul Jafarian, have produced extensive studies of Islamic organizations in this period.30  
Unfortunately, many of the post-Revolutionary productions are not only blatantly 
presentist, but are very vague about certain aspect of the Borujerdi period. 
I update Akhavi’s account by utilizing not only the P rsian sources that were 
published in the years after his study, but also the tremendous amount of British and 
American archival sources that have recently become available for historical research.  
This dissertation draws primarily from these archival documents.  This is mostly because 
my archival material has never been used before, whreas most accessible Persian 
primary sources have already been utilized in other studies.31  This is a preliminary 
intervention, and I am taking a specific approach to the material, but hopefully this study 
will encourage further research and additional sources will be brought to light.  There are 
obvious problems involved in using British and American records to discuss Iranian 
                                                      
30 Ali Davani, ed., Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Inqilab-
e Islami, 2003); Rasul Jafarian, Jaryanha va Sazmanha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi Iran, 1941–1979 (Tehran: 
private printing, 2006); Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Matn-e Kamel-e Khaterat-e Ayatollah Hossein-Ali 
Montazeri (Essen, Germany: Nima, 2001). 
31 The aforementioned articles by Tavakoli-Targhi andBahram Choubine, for example, already cite, quote 
and engage some of the most relevant material available in the Persian-language memoirs.  I offer my own
gloss in Chapter VI. 
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history.  I am aware of these issues and offer several critiques of the material (in Chapters 
II, VI, VII, and VIII).   
 
Nationalism and Religious Nationalism 
I do not offer any new theories on nationalism or religious nationalism, but instead seek 
to apply some of the insights of Anderson, van der Veer, and others to the Iranian case.  
The term “nationalism” first came into circulation in the late 18th century, shortly before 
the French Revolution (1789-99) and the American War of Independence (1775-83), 
which have traditionally served as the enduring models for national reformation, although 
this dating for the “birth” of nationalism has been challenged in recent years.32  At first, 
nationalism was really an umbrella term for a variety of Enlightenment ideas, including 
the theory of “citizenship” and the idea that governments exist to represent the interests 
of their citizens and could be changed by the people if they fail to uphold their rights.  
This was a reversal of the established order, in which subjects were loyal to the rulers of 
empires, who did not, in any way, believe that they w re obliged to uphold the rights of 
citizens, at whose pleasure they served.  Early natio lisms were generally primordialist 
in that they accepted as unproblematic the idea that national identifiers (such as “race” or 
the link between a particular language and a particular “people”) were static and ancient.  
When primordial nationalism was taken to extreme and bloody ends following the 
development of fascism in Europe, and the horrors of the Second World War, nationalism 
took much of the blame and came under heavy criticism.  Most of this criticism has 
                                                      
32 Gorski and Greenfeld, for example, argue that natio l sm emerged several centuries before the French 
Revolution.  See: Philip Gorski, “The Mosaic Movement: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist 
Theories of Nationalism,” American Journal of Sociology, 105:5 (2000): 1428-1468; and Liah Greenfeld, 
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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involved problematizing the supposedly natural and static basis for national identity.  
Most notably, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm have argued that nationalism is both 
socially constructed and the child of modernity, although nations seek to project this 
modern construction as far into the past as possible.33  They maintain that nationalism is 
largely pragmatic and utilitarian, serving other political and economic agendas.   
Benedict Anderson also believes that nationalism is socially constructed, but 
stresses that although nations are imagined, they are not imaginary.  He shifts the debate 
to the method through which the social construction of ations occurred, suggesting that a 
crucial element of this process was the development of “print-capitalism”, i.e. the mass 
production of literature in the vernacular, following the Industrial Revolution, which 
allowed for the common imagination of a shared community.  This argument was 
especially useful for explaining nationalism outside of Europe and America in terms of 
the standardization of culture, as the result of mass printing, instead of trying to clumsily 
impose a European schema to the rest of the world.  His framing of nationalism as a 
concomitant of mass printing explains how it spread in the colonial world in a way that 
does not frame this development in terms of a simple imitation of a Western idea.   
Anderson claims that nationalism involves the imagining of a political community 
that is “both inherently limited and sovereign.”  It is “limited” in that “no nation imagines 
itself coterminous with mankind,” but rather insist that the nation be bounded (although 
in reality boundaries are porous and elastic) and that beyond this boundary there can be 
found other, separate nations.  It is “sovereign” in that it invokes the idea of the nation’s 
                                                      
33 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Eric 
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
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political autonomy and self-determination and rejects the idea of “dynastic” rule by 
divine right.34   
 Religious nationalism has been treated as a marked form of nationalism that is 
distinct not only from unmarked “nationalism” (whic is usually used in connection with 
Europe) but also from other forms of marked nationalism, such as racial nationalism, or 
language-based nationalism.  Religious nationalism has even been referred to as an 
“oxymoron.”35  This attitude is ultimately rooted in a Comtean teleology of “progress” 
that sees the nation-state as the culmination of a process of political development that co-
relates to a process of civilizational development in which religion is superseded 
culturally in the same way that empire is superseded politically.36  This view has been 
discredited by the growth in religious nationalism over the last few decades, most 
dramatically by the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran.37  Nevertheless, 
religious nationalism is still treated as somewhat peculiar and distinct from other forms of 
nationalism.  I try to avoid this particularism.  As Friedland points out, most nationalisms 
are religious and it was the French Revolution, against which all later nationalisms have 
been compared, which was itself the peculiar case and a “world historical exception,” in 
that it “constituted the nation without respect to, indeed in opposition to, religion.”38 
The present study does not offer a new interpretation of religious nationalism.  I 
essentially share van der Veer’s definition and approach, drawing somewhat from the 
work of Friedland and Chatterjee.  Van der Veer sees r ligious nationalism as the 
                                                      
34 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin andSpread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), pp. 1-7. 
35 Roger Friedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,” Annual Review 
of Sociology, vol. 27 (August 2001): pp. 125-152. 
36 Anthony Giddens, Positivism and Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1973), pp. 1-3. 
37 Nikki Keddie, “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative P rspective,” in Iran and the Muslim World: 
Resistance and Revolution, ed. Nikki Keddie, (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 95-111.  
38 Friedland, “Religious Nationalism,” pp. 129-30. 
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discursive re-orientation of cultural forms that had been produced earlier by specific 
historical processes.  Like Anderson, he stresses the idea that national communities are 
both “limited” and “sovereign.”  He also argues, with respect to the communalism 
associated with religious nationalism, that a central element of nationalist solidarity is the 
idea that the nation is always threatened by competing nationalisms and by betrayals 
from within.39  With his focus on the Hindu nationalist movement, he plays special 
attention to the staging of Muslims in India as “national apostates” and argues that the 
construction of Hinduism as a national identity is largely framed in oppositional terms, as 
solidarity against this internal “threat.”40  Partha Chatterjee likewise claims that the 
“history of the nation could accommodate Islam only as a foreign element” and that 
Islamic heritage “remains external to Indian history.”41  Juan Cole has compared the 
majoritarian religious nationalisms of India and Iran and pointed out that Baha’is in Iran 
are positioned as “national apostates” in Iranian Shi’ite nationalism in the same way that 
Muslims are treated in the Hindu nationalist discourse.42  I treat the Iranian Baha’is 
similarly, and make the case that anti-Baha’ism wascrucially important in Shi’ism’s 
imagining of a religio-national political community, both in terms of its “limited” and 
“sovereign” nature, to use Anderson’s terms. 
Like Anderson, I treat nationalism as a “cultural artif ct” and I am mostly 
concerned with the process of imagining national communities.  Like him, I discuss the 
importance of mass printing in the standardization of ideas that were previously scattered 
                                                      
39 Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), pp. 10, 28-9, 134, 193. 
40 Ibid., pp. 10, 43, 123, 134. 
41 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 74, 113.   
42 Juan Cole, "The Baha'i Minority and Nationalism in Contemporary Iran," in Nationalism and Minority 




and of limited reach, leading to the development of a national consensus on certain 
cultural issues.  As part of this study, I discuss the standardization of national (as 
opposed to imperial or traditional) Shi’ism through the (“vernacular”) Islamic press 
operated by Islamic organizations in the post-1941 period, as well as other ways in which 
the Islamic activists’ imaging of “Islamic Iran” became standardized and reified.  The 
most pervasive and unifying current in these publications was the need to come together 
to form a national front in order to take action against the Baha’i minority. 
 
The Baha’i Minority in Iran 
Twelver Shi’ism43 is Iran’s official religion and Shi’ites presently make up approximately 
90% of the population, while about 8% are Sunni Muslims, and about two percent are 
non-Muslim minorities.44  In the early 1950s, there were about15.5 million Shi’ite 
Muslims, 500,000 Sunni Muslims, 200,000 Baha’is, 80,00  Christians, 40,000 Jews, and 
15,000 Zoroastrians.45  Among the non-Muslim minorities, only Judaism, Christianity, 
and Zoroastrianism are recognized by the state and enjoy some constitutional rights, 
while the largest non-Muslim minority in Iran—the Baha’i Faith—has never been 
                                                      
43 For Shi’ism, see: Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi`i Islam (Oxford: George Ronald, 1985); Said 
Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal 
Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) and
(ed.) Authority and Political Culture in Shi' ism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); 
Kamran Scott Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2004); and Wilferd Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of 
the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
44 CIA World Factbook, “Iran,” accessed 12 April 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ir.html; and USDS, “International Religious Freedom Report 2009,” accessed 12 
April 2011, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127347.htm.  The percentage of non-Muslims in Iran
was several times larger in the Borujerdi period, but Iran’s Muslim population has more than tripled since 
then, while minority numbers have remained steady or experienced decline, for a variety of reasons 
(including lower fertility rates and high levels of emigration).  For a useful survey of minority religions in 
Iran, see Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).   




officially recognized and has never received any constitutional protection.  It should be 
noted that although the American assessment of 200,00  Baha’is in the early 1950s 
seems accurate, determining the number of believers in I an is difficult.46   
The Baha’i Faith began in 1863 as an offshoot of the Babi religion (which was 
itself an offshoot of the Shaykhi school of Twelver Shi’ism).  The Babi movement began 
in Shiraz in 1844 when a young man (Sayyed Ali Mohammad, 1819-1850, later known as 
the Bab) claimed to be the bearer of divine knowledge and to be the “Gate” (bab) to the 
mahdi (Shi’ism’s main messianic figure).47  He quickly attracted a number of followers, 
although his early message was rather vague.  By 1848, he openly claimed to be the 
mahdi himself and announced the inauguration of a new religious cycle, featuring an 
entirely new holy book and system of laws.48   
As the Babis increasingly broke with Islam, and some Babis became anxious for 
revolutionary change—while at the same time the Shi’ite clergy increasingly sought to 
suppress the new heresy—hostilities escalated and a number of armed conflicts occurred 
in the late 1840s and early 1850s.49  This threat prompted the Iranian government to join 
forces with the ulama to massacre the Babis involved in the conflicts as well as several 
other Babi leaders, including the Bab himself, who was killed in 1850.  In retaliation, 
                                                      
46 See Appendix I. 
47 For more information on the mahdi, see: Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the 
Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); and Abbas Amanat, 
Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism (London: IB Taurus, 2009). 
48 For the Babi religion (and relevant aspects of Shayk ism), see: Abbas Amanat, Resurrection and 
Renewal: the Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850 (Los Angeles: Kalimat Press, 2005); and 
Denis MacEoin, The Messiah of Shiraz: Studies in Early and Middle Babism (Leiden: Brill, 2009).  The 
latter work is a massive compilation of almost everything that MacEoin has written on the topic. 
49 For the Babi approach to holy war, see MacEoin, The Messiah of Shiraz, pp. 451-493.  For a discussion 
of the most famous Babi-state conflict, see Siyamak Z bihi-Moghaddam, “The Babi-State Conflict at 
Shaykh Tabarsi,” Iranian Studies Vol. 35, No. 1/3 (Winter - Summer, 2002): pp. 87-112. 
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some Babis attempted to assassinate the Shah in 1852.50  When this plot failed, thousands 
of Babis were slaughtered.51  The religion survived underground, however, with several 
prominent Babis living in exile in Ottoman territories.   
The Baha’i Faith emerged gradually in the decades following the bloody 
suppression of its Babi predecessor, when one of the prominent Babis in exile, Mirza 
Husayn Ali (1817-92), refashioned and revived the Babi community, proclaimed himself 
to be a new messenger from God, took the name Baha’u’llah (the “Glory of God”), and 
formed the Baha’i religion from the ashes of the Babi movement.  The Baha’i Faith 
rejected many of the more extreme Babi practices and instead worked peacefully to 
promote a progressive, moderate message centered on the idea of unity and shared 
humanity.52   
The Baha’i Faith—which is also referred to as Baha’ism (although this term is 
disliked by adherents)—promotes the idea that the global processes associated with 
modernity were the symbolic fulfillment of many of the eschatological expectations of 
previous religions, but that the key element of this historic turn was not the end of time 
but rather the beginning of a new cycle of human history in which, for the first time, 
humanity would share a united global homeland.  Baha’u’llah rejected ideas such as ritual 
impurity and holy war and instead promoted world citizenship, democracy, and collective 
                                                      
50 Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 204-218.   
51 For a Baha’i version of Babi history, see Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, ed. and trans., Nabil’s Narrative 
(Wilmette: Baha'i Publishing Trust, 1970).  This work is a sacred narrative by an early believer loosely 
translated into English by the then head of the religion.  It employs elements of hagiography and 
martyrology, which one would expect given the text’s audience and purpose. 
52 For the differences between the two religions and  critique of the ways in which they have been 
conflated, see Denis MacEoin, “From Babism to Baha'ism: Problems of Militancy, Quietism, and 
Conflation in the Construction of a Religion,” Religion vol. 13 (1983): pp. 219-55.   
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security, while also condemning racism and signaling approval of gender equality.53  
Although they were conservative on issues of personal morality (such as alcohol 
consumption, gambling, and sex outside of marriage), Baha’is were very socially 
progressive in other areas, especially in comparison with the social positions of 
mainstream Shi’ism.  For this reason, in Iran it became common to mark progressive or 
liberal social policies or behavior as “Baha’i.”54   
The new religion attracted a significant following in Baha’u’llah’s lifetime, 
initially from among Babis, but later from the wider Iranian society, including significant 
levels of conversion from Jewish and Zoroastrian communities.55  As the Baha’i Faith 
grew in Iran, Baha’u’llah continued his exile in the Ottoman Empire, and was eventually 
sent, as a political prisoner, to a remote prison in Ottoman Palestine (near the city of 
Haifa in present-day Israel).  Following his death, his burial place became a shrine, and 
the remains of the Bab were also smuggled into Palestine and were buried in the same 
area, and also became a shrine.  Although most Baha’is were Iranian in the early period, 
the religion’s headquarters remained in Palestine after Baha’u’llah’s death because of the 
                                                      
53 For Baha’u’llah’s position on social issues, see Juan Cole, Modernity & the Millennium: The Genesis of 
the Baha'i Faith in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).  
For a basic survey of Baha’u’llah’s life, see: Moojan Momen, Baha'u'llah: A Short Biography (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2007).  For Baha’u’llah’s writings, see Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh (Wilmette: 
Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1982); The Kitáb-i-Aqdas: The Most Holy Book. (Wilmette, Illinois: Baha’i 
Publishing Trust, 1993); and The Kitáb-i-Íqán: The Book of Certitude (Wilmette, Illinois: Baha’i 
Publishing Trust, 1982).  For one of the best general surveys of the Baha’i Faith, see Peter Smith, The Babi 
and Baha'i Religions: From Messianic Shi'ism to a World Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987).  For an excellent collection of articles on key aspects of Baha’i history in Iran, see Sna 
Fazel and Dominic Brookshaw (ed.) The Baha'is of Iran: Socio-historical Studies (New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
54 See the discussion of this trope in Negar Mottahede ’s Representing the Unpresentable: Historical 
Images of National Reform from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse 
University Press, 2007) pp. 22-50.  Also see the section on “The hue and cry of Baha’ism” in Appendix III.
55 Juan Cole suggests that there were around 200,000 Baha’is in Iran shortly after Baha’u’llah’s death.  He 
also reports that an internal Baha’i census identifi d about a million individuals who were either members 
of the religion or attended Baha’i gatherings somewhat regularly in the 1920s (Cole, “The Baha’i 
Minority,” pp. 131-32).  For non-Muslim conversions to the Baha’i Faith, see: Fereydun Vahman and 
Mehrdad Amanat’s chapters in Fazel and Brookshaw’s The Baha'is of Iran, and Mehrdad Amanat, Jewish 
Identities in Iran: Resistance and Conversion to Islam and the Baha'i Faith (London: IB Taurus, 2011). 
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presence of the holy shrines in the Haifa area.  Generations later, following the creation 
of Israel, this became problematic for the Baha’is in Iran, since their opponents claimed 
that they were based out of Israel because they were Zionist agents 
Baha’u’llah empowered his son, Abdu’l-Baha (1844-192 ) to lead the Baha’i 
community after his death and to interpret his teachings.  He also envisioned and called 
for the creation of an elected global council (the Universal House of Justice) to lead the 
community, resolve differences, and legislate on matters pertaining to the Baha’i 
community.  This institution was eventually formed in 1963, after there was a large 
enough worldwide community to sustain it.  In the years between Baha’u’llah’s death in 
1892 and the election of the Universal House of Justice, the religion was led by 
Baha’u’llah’s son, Abdu’l-Baha (until his death in 1921), then by his great-grandson, 
Shoghi Effendi Rabbani (until his death in 1957) and, finally, by a group of individuals 
appointed by Shoghi Effendi in the 1957-1963 interregnum.   
The Abdu’l-Baha period witnessed the establishment of s rong Baha’i 
communities in Europe, America, and elsewhere, and was characterized by the 
acceptance of multiple religious identities and a focus on spreading the universal 
principles of the Baha’i religion rather than, necessarily, gaining members in a formal 
sense.56  In the Shoghi Effendi period, the Baha’i community underwent a profound 
                                                      
56 For Abdu’l-Baha’s teachings, see Writings and Utterances of Abdu’l-Baha (New Delhi, India: Baha’i 
Publishing Trust, 2000).  For a sense of Abdu’l-Baha’s personality and leadership style, see Mirza Mahmud 
Zarqani, Mahmud's Diary: Chronicling `Abdu’l-Baha’s Journey to America, trans. Mohi Sobhani (Oxford, 
UK: George Ronald, 1998); and Juliet Thompson, The Diary of Juliet Thompson (Los Angeles: Kalimat 
Press, 1983).  Marzieh Gail has written several important works on the Abdu’l-Baha period, sharing her 
family’s story, see Summon Up Remembrance (Oxford, UK: George Ronald, 1987) and Arches of the Years 
(Oxford, UK: George Ronald, 1991).  For Abdu’l-Baha’s pproach to Islam, see Oliver Scharbrodt, Islam 
and the Baha'i Faith: A Comparative Study of Muhammad 'Abduh and 'Abdul-Baha 'Abbas (New York: 
Routledge, 2011).  For the spread of the Baha’i Faith to America during this period, see Robert Stockman, 
The Baha'i Faith in America: Origins 1892-1900 (Wilmette, IL: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1985) and The 
Baha'i Faith in America, Volume 2: Early Expansion 1900-1912 (Oxford, UK: George Ronald, 1994). 
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transformation.  The focus shifted to community building and numerical and geographic 
expansion by an increasingly regimented membership.  The community gained more 
rigid borders as membership requirements became morstringent and there was a 
tightening of sectarian identity.57  In the 1950s, for example, Iranian Baha’is have related 
that before a planned campaign of intensive growth (from 1953-63) there were “purges” 
and “disciplinary action” in which “backsliders” were pressured to resign.58  The short-
term goal driving everything else was the need to es ablish the Baha’i Faith as an 
independent world religion by demonstrating its separateness from Islam and Christianity 
and by increasing its global reach.   The Universal House of Justice has continued Shoghi 
Effendi’s focus on systematic, quantifiable expansio . 
Despite the Baha’i Faith’s successful global expansion,59 and official recognition 
in almost every country, the Iranian Baha’i community does not now, and has never, 
enjoyed official recognition.  Its outsider status was reified in Iran’s first constitution 
(1906, modified in 1907), which recognizes other non-Muslim minority groups, and 
provides them with certain rights, while not acknowledging the existence of the Baha’i 
Faith.   
There are many reasons why Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism could be 
integrated, while the Baha’is could not, but the most crucial differences between the 
Baha’is and recognized non-Muslim minorities are that t ey are a post-Islamic religion 
                                                      
57 Compare Abdu’l-Baha’s approach, as seen in the citations above, with, for example, Shoghi Effendi’s 
Baha’i Administration (Wilmette, IL: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1974).  For the Shoghi Effendi period in 
general, see Ugo Giachery, Shoghi Effendi – Reflections (Oxford, UK: George Ronald, 1973) and Ruhiyyih 
Rabbani, The Priceless Pearl (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1969). 
58 E. A. Bayne, “Bahais Again: The Larger Question: Speculations on the Significance of the Bahai 
Religious Sect in Iran” (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1955), p. 7. 
59 According to the official website of the worldwide Baha’i community, there are now 5 million Baha’is in 
100,000 localities, including “2,100 indigenous tribes, races, and ethnic groups” (Bahá'í World News 
Service, “Statistics,” accessed 12 April 2011, http://news.bahai.org/media-information/statistics). 
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(and therefore seen as necessarily heretical, sinceIslam—as commonly understood—
does not allow for the possibility of additional pro hets and holy books after 
Mohammad) and that they were actively engaged in seeking converts from the Muslim 
majority, while the recognized minorities did not engage in this type of behavior.60    
Because of the Baha’is’ focus on aggressively seeking converts, they were rightly viewed 
as a threat to Islam’s position of dominance.61  Three decades after Baha’u’llah’s death, 
an internal Baha’i census found that approximately a million Iranians were either 
believers or had attended Baha’i gatherings (out of a population of approximately ten 
million).62  This initial, massive expansion was later constrained by internal and external 
factors, which caused the Baha’i population in Iran to stagnate, but the desire for 
numerical expansion, and efforts in this regard, have been constant, causing many 
Shi’ites to view the Baha’is as a threat to Shi’ite primacy. 
Aside from the threat of proselytization, the Shi’ite ulama, and others, have 
opposed the Baha’is for their anti-clericalism, perceived apostasy, advocacy of a liberal 
social agenda, supposed corruption, and reputation for being the favored local clients of 
foreign powers.63  Because of their apolitical stance and rejection of violence, they were 
                                                      
60 The Christian community in Iran is primarily made up of ethnic Armenians and Assyrians, who have not 
sought to aggressively convert Muslims.  In the modern period, Christian missionaries have attempted to 
convert the Muslim majority and this has caused restrictions on these groups, in response to this behavior, 
which do not apply to the traditional Christian communities in Iran. 
61 Baha’i scriptures forbid members from engaging in “proselytization.”  Baha’is aggressively seek new 
converts, however, and engage in behavior that outside observers consider proselytization.  Baha’is 
maintain that they simply share information with interested individuals, and that this is not proselytization.  
This is a matter of semantics.  Baha’is generally say that proselytization involves coercion or other 
practices that are not necessary elements in most definitions of proselytization, and they then argue against 
this straw man to show that they do not engage in such behavior.  Michael Fischer provides a useful 
discussion of his encounters with Baha’is and their repeated attempts to convert him, despite his lack of 
interest.  See Michael Fischer, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 222-24. 
62 Cole, “The Baha’i Minority,” pp. 131-32. 
63 I discuss some of these issues in more detail in Chapter III and Appendix III. 
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an easy target and were sometimes used as proxies or scapegoats in struggles in which 
they were only peripherally involved, if at all.64   
In the period covered by this study, they were alsotargeted because of their 
numerical expansion and increased public visibility as a result of a major push for 
expansion and recognition during the decade before the religion’s centennial celebration 
in 1963.  This growth in membership and public visibility, coupled with the perceived 
favoritism enjoyed by the Baha’is in the army and civil service, as well as in foreign 
employment, caused the ulama a great deal of worry and led some to advocate pressuring 
the new Shah to redress this perceived imbalance and restore Shi’ite primacy.   
The Iranian constitution at the time (like all earlier and later versions) recognized 
only Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, with the Baha’is having no civil 
existence.  In a sense, this silence implicitly denied their right to exist and blocked their 
access to the rights of their fellow citizens.  At the same time, while the recognized 
minorities enjoyed certain guarantees (like representation in the majles—Iran’s 
parliament), they were legally prevented from holding senior positions and their access to 
positions of power was limited by formal and informal quotas or prohibitions.  Because 
Baha’is had no status, they were not subject to consistent restrictions and could be treated 
worse than recognized minorities on some occasions, while on other occasions they could 
                                                      
64 I am speaking in general when I say that the Baha’is were non-violent and did not fight back against 
aggression.  In the early decades of the religion, there were occasions when some Baha’is fought with and 
occasionally killed members of a rival group (Azalis—i.e. Babis who did not accept Baha’u’llah), and i 
the later Pahlavi period the Baha’is of Sangsar developed a militant reputation, but violence was 
exceedingly rare and was condemned by the Baha’i leadership.  For the origins of anti-Baha’i attitudes, see: 
Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi’s “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamis  in Iran,” Abbas Amanat’s “The Historical 
Roots of the Persecution of Babis and Baha’is in Ira ,” and  Houshang Chehabi’s “Anatomy of Prejudice: 
Reflections on Secular anti-Baha’ism in Iran,” in Fazel and Brookshaw, The Baha’is of Iran; Denis 
MacEoin, A People Apart: The Baha’i Community of Iran in theTwentieth Century (London: School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 1989); Roger Cooper, The Baha'is of Iran (London: Minority Rights Group, 




be treated as indistinguishable from Muslim Iranians d advance to positions of power, 
or be disproportionately represented in certain institutions, in ways that were not possible 
for the recognized non-Muslim minorities.   
The anti-Baha’i movement during the Borujerdi period wanted to remove this 
ambiguity by making it explicit that Baha’is were to have no civil rights or access to 
positions of influence.  This movement considered the nebulous and unquantifiable 
Baha’i “infiltration” of the nation to be an imminet threat to Iran’s continued existence 




The following seven chapters can be divided into three groups.  Chapters II and III 
discuss the Islamic revival that followed the 1941 abdication of Reza Shah.  The removal 
of his “iron fist” led to a period of unparalleled political openness that allowed for the 
proliferation of Islamic societies and organizations and the return of prohibited displays 
of public religiosity (such as wearing the veil or self-cutting during Ashura 
commemorations).65  I explain the changes in governmental and clerical authority that 
allowed for the transformations of this period and explore two Islamic organizations that 
emerged in this period and are important for our purposes (the Brotherhood Party and the 
                                                      
65 The earlier proscription of Islamic dress is discussed in Appendix II.  Religiosity and resistance at Ashura 
is an important recurring theme in this study.  Ashura is the tenth day of the month of Moharram in the 
Islamic calendar.  On this day in 680, Husayn ibn Ali (Mohammad’s grandson and the Third Imam of 
mainstream Shi’ism) was martyred while resisting the tyranny of Yazid, the second caliph of the Umayyad 
period.  Every year, Shi’ites commemorate this tragedy through a number of ritual observances.  Large 
processions are common at Ashura, and these sometimes include individuals who whip or cut themselves to 
re-enact and collectively participate in the suffering of Husayn during his martyrdom at Karbala.  It should 
be noted that the Islamic calendar is lunar, so each year Ashura falls on a different day according to the 
solar calendar.  This also applies to other Islamic observations, such as Ramadan. 
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Feda’iyan-e Islam).  My main argument, which extends over both chapters, is that 
Shi’ism in Iran was being transformed into a n tional religion in this period, at least in 
the literature of the Islamic associations.  Part of this involved the movement to create an 
“Islamic Iran,” to undo the marking of Shi’ism that occurred in the Reza Shah period and 
to instead frame Shi’ism as an unmarked constituent of Iranian national identity.  This 
movement in the Islamic associations, largely driven by lay activists, was vague and 
internally divided about what exactly was involved in “Islamic Iran” and how this was to 
be achieved.  I argue that anti-Baha’ism served as a counter-melody to the staging of 
Shi’ism as an unmarked national identity, providing an issue that united diverse Islamic 
factions and facilitated the mainstream clergy’s adoption of the national and populist 
arguments of the Islamic associations.  As part of this process, scattered local strands of 
anti-Baha’ism and various obscure libels and conspiracies were standardized and 
nationalized through the Islamic publications, which allowed for a reified national 
Islamic discourse on this perceived threat and on the need for national solidarity to 
combat it.  
 The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters explore the anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955 from 
different perspectives.  Chapter IV outlines the main features of the pogrom and explains 
why the government joined with the ulama and the Islamic associations to attack the 
Baha’i minority before being forced to reverse itself under Anglo-American pressure.  
This chapter treats the pogrom, and especially its culmination in the partial destruction of 
the National Baha’i Center, as an object lesson by the Islamic movement, which was 
intended to demonstrate the primacy of Shi’ism in Iran.  Like the destruction of the Babri 
mosque in Ayodhya, this attack on a soft target of the internal Other was a political move 
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meant to convey the “limits” of the religious majority.  Chapter V analyzes the 
consequences of the Anglo-American intervention that forced the Shah to renege on his 
promise to join with the clergy in their anti-Baha’i campaign.  This intervention forced 
the new Shah to choose between his foreign patrons and his supporters among the 
traditional elite.  The resulting vacillation and the complications of this triangular 
relationship are explored, with emphasis placed on how and why Borujerdi failed to 
achieve any of the pogrom’s stated goals.  Borujerdi’s failure and humiliation in this 
episode is compared to the relative success of the Brotherhood Party in its own 
confrontation with the state, and I suggest that there was mounting clerical dissatisfaction 
with Borujerdi’s insistence on working within the established system and acting as a 
loyal opposition.  Chapter VI contrasts the ways in which the pogrom was framed by the 
ulama, the Baha’is, the government, and the British and American diplomats.  I reveal a 
tangle of intersecting authority claims and the use of the same tropes at cross purposes 
across a number of discursive currents.  Especially important is the contrast between the 
Anglo-American and clerical discourse.  In both discourses, the violence against Baha’is 
is staged as natural, primordial, and symptomatic of a need to remove the agitators 
threatening the nation.  In the clerical discourse, it is “the people” that are engaging in 
violence against the Baha’is, and this is framed as a natural, almost reflexive defense of 
the nation against an internal cancer (the Baha’is) that must be extracted if the nation is to 
be healthy and progress.  In the Anglo-American discourse, the Baha’is and the educated 
middle class are “the people” who are being attacked by the clergy, whose violence is 
seen as primordial, and natural.  In this scenario, the ulama were staged as a spreading 
cancer on the nation, whose influence must not be allowed to grow.   
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 Chapters VII and VIII explore the anti-clerical policies and orientation that 
developed in the decade from the end of the anti-Baha’i pogrom in 1955 until 1965, and 
the clerical response to the move against them.  This turn against the clergy, who were 
previously the biggest supporters of the new Shah, w s the result of intense Anglo-
American pressure on their client state to maintain order by disciplining fanaticism.  This 
intervention began to prevent the persecution of the Baha’is, but evolved into an imperial 
micro-management of Iran’s internal religious policy, which resulted in clerical 
alienation from the Shah and the conflation of the regime, the Baha’is, and the Americans 
into the hydra-headed enemy of the “Muslim nation” constituting Iran.  As the Shah 
increasingly targeted the ulama—while simultaneously promoting policies widely read as 
surrendering Iran’s sovereignty to Baha’is and Americans—this lead to the rhetorical 
dismissal of the Shah, the assertion of Shi’ite sovereignty in 1964, and the attempted 
assassination of the Shah in 1965. 
The appendices provide useful information that did not fit into the structure of my 
argument but which provide useful background information.  Appendix I deals with the 
complicated issue of Baha’i numbers in Iran and explains my reasons for estimating that 
there were about a quarter of a million Baha’is in Iran in 1955 (out of a population of 
about 20 million).  Appendix II looks at the Reza Shah period (1921-1941) and pays 
special attention to his policies vis-à-vis Shi’ism and how they related to the regime’s 
nationalization projects, particularly the push for a “national dress.”  I suggest that in this 
period there was a hegemonic elite discourse (in off cial decrees and the government-
controlled press) in which Shi’ism was increasingly marked as “foreign” and the Other to 
Iran’s unmarked national self, which was instead associated with Iran’s pre-Islamic past 
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and post-Islamic future.  This discourse found nominal support beyond the educated elite, 
but was perpetuated by the Shah’s use of violent coerci n, which cowed most of the 
opposition and humiliated the ulama by forcing them to support his policies through 
actions such as bringing their wives, unveiled, to celebrations of state policy.  The 
clerical attempt to recover from the Reza Shah period, by regaining their dignity and 
authority and unmarking Shi’ism, provides the immediate historical background for the 
transformations explored throughout this study.  Finally, Appendix III deals with the 
1924 murder of an American diplomat in Iran after h was (falsely) accused of being a 
Baha’i. This episode was constantly invoked in 1955, and is an important episode in the 
early history of American policy in Iran. 
In Chapter IX, my conclusion, I point out some of the defining features of the 
early Shi’ite nationalist discourse in Iran, including the collective forgetting involved in 
staging the myth of the nation’s birth in the fires of 1963.  Taken together, these chapters 
reveal the historical developments and cultural transformations involved in the imagining 
of the limits of the Shi’ite nation, the historicity of its claims of sovereignty, and its re-
orientation into a nationalist discourse.   






“Reza Shah Must Have Been Spinning in His Grave”: 
Mohammad Reza Shah, Borujerdi,  
and the Clerical Riposte, 1941-1953 
 
 
Reza Shah must have been spinning in his grave at Ry. To see the arrogance and 
effrontery of the Mullahs once again rampant in the holy city!  How the old tyrant 
must despise the weakness of his son, who has allowed these turbulent priests to 
regain so much of their reactionary influence.  In the old man’s day they would 





In the height of the Second World War, Iran was occupied by Allied forces due to 
concerns about Reza Shah’s links to Germany, which were considered serious enough to 
prompt regime change because of Iran’s strategic importance and oil wealth.  The Shah 
was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza, who was only twenty-one 
years old when he assumed the throne in September 1941.  The new Shah wielded no real 
political power and was maintained largely for the sake of continuity.  The relative 
independence of the Reza Shah period was undone by the occupation, and Iran was again 
controlled by the British in the south and by the Russians in the north, just as had 
occurred during the Qajar dynasty that preceded Pahlavi rule.  
                                                      
1 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 127075 / EP1015 / 30, “Notes on Meshed, June 1957.”  For Reza Shah’s religious 
policies, see Appendix II. 
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Even after the end of the War and the occupation, the new Shah remained largely 
a figurehead, with political power centered in the majles (parliament), a condition that 
persisted until the early 1950s.  For the dozen years between 1941 and 1953, Iran 
experienced a period of political openness that conrasted sharply with the royal 
dictatorships that occurred before and after this interregnum.  During this time, there was 
an explosive growth in political parties and associations, on both the Left and the Right.2  
It was also in this period that the new Shah slowly developed a desire to rule Iran 
completely, as his father had done.    
In this chapter, I explore the early rule of the new Shah and its implications for 
Islam in Iran.  I pay special attention to the emergence of Islamic religio-political 
associations and their partnership with the clerical hierarchy in the struggle against 
Communism, a struggle that was patronized by Britain and America because of Iran’s 
strategic importance in the Cold War.  I argue thate removal of Reza Shah’s “iron fist” 
led to a re-discovery of Islam which, at the popular level, took the form of a widespread 
Islamic revival and which, among the new generation of Islamic activists, led to the 
articulation of a nostalgic and utopian reading of Islam as a panacea for the weakness, 
chaos, and poverty of the 1940s.  As this discourse dev loped, “Islam” (i.e. the Usuli 
version of Twelver Shi’ism accepted by most Iranians) i creasingly came to be regarded 
not just as the state religion, but as Iran’s national religion, with Shi’ism being treated as 
an unmarked characteristic of the national self.  This was an absolute reversal of the Reza 
Shah period, in which Shi’ism was very much a marked category.3  The early stages of 
                                                      
2 When I speak of “the Left” in this period, my inte is primarily Tudeh (the largest and most important 
communist organization in Iran at the time), which was formed in 1941.  For more information on Tudeh 
and related groups, see Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, pp. 281-418. 
3 See Appendix II. 
31 
 
this nationalization of Islam are identified in this chapter, but my focus is more on the 
changes to the political environment that allowed this o occur.   The following chapter 
continues the argument and addresses the further dev lopment, and more sophisticated 
expression, of this national reformation of Iranian Islam.  
 
The Islamic Revival 
By the end of Reza Shah’s reign, his marginalization of Islam was beginning to have a 
noticeable, if superficial, effect.  The British military handbook for Reza Shah’s final 
year, for example, noted that despite the tests of the War, “the influence of religion in 
general is tending to decline.”4  After the removal of Reza Shah, however, there was an 
almost immediate revival in religiosity that was widespread and undeniable.  The most 
commonly referred to examples of this trend include previously banned Islamic dress 
becoming a common sight, the return of gender segregation in some locations, and the 
reappearance of ecstatic mourning in Moharram during Ashura processions.5 
The 1944 Moharram observances in Mashhad, for example, were described by 
observers as being the largest since 1930.  Even the February commemoration of the 
death of Imam Hasan (Imam Husayn’s brother) was celebrated at a “pre-Pahlavi” level, 
with shops and cinemas closed for three days and even Soviet troops in the city marching 
in honor of the occasion (under the cover that it also marked a Soviet military 
anniversary).6  This return to extravagant, public expressions of religiosity during the 
large festivals was not an expression of opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah, but was 
rather a collective testing of the waters in which conservative Shi’ites pushed upon the 
                                                      
4 TNAPRO, WO 252 / 827, “Military Handbook for Persia, 1940-41.” 
5 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 49, 800 – “Reactionary trend in religion, 1942”. 
6 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 40184, Mashhad to FO, February 26, 1944. 
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boundaries of what was now acceptable in order to convince themselves that the “iron 
fist” of Reza Shah had indeed been removed from over their head.   
According to the ulama, these types of popular displays of religiosity during 
Moharram were a mandate by the people for a wholesale return to Qajar-era religiosity 
and a rollback of all of Reza Shah’s anti-clerical policies.  As part of this effort to restore 
previous norms, Ayatollah Qomi came to Mashhad from Iraq to lobby Governor-General 
Mansur to return clerical control of all endowments, force veiling, and provide strong 
religious training in government schools.  These cleri al appeals were initially rebuffed 
using the “bogy” of the Russian presence to discourage further insistence.7 
With the conclusion of the War, these large public displays of religiosity began to 
change from spontaneous popular expressions to purposeful political demonstrations.  In 
1945, Ashura commemorations in Tehran, for example, “showed a marked tendency back 
to the days of black religious reaction” since “the demonstrations this year had marked 
political overtones of a rather disturbing nature.”  In the south of the city, when police 
tried to prevent organized demonstrations involving extreme self-flagellation, the crowds 
turned on the police.  In response, officers opened fir  on the Ashura mourners and killed 
four.  Prime Minister Bayat was blamed for having allowed self-flagellation at the last 
minute without also removing the security forces’ orders to use force to prevent this 
practice.  As a result, “bloodshed under such circumstances was almost inevitable.”  The 
British saw this desire for self-mutilation at Ashura as part of a shameful return to 
“savage customs” that was also blamed on the ineptitude of the government.8 
                                                      
7 Ibid., FO 371 / 40184 / E 1981, political situation report, March 29, 1944. 
8 USDS, Iran, 1945-1949, Reel 7: 333. 
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The revival of interest in Islam, partly fueled by nostalgia, influenced the press’s 
attitude vis-à-vis the ulama.  In the Reza Shah period, the mainstream press—at the 
government’s instruction—praised clerics for becoming Western and discarding the 
turban.  In the wake of the post-abdication Islamic revival, however, they were criticized 
for this complicity, and were, for a brief period, scapegoats for the decline in religion.  
The press ridiculed them for having transformed from traditionalists who refused to sit in 
chairs into modern, hat-wearing sippers of champagne.9   
This post-War nostalgia, and the scapegoating of those who had adopted 
Westernized dress, formed the seeds of what Al-e Ahmad later popularized as 
gharbzadegi (“Westoxification”).10  In this early period, however, the concept was more 
rooted in nostalgia than nativism.  Cartoons, for example, sanctified the moral superiority 
of the earlier generation, placing them in heaven, while showing modern Iranians as 
doomed for hell.11  This is not surprising, as many societies experiencing the intersection 
of economic depression and massive urbanization tend to blame their unpleasant situation 
on moral discontinuity with the past, believing that their rejection of tradition and 
aloofness from piety were responsible for the downturn in their fortunes.   
The post-Reza Shah zeitgeist was infused with a sense of profound loss and a 
longing for a more integrated sense of self.  These s ntiments found expression not only 
in the mainstream press but also in the more periphal literature.  In a labor guide, for 
example, readers are edified through the cautionary tale of Maryam Sultan.  This 
traditional woman lived a simple, innocent life in which she was unaware of modern 
culture and was content to learn all she needed to know of the world through her local 
                                                      
9 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 49, 800 – “Reactionary trend in religion, 1942”. 
10 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi (Tehran: Ravaq, 1962). 
11 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 49, 800 – “Reactionary trend in religion, 1942”. 
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cleric.  One day, a Westernized woman teases her by telling her of paradisiacal 
Hollywood images in the cinemas, featuring bare, houri-like women who enjoy lifestyles 
of unimaginable luxury in heavenly palaces, and of images of glamorous women kissing 
men before a “thousand eyes” (i.e. the audience).  Hollywood was, she was told, the 
Qur’anic paradise made tangible and projected in widescreen.  Repulsed, but intrigued, 
Maryam eventually goes to see a Western movie for herself.  Despite having been 
promised fantastical images of heaven and houris of paradise, all she sees is hellfire and 
damnation writ large.  She goes home only to have her husband beat her for her 
experimentation with modernity.  Shamed, she finds herself in the unenviable position of 
being repulsed by the gloss of the new world, but too shamed and embarrassed to return 
to her old religious gatherings.  She is left in the anguish of perpetual liminality, like 
many of her generation.12   
Unlike the confusion and liminality felt by many, the ulama were unambiguous in 
their approval of the abdication of Reza Shah and in their embrace of the opportunities 
that it brought.   The change in political leadership was a new beginning for the Shi’ite 
clergy, who had been forced off the national stage under Reza Shah.  As Jafarian puts it, 
“The devout were even more joyous at the departure of Reza Shah than the rest of the 
population, beating on the drums of jubilation… It was as if they were a bird that had 
been freed from its cage and was again taking to flight.”13 
Ahmad Kasravi expresses the same idea from the perspective of a secular 
intellectual witnessing firsthand the reversals of the Reza Shah period:  
                                                      
12 USDS, Iran, 1950-1954, Reel 44: 90-92. 
13 Jafarian, Jaryanha va Sazmanha, p. 23.  
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Those [clerics] who had been dressing in [the Western clothing that Reza Shah 
imposed on Iran] reverted to wearing their previous turban and cloak.  Those who 
had previously slithered back into their holes now crept into the open to yet again 
rage against secular law, science, and all beneficial things.  Once more, a new 
brood of mullahs—primed for leaching and parasitism—emerged in the 
desolation.14 
Within two years of the abdication, this trend was becoming alarming to British 
observers, who shared Kasravi’s apprehension and felt that this “religious revival” must 
be opposed because it threatened to retard Reza Shah’s modernizing trajectory.  In their 
view, “Iran must not be allowed again to take the veil.  Religion was alright to the extent 
that it gave the people a moral basis for their lives, but it must not be allowed to interfere 
with progress.”15 
 American observers were less concerned than the British by the Islamic revival at 
first, but, by 1948, they were perturbed by some aspects of the trend.  Revival alone was 
considered innocuous, although “primitive,” and even scattered assaults on unveiled 
women and on stores that did not close for Ramadan were considered “not serious.”  The 
Americans were, however, “seriously disturbed” by the political activities of the clergy, 
which had reached the point that “very modernized” in ividuals, like the Minister of 
Education, felt the political need to “bow” before the clergy to the extent of ordering that 
all public school teachers “take pupils to Mosque once every day, girls in veils, for 
prayers.”16   
The Minister of Education, Dr. Siassi, agreed to this demand for public religiosity 
after he was repeatedly attacked by political rivals over the lack of religious education, as 
a part of their attempt to win over the traditionalists.  The situation came to a head when, 
                                                      
14 Kasravi, Dadgah (Tehran: Ketabfurushi-ye Paaydar, 1957), p. 55.  
15 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1426 / G 500 /22 / 43, Secret Minutes, July 2, 1943. 
16 USDS, Iran, 1945-1949, Reel 7: 338. 
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while addressing the majles on April 24, 1948, Dr. Siassi made the mistake of sharing his 
views against compulsory Shi’ite religious training i  schools, on the grounds “that since 
there are many Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians among the student body, it would be 
unfair to force any [one] religion upon these students.”  These comments caused 
conservative deputies to denounce the Minister, saying: “Be quiet, you idiot… This is a 
Moslem country!”  One deputy denounced him as “an infidel, a son of a dog, a whoreson, 
and an atheist.”  Ayatollah Behbahani and his associates walked out in protest, followed 
by the speaker of the majles.  These comments eventually resulted in the Minister’s 
removal from office as a result of clerical pressure.17   
This episode and the larger phenomenon of the political courting of the ulama led 
to an increase in their prestige.  “The strength of the mullahs,” it was felt, “appears to be 
growing steadily, if not obviously, and as far as one can see, both the Shah and the 
officials seem to be anxious to obtain and keep their support.”18  The Shah, for example, 
made a regular show of worshipping at the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad.  In this 
same city, the Governor-General “has started a purity campaign to clean up the holy city, 
and has given a favourable ear to requests from the religious elements to restrict the sale 
of liquor and increase religious teaching in the schools.”19  It was as a result of this entry 
by the ulama into the political realm that Islamic education was reintroduced to public 
schools in 1948 for the first time since its removal by Reza Shah.20 
From the American perspective, this political pandering was the result of the 
“severe nervous strain Iranians have been under due to Soviet threats.”  Because of Iran’s 
                                                      
17 Ibid., 345. 
18 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 75462 / E8602, Mashhad consular report, July 1, 1949. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism,” p. 201. 
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precarious position as a Cold War battlefield, “reactionary mullahs have taken advantage 
of the situation to appeal for a return to strict Moslem ways.  Since there is no well 
developed natural patriotism in Iran, Iranians find refuge in religion under tension, when 
in other countries people would rally around the flag.”21  Although this is a biased 
oversimplification, it points out a fundamental problem with the Shah-centered 
nationalism promoted by Reza Shah.22  The former shah had been removed before he 
could successfully routinize his charisma or otherwise establish his son a viable heir.  In 
the post-1941 political context, a Shah-centered natio lism had little relevance, with 
Iran still largely under foreign control and the new shah merely a figurehead with no 
political base.  With the irrelevance of Shah-centered nationalism, and the harsh 
suppression of regional separatist movements after the War, Islam served as a patriotic 
rallying point in the absence of a strong, unifying center.  That is not to say, however, 
that this was “natural” or that this unifying role was, in any way, an exclusive 
characteristic of Islam.  The Marxist ideals of Tudeh (Iran’s Communist party) provided a 
similar unifying function and, when a strong political center did emerge with Prime 
Minister Mosaddeq’s leadership of the oil nationaliz t on movement, Iranians from the 
Right and the Left were able to (temporarily) rally around him politically, regardless of 
religious identity.23  
A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP 
Before proceeding further, some attention must be paid to the changes in clerical and 
political leadership that occurred following the abdication of Reza Shah.  The following 
                                                      
21 USDS, Iran, 1945-1949, Reel 7: 338. 
22 See Appendix II. 
23 For more information on the Mosaddeq period, see: Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, ed., 
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004); 
Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990); and 
Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions. 
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sections address the first decade of the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah and the 
contemporary rise of Hossein Borujerdi to the positi n of Shi’ism’s universal marja’ (the 
highest rank of religious authority).  This is followed by a discussion of the Cold War 
context of Islamic activism.  Once this context is established, I discuss the emergence of 
the activist Islamic associations of the 1940s and the push for a united Islamic front. 
 
“I am not a dictator” 
 [Reza Shah] had little patience with his son, a sickly lad given to daydreaming.  
One time, the old man came upon the boy standing beside a palace pool.  The 
father asked the boy what he was doing.  “Thinking,” replied the crown prince, 
whereupon his father uttered a roaring curse and kicked his heir into the pool.24 
Reza Shah was rarely happy with his son and despised h  weakness and lack of 
nerve.  He saw himself reflected more in his daughter Ashraf, who was loud, vivacious, 
and quick to violence against those who were unfortunate enough to displease her.  He 
was known to often complain, “It’s too bad she was not the boy.” 25  Unlike his brave 
sister, Mohammad Reza was terrified by his father, who would physically and verbally 
abuse him.  Even as an older teenager he still reportedly returned from meetings with his 
father “trembling, with perspiration dripping down his face.”26   
From the age of twelve, Mohammad Reza was educated at the Institut le Rosey 
boarding school in Rolle, Switzerland, in part to compensate for his father’s lifelong 
embarrassment at his lack of a formal education.  It was this same embarrassment, 
however, which resulted in the young heir being yanked back to Iran in 1935 after he got 
into a fight with an American student who had made fun of his father’s reported 
                                                      
24 Anderson and Whitten, "CIA Study Finds Shah Insecur ," Washington Post, July 11, 1975. 
25 Ibid. 
26 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 11: 102. 
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illiteracy.27  Mohammad Reza was pleased to return to Iran, since he had been utterly 
miserable in his boarding school.  “My friends were having fun,” he later reminisced, 
“laughing and dancing while I was sitting alone in my room... I had a radio and 
gramophone to keep me company, but what fun were they compared with the 
festivities my friends enjoyed.”28 
According to his close friend, Asadollah Alam, Mohammad Reza thought that, 
due to his trauma in boarding school, “he may have grown up with some sort of 
complex.”29  While at boarding school, he was strictly monitored by his tutor, Dr. Nafici, 
was allowed no social life, and had no friends except for Ernest Perron.  Perron was the 
son of a gardener and ten years older than the prince.  Mohammad Reza insisted on 
bringing Perron with him when he returned to Iran, d he stayed extremely close to 
Perron for nearly two decades.30  Perron’s long-term, intimate relationship with the Shah 
was a subject of controversy, as he was “decidedly homosexual.”31  Queen Soraya later 
recalled angrily that this "Persian Rasputin,” who "was as slippery as an eel," played a 
"sinister role" in the Court.  The nature of his relationship with the Shah was kept so 
private that Soraya related that "even I, as Empress, never really managed to unravel this 
man's relationship with the Shah."  She notes that Perron "visited him [the Shah] each 
morning in his bedroom,” ostensibly to discuss busine s.32   
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 After his return to Iran, Mohammad Reza was pampered and given a military 
education that was superficial at best.  Because of the ear and deference shown to the 
Shah, the crown prince was pampered and above critique.  He, for example, received the 
highest marks in his secondary school exams despite being described as having average 
intelligence.33  This environment cultivated in Mohammad Reza an inflated sense of self 
and a false confidence in the breadth of his knowledge and skills.  This can be seen in the 
Shah’s pride in his ability as a pilot, despite his evident lack of ability and a crash that 
was due to rank incompetence.34 
No one was confident in Mohammad Reza’s ability to lead after his father.  Even 
before anyone contemplated an Allied invasion, there was a great deal of anxiety over 
Reza Shah’s health and what his death would mean for Iran.  It was felt that the crown 
prince was out of touch with Iran and not prepared to rule.  When the abdication came, 
this lack of confidence could be seen, for example, in the outgoing Shah’s last advice to 
Ashraf and the new Shah.  He instructed his favorite child, Ashraf, to look after her twin 
brother and make sure he did not fail, while he told Mohammad Reza to “fear nothing,” 
i.e. to toughen up.35 
After becoming shah, Mohammad Reza kept a low profile and left important 
decisions to foreign advisors and elder statesmen such as Hossein Ala.  He transferred 
many royal possessions back to the state and acquies ed to the pressure he was under to 
stay out of the way of the politicians and play the rol  of a constitutional monarch.  The 
constitution of 1906 favors the majles (parliament) over the Shah and, although largely 
sidelined by Reza Shah, after 1941 the majles was gradually revived as a real centre of 
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power in Iran.  While others saw to affairs of state, the Shah spent his days “riding 
horses, flying planes, speeding around in fast cars, and chasing women.”  In this period, 
he was described as having “a weak, retiring personality” combined with “an enormous 
inferiority complex.”  His effete reputation at the time was such that, when his appendix 
was removed, it was joked that “now the Shah has no guts at all.”36   
The Shah’s laissez-faire attitude towards politics infuriated his family, who knew 
that their collective fortunes as a royal dynasty were linked to the fate of their new 
patriarch.  He was, therefore, “constantly harassed by his mother and Princess Ashraf to 
assert himself in the tradition of his father.”  Those aware of what was happening behind 
palace walls note that the Queen Mother “is aggressiv , assertive and… is constantly 
telling the Shah how far short he falls of filling the shoes of his late father; how much 
better his brother Ali could do things.”  She was “everlastingly egging him on to assert 
himself and his imperial prerogatives.”  The Shah’s first wife was also highly critical of 
him, leading the Iranian press to blame “female domination” for his weakness and to ask, 
“How can a man who fails to manage his wife be expected to manage the country?”37   
His brothers were also critical. When a radical Islamic group (the Feda’iyan-e 
Islam) assassinated the Minister of Court in 1949, for example, Prince Abdul-Reza, 
called on the Shah to “crush reactionary religious elements as did Reza Shah.”   The 
prince believed that the assassination was an ideal excuse for the return of their father’s 
much-vaunted “iron fist,” and that crushing the ulama was a prerequisite for Iran’s 
progress, but that his brother was too weak to do what needed to be done.38 
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In 1942, only months after Reza Shah’s abdication, he British expressed doubt 
about how much support they should place behind the new shah: 
We backed the last shah through thick and thin and the results were not good.  
Reza took advantage of our complete acquiescence in one-man rule, with the 
result that for many years we were entirely out of contact with the Persian 
Government, because he refused to see us.  The more we cultivate royalty now, 
the more we risk sliding back to that unfortunate state of affairs.39 
By 1943, after having more than a year to observe the Shah, the British expressed 
misgivings about whether or not Mohammad Reza should be retained in any capacity 
whatsoever.  He was seen to be mentally unstable, vacillating, stubborn, and suffering the 
same obsession with keeping up with Turkey that hounded his father.  It was felt that he 
should be prevented from assuming dictatorial control for some time because of his youth 
and unstable personality. 40  The Shah himself was not opposed to this relegation to a 
constitutional role, saying: 
I am not a dictator.  I am fundamentally and absolutely a democrat.  I would 
sooner be a private citizen than shah of an unhappy Iran.  If I could find a noble-
souled, pure-minded, patriotic Persian who could take care of this unfortunate 
realm I would gladly stand down and make my way for him.41 
This half-hearted desire to abdicate (qualified by what he saw as an impossible 
condition) was not altogether surprising.  The account below, from his school years, also 
reveals his desire to be free of the weight of what w s expected of him: 
In the wilderness years of his youth, the Shah once ask d friends at a party what 
profession each of them wished they could pursue. Th  replies where ribald and 
amusing until it came to the Shah's turn. Had he not been a king, he said, he 
would have liked to be public servant, earning enough money to indulge his 
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passion for sports. He then went on to make a significa t remark, one that runs 
true to form: he would prefer a job that spared himfrom the burden of decision-
making.42 
After the conclusion of the War, although he was approaching thirty, the Shah 
was described as an adult child who, despite ostensibly ruling Iran, was limited by 
curfews, and clearly saw his American “advisors” as his new parental figures.  British 
observers noted that he was treated “rather like a naughty though privileged child.”43  He 
complained bitterly to them of his curfew and whined that in Egypt his counterpart 
Farouk was able to go to nightclubs until all hours and it was unfair that he could not do 
the same.44   
This youthful energy was, in part, diverted to his great enthusiasm for flying.  A 
major who flew with the Shah angrily relayed that, despite nominal hours of training, the 
Shah imagined himself skilled and no one dared contradict him, although he is 
“exceedingly reckless and is by no means a good pilot.”  On one occasion, the Shah “cut 
his face badly” in a “bumpy landing” (i.e. crash) but, rather than admit this failure, he 
told American contacts that he acquired the injuries from accidentally running into a 
door.  Despite this incident, his enthusiasm was not dampened in the slightest and he 
grew annoyed when diplomats came up with any excuse available not to accompany him 
on his flights.45 
He devoted so much time to diversions and so littleatt ntion to affairs of state, 
that it was observed that the Shah had basically abandoned politics and  
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As far as I can tell from the short time I have been h re, the Shah cuts little ice 
nowadays.  If he does not live like a monk, his life is a very retiring one, and he 
seems to have more or less thrown in the sponge.  This is a great pity.  The idea of 
Kingship still cuts a great deal of ice in this backward and, in parts, still feudally 
minded, country.  The best form of insurance against violent revolution would be 
for the throne to be a central pillar around which reform and progress could 
slowly and more surely be built up, a rallying point for patriotic elements and a 
more titular head to which the Army could look.  The trouble is that this well-
educated, pleasant mannered and good intentioned youth will not be consistent or 
courageous enough to exert his influence where the xertion of it is both 
constitutional and expedient.46 
The author of the report notes that the Shah “was obviously worrying about his 
future” and that he tried to remove the young Shah’s “defeatist ideas about the end of all 
regimes of Constitutional Monarchy” by reminding him that it still persisted in Greece 
and elsewhere.  The Shah replied that it  
was almost impossible to be a constitutional ruler in this country.  I said that a 
dictatorship was impossible.  He agreed, but the people here were funny and 
would expect action of some sort.  I said that to hide in his palace was the worst 
sort of inaction.47 
The Shah ignored this counsel and continued to isolate himself in his palaces and 
largely avoided the social and official interactions expected of his position.  It was felt 
that he was excessively timid and that he had allowed the institution that his father had 
built to be reduced to a relatively insignificant iermediary between the interests of an 
ambitious Prime Minister and a “vindictive and domineering mother.”48   In the view of 
the British, “Persians like to be led: and they prefer a strong bad leader to a weak good 
one,” but no one believed that the Shah had the strength required to lead Iran.49   
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By 1948, however, the Shah grew depressed and unsatisfied remaining on the 
political periphery and began to want to take a more active role.  He tried to share his 
military insights with his American advisors, but was mocked behind his back and 
considered a clueless dolt.  His desire to gain a more active role in managing Iran was 
noted, but dismissed.50  The American ambassador thought that the Shah was hopelessly 
sad and lonely and prone to imagine into existence ven more problems than he already 
had.  To this end, it was hoped that the Shah’s planned 1949 visit to America would 
prove be a useful tool to re-impress upon him the ne d for constancy, since “It will be 
most important to keep the Shah on the beam.”  
It must be remembered that he was unhappily married to a most beautiful woman.  
His life is extraordinarily solitary; in addition he is a hypochondriac; as nouveau 
royal, he has immured himself and the entire royal family into strict court protocol 
and within his family, relations are not too happy.  This is not unusual in Asiatic 
dynasties, whether new or old…The Shah himself is weak, frustrated, suspicious, 
lonely and proud; a young man who lives in the shadow of his father… The 
attitude and actions of the Shah are dominated by an egocentric concentration on 
his own position and the preservation of the dynasty.  He jealously seeks power; 
so far he has manifested no capacity to exercise it n a constructive manner… A 
strong man technique might not be altogether bad at this stage of the game were 
the Shah really strong.  Unfortunately he lacks the ability to lead.  Moreover, he 
appears to be an extremely bad judge of men.  Most important of all, he has no 
conception of how to be an executive.51 
The Shah was described as unflappably paranoid that he would either be replaced 
by his foreign patrons or die through assassination or illness.  He was “very worried 
about his health” and it was anticipated that, due to his hypochondria, while in America 
he would require a complete check up and “perhaps an operation,” which he did not 
really need.52  Thirty years later, the Shah would fall victim to the ravages of cancer, but 
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for decades he had been so paranoid over conditions and threats that were in his own 
head that this led outside observers to slowly become numb to such rumors and to ascribe 
them to the Shah’s penchant for the dramatic.    
This hypochondria was not new.  As a child the Shah w s inexplicably sick very 
often.  He later credited divine intervention with healing him for an important fate.  The 
Hand of God was also credited for saving him at several other crucial moments later in 
life.  When he fell, but luckily avoided smashing his ead on a rock, in his mind it was 
God’s doing.  When he survived a plane crash, and numerous assassination attempts, it 
was all perceived as due to divine intervention.53  His narcissism was so deep that not 
only did he believe that God singled him out for a great destiny, but he also felt that God 
was in constant communication with him and guided him.  Much later, he claimed that he 
was not “entirely alone” since 
… a force others can't perceive accompanies me. My mystical force. Moreover, I 
receive messages. I have lived with God beside me sinc I was 5 years old. Since, 
that is, God sent me those visions... You don't believ  in God and you don't 
believe in me. Lots of people don't. Even my father didn't believe me. He never 
did and laughed about it.54 
 This exaggerated sense of self and narcissistic view of reality was mixed with self-
hatred and a pronounced lack of self-esteem, which led to a fractured sense of self.  He 
saw his public persona as a separate character from himself, a role that he played.  Close 
friends have reported that when the Shah assumed his public face it was like he was doing 
an impersonation, with even his posture and gait trnsforming to play the role he had been 
raised to play.  Despite the successful portrayal of this public character, in private the Shah 
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was constantly haunted by ghostly memories of his father—“awesome and 
frightening”55—laughing at his failures and weakness.  He was caught in the predicament 
of needing to prove his father’s assessment of him wrong despite having internalized the 
belief that his father was actually correct about him.   
The desire to live up to his idealized father was fru trated not only by his personal 
insecurities, but by the inherent contradiction of what was expected of him.  His father 
desired that he be European in education, manners, and thought, while at the same time 
possessing the rugged strength and characteristics of leadership that Reza Shah had 
achieved through his military background.  This was made all the more impracticable 
given that Mohammad Reza’s European socialization privileged democracy and 
liberalism and portrayed his father’s political style as brutish and despotic.  As a result, 
the Shah spent his life trying to prove to his father that he could follow in his footsteps, 
while simultaneously trying to convince his foreign father figures that he was nothing 
like his father.  The two projects were, of course, mutually defeating.  
This fundamental conflict can be seen in the following conversation with a British 
representative.  At first, the Shah claims that he has “no desire, nor capacity, to imitate 
his [father’s] methods” as he “hated dictatorship and government by violence was alien to 
his nature,” and was not even an option, as “he could never pretend to be something 
which he was not.”  Despite these liberal sentiments, la er in the same conversation he 
angrily defended his father’s methods, claiming that “if he had occasionally kicked 
                                                      




people with his jack boot that was because it would have been impossible otherwise to 
get anything effectively done in this country.”56 
The American ambassador to Iran, while briefing Presid nt Truman on the Shah 
before his visit, highlighted the conflict between trying to emulate his “brute,” “illiterate” 
father while also living up to the Western expectation hat he would be a “liberal 
monarch.”  In the ambassador’s analysis, it was noted that although, for the most part, the 
Shah “has become more European than Eastern,” he could n t relate to people from 
either group, always felt “terribly alone,” and “ison the whole extremely serious… [and 
suffers] from an inferiority complex.” 
He is filled with many complexes, which is entirely understandable… He, in some 
curious Freudian way, is dedicated to the vindication of his father’s memory.  His 
mother constantly irritates his sensibilities by insisting to him that he falls far 
short of filling his late father’s shoes; that in comparison he is a weakling.57 
In this American assessment, the Shah is categorized according to an Orientalist 
binary, consisting of the effete ruler and the savage despot.58  The new, “weakling” Shah 
is placed in the first category, while his father is placed in the latter category, and 
described as a “ruthless” and “cruel” despot who, with “ruthlessness and singleness of 
purpose,” overthrew the effeminate final Qajar rule who preceded him.    
The report further observes that while Reza Shah tried o instill his personality in 
his son, all Mohammad Reza inherited was a “predilection for grandiose plans, 
extravagant speeches, and fine facades with little genuine understanding or interest in the 
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factors which constitute and maintain firm foundations,” as well as “the exaggerated 
Iranian sensitivity to criticism or unfavorable comparison.”59   
In 1949—as the Shah showed increasing interest in playing a larger role in 
leading Iran militarily—he was reported to be “extremely touchy” about the denial of 
high-end military aid and the general American positi n that, in the event of a Soviet 
invasion, Iran could not defend itself and would have to be allowed to fall, to be liberated 
later by Western forces.  The Shah, to American amuse ent, considered himself a master 
military strategist and repeatedly pressed the casethat, if he was given enough military 
aid, Iran could hold back the Soviets through a strtegy he personally devised, making 
use of mountain cover and guerrilla warfare.  The Truman administration’s position was 
that, since Iran could not realistically defend itself from a Soviet assault, the best option 
in Iran was not military but political and economic, encouraging reforms that would drain 
the pool of popular support for the Communist alternative.  Given the resoluteness of 
Truman’s position, the Shah insisted that he still needed heavy-duty military weapons 
since, even if the focus was on reform not defense, “th  maintenance of internal security 
must precede steps toward economic and social developm nt.”60   
Truman was advised to simply listen quietly and not respond whenever the Shah 
pressed his military strategies and theories.  For, “The Shah considers himself a qualified 
strategist and tactician and would be mortally offend d if he were to be bluntly 
contradicted in a matter of opinion on military matters.” It was also suggested that, since 
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the desire for the latest tanks “amounts to an obsession with the Shah,” if possible, “it 
may be desirable to let him have some for political re sons alone.”61 
The Shah’s desire for a strong army had very little to do with the Soviets and was, 
instead, a continuation of his father’s rivalry with Turkey.  Like his father, he wanted to 
keep up with his neighbors but, unlike his father, he was motivated more by fear rather 
than envy.  It was reported that the Shah “has a strange notion that Turkey constitutes a 
menace to Iran.”  He claimed that the Soviet threat would eventually fade and Turkey 
would then use its superior Cold War armaments to invade Iran.62   
When pressed to carry out reforms as part of the aforementioned plan to weaken 
the appeal of Communism, the Shah claimed that he lacked the power to enact reforms 
from above, without concern for the majles, as his father had done.  He felt that he would 
need autocratic control in order to carry out the de p restructuring of society that Truman 
desired.63   
At the end of the 1940s, the Shah’s itch to increase hi  role in leading Iran could 
also be seen in his initial efforts to replace or discipline the old elite, from the Reza Shah 
period, who looked down on him and referred to him derisively as “that boy.”64  Starting 
in 1947, the Shah sought to purge this disrespectful old guard from the military and 
government.  He was encouraged in this by a new generation of ambitious politicians, 
like General Razmara, who “played upon the Shah’s desire” for affirmation by lauding 
his military strategies and ambitions.65  By manipulating and shaping the Shah’s vague 
desire for a bigger and better army, Razmara was able to facilitate his own ascent while 
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shunting the old Cossack elite who could or would not play a sycophantic role before the 
young Shah.  He rose to become the Shah’s muscle and his right-hand man, while all the 
while secretly harboring the ambition “to be THE strong man” in Iran.66  The Shah’s 
Minister of Court (Hazhir) performed a similar role on the civilian side, rooting out the 
old guard who were not loyal to the Shah.   
These processes accelerated following the attempted assassination of the Shah in 
early 1949.  This incident was used by the Shah as an excuse to expand his powers vis-à-
vis the majles—and to enhance the importance of his patronage—by establishing a 
second house of parliament in which he appointed members, and by reclaiming the royal 
prerogative to dissolve parliament.  His “miraculous” survival of the assassination 
attempt was also taken by the Shah as a sign from Gd that he was chosen for a great 
destiny.67  This fed into his narcissism and seems to have allowed him to overcome his 
fear that death was imminent.  As the Shah began to gle for more power, this was 
described as like “a child holding a 6-chamber revolver.”68   
 
Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi 
In this period, the Shi’ite clerical hierarchy was based in Qom under the leadership of 
Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi (1875-1961).  Traditionally, Iraq had been the center of 
Shi’ite scholarship, but Qom became an important ceer of learning due to the efforts of 
Grand Ayatollah Ha’eri-Yazdi (1859-1937).  After his death in 1937, Borujerdi was able 
to revive the importance of Qom’s hawza (Shi’ite seminary) in the post-War period.  
When Grand Ayatollah Isfahani died in Najaf in 1946, Borujerdi became Shi’ism’s 
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preeminent marja’ (source of religious authority to be emulated) andhe maintained this 
position virtually unchallenged until his death in 1961.  No one since Borujerdi—
Khomeini included—has been able to become a “universal” marja’.69  
Despite his authority, Borujerdi was sickly, elderly (he did not become the most 
important leader of the Shi’ite world until he was in his seventies), and generally 
incapable of travel or extended exertion.  In this early period, he maintained the 
methodology of Grand Ayatollah Haeri, who had soured on politics during the 
Constitutional Revolution and was willing to work with various regimes, having met with 
both Ahmad Shah Qajar and Reza Khan.  Unlike Ha’eri, Borujerdi’s “quietism” was 
more pragmatic than ideological.  Earlier in his life, Borujerdi had been involved in 
clerical opposition to Reza Shah over the issue of conscription of religious students.  He 
protested against Reza Shah from the safety of Iraq, and was imprisoned for this for 
several months upon his return to Iran.  There is little doubt of his opposition to Reza 
Shah, but his period of leadership began after Reza Shah’s death, when the new Shah was 
a mere youth who had little role in directing the state.  It is therefore not surprising that 
Borujerdi had little initial opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah, especially in light of the 
new Shah’s rejection of his father’s religious policies, and the more pressing issue of the 
Communist threat.   
Borujerdi and his generation were not opposed to monarchy in general, just Reza 
Shah in particular, due to his religious policies.  No prominent cleric in this period 
opposed monarchy in general, despite the widespread vitriol for Reza Shah and his 
policies.  It is impossible to overstate how much Khomeini’s later proclamation that 
Islam and monarchy are incompatible runs counter to Shi’ite tradition over the last few 
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hundred years.70  Due to the tendency to see the Court-clergy dynamic of earlier periods 
in light of later, post-Khomeini norms, there has been a false desire to bifurcate earlier 
generations of clerics and label them as either “revolutionary” (proto-Khomeinists) or 
“quietist” (enablers of royalist rule).  This is a false and ahistorical dichotomy.   
Borujerdi was politically involved and looked after the clergy’s corporate 
interests, which were generally in concert with those f the Shah in the early period of his 
leadership, but which became increasingly out of synch in the final years of Borujerdi’s 
life.  This exercise of agency in response to changing circumstances should not be 
mistakenly simplified into collaboration or a pro-Shah orientation.  Later, when 
Mohammad Reza Shah turned against the clergy, after 1955, Borujerdi had little 
compunction about opposing Mohammad Reza as he had opposed his father.71  Before 
this time, however, the Shah did nothing to provoke a lasting break with Borujerdi and, 
rather, was his ally against the Left.  The only serious altercation with Mohammad Reza 
Shah before 1955 occurred in 1950, when Reza Shah’s embalmed body was paraded 
around the holy shrine in Qom before going to Tehran.  In opposition to this, Borujerdi 
sanctioned a series of demonstrations and temporarily left for Iraq in protest.72 
This personal action was unusual, as Borujerdi usually acted politically through 
representatives such as Ayatollah Behbahani.  As Borujerdi’s political face, Ayatollah 
Behbahani “controlled a clerical-political machine i  Tehran that… was a power in 
Tehran politics and elections.”  At his height, Behba ani had up to fifteen majles deputies 
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acting as his representatives, but during the Mosaddeq period his position was threatened 
by Ayatollah Kashani’s ambitions as well as by Prime Minister Mosaddeq himself, “who 
refused to give him the kickbacks on government conracts and the influence in 
Parliament to which he felt entitled.”73  Since he did not feel respected by Kashani and 
Mosaddeq, Behbahani became one of the main channels for Western money directed at 
supporting the Shah and opposing Mosaddeq.  Behbahani engaged in all of this with at 
least the tacit approval of Borujerdi but, by having Behbahani at hand’s length, Borujerdi 
escaped the episode largely unscathed whereas, after the ouster of Mosaddeq, 
Behbahani’s importance slowly declined amid widesprad knowledge of the “Behbahani 
dollars” that had been used in the ousting of Mosaddeq.74  
 Borujerdi’s penchant for indirect action can also be seen in his attempt to join 
forces with the Shah to oppose Tudeh (Iran’s Communist party) during the Mosaddeq 
period.  American reports indicate that this partnership was poorly organized, that those 
involved were not skilled at actions of this type, and that it was eventually called off.  
Part of the problem was that the Shah had to communicate with Borujerdi through a 
series of intermediaries, including Tehran’s imam jom’eh (Friday prayer leader), and 
communication was therefore quite protracted and inefficient.  During these 
communications, Borujerdi indicated that there was little that he could do directly, short 
of initiating a takfir campaign against Tudeh (declaring that that they wre apostates 
deserving of death) and inciting a genocidal witch hunt against them.  He had no interest 
in this and instead felt that indirect actions were pr ferable and that the Feda’iyan-e Islam 
terrorist group should be used to battle the Tudeh while the Shah simultaneously made 
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public and visible moves against them, to which Borujerdi could lend his weighty 
support.75   
 
The Islamic renewal in the context of the Cold War  
From the beginning of the Cold War struggle over control of Iran, the ulama were seen as 
a potential bulwark against Communist expansion southward.  They were involved in 
several early attempts to oppose Communist expansion—s me self-initiated and some 
Western-sponsored—but these early attempts bore few fruits and were mostly significant 
for highlighting the organizational and propagandistic weaknesses of Shi’ism and the 
comparative strengths of the Leftist model.  
 In 1946, for example, the British were hopeful that, due to the manifest dislike 
that the clergy in Mashhad had for the Soviets, the ulama would be able to mold this 
sentiment into an organized anti-Communist movement.  They soon found that this hope 
was ill-founded, since the ulama  
have not been able so far to rally any conspicuous ma ses under their banner.  
They have considerable influence but they lack organization and a practical 
programme; they have no concrete counter-proposal t offer against Tudeh 
slogans of bread and employment.76 
Nevertheless, there were many Western attempts, between 1946 and the early 
1950s, to use the ulama as the first line of defens against Communism.  To this end, the 
three main camps of Shi’ite leadership (the clerical establishment under Borujerdi, the 
“political mullahs” like Kashani and Behbahani, and the Islamic associations discussed 
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below) were all pulled into the Cold War struggle to win the allegiance of the Iranian 
masses, especially the all-important demographic of young men.  They were more than 
willing to receive patronage for this struggle, and gain powerful allies, since they already 
saw Communism as the most significant danger faced by Islam.77  The rapid rise of the 
Left in post-War Iran terrified the elite ulama, such as Ayatollah Borujerdi and Ayatollah 
Behbahani.  They would have been engaged in opposing the threat from the Left even 
without foreign prompting and assistance.  They were worried by the appeal that Leftist 
groups had for the youth and the clerical hierarchy provided funds for “alternative” 
religious organizations that would help the youth develop a firm Shi’ite identity that 
could stand up to the secularizing process and resist the temptation to join Leftist groups 
like Tudeh.78   
 The British consul-general expressed serious apprehension about the ability of 
Islam to meet this Cold War need, since “Persians have seemed to me to be groping for 
something to replace the religion of their fathers.” 79  Other British diplomats on the 
ground in Iran shared this apprehension about the usefulness of the ulama in anti-
Communist efforts, but this strategy was foisted on them from above.  In 1952, for 
example, Farley warns the Foreign Office that “the value of Islam as an anti-Communist 
antiseptic has been much exaggerated” and that “in the long run its braking effect on 
progress and encouragement of xenophobia more than outweighs any value it may have 
as a specific enemy of Communist parties.”80  These objections were noted but ignored. 
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 The Americans were less skeptical about the efficacy of ulama-led “movements” 
against Communism.  In order to prevent the spread of communism in Iran, the CIA 
worked out of the American embassy from 1947 onwards nd carried out a series of 
covert activities that increased in intensity with Mosaddeq’s rise to power and the 
subsequent oil “crisis.”81 Through the CIA’s BEDAMN program (established in 1948) 
and similar operations, America funneled millions of d llars into the hands of clerics, 
local agents, and thugs during the late 1940s and erly 1950s, in order to undermine the 
Left and the Mosaddeq government.  These American covert operations involved 
bombing mosques and blaming Tudeh, artificially swelling Tudeh crowds to spread 
panic, and encouraging the chanting of “Death to the United States” to cause fear of 
Tudeh back in Washington.  This seems to have been partly aimed at influencing the 
presidential election at home, to ensure that the more interventionist Eisenhower was 
elected.  Indeed, part of the Eisenhower campaign was the promise to prevent Iran 
becoming a “second China.”82   
The program also involved channeling money to Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Taqi 
Falsafi—a firebrand close to Borujerdi—to develop a kinetic version of Islam that would 
appeal to the youth.83  Falsafi was generally considered “the most powerful orator in 
Iran.”84  This was likely the reason why the Americans chose him to create a youth-
friendly reboot of Shi’ism, and why Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi later tasked him with 
convincing the Shah and the masses of the need to deal with the Baha’i minority.  In 
addition to his rhetorical skills, Falsafi was infamous for his political ambition and was 
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widely eyed as a potential “new Kashani” (Kashan is discussed later in this chapter).  
Falsafi was tasked by the CIA to develop a “clerical alternative” to the appeal of the Left 
that would offer Iranians a new version of Shi’ism with a more “fundamentalist line,” 
which could capture the imagination of the nation’s young men, and which would be 
firmly against the irreligion of communism.85  Towards the end of the Mosaddeq period, 
when American money was being funneled to amenable clerics to oppose the National 
Front and assist in the Western-led coup to remove Mosaddeq, Falsafi was part of the 
group of prominent “political mullahs” involved in toppling Mosaddeq (along with 
Ayatollah Kashani and Ayatollah Behbahani).86  
 American consular reports shed additional light on he extent of foreign use of 
ulama as political agents.  On March 29, 1955, for example, just weeks before the 
beginnings of the anti-Baha’i pogrom discussed in later chapters, the American Consul in 
Mashhad secretly met with Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad T qi Sebt-e Ashtiani.  Ashtiani 
only agreed to meet with the Americans because he wanted to warn them of the danger of 
their policy of funding extremist clergy and encouraging radical Islam as a brake on 
Communism.  He was at first indirect, saying only that “foreign powers” were behind 
this, but by the end of the interview he was directly implicating the Americans.  He 
warned that with this patronage “mullas are cynically playing on the ignorance of the 
people to advance their own ends.”  He saw the type of violent demonstrations of 
religiosity that this group favored to be a sign not of the “vitality of Islam” but rather of 
its “bankruptcy.”  In his view, Shi’ism itself was threatened by this foreign-inspired and 
foreign-funded shift to “religious intolerance and superstition.”  He said that the ulama’s 
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role as political agents had created a new generation of ulama who were “playing a 
dangerous game by encouraging unthinking fanaticism.”  He advised the Americans that 
fanaticism is too dangerous to control and should not be used as a tool with which to fight 
the Cold War.  He warned America to get out of thisdangerous game, and rightly 
predicted that, “foreign powers which support reactionary elements in the Moslem world 
would [soon] find out how shortsighted their policy has been.”87   
 
THE “MUSLIM NATION” 
A flurry of Islamic societies and associations emerged as a result of the new political 
openness that followed the removal of Reza Shah.  These organizations took advantage of 
the political freedom of the period, and used it to pr pagate Islam and to attempt to 
protect it from perceived threats.  These associatins and societies included Navvab 
Safavi’s Feda’iyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam), Ayatoll h Shirazi’s Hezb-e Baradaran 
(Brotherhood Party), the Anjoman-e Tablighat-e Islami (Islamic Propagation 
Association),88 the Jami‘at-e Ta‘limat-e Islami (Society for Islamic Teachings),89 and 
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many more.90  The two associations most important for our purposes are the Brotherhood 
Party and the Feda’iyan-e Islam.  
 
The Brotherhood Party 
The Brotherhood Party (Hezb-e Baradaran) is one of the earliest Islamic associations and 
one of the associations that is most important in terms of the larger threads of this study.  
It was formed by Ayatollah Nureddin Shirazi (1895/6-1957) in order to create a united 
and disciplined defense of Islam.  He created an early version of the Brotherhood Party 
(also known as the Hezb-e Nur, or Party of Light) in 1313 (1934/5) as a “defensive, 
religious line” against the Left.91  It was secretly formed, due to the restrictions of the 
Reza Shah period, and received little interest or notice at the time.  According to Shirazi, 
he was “sowing seeds” but “no results were evident.”92  Nevertheless, he persisted in his 
Islamic propagation efforts in Shiraz, which led to short exiles for his opposition to Reza 
Shah’s religious policies.93   
Following the 20th of Shahrivar [the end of Reza Shah’s rule], Shirazi became 
intensely involved in Islamic activism in Shiraz, slowly becoming the most prominent 
cleric in the city, a position that he held until his death in early 1957.  The Brotherhood 
Party also greatly increased its activities following Reza Shah’s abdication and gained 
wide popularity within a few years.  This expansion was facilitated, in part, by Shirazi’s 
efforts to take advantage of the new freedom to openly stablish religious organizations 
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and committees.  He formed more than a dozen of these within Shiraz alone.  According 
to a July, 1951 report from the region’s governor-general, Shirazi had also won the 
allegiance of the bazaar, and his Brotherhood ruled political opinion in Shiraz.94 
Those who pledged their allegiance to Shirazi were supposed to be spiritually 
renewed and born again in order to enter the Brothehood.  Even for Shirazi himself, 
there was a noted division between his life in the Brotherhood and “my previous life” 
(jan-e gozashteh-ye man).95  To join the Brotherhood, one had to pledge, “I swear before 
God to join with you, my brothers, in protecting the independence of Iran, under the 
shadow of the Ja’fari sect [i.e. Twelver Shi’ism].”96  Through this sacrament, one was 
sworn into a secretive fraternal order dedicated to a sacred, national cause. 
The details of this mission are explained in the group’s manifesto.  The first 
article is very similar to the oath and calls for “the protection of the national unity (hefz-e 
vahdat-e melli) of Iran and the expansion (tawse’eh) of the Ja’fari sect.”  The second 
article calls for “the implementation of the [constitutional] laws relating to Islam (qanun-
e Islami), in particular the supervision of the ulama.”  Other articles include opposition to 
superstition, protecting Iran’s territorial integrity, utilizing Iran’s national resources, the 
struggle against despotism wherever it arises, and v rious calls relating to the need for 
combating ignorance and promoting public education on orderliness, hygiene and other 
matters.   
The second article of their manifesto is a reference to the first two articles of the 
Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 1907, especially the unimplemented second article, 
which called for a committee of ulama to veto legislat on deemed to be anti-Islamic.  
                                                      





Shirazi explicitly confirmed his desire to implement these laws when he claimed that 
“complete unity between the state and the nation (mellat) of Iran can only be brought 
about through the implementation of the second article of the Supplementary 
Fundamental Laws.”97 
The Brotherhood Party was aimed at the “mobilization (basij) of the religious 
population” of Shiraz “against the members of Tudeh and others groups,” which was 
framed as the first step of a movement to rescue all of Iran.98  A major aspect of this 
effort involved forming a scholarly council (hay’at-e ‘elmiyyeh) and “uniting the clerical 
factions” of the city.99  Shirazi dedicated himself to this “unification of the clerics of 
Shiraz” and was, for example, the prime mover behind the formation of the Clerical 
Society (Jami'at-e Rohaniyyat).  His hope was that, “beginning from Fars,” there would 
emerge “a single, strong, unified front of the 14 million Shi’a of the Ja’fari sect [i.e. 
Twelver Shi’ism].”100   
He described his efforts as the beginning of the “regeneration (tajaddad) of Iran” 
following its decline under Reza Shah.101  In his opinion, Iran “should presently be 
ranked equal to the developed nations of the world.  Instead, it is, unfortunately, left 
behind in this point of degradation.”102  He blamed this sorry state of affairs on the 
corruption of its bureaucracy, which left Iran as a damaged structure sorely in need of 
repair.103  In light of his supposed role as national savior, Shirazi was referred to by his 
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followers as “the Imam” (a highly elevated, somewhat millenarian title that was later 
used to refer to Khomeini).104   
Shirazi’s activities extended beyond his city and, i  order to further his national 
aspirations, he even spent his own money to widely istribute his writings across Iran.105  
As part of this self-promotion, he used a 1948 pilgrimage to Mashhad to promote the 
Brotherhood and the unification of Islamic factions.  He set out with an entourage of 500 
supporters and made stops in several cities.  He was received warmly in Isfahan, Tehran, 
and elsewhere by the ulama and by Islamic associatins such as the Anjoman-e 
Tablighat-e Islami.  In Qom, Ayatollah Borujerdi even met him personally.  He also used 
the trip to lobby the majles to take action to ban the sale of alcohol, calling upon 
supportive majles deputies to resign if this was not achieved.  In his speeches in this 
regard, he spoke of the need for the government to follow the will of the “Muslim 
nation.”106 
While in Tehran, he also argued that it was not permitted to be complacent in the 
face of tyranny and, when the situation demanded it, he claimed that “it is necessary to 
rise up and take action (eqdam va qiyam nemudan).”107  In his view, Iran was in ruins 
because Muslims were thinking as individuals and not as a nation, and individual action 
in fulfillment of one’s religious duty to rise up did not produce results.  In order for 
change to occur, believers must become disciplined and turn towards one goal so that 
what the individual could not accomplish would instead be achieved through the 
“cooperation and like-mindedness of the Muslims.”  To assist in this galvanizing of the 
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community, he claimed to have opened a branch of the Brotherhood in each city for those 
who answer the call to “cooperate together to safeguard the independence of Iran under 
the banner of the Ja’fari sect.”108 
The official publication of the Brotherhood Party was A’in-e Baradari.  It was 
supported in its efforts by several complimentary publications, among which was Mehr-e 
Izad, which was similar to A’in-e Islam and Donya-ye Islam, to which Shirazi also 
contributed.   He wrote many articles himself, which were often serialized, and which 
largely concerned Islamic society (jam’eh-ye Islami) and the differences between 
“national” governments (i.e. those which expressed th  will of the “Muslim nation”) and 
despotic governments.109   
 During the Mosaddeq period, Shirazi was initially  strong supporter of the Prime 
Minister, due to oil nationalization, and urged hisfollowers to support him and to pray 
for his success.110  He later became disillusioned, however, withdrawing his support for 
Mosaddeq and instead opposing him intensely.  This was largely due to Mosaddeq’s 
failure to Islamicize Iran.  Shirazi believed that it was the government’s job to oversee the 
renewal of Islam—especially among the younger generation—in order that that “their 
evaporated faith is restored to them.”111  He also opposed Mosaddeq’s ties to Tudeh, 
since the Brotherhood was fiercely opposed to the Left, the Baha’is, and the intellectuals 
(specifically Ahmad Kasravi).112  The Brotherhood Party’s post-Mosaddeq activities are 
covered in Chapter V. 
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The Feda’iyan-e Islam 
The Feda’iyan-e Islam (“Devotees of Islam”) was founded in 1946 by Mojtaba Mir-
Lowhi (1924-55), later known as Navvab Safavi.  Like the military wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which began in Egypt nearly two decades earlier, the Feda’iyan-e Islam 
was xenophobic and amenable to the use of violence a d assassination in order to 
advance a radical Islamic agenda.  As with the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Feda’iyan was 
founded by an individual from a traditional background who became radicalized in 
reaction to the rapid pace at which he saw his society, and especially his fellow youth, 
abandon religion, while the established religious athorities did little to actively tackle 
this trend.113   
The Egyptian Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna, came from a 
conservative, rural family and his father worked as a teacher and prayer leader at the local 
mosque.  As a teenager, he came to Cairo to study and, after completing his studies, he 
went to work as a school teacher in Ismailia, a city in the Suez Canal area in which there 
was at the time a significant foreign presence and influence.  In Cairo, al-Banna had been 
disturbed by his generation’s drift away from Islam nd was upset at the failure of the 
Islamic scholars at al-Azhar to respond to the rising t de of atheism and foreign influence.  
His anxieties increased in Ismailia, where he was disturbed by the British military 
presence, foreign economic domination, and the luxuries enjoyed by foreigners while 
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local Egyptians struggled to survive.  He rejected the complacency of the religious 
establishment, and instead developed a more radical, k netic, and youthful interpretation 
of Islam that drew organizational inspiration from Sufism while, ironically, rejecting all 
such later accretions and hybridizations, instead calling for a return to the undiluted Islam 
of the original Muslim community.  Al-Banna was able to expand his movement across 
Egypt within a decade and, by the time he was murdered in 1949, he had approximately 
half a million followers and had established an organization that continued to grow and 
expand after his death, both within Egypt and across the Sunni Muslim world.114  
Navvab Safavi’s story has a similar beginning but a very different ending.  Like 
al-Banna, Safavi came from a conservative background.  He also studied at a modern 
educational institution (a German vocational school) before working in one of the areas 
of his country with the most pronounced Western presence (Abadan).  Likewise, in his 
youth he founded and became the charismatic leader of a kinetic, violent reimagining of 
Islam.  He too expressed outrage at the drift towards secularism and atheism and 
employed violence against governmental figures to affect change.  The Shi’ite clerical 
establishment in Iran felt the barbs of the Feda’iyan just as the establishment at al-Azhar 
received the attacks of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Both organizations had secret military 
wings and both organizations had utopian fantasies and messianic characteristics.   
It was Safavi’s negative experiences in Abadan that caused him to re-imagine 
himself and to choose a new life path.  He quit his job working for the British and 
departed for Iraq.  He returned shortly thereafter w aring religious garb and had 
apparently been inspired by the teachings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.115  
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Despite his lack of religious training, he was “a spellbinding speaker whose ability to 
attract a following from among the uneducated masses was phenomenal.”  He was 
completely devoted to his cause and “his willingness to die for that cause was an 
important ingredient in his attraction.”116   
 Before founding the Feda’iyan, Safavi is reported to have had some contact with 
Khomeini in 1943 and 1944, conveying to Khomeini the ideas of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which he apparently became acquainted with during his brief stint in 
Iraq.117  I am skeptical that such contact occurred.  More likely, this apocryphal 
connection between the two is part of the larger att mpt to link Khomeini to Safavi’s 
revolutionary efforts in order to create the impression that Khomeini was more important 
and more revolutionary than he actually was in the pre-1962 period.  These supposed 
early encounters with Khomeini are also considered important because Safavi would later 
be claimed by Khomeinism as part of its revolutionary genealogy, with the Feda’iyan re-
imagined as the harbinger of later Islamic revolutinaries.118   
Despite its similarities with the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Feda’iyan never gained 
the breadth or depth of support that the Brotherhood was able to command.  Although the 
Egyptian Brotherhood engaged in violent acts and had a messianic center, this accounted 
for only a small percentage of its activities.  Most f its members were engaged in 
religious education and social services.  The Feda’iyan, on the other hand, lacked this 
philanthropic component and had little to offer themasses.  Unlike the half a million 
members of the Egyptian Brotherhood in this period, there were less than a hundred 
                                                      
116 Ibid., p. 73. 
117 Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revoluti n (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 
1986), pp. 98, 102.  
118 As part of this questionable appropriation, the Islamic Republic has named a metro station and an 
expressway after Safavi. 
68 
 
committed members of the Feda’iyan, with those loosely affiliated amounting to less than 
thirty thousand.119  Despite its small active core, the Feda’iyan was able to exercise a 
massively disproportionate influence due to its large group of sympathizers, powerful 
patron (Ayatollah Kashani), and the fear it generated through dramatic, high-level 
assassinations.   
The Feda’iyan-e Islam was xenophobic, isolationist, messianic, and puritanical.  It 
desired not only the implementation of a harsh interpretation of Islamic law (including 
forced veiling and amputations for stealing) but also a strict purging of music, films, 
secular learning, Western clothing, tobacco, opium, and gambling.120  It was especially 
critical of secular intellectuals, claiming in 1951 that “three-fourths of the educated class 
of Iranians is void of human character.”  They also detested the coeducational system in 
which youth “give their passions full freedom.”  Speaking against the clerical 
establishment, they claimed that “those who are wearing the clergy’s cloak but in reality 
are enemies of Islam should be unmasked and denounced.”  Like Shirazi’s Brotherhood 
Party, they believed that the ignored Islamic provisions of the Constitution should be 
enforced, adding that “an administration should be established under the supervision of 
well-informed and honest clergymen.”  They went far beyond Shirazi’s desire for the 
implementation of mainstream Islam, however, and instead imagined an Islamic utopia in 
which, for example, all cinemas would be banned or, if allowed, would be segregated and 
run only plays about Islamic history and morals, in order that the present “awful voices” 
of popular culture would be replaced with chanting from the Qur’an.121  
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Despite the Feda’iyan’s abhorrence of Reza Shah, they nevertheless internalized 
his notions of utilizing public space and public dress for nationalist pedagogy.  They 
internalized these lessons to the point that they saw it as natural to state, as the former 
shah did, that “public dress” is like the “national fl g.”  They accepted Reza Shah’s 
premise and methodology, differing only in that they thought that this imposed uniform 
should be Islamic and not involve “strange hats” or require citizens to “attach reins to 
their necks [ties].”122   
Instead, Safavi believed that the nation should invent a new national dress that 
would conform to Islam and not ape foreign fashions.  Of course, Safavi must have 
realized that non-Western, “Muslim” headwear already existed, in many forms, across 
many centuries.  What he is instead suggesting here is not just a revival of the Islamic 
clothing from the period before Reza Shah, but the inv ntion of a modern, homogenous 
Islamic dress that would serve as a unifying nationl “flag” for Iranian Shi’ism 
specifically.  Earlier Islamic dress had been diverse in appearance and was seen by Safavi 
to be “foreign” (like Reza Shah’s national dress), in that it reflected the influence of a 
variety of non-Iranian nations, including the Arabs, Afghans, or Turks.  What Safavi 
wanted was to create a religio-national uniform for Iranian men that would serve the 
same unifying and patriotic function that the chador (an enveloping cloak that is largely 
limited to Iran) later served for religious Iranian women in the 1970s, i.e. a uniform of 
Shi’ite nationalism that unified, inspired, and homogenized the believers.123    
                                                      
122 Ibid. 
123 Many of the ideas of the Feda’iyan about the natiolization of Islamic dress eventually found their way 
into Khomeinism in diluted form (as did other elements of their positions on clothing, including the 
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Although the Feda’iyan’s utopian landscapes are fascin ting and under-explored, 
the organization is generally known for orchestrating a series of dramatic assassinations 
(and assassination attempts) between 1946 and 1955,and for inspiring later violence 
(such as the 1965 assassination of Prime Minister).  The organization’s first victim was 
Ahmad Kasravi, the aforementioned prominent secular intellectual.  Kasravi was a 
powerful and eloquent critic of Shi’ism who raised the ire of the Iranian clergy of the 
1940s in much the same way that Salman Rushdie rattl d the ulama in the 1980s.  
Kasravi’s views were generally considered anathema by conservative Shi’ites and the 
Feda’iyan was not alone in its opposition to his views.  Khomeini also criticized 
Kasravi—anonymously—in his first book, Kashf al-Asrar (Unveiling the Secrets), 
referring to him as mahdur ad-damm (i.e. indicating that his blood could be spilled with 
impunity).  Amir Taheri takes this insult by Khomeini as a causative factor in the 
assassination of Kasravi and as a “virtual death sentence” on him.124  This vastly 
overestimates the influence of Khomeini at this time and is part of the aforementioned 
tendency to retroactively insert a key role for Khomeini into earlier developments in 
order to maintain the Khomeinist myth that, although Khomeini did not actively oppose 
the Pahlavi regime until he was in sixties, he wanted to do so, but was restrained by 
Borujerdi, yet was still able to play a crucial role through his influence.  In reality, 
Kasravi was detested by most conservative Iranians and was an easy target for both 
Safavi and Khomeini.  He was a victim on whom the Feda’iyan could “cut its teeth” with 
a fair expectation that this act would be well-received in conservative circles.   
Safavi attempted to kill Kasravi himself in April 1945.  He failed, but gained a 
great deal of notoriety and support.  The following March, Kasravi was assassinated by 
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71 
 
Hosein Emami, on Safavi’s order.  Although Kasravi was killed in his office, in the view 
of numerous witnesses, Safavi and Emami were cleared of the murder.  This was 
achieved, in part, because none of the witnesses were illing to risk testifying against the 
Feda’iyan.  More importantly, they were freed because the case was transformed from a 
simple criminal matter into a proxy war between secular reformers and the conservative 
establishment.   
Kasravi’s assassination led to the first significant secular-clerical standoff in the 
post-Reza Shah era.  The assassin, Hosein Emami, was asayyed (a descendant of the 
Prophet through the holy Imams) and this was used by conservatives in order to frame the 
prosecution of the murderers as the persecution of a descendant of the Imams for 
defending his religion against vile attacks.125  The clerical establishment rallied behind 
Emami and implored the Shah to pardon him.  The new Shah was forced to decide, in the 
midst of the Azerbaijan crisis,126 if he wanted to take on the added burden of a fight with 
the clergy, in defense of a perceived enemy of religion, in order to kill a sayyed.  There 
was little to be gained by this, and Emami was allowed to live.  As a result, an aura of 
immunity emboldened the Feda’iyan, and a string of assassinations and assassination 
attempts occurred in the years that followed.   
The Feda’iyan killed Abdolhossein Hazhir (the Minister of Court) in November 
1949, while he was acting as the Shah’s representative nd was greeting the Moharram 
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processions converging on the Sepah Salar mosque in Tehran.  He was standing with the 
Pakistani ambassador and several religious officials when Hossein Emami tapped him on 
his shoulder.  When Hazhir turned, Emami shot him in the heart and then tried to shoot 
again, but the gun jammed.  Not slowing down, Emami pounced on Hazhir and began to 
pummel his head with the butt of his gun until he was dragged off.  Hazhir died of blood 
loss in the hospital before a blood transfusion could be performed.127    
Hazhir was an enemy of both the Feda’iyan and theirpatron, Ayatollah Kashani, 
for a number of reasons.  One of these was that, as  re ult of political demonstrations 
against Hazhir a year and a half before, security forces supposedly fired into the 
protestors (led by a cleric holding a Qur’an), wounding over seventy.   Hazhir was also 
(falsely) accused by the Feda’iyan of being a Baha’i, and this was publicized as the 
reason for his execution.128   
Hazhir’s assassin had a reputation as a professional killer, having risen to infamy 
as one of Kasravi’s assassins, along with his brothe  Mohammad Emami.  This time, 
however, there was massive outrage in the press over the assassination, especially its 
brazen nature, in broad daylight, by a man who had already been given a free pass for a 
previous assassination.  Emami was executed in secret, but the Feda’iyan hailed him as a 
hero.  Leaflets were distributed across Tehran, which claimed that Hazhir “was sent to 
hell and [Emami] will go to heaven.”  They went on t  claim that Emami was a martyr 
without fear, and that the only ones cowering were the “traitors” who ran the government.  
It was claimed that the Feda’iyan had thousands of members and that they were 
“nationalists” and would kill one “traitor” on their list for every hair that was hurt on 
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Emami’s head.   “Beware,” they warned, “and fear God’s anger and the bloodstained 
fingers of vengeance.”129    
In March 1951, Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated by the Feda’iyan for 
his opposition to oil nationalization.  Razmara was one of the most prominent opponents 
of oil nationalization and, as such, the Feda’iyan s w him as a traitor to the nation and a 
British stooge.  After Khalil Tahmasebi killed Razmara with Safavi’s approval, this set 
the stage for Mosaddeq to become Prime Minister shortly thereafter, with the 
assassination spun as a popular mandate for oil nationalization and a vote of no-
confidence in those who opposed it.  As with Kasravi’s murder, the attempt to bring 
Razmara’s assassin to justice became a proxy struggle, this time over the issue of oil 
nationalization.130  Opposition to a pardon was staged as opposition to nationalization and 
a sign of Anglophilia.     
As usual, the chief defender of the actions of the Feda’iyan was Ayatollah 
Kashani, an ambitious majles deputy who increased his own importance through strategic 
alliances with both Mosaddeq’s National Front and Safavi’s Feda’iyan.  The Feda’iyan 
was never a part of the National Front, but were linked to Ayatollah Kashani and assisted 
the Front’s efforts because of this alliance and because of a sincere hope that Mosaddeq 
would remove foreign influence and Islamicize Iran.   
Although Tahmasebi was arrested, he was seen as a hero and the Feda’iyan 
expected that he would be promptly freed by Mosaddeq and Kashani out of gratitude and 
due to public pressure.  Despite the debt that they owed the Feda’iyan, however, 
Mosaddeq and Kashani were unwilling to go along with many of their demands.  Because 
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of this, Safavi angrily denounced Kashani and Mosaddeq and threatened to kill them for 
their betrayal and for their failure to implement Islamic reform.  As a result, Mosaddeq 
ordered Safavi’s arrest on June 8, 1951, after which e “hid in the majles, where he 
remained until Safavi was arrested.”131   
With their leader imprisoned for many months, a group f frustrated Feda’iyan 
entered the jail where Safavi was held, said that tey would not leave without him, and 
threatened that, if this did not occur, “our reaction will be so violent that it will surprise 
the whole world.”  They warned the new parliament that “the same force will be used and 
will plunge the 17th majles in blood” for “soon we shall assume power, and the country 
will be ruled by Moslems.” 132  The threats of disproportionate retribution were bluffs, but 
there was an assassination attempt on the Deputy Prime Minister (Hossein Fatemi), 
which was nearly successful.  This led to further arrests and crackdowns, but majles 
deputies were nervous and feared for their lives.  Many apparently believed the rumors 
that the Feda’iyan had assassins on the ready and coul have anyone killed at any time.  
Out of fear, Razmara’s killer was released on the pretense that he acted for the nationalist 
cause.   
Safavi was also released from jail in February 1953.  By this point, he had 
become so alienated from Mosaddeq that he supported the August 1953 coup that ousted 
him and returned the Shah to power.133  In the years that followed, Safavi had the 
gratitude of Prime Minister Zahedi’s administration because of his support for the coup.  
In the spring of 1955, however, the Shah betrayed th  Islamic organizations and initiated 
a serious crackdown against them.  As a result of this anti-clerical policy, the Feda’iyan 
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tried to kill Prime Minister Ala in November 1955.  No longer enjoying the support of 
Kashani or the gratitude of the regime, the group was ruthlessly rooted out and Safavi 
was executed along with Tahmasebi and his chief lieutenants.  They died “with victorious 
smiles on their faces,” seeing themselves as about to be rewarded for their services to 
Islam and to the Iranian nation.134   
Unlike the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that inspired it, the Feda’iyan was a 
national movement.  The Muslim Brotherhood’s manifesto was applicable to the entire 
Sunni world; although it grew via nationally organized chapters and became involved in 
national politics, its appeal was broader and its nature pan-Islamic.  By contrast, the 
Feda’iyan was a resolutely Iranian construction, exclusivist, and not focused on Shi’ism 
in general, but specifically on Iranian Shi’ism.  In its 1952 manifesto calling for the 
release of imprisoned members, the Feda’iyan refers to it elf as “the Iranian Moslem 
Nation” and “We, the sons of Islam and Iran.”  They r fer to the imprisonment of their 
members as crimes against this authentic nation that constitutes Iran.  Governmental 
leaders are placed in opposition to this imagined Islamic nation, and are described as 
“traitors” and an “apostate” and “heretic ruling class.”135  
 Apostasy from the nation and apostasy from Shi’ism were conflated and 
reinterpreted in a novel way such that it could include even their former allies whose 
religious and national credentials were beyond question.  The Feda’iyan’s extension of 
apostasy to co-religionists with objectionable political policies, and the belief that their 
murder was justified on these grounds, would find expr ssion in the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood a dozen years later, in the writings of Sayyid Qutb, whose influential 1964 
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work Ma'alem fi al-Tariq (Milestones) makes a similar argument in a Sunni context.136  
This opens up the intriguing possibility that, while the early Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt inspired Safavi, Safavi could have inspired the later Brotherhood, although an 
exploration of this possibility is beyond the scope of the present work.   
Ironically, although the Feda’iyan attacked the Mosaddeq government as 
“traitors” opposed to the nation, the Feda’iyan itself later worked with the British against 
the sovereign Iranian government in the period leading up to the coup.  In a top secret 
British Foreign Office memo from 1952, R. C. Zaehner muses on the advantages “of 
keeping the Feda’iyan as allies once they have wreaked their vengeance on the National 
Front.”  In his view, their basic desire that Islamic Law “should be respected throughout 
the realm,” and corruption ended, were not sufficient r ason to prevent them from 
continuing to be British allies after Mosaddeq fell.  He defends their past “fanatical” 
behavior vis-à-vis Razmara and Hazhir (i.e. their mu der) by highlighting that these 
victims “were regarded as representative of an alien European civilization” and were the 
leaders chosen by “a completely Westernized Court.”  Zaehner notes that the group’s 
xenophobia is not uniform or inflexible as they were willingly working for the British 
through Sayyid Zia'eddin Tabataba'i,137 despite their public statements that the British 
and the Americans were equally undesirable.  He proposed a plan in which the 
Mosaddeq-era partnership with the Feda’iyan would continue until the National Front 
collapses, after which they would continue to be employed—indirectly through pro-
British clerics—as a check on the Shah.  Once they became somewhat pacified, he 
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considered them a possible political base for a political party led by reliable 
Anglophiles.138   
The Feda’iyan’s switch from the patronage of Kashani to that of Tabataba’i was 
based on their assumption that he would “enforce the shari’at [Islamic law] as far as 
possible” and their belief that, unlike the pan-Islamic Kashani, with Tabataba’i “his 
mentality is purest Persian.”  Although Zaehner admits that Tabataba’i’s “connection 
with us is in the widest open of open secrets,” the Feda’iyan saw him as genuine in his 
religiosity, unlike Kashani, and although they knew he was pro-British, “of the three 
evils, they dislike us least.”   
Tabataba’i encouraged this attitude by persuading the Feda’iyan that in order to 
get rid of the greater threats—the Soviets and the Am ricans—the British were a useful 
ally.  He pushed the position that the British have historically ruled indirectly and left 
their allies to their own religion while the Americans—“whose standards in sexual 
morality are, regrettably, lax”—are more decadent than the British.  In addition to the 
implementation of Islamic Law, Tabataba’i promised the Feda’iyan that they would have 
British support for several other Islamic reform programs, such as rounding up all the 
prostitutes in Iran to be incarcerated in maisons correctionnelles, where they would 
undergo re-education in Islam.  Such incentives, in Zaehner’s view, provided “good 
grounds for hoping that once their task of liquidating traitors has been accomplished, they 
may be guided into more positively useful channels… [ uch as acting as] a useful check 
on any undue ambitions the Shah may still have.”139  Needless to say, this unlikely 
alliance seems to have collapsed in short order following the coup. 
                                                      






It is impossible to discuss the Feda’iyan-e Islam without discussing the important role 
played by its most important patron, Ayatollah Abo’l-Qasem Kashani (1882-1962), who 
was the most prominent “political mullah” of this period.  Unlike Khomeini, who 
cultivated the perception that he did not have any political ambitions, Kashani was openly 
political, serving as a majles deputy and leading the nationalization movement with 
Mosaddeq before their partnership collapsed.  He was the Speaker of the majles during 
both the oil nationalization and the 1953 coup.    
Kashani was the black sheep of the clerical hierarchy.  Among important 
ayatollahs, he was almost alone in his support for M saddeq, with the clerical hierarchy 
supporting the Shah.  Kashani was also the only leading ayatollah who explicitly 
supported and patronized the terror campaign of the Feda’iyan-e Islam.  Borujerdi and the 
clerical establishment detested him, doubted the sincerity of his belief in Islam, and saw 
an irreconcilable divide between Islam as they understood it and the pan-Islamic, 
Communist-sympathizing, and overtly political attitudes of Kashani.  They blamed his 
time in Iraq for his aberrations and sought to juxtapose the sanctity of Borujerdi with 
Kashani’s worldliness and shady connections.  This hostility is explicitly conveyed in a 
1952 polemical pamphlet that attacks Kashani and urges support for Borujerdi.   
In this polemical piece, Kashani is denounced as a misleader and one who, in 
comparison to Borujerdi, is an idiot who “cannot even claim to compare himself with the 
theological students of Qum.”  In the First World War, he is said to have been a paid 
agent of both the Germans and the British, making a fortune only to waste it all on 
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prostitutes, supposedly spending the equivalent of 10,000 rupees on a Jewish girl in 
Basra.  His actions were said to have literally shamed his father to death.   
This is not his worst offense, however.  He is said to have committed the cardinal 
sin of befriending his Baha’i doctor (Mohammad Fazel Burazjani) while in Baghdad.  
According to Borujerdi’s supporters, this led to Kash ni’s acceptance of Baha’ism and to 
subsequent correspondence with Abdu’l-Baha (the leader of the Baha’i religion at the 
time), “in which he expressed faith in him.”  This most serious of crimes was said to have 
so inflamed the Shi’ites of Najaf that Kashani was expelled from that city for some 
time.140   
According to the pamphlet, Kashani then worked to install Reza Shah on the 
throne and was culpable in the murder of senior ulama, in exchange for which he 
received a salary of 1000 tomans a month, which he used to finance a habit of serial 
marriage every few days, to the point that a whole new class of prostitutes developed in 
Iraq known as “zan aqa” (wives of the gentleman, i.e. Kashani).  Later, he supposedly 
again worked as a British agent, cashing in on his reputation as “their old and sincere 
agent.”   
By rejecting the Shah and joining with Mosaddeq to nationalize Iranian oil, 
Kashani was supposedly letting the country burn in the “flames of poverty” while using 
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the people’s money to pay for Cadillacs and gambling in addition to “alcoholic drinks, 
sodomy, and adultery.”  Readers are asked to look t Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi instead 
of Kashani and to ponder “whether a man who does not hold a theological diploma can 
falsely call himself an authorized mojtahed [cleric authorized to make independent 
religious decisions],” while at the same time “spending thousands of tomans of the 
Moslems’ money on luxury.”141   
The accusations in the pamphlet are either egregious exaggerations or outright 
lies, but they reveal Borujerdi’s camp’s disgust with Kashani and their perception of him 
as a hedonistic apostate and a charlatan.  Most interesting is their use of his life abroad to 
mark him as “foreign,” and the utilization of the nbulous nature of this foreign period as 
a screen on which to project various crypto-loyalties, and on which to stage his various 
supposed crimes.   
Clerical anger at Kashani was rooted, in part, in nervousness about his attempt to 
marshal, legitimize, and use terrorism to propel his own ambitions and silence critics.  At 
one point, for example, the headquarters of the Ett la’at newspaper, was surrounded by 
hundreds of demonstrators after it published an article critical of the upswing in Shi’ite 
fanaticism.  The crowd threatened to attack the publisher (Massoudi) and held him 
personally accountable for denigrating the Islamic ovement associated with Kashani.  
Another journalist, from the AP, was also threatened for releasing reports that were 
critical of Kashani’s pro-Nazi past.  Those, like Tabataba’i, who had earlier sought to 
pander to disaffected young men by giving a platform to people like Kashani in his paper, 
Keshvar, grew nervous and sought to distance himself from Kashani.142   
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Despite the increasingly violent and unwieldy nature of this revival-turned-
“movement,” Kashani embraced it and became the patron that the movement needed, a 
role no other senior cleric was willing to assume.  By 1948, Kashani was generally 
accepted as the “leader” of the “present religious movement.”  A leader that London 
informed Washington was a “real demagogue” who “was known for his use of the 
Palestine situation as a powerful rallying point.”  He led protests against Israel’s 
existence, as well as protests against both the United States and the Soviets, for 
recognizing its existence.143   
In many ways, Kashani largely echoed the pan-Islamism of Asadabadi (also 
known as “Sayyid Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani,” 1838-1897).  Asadabadi claimed that 
Muslim in-fighting was the reason why the West was dominant and he urged Muslims in 
the Middle East to unite to defend themselves against colonialism and to prevent the 
Middle East suffering the same fate as India.144  Kashani modernized this argument by 
replacing the Indian example with Palestine and by claiming that God had only allowed 
Israel to be created in order to catalyze the reunification of the Muslim community, since 
Muslims need “greater unity in order to defeat our enemy, maintain our independence 
and drive out the foreigners from our home.” “The soul  of your fathers,” he claims, 
“…look upon you with hate and anger when they see 400 million of their children obey 
the foreigners.”145    
It is clear from his ongoing references to Islam as a whole, the entire Muslim 
ummah (community), Palestine, and the colonization and division of the Arab world, that 
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Kashani is more of an anti-imperialist and pan-Islamist than he is an Iranian nationalist.  
Like Asadabadi’s involvement in the Tobacco Protest in Iran, Kashani’s involvement in 
oil nationalization is a local application of a much larger trans-national agenda.  This 
attitude is in sharp contrast to the aforementioned Iran-centric unification mission of 
Ayatollah Shirazi and his Brotherhood Party, or the Feda’iyan’s battle to establish a 
specifically Iranian Islamic utopia. 
 Contemporary American assessments of Kashani mistakenly saw his project as a 
"reaffirmation of Shiism as an Iranian nationalist force.”146  This misreading came from 
Kashani’s utilitarian appropriation of some of the r toric of nationalism and from his 
pandering to nationalist groups such as the Feda’iyan-e Islam.  Kashani’s superficial use 
of nationalist language can be seen in his discussion of a “national” Muslim army.  In 
1952, Kashani informed the Americans that the army of the state should be replaced by a 
new, million-man “national” army of Muslims in Iran, which he would train and lead.  He 
recalled the past glories of “his” proto-army, the Feda’iyan-e Islam, and looked ahead to 
the future exploits of his Muslim “national” army, claiming: "We sent Razmara to hell 
and we shall also send Naguib [Egypt’s secular leader] to hell."  He further warned: "I am 
not an ordinary person.  I am leader of Moslem world and Moslem world will soon be 
force to be reckoned with."147  His transnational ambitions are clear, with Iran treated as 
the first step of a larger pan-Islamic agenda, including the removal of secular Arab 
leaders and the unification of the wider Islamic world under his leadership.  He refers to 
himself most often not as an Iranian leader, or a Shi’ite leader, but as a leader of the 
Muslim world.  As such, one of his main obsessions, during the height of the oil crisis, 
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was his ongoing struggle to organize an internationl Islamic conference in Iran, which 
would serve as his debut as a leader of the international Muslim community.148  
Kashani’s expedient use of the language of nationalism, despite his essentially pan-
Islamic agenda, provided a model for Khomeini in the 1960s, when he began a similar 
patronage of former Feda’is, despite his largely pan-Islamic worldview. 149  
 
Creating an “Islamic Sphere” 
The new Islamic organizations interacted with each other and with existing Islamic 
institutions to engage in what Tavakoli-Targhi describes as an attempt to create an 
“Islamic public sphere.”150 This effort involved safeguarding and promoting Islam in Iran 
and actively challenging and opposing all forms of “irreligion,” especially Communism 
and Baha’ism.  Much of this activism was limited to the rhetorical realm, not only 
through sermons but, more importantly, through the explosion of Islamic publications 
which occurred in this period.   
Notable publications included A’in-e Islam (the Religion of Islam), Parcham-e 
Islam (the Banner of Islam), Donya-ye Islam (the Islamic World), Neda-ye Haqq (the 
Call of Truth), and Nur-e Danesh (the Light of Knowledge).  Most publications were 
linked to particular associations, but there were significant levels of inter-textuality, as 
ideas and incidents that were brought up in one journal would be refined, expanded, and 
standardized in other publications, such that an anecdotal report in one letter could be 
picked up, generalized, and, over a period of time, reified as fact.   It was through the 
testing ground of these publications that the arguments for the nature, rights, and goals of 
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the “Muslim nation” were initially worked out.  Although this virtual Islamic sphere was 
important, it should be noted that it was limited in scope and influence, with even one of 
the most influential publications, Parcham-e Islam, almost having to close down due to 
poor sales.151 
According to Rasul Jafarian, from the time of Shahrivar 1320 (Reza Shah’s 
departure) onwards, the Islamic forces (niruha) were united in the arena (ma’rakeh) of 
battle (mobarezeh) against the infiltration and influence (nofuz) of the Baha’i minority.  
This common enemy provided the Islamic organizations, a d their publications, “one of 
the key elements in their strengthening and consolidation.”152  Moreover, it played a key 
role in refining and developing the rhetoric of Shi’ite activism, as it evolved in the 
Islamic press.   
Jafarian’s exploration of this literary development, catalyzed by anti-Baha’ism, 
begins with a series of complaints against the Baha’is in the conservative A’in-e Islam 
magazine, starting in 1944. This publication provided a national forum for the expression 
of local anger at the state of affairs vis-à-vis the Baha’i issue.  Complaints were published 
from such diverse locations as Zahedan, Qom, Sanandj  Jahrom, expressing anger 
that the Baha’is in their locality were increasing their “self-serving propaganda,” had 
taken over important governmental posts, were insulting Islam, and were causing 
“anxiety” among the residents.  As a result, it was demanded that action be taken from 
the center for the “eradication of the corrupt elements.”153   
Since these appeals were rhetorically addressed to the central government, the 
Baha’i threat came to be framed as a danger to the stat .  Baha’is increasingly came to be 
                                                      
151 Ibid., pp. 210-11. 
152 Jafarian, Jaryanha va Sazmanha, pp. 162, 167. 
153 A’in-e Islam,1:11, p. 3; 1:13, pp. 5-7; 2:23, p. 10; and 3:26, p. 11. 
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cast not as a religious heresy but as a threat to nati nal security.  In this emerging, self-
referential and self-reaffirming rhetoric, it is the sedition (toghyan) of the Baha’is that is 
given as the reason for the hatred (boghz) that people feel for them.  This “danger” to the 
state was said to be the cause of panic (haras), since these supposedly insurgent elements 
had infiltrated the government and had gained close acc ss to the Court.154  To support 
these accusations, complaints often included lists of Baha’is holding high office.  These 
individuals were said to have taken advantage of their status to further propagate their 
cause at the expense of the general population.   
This “infiltration” was presented as a cancer that w s impossible to ignore and 
which the general citizenry had no choice but to try to remove themselves, in self-
defense, because of the failures of government to protect them from this threat.  Although 
Baha’is did not engage in demonstrations or riots, they were held responsible for the 
political demonstrations and violence that occurred in opposition to them, which was 
blamed on their supposed intrigues and “incitement” (fitnah angizi).155   
The Feda’iyan-e Islam’s Parcham-e Islam announced its intention to join the anti-
Baha’i fray (mobarezeh) in its Mehr 1326 [1947] issue, claiming that their intervention 
on this issue was in part due to the Baha’is’ wickedness, in contradiction of civility and 
the laws of the state.156  Baha’is were accused of striking out against (zarb) and cursing 
Muslims, but this was framed not as a religious dispute, but as dissension to disrupt 
national unity, which was done at the behest of foreign powers.  The fact that an earlier 
Baha’i leader (Abdu’l-Baha) had been knighted (for humanitarian efforts during the First 
                                                      
154 Jafarian, Jaryanha va Sazmanha, pp. 162-63. 
155 Ibid., p. 164. 
156 Parcham-e Islam, Mehr 1326 [September/October, 1947]. 
86 
 
World War) was advanced as evidence of this supposed for ign ownership of the 
religion. 157   
In a February 1948 open letter in Parcham-e Islam, the Jami’at-e Mazhab-e 
Ja’fari warns of the infiltration of the Baha’is into the centers of power and calls for 
action to end this state of affairs.  The letter claims that the infiltration of the Baha’is has 
been occurring little by little and that it had reached the point where Baha’is hold 
important positions in every ministry and governmental office.  To guard the nation from 
this danger, the Shah is called upon to dismiss Baha’i employees.  Despite the accusation 
that the Baha’is permeate the regime, the regime itself is not directly targeted or 
implicated at this point, as it would be in similar anti-Baha’i critiques in the 1960s.  The 
use of “infiltration” suggests that this situation ccurred without the regime’s active 
consent, and the letter is explicitly royalist, praising the Shah as “sacred and blessed.”158   
In 1949, Donya-ye Islam published and anonymous reply to the open letter above.  
This appeal was addressed to the majles and urged them to protect “order and security” 
by opposing the “treacherous plots” of the Baha’is.  If this is not done, “the day will 
come when the Muslim nation of Iran will settle its accounts with the enemies of Islam 
and you will be punished mercilessly.” Moving from the majles to the clerics, the appeal 
urges systematic action. 
It is imperative to develop a system for propagation hat is based on the exalted 
principles of religion, a system that will deepen the faith of the people… This 
system will awaken the people one by one, until such time as every Muslim is 
capable, by producing strong rational proofs and showing the power of Islam, to 
deliver a fierce blow to the mouth of those who oppse Islam.159 
                                                      
157 Ibid., Bahman 1326 [January/February, 1948]. 




Interestingly, this appeal is framed in terms of the protective duties of the majles 
and the self-defense of the people.  The clergy are larg ly pushed to the side, at least 
rhetorically, and cast simply as those whose job it was to animate the people.  It is the 
people themselves, the citizenry, who are the chief actors of the drama, who only need to 
be “awakened” to their Muslim-ness before arising to serve through individual and 
collective action against their common enemy.  The majles is framed as the servant of the 
citizenry, but here this unmarked category is a reference not to Iranians as a whole, but to 
the aforementioned “Muslim nation,” which was considered to be the true Iran. 
In this discourse of admonition, Baha’is are denounced as “those who have 
deviated” (monharefan), and as a political group that is zaleh160 (misled, misleading, lost, 
astray), gomrah (misled, astray, lost, wandering, deceived, deluded, s duced, perverted), 
gomrah konandeh (seductive, sinister, delusory) or mozel (which also means misleading, 
leading astray, or seductive).161  An interesting aspect of these pejoratives is that they all 
imply that the Baha’is are lost, or will cause others to become lost and seduced away 
from the fold.  This involves the idea that the Baha’i “other” is akin to a prodigal son, or 
a lost sheep, wrongfully separated from the Islamic flock.  This idea is also seen in the 
language used to refer to Baha’is who leave their religion to convert to Islam.  This act is 
                                                      
160 The “misguided and misguiding” label actually pre-dates the Baha’i religion and was used in anti-Babi 
polemic (Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism,” p. 203).  In the Qajar and early Pahlavi period, it was used to 
imply that Babis (and Baha’is after them) were misled about Islamic matters and were leading others into 
heresy and apostasy.  This earlier opposition to the Babis and the Baha’is was part of a much-longer history 
of (Usuli) clerical opposition to batani (esoteric) movements, in which these groups were staged as the 
Other.  This can be seen with the Hurufis, Nuqtavis, Sufis, Shaykhis, and others (see, for example, the early 
sections of Denis MacEoin’s dissertation—included in The Messiah of Shiraz—and Babayan, Mystics, 
Monarchs and Messiahs).  What is different in the later Baha’i case, however, is that it occurred in the 
context of nationalization.  In the post-1941 polemic, the charges against the Other shift, from misguided 
Muslims to misguided Iranians.  The primary charge is no longer leading the Muslim community into 
heresy, but leading the Iranian nation into colonialism.   
161 See, for example: Parcham-e Islam, Esfand 1328 [February/March, 1950]; Jafarian, Jaryanha va 
Sazmanha, pp. 164, 167; and Kayhan, 26 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 17, 1955]. 
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described as a “returning” (bar gashtan) to Islam.162  As with the Hindu nationalist 
assumption of a primordial Hindu identity that certain groups have lost but can reclaim, 
the anti-Baha’i rhetoric likewise involves the assumption that Baha’is are “lost” Muslim-
Iranians who can be reclaimed.163   
  
Conclusion 
The Islamic associations of the 1940s spoke of an Isl mic future in grandiose, utopian 
vagaries.  They glorified an “Islamic Iran,” but this nebulous panacea was amorphous, 
defined largely in terms of what it was not.  While th  Left had concrete slogans of 
“bread and work,” the Islamic associations and the ulama focused on what was wrong 
with Iran—corruption, poverty, lost glory, and humiliation at the hands of foreigners—
and promised that Islam offered an end to this state of affairs and a better future, although 
little details were provided.   
The deficiencies of the clerical discourse on “Islamic Iran” were implicitly 
acknowledged by its pairing, almost from the beginning, with anti-Baha’i and anti-Tudeh 
fear-mongering.  The use of the Left as a countersubject to Islam declined later, as Tudeh 
was crushed in the 1950s and as intellectuals and combatants from the Right and the Left 
found common cause in the anti-regime struggle.164  The use of Baha’ism as the inverse 
of Islam, however, became hegemonic (as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters).  
                                                      
162 For examples of these usages, see: Jafarian, Jaryanha va Sazmanha, pp. 164, 166; and Davani, 
Khaterat va Mobarezat, p. 208 n1. 
163 This belief in religio-patriotic rehabilitation evntually formed the fundamental premise behind the work 
of the Hojjatiyeh Association, which became the umbrella organization through which most anti-Baha’i 
action was taken after 1955.  See Chapter VIII.   
164 For the complicated relationship between Islam and the Left in the decades before the 1979 Revolution, 
see the previously mentioned works of Ervand Abrahamian (Iran between Two Revolutions, Khomeinism, 
and Radical Islam) as well as Maziar Behrooz’s Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran (New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 1999) and Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: a Political Biography of Ali Shariati 
(London: IB Tauris, 2000). 
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Jafarian points out that, out of the two threats to Islam, it was only in reaction to 
Baha’ism that believers “have a sensitivity (hesasiyat dashtan) that is singular and unique 
(tanha va tanha).”165  The following chapter shows how the discourse of anti-Baha’ism 
acted as the counter-melody to the nationalization of Iranian Islam.
                                                      





“Islam is in Danger”: 
Anti-Baha’ism and the Nationalization  
of Shi’ism, 1946-1954 
 
Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Ayatollah Shirazi called for a united Islamic front 
in order to achieve what no individual or group could hope to accomplish alone. By the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, however, Islamic groups were divided over the priorities and 
specifics of Islamicization, and were equally disunified when it came to the political 
issues of the day (such as oil nationalization).  They were only able to maintain the united 
front envisioned by Shirazi when it came to the Baha’is, who were cast as the internal 
Other against which the emerging Islamic national self could be defined.     
The struggle against the Baha’is, which had been developing in the discourse of 
the Islamic organizations, crossed into the mainstream and began to become an issue of 
truly national concern when it was taken up by Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, who used the 
issue as a populist rallying point with which to positively frame the Islamic movement as 
a struggle between the honest, patriotic values of “the people” and the cosmopolitan, un-
patriotic, and cliquish values of the elites (the Baha’is).  This populist opposition to 
Baha’ism was later turned against the regime itself, after Baha’ism and Pahlavism were 
conflated following the events of the late 1950s, di cussed in later chapters.  
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 Before pursuing my discussion of anti-Baha’ism in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, I discuss the larger process of nationalizing religion that occurred in Iran in this 
period.  I do so by looking at the pressure applied to the recognized religious minorities 
to restrict their leadership to Iranians and to demonstrate patriotic loyalty in other ways.1   
 
Demonstrating loyalty: the official minorities and the nationalization of religion 
In the aftermath of Iran’s wartime occupation, there was a predictable upswing in 
xenophobia and its concomitant, nativism.  From the lat  1940s until the 1953 coup, 
Iranian politics was dominated by these two forces.  Oil nationalization is the most 
famous example of the popular demand that Iran regain control of its own resources and 
that foreign influence must be limited or removed, but nationalization was extended to 
other areas as well, including the religious sphere.  This demand for religious nativism 
can be seen in the reining in of prominent foreign missionaries, the prohibition of foreign 
churches having services in Persian, and new laws that prohibited all non-Muslim 
religions in Iran from having foreign leaders or allowing foreigners to preach to their 
members.  The 1949 edict that contained many of these n w restrictions also banned 
                                                      
1 For non-Muslim minorities in Iran, see Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); and A. William Samii, "The Nation and Its Minorities: Ethnicity, 
Unity, and State Policy in Iran," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 20:1-2 
(2000): pp. 128-137.  For the Jewish community in Iran, see Habib Levy, Comprehensive History of the 
Jews of Iran: The Outset of the Diaspora, ed. Hooshang Ebrami, trans. George Maschk (Costa Mesa, CA: 
Mazda Publishers, 1999); David Yeroushalmi, The Jews of Iran in the Nineteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 
2009); Daniel Tsadik, Between Foreigners and Shi'is: Nineteenth-Century Iran and its Jewish Minority 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Hilda Nissimi, The Crypto-Jewish Mashhadis: The Shaping of 
Religious and Communal Identity in Their Journey from Iran to New York (Brighton: Sussex Academic 
Press, 2007); and Amnon Netzer, "Persian Jewry and Literature: A Sociological View," in Sephardi and 
Middle Eastern Jewries: History and Culture in the Modern Era, ed. Harvey E. Goldberg (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 240-255. For Christianity in Iran, see Richard Schwartz, "The 
Structure of Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Iran" (PhD dissertation, Washington University, 
1973); and Cosroe Chaqueri, ed., Armenians of Iran: The Paradoxical Role of a Minority in a Dominant 
Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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foreign religious officials from coming to Iran to “inspect” their Iranian branches, and 
forbid foreign, non-Muslim religions from becoming involved in Iranian politics.2   
This law was, ostensibly, aimed at the Armenians and meant to forestall the 
Soviets choosing one of their own to replace the rec ntly-deceased Armenian archbishop 
in Tabriz, but it was also used—albeit inconsistently—against religious minorities in 
general.3  As part of this push for nationalizing the minorities and their institutions, the 
mixed-heritage (Anglo-Armenian) Aidin sisters were blocked from continuing their 
duties as headmistresses at Christian schools.  They were replaced by “local” women.4  
At minority schools that previously employed Iranians as well as foreigners, only one 
foreign teacher was allowed to stay under the new provisions.  The Shah’s intimate 
friend, Ernest Perron, himself a Catholic, fought Mosaddeq over this issue until he was 
able to delay further plans to restrict foreign lead rship of Iran’s religious minorities.5   
The provisions continued to be enforced haphazardly, however, and were 
supported by additional legislation, such as the February 25, 1952 order against non-
Iranians proselytizing within Iran.  As a result of these new restrictions, some long-
established expatriates in Iran, like Clement Heydenburk, were targeted.  Heydenburk ran 
a Presbyterian orphanage in Kermanshah and had been conducting regular services for 
over a dozen years.  In 1954, however, local enemies us d the anti-proselytization laws to 
compel the authorities to block his activities.  Asa result, he was told that he was 
breaking the law by conducting religious services for his congregation, since he was not 
Iranian.  He protested that if he could not teach anyone the Gospel at his orphanage then 
                                                      
2 USDS, Iran, 1945-1949, Reel 7: 350; USDS, Iran, 1950-1954, Reel 40: 941, 947-952; NACPM, RG 84 
350 / 61 / 19 /04 / Box 25, letter dated March 18, 1951. 
3 USDS, Iran, 1945-1949, Reel 7: 352. 
4 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 98720, Tehran to FO, January 28, 1952. 
5 Ibid., FO 371 / 98720 / EP 1782 / 7, Tehran to FO,May 3, 1952. 
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his home church would likely withdraw funding for it.  In reply, he was told that the 
government had no choice but to enforce the existing regulations.6 
In terms of the Jewish minority, despite anger at the fate of the Palestinians 
following the creation of Israel, and the widespread presence of anti-Semitism, Jews in 
Iran were—for the most part—treated better and were more socially integrated than the 
Jews in the Arab world during this period.  Iranian Kurdistan7 provided a notable 
exception, when looting and assaults forced four thousand Jews to flee and led many to 
seek the comparative safety of Israel.8  This was not representative of Iran as a whole.   
Even though Iran’s Jewish population dwarfed that of Iraq, almost all of those 
leaving Iran for Israel were Iraqi refugees and, among the small fraction of Iranian Jews 
attempting to go to Israel, most were from Iranian Kurdistan.  Among the small number 
of Iranian Jewish emigrants from other areas, most were described as “voluntary 
refugees” who left to break the cycle of poverty.  For these reasons, the Jewish refugee 
issue was treated as an “Arab issue” and neither the Iranian government nor the small 
percentage of affluent Jews in Iran took an active int rest in the fate of the refugees, 
despite the fact that at one point nearly a thousand people were cramped into one small 
synagogue without adequate resources, while hundreds more slept in the nearby Jewish 
cemetery (without any sanitary facilities), or on the street.9   
                                                      
6 USDS, Iran, 1950-1954, Reel 41: 47-49. 
7 Most Kurds in the Middle East live in a loosely-defin d area known as Kurdistan, which includes parts of 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.  Kurds have their own language and culture and some Kurdish nationalists 
hope to establish independent Kurdish rule in all or parts of Kurdistan.  In Iran, 7% of the population s 
Kurdish, and Kurdish-majority areas lie, for the most part, along parts of the borders with Iraq and Turkey.  
For a useful survey of Kurdish history, see David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: IB 
Taurus, 2004).  Also see Abbas Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity (London: 
IB Taurus, forthcoming). 
8 Tensions over Jewish refugees were heightened in Iranian Kurdistan for a variety of reasons (including a 
famine and subsequent crop failure that further aggavated the strain of having more than ten thousand 
Jewish refugees entering Iran through Kurdish areas).   
9 USDS, Iran, 1950-1954, Reel 40:  882-891.  
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When foreign Jewish aid workers working in Iran raised the possibility of a 
pogrom against Iranian Jews, they were pooh-poohed as naïve by the Iranian Jewish 
community.  Only a few years later, however, the Israeli Jewish Morning Journal ran the 
following headline on March 24, 1952: “Jews in Iran in a panic because of threat of 
pogrom.”  This threat, which was taken very seriously by Iranian Jews, came at the height 
of the crisis over oil nationalization.  Due to the dire economic problems faced by the 
government as a result of the blockade of Iranian ol following its nationalization, the 
Mosaddeq administration requested a loan of fifteen million rials from the Jewish 
community.  Although the community had some very affluent members, such a large sum 
was impossible to obtain quickly in the midst of an economic crisis.  Jewish leaders 
pleaded with Mosaddeq, but he said that the money was needed.  To force the issue, 
Mosaddeq’s then political ally, Ayatollah Kashani, “who is known as the Iranian Hitler,” 
met with Jewish leaders (apparently without Mosaddeq’s knowledge) and told them that 
if he was not paid, “the results will be unpleasant.”  He warned that if there was non-
compliance, “every Jew in Iran would pay with his blood ‘for his opposition to the 
national Iranian government.’”  In spite of great efforts, the full amount could not be 
obtained since, despite stereotypes of affluence and influence, most of the primarily rural 
Jewish community had “plod rod” to contribute.  Children were reportedly forced to take 
to the streets to beg in an attempt to meet the requested amount.10  Ten million rials were 
eventually paid.11 
The perception of Jewish affluence led to the mistaken idea that this group had 
money to spare that could be used to aid the nation  a time of profound crisis, with 
                                                      
10 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 19 / 04/ Box 42 / Folder 570.1 – General, concerning the Jewish situation in 
Iran, January 23, 1952; USDS, Iran, 1950-1954, Reel 40: 905. 
11 Ibid., "Preoccupation of Jews with present situation in Iran," January 23, 1952. 
95 
 
failure to contribute taken as an anti-patriotic stance.  In the earlier refugee crisis 
involving Iraqi Jews, Iranian Jews had been aloof, believing themselves safe and 
integrated into the Iranian nation.  With the increas d emphasis on nativism as the oil 
crisis escalated, Iranian Jews were called upon to prove their Iranian identity and loyalty 
by contributing to the nationalist cause.  They were treated as second-class citizens, and 
were the victims of anti-Semitic assumptions and threats, but they were, behind all of 
this, at least considered to be Iranian and to have a role in the national struggle.  The 
Baha’is had no such place.  They were treated as irreconcilable, irredeemably “foreign” 
elements, who were cast as a fifth column within Iran. 
 
Anti-Baha’ism, 1941-1954 
Abbas Amanat and Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi have identfi d a shift in anti-Baha’ism in 
the 1940s, as accusations of treason and anti-patriotism (i.e. national apostasy) replaced 
charges of religious apostasy.12  Unlike these two assessments, most discussions of 
Baha’i persecutions are not as distinguishing about the significance of changing anti-
Baha’i sentiment over time, instead grouping the Babi and Baha’i religions together and 
discussing a “century and a half” of mostly continuous persecution, from the beginning of 
the Babi movement in 1844 until the present, even though the Baha’i Faith itself did not 
                                                      
12 I have consciously avoided getting drawn into an analysis of the heretical arguments of the earlier period 
because this explanation for anti-Baha’ism has been excessively foregrounded and mistakenly applied to 
the post-1941 period.  This is not dissimilar to the problematic conflation of traditional anti-Semitism with 
its national incarnation in the Middle East following the creation of Israel.  I am limiting my discussion of 
earlier religious objections since my main aim is to situate the anti-Baha’ism that culminated in the 1955 
pogrom in terms of the larger threads of Iranian history without getting drawn into theology, martyrology, 
apologetics, or the exotic and complex history of the Babis and Baha’is, which has tended to contribute to 
the ghettoization of Baha’i history and its (partially self-imposed) segregation from mainstream Iranian 
history. As a corrective move, I am attempting to discuss Baha’i history not in terms of Shi’ite eschatology 
and heresiology, but rather as a component of the history of the ulama, the Pahlavi regime, and American 
foreign policy.   
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even exist until the 1860s.13  The most recent example of this ahistorical approach is last 
year’s 160 Sal Mobarezeh ba A’in-e Baha’i (160 Years of Combating the Baha’i Faith).14 
Taking a more sophisticated view, Amanat points out tha  whereas Baha’is were 
attacked as heretics in the Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, from the 1940s onwards anti-
Baha’ism underwent a profound transformation, moving away from the realm of ‘heresy’ 
into allegations of corruption, espionage, and conspiracy.  As anti-Baha’ism shifted to an 
attack on corruption and unpatriotic collaboration with foreign powers, it was taken up by 
intellectuals and secular Iranians who had little int rest in earlier accusations of heresy.  
This new phase of anti-Baha’ism was, in many ways,  rallying cry based on the 
reaffirmation of Shi’ism as the inverse of Baha’ism.  As Amanat puts it, anti-Baha’ism 
was “transformed into an act of reaffirming a threatened and confused Shi’i ‘self’ at a 
time when social dislocation, acculturation, and political oppression under the shah left 
little else for the Shi’i majority to rally behind.” 15  Tavakoli-Targhi likewise claims that 
the Baha’i Faith was opposed as a heresy from its inception until the 1940s, but that in 
this decade it came to be opposed primarily in terms of its supposed foreignness, despite 
being a “genuinely Iranian religion.”16   
Tavakoli-Targhi contends that this marking of the Baha’is as “foreign” is based 
on a “purposeful forgetfulness” of the Iranian and Shi’ite origins of the religion.  He links 
                                                      
13 For a problematization of the conflation of Babi and Baha’i history, see MacEoin, “From Babism to 
Baha'ism.” 
14 Fereydun Vahman, 160 Sal Mobarezeh ba A’in-e Baha’i (Darmstadt, Germany: Asr-e Jadid, 2010). 
Despite my objection to its title, this book is a useful resource.  For additional details on the persecution of 
Baha’is in different periods, see: Mottahedeh, Representing the Unpresentable; Amanat, “The Historical 
Roots of the Persecution of Babis and Baha’is in Ira ;” Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice: Reflections on 
Secular anti-Baha’ism in Iran;” Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism in Iran;” Reza Afshari, 
“The Discourse and Practice of Human Rights Violatins of Iranian Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran” in Seena Fazel and Dominic Brookshaw ed.,  The Baha'is of Iran: Socio-historical studies (New 
York: Routledge, 2008); and Cole, "The Baha'i Minorty and Nationalism in Contemporary Iran.” 
15 Amanat, “The Historical Roots,” pp. 171-72. 
16 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism in Iran,” p. 202. 
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this shift in anti-Baha’ism to a more general turn to xenophobia and nativism in the post-
War period, which sought to explain Iran’s failures by appealing to an external cause and 
promoting nativism as a panacea.  As part of this larger phenomenon, the Islamic 
organizations of the period promoted a nationalized form of Shi’ism as the answer to all 
of Iran’s problems, and the Islamicization of the public sphere as the first step in this 
soteriological project.  A key element of this sanctification of the public sphere involved 
the removal of its previous openness to non-conformist thought and belief.17    
The “othering” of the Baha’is was intimately connected to this intellectual 
construction of Iran as a “Muslim nation.”  The two ideas were so linked that an inverse 
relationship was perceived between the two sides of the binary, such that it was firmly 
believed that the infrastructure of Baha’ism had to first be torn down in order for an 
Islamic nation to be established in its place.  This need by the clergy and Islamic 
organizations to define themselves negatively, as the inverse of Baha’ism, and to delay 
expectations of an Islamic utopia by shunting this po sibility into a post-Baha’i future, 
was symptomatic of a lack of ideological confidence. 
According to Sanasarian, one powerful motivator driving anti-Baha’i action has 
been the aggressor’s need for “self-justification,” their need to justify and explain their 
own failings and unacceptable situation by looking for a scapegoat.18  Baha’is were 
chosen to fulfill this function for a number of reasons.  One was that, unlike other 
religious minorities who were traditionally easily identifiable and segregated in various 
ways, Baha’is were found in all locations and were indistinguishable from the wider 
                                                      
17 Ibid., pp. 200-01. 
18 Sanasarian, “The Comparative Dimension,” p. 160. 
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population in terms of language, dress, neighborhood, names, or ethnicity.19  As such, 
they could be framed as “the enemy within,” since th y were indistinguishable, at the 
surface level, from those around them, yet they maintained a separate, private religious 
affiliation.20   
Sanasarian also suggests that the verbal abuse involved in anti-Baha’ism should 
be seen in light of Brennan’s observation that “Behind almost every escalation of 
linguistic derision is some kind of ideology: that is a philosophy, a social theory, a set of 
interrelated ideas, concepts, beliefs, and values that generate and sustain the 
dissemination of dehumanizing terminology.”21  If we accept Brennan’s theory that 
escalations in minority persecution are symptomatic of deological developments, we can 
link the anti-Baha’ism of the post-1941 period to deeper ideological changes among the 
clergy and Islamic associations involved in the anti-Baha’i struggle.  Whereas earlier 
persecutions were perhaps symptomatic of class struggles, the post-1941 persecution was 
also symptomatic of the early stages of Shi’ite nationalism.  That is to say, it was related 
to the imagining of the “limits” of the nation.   
In order for religious nationalism to find traction, it (ironically) must frame the 
“religious” issue in such a way that the movement can be supported by even secular 
individuals, as occurred with Islam in Pakistan, Judaism in Israel, and Islam in Iran’s 
1979 Revolution.  Such framings often involve the us of scare tactics involving a 
dangerous Other.  Acceptance of the polemic about the dangers of the Other is a gateway 
to the acceptance of the other side of the binary, the belief that religion provides the best 
                                                      
19 This is generally true, but there are some ways in which a stranger could be recognized as a Baha’i.  
Many prominent Baha’i families, for example, took their last name from the terms that Baha’u’llah or 
Abdu’l-Baha used in tablets addressed to their ancestors.  Many Baha’is also wear rings or necklaces 
featuring a distinct and recognizable Baha’i symbol (the Baha’i “ringstone symbol”). 
20 Sanasarian, “The Comparative Dimension,” p. 163. 
21 William Brennan, Dehumanizing the Vulnerable (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1995), pp. 11-12.  
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way to achieve national unity to face this threat.  If, shortly before Indian independence, 
for example, a secular Muslim could be convinced that he would be mistreated under a 
Hindu majority, this belief also involved the implicit acceptance of the argument’s 
complement, that he would be better treated in a Muslim state.  In this scenario, Pakistan 
is not appealing based on religious sentiment but is instead sold, to religious as well as 
secular Muslims, as a defensive move against a dangerous Other.  Israel is, likewise, a 
nationalization of religious identity as a defense against a threatening Other, which is a 
premise that has been appealing to secular as well as religious Jews.   
A similar argument was being made in the post 1941 anti-Baha’i discourse.  
Namely, that the nation is in danger, due to the boogeyman of a Baha’i fifth column, and 
that patriotic Iranians must rally as an Islamic nation to remove this “foreign” threat and 
ensure that the state reflects the identity and orientation of the nation.  This is a proto-
religious nationalist argument, and it contained many spects of the religious nationalism 
that emerged publically in the 1960s and thereafter, but it did not yet reach the threshold 
of autonomous nationalism because it was still subsumed within royalism and accepted 
the traditionalist relationship between the Shah and the clergy, in which the Shah could 
be admonished about the need to enforce Islam, but executive powers remained with him.   
In other words, it was a discourse on the “limits” of the nation that did not yet 
involve claims of “sovereignty.”  As noted in the previous chapter, the Shah is praised in 
letters warning about the Baha’i threat, and he is not himself linked to them.  In these 
appeals, although the “Islamic nation” is lauded, it is the Shah and the majles that are 
called upon to play the role of saviors by removing the Baha’is.  Later, in the period 
between 1955 and 1963 discussed in subsequent chapters, this acceptance of the 
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naturalness of royal rule falls away as the Shah, the Americans, the Baha’is, and the 
Israelis are rhetorically equated, and an autonomous Shi’ite nationalism emerges in 
opposition to this many-faced boogeyman. 
Chehabi has questioned why the Baha’i religion has received intense hostility 
from secular Iranians, which is confusing given its progressive ideas and its scripture’s 
patriotic elevation of Iran as “the noblest of nations” (ashraf-e melal).  He proposes that 
this hostility is the result of the ingrained perception in most Iranians, including secular 
Iranians, that the Baha’is are, or were (1) a source of national division, (2) the tools of 
foreign powers, (3) disproportionately represented in the Pahlavi regime, and (4) cliquish 
and self-serving.22  This framing of anti-Baha’ism in non-religious terms has allowed the 
struggle against them to be phrased in nationalistic language that could appeal to secular 
Muslims and even other minority groups.   
Interestingly, although the Islamic organizations disseminated these ideas and 
helped them to become ingrained in the Iranian psyche, these arguments were largely 
borrowed from secular intellectuals who objected to the Baha’is because of their revival 
of religion in Iran.  The first two objections to the Baha’is that were raised by Chehabi 
are expressed in the writings of two of the most important Iranian historians of the 1940s, 
Fereydun Adamiyat and Ahmad Kasravi.   
Writing in 1944, Adamiyat claims that clinging to superstition and religion 
instead of modern science has led to dangerous internal divisions like the emergence of 
the Babi-Baha’i religion.  He suggests that the reason why the Baha’is were successful in 
                                                      
22 Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice,” p. 184-86.   
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pulling Iran backwards (contrary to the supposedly unidirectional march of progress) was 
that the Powers “watered its roots” and intervened to promote it within Iran.23   
In 1322 (1943/4), Kasravi also denounces Baha’ism, referring to it as just a 
warmed-over rehash of old Shi’ite falsehoods.  He claims that Baha’is are the enemies of 
the people (mardom), and that they try to achieve communal success by destroying the 
nation.24  This binary that Kasravi created—between the “peopl ” and the Baha’is—
slowly became a recurring motif in clerical anti-Baha’i literature from the 1940s 
onwards, and is treated in detail in Chapter VI.  The Islamic movement’s use of Kasravi 
is deeply ironic, especially so because of the Feda’iyan-e Islam’s role in the 
dissemination of these borrowed ideas, since it was the Feda’iyan-e Islam that killed 
Kasravi for his intellectual criticisms of Shi’ism, and it was Navvab Safavi’s intense 
hatred for Kasravi that prompted him to form the terror group in the first place.  The 
intense hatred for Kasravi in conservative circles led to not only his assassination, but to a 
series of literary refutations that necessitated a close (albeit hostile) reading of his 
works.25  This close familiarity with his work led to the absorption of some of his ideas, 
including his secular-nationalist objection to Baha’ism.  A similar phenomenon occurred 
later with the Hojjatiyeh, who engaged in intense hostile readings of Baha’i texts only to 
absorb and emulate many of their target’s external features.26 
The remaining secular objections to Baha’ism that were identified by Chehabi—
their over-representation in the Pahlavi period and cliquish ways—are complicated by 
disagreements over who is a Baha’i and what it means to be a Baha’i.  This perception of 
                                                      
23 Fereydoun Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va Iran (Tehran: Bungah-e Azar, 1944), p. 258. 
24 Ahmad Kasravi, Baha’i-gari (Cologne, Germany: Mihr, 1996), pp 99-100. 
25 Khomeini’s first book, 1942’s Kashf al-Asrar (Uncovering of Secrets), was a refutation of Kasravi’s 
ideas, based on a close reading of Asrar-e Hazar Saleh (Secrets of a Thousand Years), written by a disciple 
of Kasravi.  
26 See Chapter VIII. 
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over-representation was so strong that even former Prime Minister Alam (who was the 
greatest defender of the Baha’is during the 1955 pogrom) suggested, in a 1973 diary 
entry, that Baha’is had infiltrated the realms of pwer to the point that half the Cabinet 
was said to be Baha’i.27  A close reading shows that Alam is not stating this as a fact, but 
is instead relating a popular perception.  Nevertheless, Alam’s comments and those of 
other insiders were used—and are still used—to reinforce this perception.   
Baha’i apologetic works acknowledge the success of Baha’i businessmen, such as 
Habib Sabet, but claim that the politicians accused of Baha’ism (such as Prime Minister 
Hoveyda) were not Baha’is, although they came from Baha’i backgrounds in some cases.  
Chehabi problematizes this stance by pointing out that while Baha’is maintain that they 
are a voluntary association and, as such, do not attribute Baha’i identity to those who are 
not enrolled members of the community, Muslims generally judge Baha’i-ness with the 
same criteria that is used to determine who is and is ot a Muslim.28  As such, Baha’i 
apologists largely miss the point by framing the issue in terms of official membership.  
Those who make accusations against Hoveyda and others do sometimes claim that these 
individuals had Baha’i membership, which is not true, but their main point is that these 
individuals who came from Baha’i backgrounds had a Baha’i identity of some sort, just 
as a lapsed catholic would likely have a Catholic identity of some sort, or a non-religious 
Jew may still claim Judaism as their ethnicity.  Chehabi mentions Fu’ad Rohani (future 
head of OPEC) as an example of someone who came fro a Baha’i background but who 
was not a Baha’i himself, by Baha’i definitions.29  In 1955, however, in the midst of anti-
                                                      
27 Alikhani, Yaddashtha-ye ‘Alam (Bethesda, MD: Iranbooks, 2006.), vol. 2, p. 166. 




Baha’i persecutions, Rohani displayed a clear Baha’i identity in discussions with him on 
this matter.30   
There are also Muslims, like Major Arsham (discussed in subsequent chapters), 
who are not Baha’i and have no Baha’i ancestors, but nevertheless possess a form of 
Baha’i identity because they are married to Baha’is and thus have a special sensitivity 
and sympathy for Baha’is issues in the same way that a non-Jewish spouse of a Jewish 
individual may take personal offense at anti-Semitis  and feel included in the targeted 
group although not Jewish themselves.  Identity is not monochromatic, and Baha’i 
disavowals of certain individuals based on membership data alone have been 
unconvincing.  Of course, many of those accused of Baha’ism had no connection 
whatsoever to the religion, but nevertheless found the slander difficult to shed, because of 
the perception that many Baha’is engaged in dissimulation.31   
 Regarding the issue of over-representation, Chehabi notes that this was not a 
reason for anger in and of itself, since graduates of certain schools were 
disproportionately represented in the circles of power without objection.  In the Baha’i 
case, over-representation led to anger because of th  perception that this power was used 
in a biased way, to promote cliquish interests, as well as to support and defend the corrupt 
status quo.32  Moreover, this power or influence was considered dangerous because 
Baha’is were believed to be cosmopolitan and externally-oriented rather than 
nationalistic.  Iranian nationalism—both secular and religious—leans heavily on 
nativism, xenophobia, and conspiracy theories, while t e Baha’is consider themselves 
                                                      
30 See, for example, TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1 / 55, British Consulate in Khorramshahr to FO, 
May 25 1955, p. 1. 
31 Appendix III includes an extended discussion of the practice of falsely accusing opponents of Baha’ism. 
32 Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice,” pp 190-91. 
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world citizens, preach the unity of nations, believe in the integration of the East and the 
West, and are highly critical of difference-centered nationalist ideologies.  As such, they 
could, with little effort, be cast as the “quintessntial internal Other of the nationalist 
imagination.”33  Because of their world-embracing beliefs, even the sympathetic Alam 
refers to them as “nationless” (bivatan) and wonders, “Is it possible to be a… Baha’i and 
still have the interests of his nation at heart?”34 
This suspicion concerning the national loyalty of the Baha’is increased 
significantly following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, which caused the 
headquarters of the Baha’i Faith in Haifa, Palestin o become situated in the “Zionist 
entity.”35  This linking of Baha’is and Jews was accelerated by the creation of Israel, but 
was present in earlier polemic during the 1940s.  A September 1946 article in Parcham-e 
Islam, for example, claims that the reason why so many Jews converted to the Baha’i 
                                                      
33 Ibid., pp. 192-94. 
34 Alikhani, Yaddashtha-ye ‘Alam, Vol. 2, pp. 166, 362 [quoted in Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice,” pp. 
188-93].  It should be noted that despite the repeated charges that the Baha’is were “nationless” and were 
rootless cosmopolitans, the founders of the Baha’i F ith were proud Iranians whose writings were full of 
patriotic praise for their homeland.  Baha’u’llah’s book of laws (al-Kitab al-Aqdas, c. 1873) includes the 
promise that in the future Iran will be ruled by a tolerant republic controlled by the people (verses 91-93).  
On occasion, Baha’u’llah demonstrated his love and ppreciation of Persian culture by writing in “pure 
Persian” (i.e. not using any Arabic loan words, which is exceedingly difficult since modern Persian is 
infused with words of Arabic origin) in works such as the Tablet of Seven Questions (Lawh-e Haft 
Porsesh).  With Baha’u’llah’s support, his son Abdu’l-Baha wrote an extended essay (Resaleh-ye 
Madaniyeh, c. 1875, known in English as The Secret of Divine Civilization) in which he critiqued the 
political environment in Iran and suggested a number of reforms (instituting elections, mass education, 
legal reform, and so on) for the good of the nation.  Baha’is and Azalis (Babis who did not accept 
Baha’u’llah) were also involved in Iran’s Constitutonal Revolution and other political movements.  
Admittedly, things changed after 1921, since Shoghi Effendi’s focus was global and he forbid involvement 
in Iranian politics.  Likewise, the Universal House of Justice has chosen not to get involved in any political 
movements in Iran (or elsewhere). 
35 As previously discussed, the Baha’i headquarters is in Haifa (Israel) because that is where the religion’s 
founder died in 1892, having been sent there as a political prisoner of the Ottoman Empire.  Obviously, this 
cannot rightly be seen as anything other than an historical accident.  Yet, this issue has been repeatdly 
used in anti-Baha’i polemic as evidence that Baha’is re Zionists and Israeli spies. 
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Faith is that the two groups are so similar in their methodology and fabrications, and that 
“In whatever country they reside, [Baha’is] and Jews commit involuntary treachery.”36   
American support for both Iran and Israel, and increasing American involvement 
in Iran, heightened suspicions in this regard, since anti-Baha’i activists had an 
exaggerated perception of the size and influence of the Baha’i community in the United 
States, and were fearful that the Baha’is would convince America to hand Iran over to 
them, just as—they believed—the Jews in the West were able to have Palestine given to 
them.  Whereas Baha’is were attacked earlier in the 1940s as the creation of foreign 
powers, to create internal divisions in Iran, in the post-1948 period they were described as 
the active agents of Zionism and America, colonialism’s advance guard.  This led to the 
conflation of anti-Bahaism and anti-Zionism, and the development of “Jews and Baha’is” 
as a paired target.   The blending of anti-Semitism and anti-Baha’ism also led to anti-
Jewish tales being re-imagined and repurposed against the Baha’is.  This can be seen in 
the fabricated episode related in the memoirs of Ayatollah Mas’udi Khomeini, in which 
Baha’is are said to kill Muslim children during the mourning for Imam Husayn during 
Ashura, which is a rehashing of traditional blood libels that attributed such behavior to 
Jews at Easter, with Christian children.37   
The most important reason why Baha’is came to “constitute the internal Other” 
for both religious and secular Iranians, according to Chehabi, is that—in the period after 
the Second World War—the majority of the population internalized and naturalized the 
idea that “to be a ‘true’ Iranian… one has to be at le st culturally from a Twelver Shi’i 
                                                      
36 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism in Iran,” pp. 220-21. 
37 Mas’udi Khomeini, Khaterat-e Ayatollah Mas’udi Khomeini, Javad Emami ed. (Tehrān: Markaz-e 
Asnad-e Inqilab-e Islami, 2002), pp. 229-30.  For mre information, see Sen Mcglinn, “The Blood Libel: 
Qom Variant,” accessed 15 February 2011, http://sensday.wordpress.com/2010/05/25/blood-libel-qom/. 
106 
 
background.”  He supports this claim by referring to Najmabadi’s observation that 
“Iranian modernity has not openly and explicitly inscribed Baha’is in the category 
Iranian.”38  
Chehabi is correct up to a point, but Baha’is were placed on the other end of this 
binary structure not because they were the minority most culturally different from the 
majority, but because they were the one that was most similar.  Not only were Baha’is 
indistinguishable based on names, appearance, language, or location, but the Babi-Baha’i 
tradition was itself an offshoot of Shi’ism, maintai ing many of its aspects in modernized 
form to become, as MacEoin puts it (with relation t Babism), a through-the-looking-
glass version of Shi’ism that had “delved to the depths of Islam and came out on the other 
side de-Islamicized.”39  Fischer also claims that Baha’is were uniquely problematic for 
Shi’ism because “the idiom of Bahaism is so close to that of Islam that it denies the 
normal construction of significance that Muslims place on their idiom.”40  This brings us 
back to Kasravi’s argument that Baha’ism is just a new take on Shi’ism (feigning 
modernity while being culturally the same as its earli r form), which attacks the Baha’is 
not for being dissimilar to Shi’ites, but for being too similar. 
Chehabi’s formulation is incomplete, as it is not sufficient to say that the masses 
internalized and naturalized the idea that one must be “culturally from a Twelver Shi’i 
background.”  It may be more accurate to say that the masses naturalized the idea that to 
be Iranian meant that one opposed Baha’ism, since the idea that Iran’s unmarked national 
                                                      
38 Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice,” p. 195; Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without 
Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), p. 299 n41.  
39 MacEoin, The Messiah of Shiraz, p. 646. 
40 Fischer, Iran, p. 187. 
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identity is Shi’ite (the founding myth of Shi’ite nationalism in Iran) is, and has been, 
inseparably intertwined with the concomitant marking of Baha’ism as a foreign threat.   
 
Borujerdi and the anti-Baha’i lobby 
According to Rasul Jafarian, in the decade after th abdication of Reza Shah, two “major 
dangers” faced the Muslims in Iran.  The first was the (Communist) Tudeh party, while 
the second was the Baha’i religion, “about which the believers have a sensitivity 
(hesasiyat dashtan) that is singular and unique (tanha va tanha).”41  The Baha’is were 
believed to have infiltrated the governmental bureacr cy since the Reza Shah period, but 
it was not until his abdication that action could be taken to protest this development.  The 
danger from Communism was considered more important before 1953 but, after the 
dismantling of Tudeh following the coup to remove Mosaddeq, Baha’ism came to be 
seen as the most serious danger to Iranian Muslims.42 
As Shi’ism’s leading marja’ (the highest rank of religious authority), Ayatollah 
Borujerdi became the ultimate source of appeal for action against the Baha’is, with a 
flood (sayl) of complaints regularly reaching him about this matter. As a result of this 
pressure from below, he came to intensely oppose the Ba a’is.43  According to his student 
and biographer, Ali Davani, Borujerdi was initially hopeful that by admonishing the 
government he could awaken it to “the danger that comes from the direction of the 
Baha’is” and that this would lead to action to prevent “their influence in the 
governmental establishment, their arrogant conceits, revolutionary sedition (ashub), and 
riotous disturbances (balva).”  After communication with the shifting governments of the 
                                                      
41 Jafarian, Jaryanha va Sazmanha, p. 368. 
42 Ibid., p. 369. 
43 Ibid., pp. 163-64. 
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time, however, Borujerdi sensed either apathy or support for the Baha’is in the majles and 
the Cabinet, and began to consider his admonitions and the polite replies that they 
received to be a pointless exercise.  In a letter to Falsafi, he claimed that the lack of a 
decisive response from the majles was evidence that “the development of the infiltration 
and consolidation (nofuz va taqveyat) of this sect [in the state administration], in terms of 
its purpose and intention, is conscious and deliberate” and was not a lapse or oversight on 
the part of the majles.  What rare anti-Baha’i efforts came from the majles, he 
maintained, were “mere pretense and deception, lacking reality.”  Leading him to 
conclude that “in this matter, all I see is nonsense and idle talk.”44 
Despite his disillusionment, Borujerdi was able to achieve limited dismissals of 
some Bahais employed by the government during the Razmara administration (July 
1950-March 1951).  He successfully convinced Minister of Culture Jaza’iri to inform the 
Cabinet that Muslims were unhappy because the Baha’is were engaging in “political 
demonstrations.”45  When this message was delivered, it was brushed aside with the 
decision to send a circular to the governors re-affirming that the Baha’is were not a 
recognized minority group.  The Minister of Culture, d spite this dismissal of the issue, 
decided to independently dismiss or demote Baha’i employees who refused his 
instruction to affirm “Muslim” as their religious identity.46 
 Part of the problem Borujerdi faced in winning governmental support for strong 
anti-Baha’i action was that, before Mosaddeq, Iran’s leadership was nebulous and 
                                                      
44 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat, p. 198 n1. 
45 Communal political demonstrations are forbidden in the Baha’i Faith.  What Borujerdi is actually 
objecting to is outward and open manifestation of aBaha’i identity, which the Baha’i leadership did call for 
in this period. Seeing a “political protest” in not hiding one’s non-conformist identity is like perceiving a 
“homosexual agenda” whenever a gay person publicly a knowledges their identity.  It speaks to the 
anxieties of a threatened group within the mainstream and is not an indication of any overt political action 
by the feared Other. 
46 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism in Iran,” pp. 213-15. 
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shifting.  The Shah had little influence and was not directly involved in government, 
while those who wielded political authority did so tenuously and briefly.  This can be 
seen in an episode in which, having lost faith in the majles, Borujerdi sent Ruhollah 
Khomeini to ask the Shah to intervene to make sure that some Muslims who had 
murdered Baha’is would not be held accountable for their crime.  Khomeini informed the 
Shah that in the time of his father, Reza Shah, the Baha’is had been kept “in their place” 
and now the people (mardom) expected the same from him.  In reply,  
this youth (the Shah) heaved a sigh and said: “Mr. Khomeini! Do not compare 
now to that time!  That time all of the ministers and all of the nation’s dignitaries 
were obedient to my father.   They were not courageous enough to offend him, 
but now even the Minister of Court does not obey me!  So, how can I take this 
action?47   
 When Mosaddeq became Iran’s unrivaled political authority (1951-53), Borujerdi 
initially had high hopes about the prospect of anti-Baha’i action.  He sent Falsafi, to meet 
with Mosaddeq and explain that the Grand Ayatollah w s receiving constant complaints 
about Baha’i activities and desired strong governmetal action to remedy the Baha’i 
problem.  Falsafi informed the Prime Minister of “the danger of Baha’ism” and told him 
that “the Baha’is were gradually coming to be considered part of the nation (mellat) of 
Iran, and the possessors of rights equal to those of Muslims.”48  He was shocked when 
Mosaddeq responding with laughter and a “mocking” dismissal.  This shock turned to 
astonishment when Mosaddeq’s told him that “there is no difference between Muslims 
and Baha’is. They are all one nation and Iranian.”  Falsafi, sensing the firmness of the 
                                                      
47 Habib Ladjevardi, ed., Khaterat-e Dr. Mehdi Ha’eri-Yazdi (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 2001), pp. 56-57; Khomeini, Khaterat-e Ayatollah Mas’udi Khomeini, 
pp. 228-29; this involvement by Ruhollah Khomeini is challenged by Abo’l-Qasem Khazali, Khaterat-e 
Ayatollah Abo’l-Qasem Khazali (Intisharat-e Markaz-e Asnad-e Inqilab-e Islami, 2003), p. 58. 
48 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat, p. 200. 
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Prime Minister’s convictions in this matter, dropped the issue and relayed his failure to 
Borujerdi, who received the news of the Prime Minister’  pronouncement on the Baha’is 
with shock and disbelief.49  Hojjat al-Islam Qannatabadi and others have linked th  
clerical turn against Mosaddeq not only to his support for the Left and failure to 
implement Islamic reforms—as per the standard narrative—but also to his support for the 
Baha’is, which led to paranoia that he planned to deliver Iran to the perceived twin poles 
of irreligion, the Communists and the Baha’is.50 
Despite his disillusionment, Borujerdi continued to admonish the government to 
little effect, and this pattern continued after theCIA-sponsored coup of 1953, which 
replaced Mosaddeq with Zahedi.  Although Zahedi wasgr teful to the clerical hierarchy 
for their opposition to Mosaddeq, he continued the practice of shunting action on the 
Baha’i question, this time on the excuse that the remnants of Tudeh must first be crushed 
and oil negotiations completed.  In a June 9, 1954 letter to Falsafi, Borujerdi laments the 
government’s indecision on the Baha’i matter and claims that this has led to a Baha’i 
takeover of the oil operations in Abadan (an allusion to the aforementioned Rohani, 
among others).  He instructs Falsafi to seek a meeting with the Shah, but says, “I do not 
believe that even a little will be gained.  This low y one is completely out of hope for the 
rectification of this country.”  He bemoans the fate of Iran if action is not taken on the 
Baha’i question: 
I do not know where the conditions in Iran will lead!  It is as if the leaders of Iran 
have fallen into such a deep sleep that no sound—however horrible it is—can 
wake them up.… This lowly one sees the affairs of Iran facing grave danger due 
to this sect.  They are given so much access into the government bureaucracy, and 
                                                      
49 Ibid., pp. 138-39. 
50 Ali Rahnama, Niruha-ye Mazhabi bar Bestar-e Harakat-e Nehzat-e Melli (Tehran: Gam-Naw Publishing, 
2004), p. 996. 
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have come to dominate affairs so much… I do not know with whom one must 
speak and what bell one must ring to awaken the sleeping ones.51  
The frustration of the early Zahedi period coincided with Baha’i plans for 
unprecedented global expansion, which featured prominent plans for Iran, including the 
goal of doubling the number of Baha’i communities within Iran.  This was part of a 
global campaign of expansion, from 1953-63, that the leader of the Baha’is (Shoghi 
Effendi Rabbani) called the “Ten Year Crusade.”  Part of this “Crusade” involved the 
construction of a handful of prominent “Mother Temples,” or “Houses of Worship,” 
which were to be built at strategically important locations—including Iran—to mark the 
opening up of the world to the Baha’i religion.52   
Those with strong anti-Baha’i views saw this planned T mple as the equivalent of 
a territorial claim on Iran, which threatened their view of Iran as the stronghold of 
Shi’ism.  The Temple was also problematic because of Iranian Shi’ism’s concern with 
maintaining its hegemony over the sacred skyline by restricting the ability of minority 
groups to build or expand their places of worship in a way that would appear to threaten 
the structural dominance of Shi’ism.  The idea thate Tehran skyline would be 
embellished with a prominent Baha’i temple symbolizing the “conquering” of Iran was 
too much for some to take.  There was a strong feeling that something had to be done 
immediately to prevent this. 
                                                      
51 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat, p. 199. 
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              Figure 3. 1.  The planned Baha’i temple in Tehran. 
 
Kill them, where possible 
In light of the government’s failure to respond to calls for action against the Baha’is, 
there were a number of instances in which local anti-Baha’i activists attempted to remove 
Baha’i nofuuz (influence, infiltration) themselves, often with te incitement and support 
of the clergy.  These violent episodes during the 1940s were outlined in an extensive 
October 23, 1951 letter from the Baha’i community to the Iranian government, written on 
the advice of Mosaddeq.  This document traces an extended narrative of murder, assault, 
looting, mutilation, desecration, arson, and verbal and sexual humiliation at the hands of 
the clergy and “crazed mobs” under their sway, with the government, security forces, and 
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general public either ignoring, enabling, or joining i  the persecution.53  These 
persecutions occurred sporadically in rural areas, with no national co-ordination, and 
tended to be chronologically clustered around the periods of greatest social stress—such 
as the end of the War and the politically chaotic years immediately before Mosaddeq’s 
premiership.  The anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955, treated in later chapters, differed from the 
persecutions of this period not so much in its content—with virtually every form of 
persecution outlined in this 1951 letter repeated in 1955—but in terms of its centralized 
organization, national scope, and formal governmental participation.  
Borujerdi indirectly supported anti-Baha’i violence.  This approach is consistent 
with his previously mentioned approach to Tudeh, in which he expressed disdain for 
directly calling for violence that would lead to bloodshed in the streets, instead preferring 
to keep his hands clean by utilizing the more violent Islamic organizations.  Because of 
this preference for indirect involvement, sources disagree about his attitude regarding 
autonomous action the Baha’is.  According to a student of his, Ayatollah Ahmadi-
Shahrudi, Borujerdi approved of the extra-judicial killing of Baha’is.  Before sending out 
his deputies to preach against the Baha’is, he report dly instructed them that they should 
kill the Baha’is where possible.54  According to Ayatollah Montazeri, however, 
Borujerdi’s focus was not on murder but on segregatin  Baha’is from Muslim society.  
Montazeri recalls how, in obedience to this mandate, he gathered together representatives 
from different classes and professions in Najafabad (such as bakers and taxi drivers) and 
made each group pledge not to sell to, or provide services for, Baha’is.  As a result, it was 
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said that—even if he pleaded—a Baha’i was not able to even catch a taxi, even if he 
offered fifty times the standard fare.55  
It should be noted that, although it was claimed that e clergy were voicing the 
will of the people when they spoke out against the Baha’is, at the local level the people 
were often admonished by Borujerdi’s representatives and guided into the expressions of 
anger against the Baha’is that had supposedly originated with them.  The clerical center 
at Qom sent itinerant preachers to the provinces to inspire local action vis-à-vis the 
Baha’i issue.  Ayatollah Khalisizadeh, for example, gave a speech to the people of Yazd 
in which he chastised them, asking mockingly: “Peopl  (mardom)! What kind of 
Muslims are you?”56 He then “outed” various successful local men who were Baha’is 
(including the head of the Chamber of Commerce, a prominent merchant, and the head of 
the local telephone company), all the while repeating he taunt “What kind of Muslims 
are you?” impugning the audience’s manhood for allowing this Baha’i infiltration.57   
Despite the shame that he claimed the audience should feel, Khalisizadeh urged 
temporary restraint when it came to taking action against the Baha’is, as a matter of 
strategy, until the support of the government could be obtained.  In the meantime, he 
echoed the calls for segregation mentioned by Montazeri, but suggested that this was only 
strategic.  Khalisizadeh warns the people: 
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You must only cut off business transactions and social intercourse with them. 
Business dealings with them are forbidden (haram) until, with the aid of the 
government, I will be able to proceed to annihilate ( z bayn bordan) this 
religion… the government will eradicate them (az bayn bordan), and the first 
thing to be destroyed will be Tehran’s National Baha’i Center (Haziratu’l-
Quds).58 
This anticipated governmental action would take far longer than Khalisizadeh 
envisioned, but his speech reveals the long-gestating s rategy to slowly obtain 
governmental support for widespread violence, and the early priorities for what would be 
targeted once this support was eventually obtained.  The identification of the Baha’i 
National Center as the initial target for governmental intervention can also be seen in 
similar early calls by Ayatollah Kashani and by Iran’s Society of Worshipers.59  As a 
result, rumors of the imminent destruction of the Haziratu’l-Quds (National Baha’i 
Center) were in circulation since May 1948.60 
In addition to the activities of the mainstream clergy, the Feda’iyan-e Islam also 
began to take autonomous action against the perceivd Baha’i threat.  After their 
assassination of Minister Hazhir in 1949—in part due to accusations of Baha’ism—
Navvab Safavi hid near Qazvin and Taleqan and, while in these areas, continued to speak 
out against the Baha’is threat.  Some of the Feda’is in the area, motivated by Safavi, used 
shovels and pickaxes to murder a Baha’i landlord in a village near Qazvin.  Those 
arrested for the murder were not tried until early1953.  During this trial, the Feda’iyan 
rallied to the support of the accused and were able to raise approximately 400,000 tomans 
in the bazaar to support their accused brethren.  As a result of intense pressure by the 
Feda’iyan, the accused were freed and, to celebrate, six sheep were sacrificed in front of 
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60 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism in Iran,” p. 215. 
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the courthouse and a night of celebration was organized in which several hundred 
members engaged in revelry into the middle of the night, led by Safavi himself.61 
 
The “Martyrs” of Abarqu and the murder of Dr. Berji s 
On January 3, 1950 a middle-aged woman (Soghra) and her five children were 
slaughtered in the outskirts of Abarqu (just over 200 km from Yazd).  All evidence 
indicates that the murders were ordered by a wealthy local landlord (Isfandiyar Salari) 
who held a grudge against the old woman and wanted revenge (since she had steered a 
widow he desired into a relationship with another man).  This is how Dad initially 
reported the case.  Later, influential associates of Salari protected him and used Baha’is 
as scapegoats for the crime (despite the fact that here were no Baha’is in the area). 
Without cause, Baha’is from nearby areas were arrested, as were those falsely believed to 
be Baha’i, as well as all nine members of the administrative council of the Baha’is of 
Yazd.  In order to make the Baha’i explanation work, Soghra was re-imagined as a pious 
Muslim hero who was brutally slaughtered because of her brave and pious words against 
the Baha’is.62    
This scapegoating of the Baha’is was accompanied by a great deal of fear-
mongering and propaganda, which resulted in an increase in anti-Baha’i sentiment and 
violence in Yazd.  In March 1951, for example, a ded body was discovered and, based 
on nothing, it was claimed that the Baha’is had murdered the man.  His coffin was 
paraded around by youth who lamented the death and spoke against the evils of the 
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Baha’is.  This increased tension also led to the murder of Barham Rohani, as well as 
several attacks on Baha’i properties.63 
According to Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, anger over the Abarqu murder was also the 
chief motivating factor for the killing shortly thereafter of a Baha’i doctor in Kashan.64  
Dr. Sulayman Berjis (1897–1950) was one of the most prominent doctors in Kashan and 
came from a family of Jewish physicians that had converted to the Baha’i Faith.  Towards 
the end of his life, he spent a great deal of his time making house calls to provide medical 
care and dispense prescriptions, often at nominal charge.65  This practice was exploited 
when, on February 3, 1950, he was lured to the place where he was murdered through a 
fictitious story about a sick individual in need of treatment. 66   
Upon arriving, he was told to recant his religion or face death.  He attempted to 
flee, but was caught and dismembered, with more than eighty wounds inflicted to his 
body.  The murderers then proceeded on a victory mach through the bazaar, praising 
God and claiming to have killed a “murderer.”67  Some observers showed support by 
closing their shops to join in the procession, which reportedly came to number in the 
thousands.  Eventually, the murderers arrived at the police station and proudly announced 
that they had killed the leader of the Baha’is in fulfillment of their religious obligation.68  
After they were arrested, a large crowd gathered to protest their imprisonment and the 
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streets of Kashan became chaotic until security forces dispersed the crowd by firing 
warning shots into the air.   
The leader of those who confessed to the crime was Muhammad Rasulzadeh, a 
dye and silk salesman, while the other three men with him were youth between sixteen 
and twenty.  Upon interrogation, the four openly admitted to killing Berjis because he 
was an “infidel” who sought to spread his religion t  Muslims.  They maintained that the 
act of murder was legal because they had been carrying out their religious duty by acting 
in obedience to a fatwa (authoritative religious decree) by the most learnd cleric of the 
age.  They refused to say who they considered this to be.   
There are some indications that the four men were pa t of the Feda’iyan-e Islam, 
and that they even announced this affiliation following the murder.69  Regardless of 
membership, the men had clearly been influenced by both the Feda’iyan and the itinerant 
anti-Baha’i preachers that had been moving through the area.  Among these were 
firebrands such as Ahmadi-Shahrudi and Turabi.  These individuals spoke, as Borujerdi’s 
representatives, at nearby gatherings of the Islamic Propagation Association (Anjoman-e 
Tablighat-e Islami), and even organized a new sub-division of the Association, which 
was specifically aimed at combating the Baha’is.  They were joined in these efforts by 
other traveling preachers, such as the aforementioned Khalisizadeh, who traveled around 
Iran inspiring young men to get involved in religio-p litical activism, especially against 
the Baha’is.  These individuals and groups repeatedly stirred up violence against the 
Baha’is in the area.70  While in Kashan, Khalisizadeh had announced from the pulpit that 
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Dr. Berjis was the leader of the local Baha’is and should be killed, which led to a series 
of attacks on Baha’i properties.  This escalation leading up to the murder even involved 
the decapitation of Dr. Berjis’s horse, on the rationale that a Baha’i should not ride a 
horse while Muslims walk.71  Khalisizadeh’s call for the death of Dr. Berjis, while there 
as representative of Borujerdi, could have been seeby the murderers as the equivalent of 
a fatwa by Borujerdi for the death of Dr. Berjis. 
Borujerdi, Behbahani, and Kashani all intensely pressured the government to 
release the murderers of Dr. Berjis.  The Ministry of the Interior reported daily lobbying 
regarding this matter.  These efforts were organized out of Qom, where special 
committees were set up to train and direct regional lobbying efforts designed to give the 
impression of a flood of support for the accused from every region in the country.  This 
strategy had earlier been employed successfully to prevent the execution and ensure the 
freedom of Abdu’r-Rahim Rabbani-Shirazi after he killed a Baha’i leader in Sarvestan.  
Navvab Safavi, the leader of the much-feared Feda’iyan-e Islam, also got personally 
involved and swore to prevent the execution of those who had killed Dr. Berjis.   Faced 
with intense pressure, Tehran’s criminal court dismis ed the charges against the 
defendants, although they had openly and proudly claimed credit for the murder.  After 
the acquittal, there was “an unseemly display of jubilation at the house of a leading cleric 
and there was for a time wild talk about burning down the Baha’i [headquarters] in 
Tehran.”72 
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“Baha’is have been killing the people” 
While in America, Prime Minister Mosaddeq met with American Bahais and promised to 
personally do all that he could to assist the Baha’is f lsely accused of the Abarqu 
murders.  He claimed to already know of the details of the case as a result of a meeting 
with Major-General Ala’i, a Bahai, who had discussed the issue with him.  Before he 
could help them, however, Mosaddeq suggested that the American Baha’is first send the 
Iranian government a detailed appeal fully describing the persecution of Baha’is in Iran.  
He personally dictated the conclusion that this appe l should arrive at: “We wonder that 
in a country which has an ancient civilization and possesses constitutional laws, a group 
of people is treated in a manner which conflicts with these fundamental laws. The latter 
proclaim that the people are equal before law.”73  Despite this promise, Mosaddeq 
apparently did not intervene, since by the time that e verdict was delivered he was 
distracted by larger issues and could not afford to spend political capital in this area. 
Ayatollah Borujerdi was deeply distressed about the events in Abarqu and feared 
that the Mosaddeq regime would free the accused Baha’is.  According to his biographer 
and student, Ali Davani, the Grand Ayatollah sincerely believed that the Baha’is were 
guilty of the crime.74  As a result, in the pursuit of what he saw as justice, it was said that 
he did not take a moment’s rest and would constantly send appeals to Tehran to see that 
the Baha’i “killers” paid for their bloodthirsty murder of this elderly Muslim woman and 
her innocent children.   
On another occasion, he similarly lobbied to have charges dismissed against a 
Muslim charged with the murder of a Baha’i.  On this other occasion he too lost sleep and 
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lobbied persistently for the murderer to be freed, claiming that until he was assured of 
success, his entire body trembled and he was consumed by worry, lest an innocent 
Muslim die on account of his failure.75 
According to an attorney involved in the 1952 trial of the Baha’is accused of the 
Abarqu murders, Borujerdi raised over 700,000 tomans to pay for the lawyers to 
represent the family of the Muslim victims, but Ayatollah Behbahani refused to pay 
anything over 2000 tomans to each lawyer, pocketing almost all of the remaining funds.  
The lawyer explained that fear-mongering over the Baha’i issue was a handy issue with 
which to raise a small fortune each year, and that as long as such sums of money could be 
raised, each year the clergy would accuse a Baha’i for having murdered someone and—
on the pretext of hiring tort attorneys—collect and pocket large sums.”76   This 
assessment fails to take into account the large sums that were spent by Behbahani in other 
areas related to the trial, such as funding daily gatherings denouncing the Baha’is.  There 
was also the matter of payments to individuals such as ‘Amidi-Nuri, the editor of Dad, 
who had initially reported the true nature of the crime, but who, after being hired by 
Ayatollah Behbahani, joined those scapegoating Baha’is.  In addition, there were the 
payments to be made to those who were hired to sit in the courtroom and constantly 
disrupt proceedings, intimidate the defendants, and repeatedly call for their execution.  
Over a thousand people filled the court during the trial, and a large percentage of this 
crowd was being paid 3 tomans a day to actively support the prosecution.  These 
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individuals also accosted and threatened the defens attorneys, leading one to resign in 
fear.77 
To compensate for the lack of evidence, the accused were tried not on the 
specifics of the case, but on the basis of their idntity as Baha’is.  One prosecuting 
attorney claimed that “for fifty years, Baha’is have been killing the people,” and that 
executions are necessary or “the people will take their own revenge.”78  In other words, 
the Baha’is were guilty of crimes not against the sp cific victims, but against “people,” 
which is to say Muslims.  The “fifty years” is a reference to 1903, when the Baha’is of 
Yazd were severely persecuted, and dozens were killed.79  In the intervening fifty years, 
there was relative peace and the slow regeneration of the Baha’i community in the area.   
The claim that the Baha’is have been killing the peopl  for half a century is a 
ludicrous fabrication if taken literally, but this accusation is useful if examined 
metaphorically.  Looked at from this perspective, it can be argued that it is the continued 
Baha’i presence in the area after 1903, this mere existence, which is framed as a “killing” 
act against the people.  This “killing” may also allude to the expansion of the Baha’i 
community, which was seen as a zero-sum operation, in which the animation of the Other 
is perceived as the decimation of the self. 
Another attorney, approaching the issue less elliptically, claimed that fifty years 
ago, before the Constitution, Baha’is could be legally killed on the basis of clerical 
fatwas, and that this happened on hundreds of occasions, but that under the Constitution 
the state was now in control of capital punishment and that the clergy could no longer 
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legally pronounce death for Baha’i membership.  Thecourt, however, still had this power 
and should exercise it by using the justification of a guilty verdict to “eradicate these 
people.”80  In other words, the trial was explicitly framed as a way to obtain a legal 
precedent to support the clerical claim that Baha’is remained mahdur ad-damm (ones 
who could be killed without fear of legal repercussion ).  
The Feda’iyan-e Islam joined Borujerdi’s efforts to seek the execution of the 
Baha’i defendants for the murders in Abarqu.  Every da , members would distribute 
pamphlets outside of the trial, spreading the word about the murders, sensationalizing the 
trial, and promising autonomous action if the Baha’is were to be freed.  The elderly 
Soghra, murdered on the order of a wealthy landlord f r facilitating the object of his 
affection’s relationship with another man, was re-imagined in the Feda’iyan’s 
propaganda as “our Muslim Sister,” and a “meek Muslim lady” who was ripped to pieces 
by “shameless” Baha’is.  In a leaflet distributed in connection with the trial, the top of the 
page depicts the elderly woman and her innocent children resting peacefully, while the 
bottom of the page shows their slaughtered bodies, leading to a strong and negative 
emotional reaction in the readership.81  Soghra and her young children were elevated to 
the rank of “blood-soaked martyrs” in the struggle between the “Muslim nation” and the 
Baha’is.82 
It is this national dimension to the Feda’iyan’s pro aganda that is especially 
important for our purposes. Several years later, in the anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955, 
Borujerdi and the mainstream clergy pick up this usage vis-à-vis the Baha’is, but it was 
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the Islamic associations (especially the Feda’iyan) that pioneered this framing of the 
Baha’i issue in explicitly national terms.   
The Feda’iyan’s propaganda tracts relating to the Abarqu trial begin with the 
assertion that Iran is an Islamic nation and that, as such, the battle against the Baha’is is 
not waged as Muslims qua Muslims, but rather as the citizenry (mardom) of an Islamic 
“nation” who are attacking Baha’is not for being heretical, but rather for being 
“unpatriotic.”  Unlike Mosaddeq’s pronouncement that the category “Iranian” included 
Baha’is as well as Muslims, the Feda’iyan believed that Shi’ism was the essential and 
unchanging identity of the nation that formed the state.  As such, their pamphlets 
denounced the treachery of the “nationless” (bivatan) Baha’is. 83  The push for the 
execution of the defendants was in many ways an excus  to let the Baha’is know that 
they were not part of Iran, and should be removed from it violently.  
Attorneys bypassed discussions of evidence to instead r ad and ridicule Baha’i 
holy books and rehash a variety of baseless conspiracies and libels.84  In response, the 
paid seat-fillers would erupt into riotous applause to signal approval of every slander 
made against the Baha’is.  As part of the spectacle, on  attorney actually spent forty 
minutes reading aloud most of The Memoirs of Kinyaz Dolgorouki, which holds a place 
in anti-Baha’i polemic that is comparable to the positi n that The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion holds in anti-Semitic literature.85  
On May 27, 1952, after nearly three weeks, the trial concluded.  All of the 
defendants were found guilty and four were condemned to death while the others were to 
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serve extended terms of imprisonment with hard labor.  After an appeal process, only one 
person was executed, an innocent local Muslim wrongly believed to be a Baha’i, while 
the (actual) Baha’is from neighboring areas served jail sentences of three to ten years, 
with one elderly Baha’i dying in prison.86 
 
Conclusion 
Baha’is represented a genuine threat to Shi’ite primacy because of their intense 
proselytizing and demonstrated ability to win converts if allowed to operate freely.87  In 
this sense, the Baha’i threat was real.  The danger of Baha’ism that was rhetorically 
conjured, however, was not.  The threat of Baha’i sedition against the state was—and 
is—a MacGuffin, an excuse for collective action and further Islamicization.  The specter 
of Baha’ism was a boogeyman that could be rolled out to distract from the failures and 
fissures of the movement for “Islamic Iran.”  By the early 1950s, after a decade of 
impassioned activity, only nominal progress had been made towards the original goals of 
the Islamic movement (such as implementing the ignored Islamic provisions in the 
supplemental laws, or banning the more odious aspect  of Western cultural imperialism).  
The Baha’i issue, however, afforded easy victories that could be rallied around and used 
to distract from stagnation or reversals in other ar as. 
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At the end of the last chapter, I introduced the idea that anti-Baha’ism was used as 
a counter-melody to the articulation of national Shi’ism, meaning that it was intrinsically 
connected and, although in a subordinate role, it played the important role of filling the 
gaps and hiding the deficiencies of the main argument, which was incomplete.  This 
chapter has shown how anti-Baha’ism compensated for the limited reach and divided 
aspirations of the Islamic movement by providing it with a powerful unifying issue that 
could not only consolidate the diverse Islamic factions, but also frame the Islamic 
movement as a populist struggle that could appeal to less devout Iranians. 
This emergence of anti-Baha’ism as a national struggle was an important proto-
nationalist development.  As van der Veer notes, one of the main features of nationalist 
discourses is the idea that “the nation is never enti ely secure,” since it constantly faces 
the threat of other forms of nationalism as well as betrayal from within by national 
apostates.88  In this period, Communism was treated as a competing national ideology, 
while the Baha’is were cast as Iran’s national apostate . Not only were the Baha’is cast as 
the “enemy within,” but it was in the struggle against them that the first “martyrs” of the 
“Muslim nation” were discursively created in connection with the Abarqu murders.  It 
has been said that every creation myth needs its devil,89 and, for the early Islamic 
movement in Iran, the Baha’is were cast in this role.
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In 1955, during the month of Ramadan (April 24– May 22), the Iranian government 
joined with the ulama and several Islamic organizations in a national pogrom against the 
Baha’i minority.1  As discussed in Chapter I, in the existing literatu e this pogrom has 
generally been ignored or treated as an early clerical v ctory on the road to Revolution.2  
This chapter treats the pogrom, and particularly its culmination in the destruction of the 
dome of the National Baha’i Center, as object lesson.  That is to say, I argue that it was 
the tangible demonstration of an idea that was design d to be instructive, meant to 
convey authority, and intended to serve as a deterrent to further deviation.   The idea that 
was embodied in this destructive episode was the beli f that Shi’ism was the basis of 
Iranian nationhood.  The growing influence and size of the Baha’i minority, and its 
increasingly bold entry into the public sphere, were perceived as fundamental threats to 
the Shi’ite nature of the state, which needed to be actively opposed.  The pogrom was 
essentially a marking of territory, writ large, a demonstration of power meant to 
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intimidate and scare away a perceived rival.  Although ultimately unsuccessful as a 
pogrom, failing to achieve any of its enumerated goals, I argue that the pogrom 
succeeded as object lesson, a point that is further developed in subsequent chapters. 
“To rule, not reign” 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Ayatollah Borujerdi spent many years trying in vain 
to convince the government to take systematic action against the Baha’is.  In 1955, he 
was finally successful in winning governmental approval due to the synchronicity of 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s first attempt at direct rule and the first real period of political 
calm since 1941.  By 1955, the political uncertainty following the 1953 coup to remove 
Mosaddeq was fading and Tudeh (Iran’s major communist party) had been decimated 
through an intense two-year campaign aimed at eradicating it as a viable force in Iran.3  
With the Left forced underground and the Right firmly in the royalist camp, the Shah felt 
profoundly confident (except for his ongoing anxiety over the lack of an heir).  His 
confidence was demonstrated by his replacement of the American-chosen Prime 
Minister, General Zahedi, with Hossein Ala, who was recognized as “the Shah’s 
instrument.”4  This replacement was widely and correctly understood as an indication of 
the Shah intention “to ‘rule’ rather than ‘reign.’”5  Later American diplomatic 
assessments identified 1955 as the beginning of the Shah’s dictatorship.6 
The hesitant and undecided Shah, discussed in Chapter II, had been emboldened 
by the “popular” movement that removed Mosaddeq.  He reportedly believed that the 
                                                      
3 DDEPL, WH Office, NSC Staff, Papers 1948-61, Disaster File Series, Box 65, Folder – Iran (1) 
NSC, Progress Report on “United States Policy towards Iran,” October 13, 1954. 
4 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 114808 / EP 1015 / 4, Stevens to FO, October 6, 1955. 
5 DDEPL, WH Office, NSC Staff, Papers 1948-61, Disaster File Series, Box 66, Folder (7), Progress 
Report on “United States Policy towards Iran,” July 6, 1955. 
6 See, for example, NACPM, RG 59 / 250 / 63 / 18 / 6, Box 3, Folder 20: Task Force on Iran, draft 
recommendation, May 10, 1961. 
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American-funded crowds on the street during the coup had actually been genuine in their 
expressions of affection and in their desire for his return.  He wept at the people’s 
supposed displays of love for him and exclaimed, “Can it be true?  I knew it.  I knew it.  
They love me.”7  At the very least, he saw the coup as a British and American vote of 
confidence in him, which put to rest, at least temporarily, his abiding anxiety about 
suffering the same fate as his father.  American reports relate that, after the coup, the 
Shah  
seems to be living in a dream world.  He appears have the idea that he was 
brought back into power entirely by the love of hispeople for him personally, and 
to resent any suggestion that his return was due to the efforts of any particular 
military or civilian groups.8   
In a later interview, the Shah said that the fall of Arab monarchies did not disturb 
him, since he considered the removal of Mosaddeq in 1953 to have been a popular 
revolution of the people and “a form of election” tha  confirmed his position as king.  “I 
was ready to die for my people,” he claimed, “but the uprising demonstrated that my 
people were also ready to die for me.9 
 Despite this new confidence, there was the ongoing irritant of the lack of an heir.  
The Shah’s first marriage produced a daughter, but his second marriage had not resulted 
in any children.  To make matters worse, Ali Reza, his half-brother and the crown prince, 
had died in a plane crash in October 1954.  When it came to securing the dynasty that his 
father had started, producing an heir was seen as a necessary concomitant to seizing more 
direct control of the affairs of state.  For this reason, the Shah and Queen Soraya traveled 
across Europe and the United States from late 1954 until early 1955.  The Shah wished to 
                                                      
7 Newsweek, August 31, 1953, pp. 30-1. 
8 USDS, Iran, 1950-1954, Reel 12: 876. 
9 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 133007 / EP 1015 / 62, Tehran to FO, December 2, 1958. 
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test the likely American reaction to his planned assumption of more direct control over 
Iran, to secure additional financial and military aid to facilitate this ambition, and to have 
the best available fertility experts examine his wife and himself to determine why they 
were not able to conceive.  The tests revealed that the couple should be able to produce 
children, leading to confidence in the likely arrival of a male heir. 10  The Shah, who had 
a limited role in politics up to this point, now decided that the time had come for him to 
“rule not reign,” a development that marked the “keynote” development of that year.11  
The replacement of Zahedi was the beginning of what as to become a revolving door of 
Iranian Prime Ministers, none of whom were allowed to evelop into a “strong man” 
alternative to the Shah.   
With the Shah’s personal assumption of power, the breaking of Tudeh, and the 
replacement of a Prime-Minister beholden to the West with one beholden to the Crown, 
the Shah could no longer find excuses to postpone or otherwise evade the debt that he 
owed the ulama for the key role that they played in removing Mosaddeq and returning 
royal rule in 1953.  It was, therefore, not a complete surprise when Borujerdi’s 
representative, Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, came to colle t this boon, which the Shah had 
been able to evade in previous years.   
Falsafi had long been used by Borujerdi as his chosen lobbyist on the Baha’i 
issue, as discussed in the previous chapter.  He was utilized because he had allegiances 
beyond the traditional clergy, was on good terms with powerful politicians, and 
“reportedly enjoys the favor of the Shah.”12  He had endeared himself to the Crown so 
                                                      
10 Ibid., FO 371 / 114808 / EP1015 / 2, Stevens to FO, April 4, 1955. 
11 Ibid., FO 371 / 120710 / EP 1011 / 1, Stevens to FO, January 1, 1956. 
12 USDS, Iraq, 1955-1959, Reel 15: 140. 
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much that, in the years following the 1953 coup restoring the Shah, Falsafi had been 
chosen to deliver sermons on state radio throughout t e holy month of Ramadan. 
The request for royal tribute was, moreover, made wh n the new, sickly Prime 
Minister was out of the country for many months receiving medical care, thus preventing 
the Shah from shunting any requests to Ala.  The vacuum created by the removal of 
Zahedi and the absence of the seasoned Ala provided a tempting opening to be exploited, 
as the Shah and his chief advisor (Alam) were eager but green, and the Cabinet divided.  
In the British assessment, “the disappearance of a strong PM and the absence of a weak 
one” explained the regime’s susceptibility to intrigues and inability to recover quickly 
from them.13  
The conclusion of oil negotiations also further hampered the Shah’s ability to 
impede calls for anti-Baha’i action.  The British Ambassador at the time reported that 
“efforts were made last year [1954] to start some move against [Baha’is], but the 
Government counseled delay while the oil negations were in progress.”14  This is also 
confirmed by Falsafi in a May 10, 1955 interview in Etehad-e Melli n which he 
describes a meeting earlier in the year with Borujerdi in which the Grand Ayatollah was 
deeply distressed over the Baha’i matter and insisted that, since the oil negotiations were 
now over and the Tudeh threat removed, it was the right time to rise up and demand 
action against the Baha’is.15 
 Shortly before the beginning of Ramadan 1334 [April 1955], Falsafi sought 
permission from Borujerdi to speak out against the Baha’is during his popular Ramadan 
                                                      
13 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 120710 / EP 1011 / 1, Stevens to FO, January 1, 1956. 
14 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1/ 55, Stevens to FO May 12, 1955. 
15 Etehad-e Melli, 19 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 10, 1955]. 
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sermons at Masjed-e Shah [The Shah’s Mosque], which were broadcast on state radio.  
After considering Falsafi’s proposal, Borujerdi felt that this would be a dangerous gambit 
that could be used as a pretext for obstructing the larger campaign against the Baha’is.  
To guard against this possibility, he instructed Falsafi to first obtain the permission of the 
Shah.  If this could be obtained, he approved of Falsafi’s plan to take the case against the 
Baha’is and present it directly to the national audience, expressing hope that although the 
appeals to the leadership of Iran had failed, “at le st the Baha’is will be hammered in 
public opinion (afkar-e ‘omumi).”16   
 Armed with Borujerdi’s approval, Falsafi met with the Shah several days before 
the beginning of Ramadan.  In his version of the meting, Falsafi informed the Shah that 
Borujerdi had expressed approval for him to use his national broadcasts during the holy 
month to address the Baha’i controversy, which “had become the cause of anxiety to 
Muslims.”  In this version the Shah thought briefly before telling Falsafi to “go ahead and 
speak.”17   
At this time, Borujerdi and Falsafi took the Shah’s approval at face value.  In later 
clerical treatments of these events, however, the Shah is portrayed as insincere from the 
start.  Davani, the biographer of both Falsafi and Borujerdi, constantly annotates any 
references to the Shah’s partnership and support for the pogrom with notes that argue that 
this support was always insincere and duplicitous.  He claims that both Pahlavi shahs 
were supporters of the Baha’is and that the apparent nti-Baha’i moves in 1955 were only 
“surface-level” and were merely a distraction to satisfy the frenzy (shur) or the people 
                                                      




against the Baha’is, which could not be ignored, but that after this public outcry faded the 
state grew even closer to the Baha’is than it had been before the pogrom.18 
Despite these later reappraisals, Falsafi and Borujerdi both acted as if they fully 
accepted that the Shah had agreed to national efforts against the Baha’is.  Falsafi notes 
that, following the meeting with the Shah, he gathered together a number of clerics, 
briefed them on the plans for Ramadan, and told them to spread the instructions 
nationally.  A multi-layered campaign was devised in which what was broadcast on the 
radio would be re-enforced in the mosques and in the public squares, such that 
“Conversation everywhere was centered on the necessity of repressing (sarkubi) the 
Baha’is, who were clients (vabasteh) of Zionism and America.”19 
Falsafi’s version of the Shah’s agreement to the pogrom has obvious problems.  In 
Vahman’s view, the Shah’s hasty, closed-door approval f the pogrom, only two days 
before it was to begin (and without even consulting with Alam) is in itself an indication 
that Falsafi had coerced the Shah into agreeing.20  The Shah had obfuscated on the Baha’i 
issue for a decade, and was famous for his indecisiv ness, so it is highly unlikely that he 
would immediately agree to such a pogrom unless he felt forced into a corner.  The 
details of this coercion emerge in the British diplomatic records from this period.  The 
British Ambassador relates his initial belief that 
the present move on the part of the Moslem leaders has been brought about by 
strained relations between the Shah and Ayatollah Burujerdi, the Supreme Shia 
divine in Qum.  The latter, whether genuinely or as a means of increasing the 
influence of the mullahs, claims to be dissatisfied by the Shah’s attitude towards 
religion and shocked by the gay social life at Court and during the Shah’s visit 
abroad.  It is believed that he may have prompted Falsafi to suggest when he saw 
                                                      
18 Ibid., p. 200 n1. 
19 Ibid., p. 201. 
20 Vahman, 160 Sal Mobarezeh ba A’in-e Baha’i, p. 241. 
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the Shah on April 22 (2 days before Ramadan) that he should preach a series of 
sermons against communism and also attack the Baha’is.21 
 
The reference to objectionable activities abroad concerned the aforementioned 
visit to the West by the Shah and Queen Soraya fromlate 1954 until early 1955.  They 
made a vacation out of the trip and engaged in rathe  risqué behavior that was, 
unfortunately for them, captured by the press.  Reports had been coming back to Iran of 
the new Shah’s open drinking, gambling, and decadence (he brought a fleet of luxury 
vehicles with him).  These reports were of limited consequence, but what caused serious 
problems were photographs of Queen Soraya in a barely-th re swimsuit in Miami.  
Borujerdi and Falsafi came to possess some of these photographs and used them to 
blackmail the Shah into agreeing to the anti-Baha’i pogrom that Borujerdi had been 
lobbying for since the late 1940s.22   
According to Denis Wright, of the British Embassy, it was the Shah’s media 
officer (Hamzavi) who first revealed that the paparazzi were to blame for the pogrom: 
Hamzavi then came to the point which he said was the reason for his insistence on 
seeing me today; it was that he had learned from Dr. Eqbal that the Shah had 
admitted that he had agreed to Falsafi’s preaching against the Baha’is as the price, 
at Falsafi’s suggestion, of buying off Burujerdi’s displeasure with the behavior of 
the Queen in America, particularly her appearing publically and being 
photographed in a scanty bathing costume.  Hamzavi modestly said that these 
photographs had been taken during the two weeks that he was not with the royal 
family in America; if he had been there it never would have happened.  This news 
of the Shah’s sole responsibility for the anti-Baha’i business should be conveyed 
immediately to the Americans so as to finally explode their suspicions that we 
were behind the troubles.23 
 
Decades later, when Denis Wright discussed the occasion for the Iranian Oral 
History Project, he shared a similar recollection of the event, but added that Alam had 
                                                      
21 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1 / 55, Stevens to FO, May 12, 1955. 
22 See Chapter III. 
23 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 29 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Wright, June 15 1955. 
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personally shown him one of the offending pictures.24  He also added an additional 
element to the blackmail threat, saying that the Shah’s supposed affair and illegitimate 
son with Mrs. Cabot-Lodge was also to be exposed and used against him, since he was 
unable to produce a legitimate heir.  This version of events is also related in Wright’s 
unpublished memoirs, which discuss how Alam showed him two American weeklies, one 
of which discussed the illegitimate son, while the other featured a photo of the queen in 
the “scantiest of bathing costumes.”25 
The British Ambassador, Roger Stevens believed that the Shah agreed to the 
clerical call for action because he “thought it inadvisable to resist the proposal for attacks 
on the Bahais in view of his general relations with Ayatollah Burujerdi.”26  Giving in on 
this one issue, which he saw as inconsequential, would settle his debt with the ulama and 
assure their support as he consolidated power.  Moreover, the victims of the pogrom 
would be from an apolitical community from which he ad no cause to fear reprisals, 
and—he imagined—no one outside of Iran would care about Iran’s internal communal 
conflicts as long as Christians and Jews were not targe ed.   
The theory that the pogrom was primarily the result of the Shah’s desire to 
maintain good relations with Borujerdi is also supported by Tehran’s imam jom’eh:   
 
When the Shah went to Qum during the [Persian New Yar celebrations at the end 
of March], Ayatollah Burujerdi made a point of being out of town on that 
particular day.  Burujerdi no doubt put Falsafi up to the [Baha’i] game the latter 
                                                      
24 Denis Wright, Interview recorded by Habib Ladjevardi, 10, 11 October 1984, Aylesbury, England. 
Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University.  http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds /view/2906583? 
n=1&s=4&printThumbnails=no (accessed February 20, 2011). 
25 Denis Wright, “The Memoirs of Sir Denis Wright (191-1976),” 2 volumes (unpublished memoirs), vol. 
1., p. 280. 
26 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1 / 55, Stevens to FO, May 12, 1955. 
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has been playing… The Shah must have realized the significance of this [pogrom] 
but, in view of his relations with Qum, thought it best to let it go.27   
 
Although the government would later blame the clergy for the events of the 
pogrom, feign ignorance, and deny all culpability, Asadollah Alam (the Interior Minister 
and the Shah’s chief advisor and friend) admitted to the British embassy that these claims 
were false and said that “the anti-Baha’i agitation had been entirely the Government’s 
and the Shah’s fault.  Falsafi had said beforehand that he proposed to talk against 
Communism and against the Baha’is and he had been allowed to go ahead.”  He further 
admitted that it was the Shah who was personally at fault since he made the decision to 
support Borujerdi’s call for action without consultation and on his own authority, since he 
“wanted to keep in with the mullahs” and “thought Borujerdi was upset with him.”   
In Alam’s opinion, the Shah was a fool to take Falsafi’  “fabricated” version of 
Borujerdi’s instructions at face value, since he “was a blackmailer and he had been 
caught out at least once claiming to speak for Borujerdi when he had no justification for 
doing so.”28  Many years later, Alam repeats this assessment of Falsafi.29  In his opinion, 
it was Falsafi, not Borujerdi, who forced the pogrom and deluded (eghfal kardan) those 
in power in order to achieve a national battle against the Bahais.30  In his later comments 
about1955, Alam claims that the elderly Borujerdi “seemed to have become like someone 
who had become addle-brained but who was not permitt d to let this condition become 
public.”31  This claim is not supported, however, and all documents that I have seen from 
the years in question suggest that Borujerdi was lucid and functioning well at the time.  
                                                      
27 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Fearnley, May 11, 1955. 
28 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 18 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Fearnley, May 24, 1955. 
29 Asadollah Alam, Guftoguha-ye Man ba Shah (Tehran: Tarh Naw Publications, 1992) part one, pp. 66-67. 
30 Afnan, Bigunahan, pp. 260-61. 
31 Alam, Goftoguha-ye Man ba Shah, part one, pp. 66-67. 
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He was, however, very reliant on his agents and never showed any inclination to question 
his sources, or to interact directly with the government, and this gave his agents a high 
level of autonomy, which could have been exploited to a limited degree.  Whether or not 
Falsafi initially misrepresented Borujerdi, it is clear that the Grand Ayatollah was fully 
supportive of action against the Baha’is and was fully behind Falsafi once royal 
permission had been granted. 
The eleventh hour parlay for a pogrom led to a campaign that caught the Baha’is 
completely by surprise, since the Shah had shown no i dication that he would turn 
against them.  On Naw-Ruz (March 21, 1955), just over a month before the pogrom 
began, the Baha’i community was optimistic about expansion in Iran, announcing that 
twelve million tomans were being raised for the construction of a lavish Ba a’i Temple in 
Iran, designed by Mason Remey, and featuring a hugegolden dome.  This was to be the 
first Baha’i temple to be constructed in Iran.32  None were planned previously because 
conditions in Iran were never considered stable enough or safe enough for such a project 
to be attempted.  The 1955 temple plans show that the Baha’is did not have any 
indication that a pogrom was imminent, but rather saw themselves entering a period of 
relative calm and safety. 
 
The “anger of the people” 
Ramadan sermons had been broadcast on state radio since 1948 and in 1953 and 1954 
Falsafi had been chosen to give these sermons with the understanding that he would use 
the national platform to speak out against Communism.  He began his 1955 sermons with 
a similar emphasis in the first few days of the month before he shifted his attacks to the 
                                                      
32 Baha’i News, May 1955, p2. 
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Baha’is.33  This delay served two purposes.  It provided time for the national organization 
of a pogrom that was only approved days before the beginning of the month, and it also 
allowed him to create the impression that anti-Baha’i action was a continuation of the 
anti-Communist actions of the previous years, both thematically (Baha’is and 
Communists were both similarly marked as foreign, treasonous, and irreligious) and in 
terms of state approval for both efforts.   
Falsafi’s official Ramadan broadcasts provided the tent pole for a nationwide 
series of efforts against the Baha’is, which were ld by the ulama as well as the Islamic 
associations discussed in the previous two chapters.  The broadcasts were mostly heard 
through radios in the bazaars and other places of business and were aired between one 
and two in the afternoon.  Falsafi’s sermons were popular, even before the pogrom, 
because he was an engaging speaker who was considered th  most skilled orator of his 
generation.  Unlike Borujerdi’s preference for seclusion and erudition, Falsafi was at 
home working a crowd.  According to Fischer, young religious enthusiasts knew Falsafi 
“the same way they know movie actors.”34   
His sermons involved vicious attacks against the Baha’is in order to “stoke the 
flame of the fire of hatred and the anger of the peopl .”  Falsafi did not attack the Baha’is 
as apostates from Islam, but as national apostates, raitors to the homeland.  He repeated 
the charge, popularized by the Feda’iyan-e Islam, that Baha’is were “nationlessness” 
(bivatani).  To prove this, he quoted the command in Baha’i scriptures to “Glory 
                                                      
33 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Bahaism,” p. 218. 
34 Fischer, Iran, p. 100. 
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not in love for your country.”  He did not quote the rest of the sentence, which adds the 
qualifier: “but rather [glory] in love for all mankind”35  
Falsafi claimed that the Baha’is were an even greate  threat than Tudeh (Iran’s 
Communist party) and that there were a million Baha’is in Iran, all of whom he 
denounced as not only “enemies of Islam”36 but also as “traitors” and “agents of a foreign 
power.”37  Baha’is were “accused of wishing and plotting for the overthrow of the 
constituted government of Iran and are pictured not as Iranian citizens… but as members 
of a diabolical conspiracy which threatens the very security of Iran.”38  He claimed that 
even atheism would be preferable to Baha’ism, which e believed emitted an evil 
influence, and whose followers “had become increasingly powerful in Iran” and “have 
been planning to set up a Baha’i regime in the spring of 1956.”39  This last charge seems 
to be a paranoid reading of plans for a Baha’i House of Worship in Iran as part of their 
global “Ten Year Crusade,” which catalyzed the anxious agitation discussed in the 
previous chapter.  The accusation that Baha’is were paid foreign agents is, of course, 
particularly ironic given Falsafi’s role as a paid gent of the CIA during the coup and 
through programs such as BEDAMN.40   
Later in Ramadan, Falsafi claimed that, since their own party was prohibited, 
Tudeh members were now integrating themselves into Baha’ism in the hope of joining 
the Baha’is in a coup to take over Iran in 1956.  This claim of Tudeh co-operation was, in 
part, aimed at calming American objections to the pogrom by framing it as an anti-
Communist endeavor.  In response to international opposition to the pogrom, particularly 
                                                      
35 Afnan, Bigunahan, p. 256. 
36 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 326. 
37 CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary: 26 May 1955, p. 4. 
38 USDS, Iraq, 1955-1959, Reel 15: 140. 
39 Ibid, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 326. 
40 Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, p. 70. 
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American opposition, Falsafi argued that he was not e gaging in religious persecution, 
but was instead targeting a subversive political organization, just as he had done against 
Tudeh with American approval.  By equating the Baha’is with Tudeh, and even claiming 
that Tudeh and the Baha’is were merging, Falsafi was appealing to America’s Cold War 
sensibilities and support for anti-Communist efforts. 41  This attempt at spin was never 
taken seriously by American officials. 
A major element of Falsafi’s call to excise Baha’ism involved the demand for the 
removal of Baha’is from important and influential positions.  Although this call was 
framed negatively, in terms of the removal of Baha’is, it also involved the positive 
assertion that those who controlled Iran must come from, and concern themselves with, 
the needs of the “Islamic nation.”  This deeper message was conveyed using the example 
of the Shah’s personal physician, who was a known Baha’i.  This individual was used as 
an example of Baha’is usurping the place of Muslims.  In one of his broadcasts, Falsafi 
insists that the Shah must replace Dr. Ayadi since “our country has so many Muslim 
doctors and the people are upset that a Baha’i individual is the personal physician of the 
Shah.”42 
According to Davani, as a result of Falsafi’s call for action the nation “raged with 
one voice,” protested against Baha’ism and “sought to achieve the extermination of the 
                                                      
41 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Bahaism,” pp. 215, 218-9.  Bayne notes that although the alleged Tudeh-Baha’i 
alliance was a fabrication, the two organizations were not that different in many respects. They were both 
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the modern middle class (Bayne, “Baha’is Again,” pp. 6-7, 10). 
42 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 194. 
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roots and traces of the Baha’is from the country.”  He claims that Falsafi did not create 
these feelings, but merely channeled and legitimized th  “profound and immense disgust 
and loathing” that the people already felt towards the Baha’is.  He traces these feelings to 
the Baha’is’ supposed use of their important and influe tial positions to act in a “Zionist-
like” fashion against the Muslims in different locations in Iran, leading to their desire for 
justice.43   
The terror campaign affected hundreds of cities, towns and villages and 
victimized hundreds of thousands of people.  In rural a eas Baha’i farmers saw their 
crops destroyed, irrigation water diverted, and animals mutilated.44  In small villages, 
Baha’i businesses were boycotted, stores would refuse to sell food to Baha’is, and they 
would sometimes be forced to choose between starvation nd emigration.45  Many Baha’i 
centers and holy places were damaged, desecrated, vn alized, and burned, with the most 
valuable properties seized and looted by government forces.  Throughout the country, 
many Baha’i private homes and businesses were also looted, vandalized, and burned.46  
Cemeteries were desecrated and corpses mutilated.47  Some Baha’i children were 
expelled from school.  Baha’is faced constant torment on the street and taunting about 
their imminent “holocaust.”  Some Baha’i women were kidnapped and forced to marry 
Muslims.48  Other Baha’i women and girls were raped or gang-raped, sometimes as 
punishment if their family did not convert.49  One fifteen-year-old girl was stripped 
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48 Ibid., 366. 
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naked, beaten and gang-raped in public.50  Physical assaults “have been frequent”51 and 
there were instances of stoning.52  The security forces ignored, encouraged or joined  all 
of this.  When Baha’is requested protection from the government, officers would 
typically show up and demand money in exchange for pr tection, but would usually not 
actually provide protection, even after their monetary demands were met.53  As a result of 
this intense atmosphere of terror, papers like Dad carried letters from individuals in 
which they denied a Baha’i identity and claimed to be Muslim, in the hope of escaping 
persecution.54 
In addition to these attacks, there were threats of a “general massacre”55 later that 
year during the holy month of Moharram (which contai s Shi’ism’s central ritual 
commemorations during Ashura, and which is a period often characterized by heightened 
religiosity).  Unlike the threatened massacres in Moharram, the Ramadan campaign 
seemed primarily concerned with putting the Baha’is “in their place” by removing their 
material wealth, humiliating and terrorizing them, removing them from positions of 
prominence, and scaring them into “returning” to Islam.  Murder does not seem to have 
been the primary intent of this campaign, although some murders certainly occurred and, 
of course, many died nationwide as a result of injur es received during beatings.56  
Violence was also limited because of Falsafi’s insistence (under pressure from the 
government, which was itself under Anglo-American pressure) that order be maintained.  
                                                      
50 Ibid., 366. 
51 Ibid., 367. 
52 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 22 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Wiggin, May 19, 1955. 
53 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 343. 
54 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Bahaism,” p. 217. 
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Due to these restrictions, those leading the pogrom did not aim to kill but rather to injure 
(aziyyat), torment (azar), and loot (gharat) the Bahais.57 
In the violence that did occur, Baha’i sources relate recurrent patterns in which 
the abuse and harassment of the “terrorists” (kharab karan) escalated until the “cruel 
tyrant’s claw” came down on the innocents, not killing but coming close, by slicing 
heads, stabbing, or committing atrocities so “savage” (vahshianeh) that “the pen is 
ashamed from describing it.”58  The height of the attacks were generally accompanied by 
looting, arson, or desecration, and the incidents typically involved unanswered appeals to 
governmental authorities, who quite often mocked or extorted the victims, and sometimes 
actively took part in their persecution.  Fatalities were rare and were generally among 
those who were too ill or too old to withstand the physical and psychological stresses of 
the attacks.  Full details of specific acts of violence are given in Baha’i martyr narratives 
and have not been related in this study except in cases where they provide necessary 
context or are discussed for a larger analytical purpose.59 
  In support of the clergy, the acting Prime Minister (Entezam) spoke publicly 
against the Baha’is, referring to them as a politicized “misled group.”  He dropped this 
façade in private discussions, however, as did Prime Minister Ala.  Off the record, both 
admitted that the clerical polemic that the governme t was repeating “was nonsense.”60  
Although they did not accept Falsafi’s polemic against the Baha’is, the mostly secular 
Cabinet felt no sympathy for them.  Even Alam, who fiercely opposed the pogrom, did 
not do so because of any sympathy for the Baha’is, but rather out of a deep anti-clerical 
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sentiment.  According to Fearnley (of the British Embassy), Alam “showed no qualms 
about the way the Baha’is had been treated.  Nor did he seem particularly worried about 
the effects of the Gov.’s action on opinion abroad.”  Instead, his efforts against Falsafi 
were primarily motivated by personal animosity.61 
 When British and American pressure to stop the anti-Baha’i pogrom began to be 
applied, Alam took the lead in attempting to reign in Falsafi.  He was politically naïve, 
however, and was repeatedly bested by Falsafi.  In an early encounter, Alam pointed out 
that there was no need for Falsafi’s political agittion, as the Baha’is already lacked 
constitutional recognition and “could be proceeded against under existing laws.”  Sensing 
an opportunity, “Falsafi asked if he could quote Mr. Alam on this, and the latter, 
foolishly… agreed that he could.62  Alam’s off-the-cuff remark to Falsafi that no new 
anti-Baha’i legislation was needed was publicized by Falsafi as a promise by the 
government to dismiss the Baha’is.63  
 
The seizure of Baha’i centers 
The National Baha’i Center and other large Baha’i centers across Iran were occupied on 
May 7 following a series of dramatic street protests by anti-Baha’i mobs that culminated 
in the seizure of the Baha’i National Center.64  Within Iran, the government pretended 
that these seizures were an expression of common cause with the anti-Baha’i mobs, while 
internationally, and in private conversations, they were framed as protective moves aimed 
at safeguarding Baha’i properties from mob action.  The latter description was accurate, 
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and the occupation of Baha’i properties occurred in response to the increasing pressure 
by Iran’s foreign patrons to prevent disruptive anti-Baha’i violence. 
 The protective nature of the military occupations was not initially suspected by 
the anti-Baha’i forces.  Falsafi claimed that the seizures took place in response to the 
“public frenzy” (hayajan) stirred up by the pogrom, which he referred to as “the 
movement of the people” (mardom).65  In General Bakhtiar’s proclamation announcing 
this move, he appropriates the rhetoric of the anti-Baha’i movement: 
Since the public displays (tazahorat) and propaganda of the Baha’i sect have 
come to be the source of the agitation (tahrik) of the public’s emotions, for the 
preservation of discipline and public order, the disciplinary forces have been 
directed to occupy this sect’s propaganda centers, which have been called 
‘Haziratu’l-Quds,’ so that all possible eventualities will be prevented.  At this 
time, the military governor of Tehran also expects from every patriot that, in this 
matter, they exhibit consideration for discipline and public order, and abstain 
from all demonstrations and non-sanctioned actions that are disruptive of public 
order...66 
 This announcement drew crowds who were curious about the situation, and who 
gathered around the seized property. 
After the publication of the news of the occupation of the Haziratu’l-Quds 
[National Baha’i Center] numerous groups of people set out looking for 
information about the state of the situation and to see the secret society (mahfel-e 
makhfi) of the Baha’is at the Haziratu’l-Quds.  After breaking the fast, sweets 
were distributed amongst the people.67   
 Although he applauded the action of the government at the time, Falsafi later 
denounced it as a “feign” and a “show of religiosity.”  He claimed that this was known at 
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the time and it was for this reason that the Association of Clerics did not thank him.  
Davani claims that this occupation was carried out because   
The regime, which did not expect such a far-reaching reaction from the people, 
was compelled by them to feign common cause before it lost control of the 
situation.  It joined the movement and occupied the headquarters of the Baha’is, 
which had previously been seized by the people.68 
Davani then contrasts the citizenry’s “seizure” of the National Baha’i Center with 
the military governor’s “occupation” of Baha’i properties.  He points out that while “the 
people”69 had engaged in tasarof (seizure), the government was instead very careful to 
always refer to what they did as e hghal (occupation).  At the time, people assumed that 
these were synonymous, but he later realized the significance of the wording, as seizures 
imply permanence whereas occupations are temporary.  The government, with its word 
play, was “implicitly admitting that they would eventually return ownership of those 
centers to the Baha’is” and that this temporary occupation was just to allow them to be 
“shielded them from the destructive rage (khashm-e virangar) of the Muslim people 
(mardom).”70 
Despite these latter day clerical denunciations of the Shah’s deception in this 
matter, contemporary documents reveal sincere thankfulness and excitement about the 
government’s efforts, which were taken at face value at the time.  Shortly after the 
proclamation by Bakhtiar, Ayatollah Behbahani released a letter of congratulations to the 
Shah (as Borujerdi’s representative), while Borujerdi wrote to congratulate Falsafi for the 
seizure of Baha’i properties.  All clerical communications relating to this event are 
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explicitly royalist, as the anti-Baha’i movement did not want to oppose the Shah, but 
rather desired his leadership in their struggle. 
In Behbahani’s letter on behalf of Borujerdi, he blsses and praises the Shah and 
thanks him profusely for having “answered the desires of many years’ worth of prayers, 
not only those of this lowly one, but also those of the entire Islamic nation (mellat-e 
islami).”  For their closing of “the center of religious and political corruption,” Behbahani 
glorified Bakhtiar’s troops as “the army of Islam” (artesh-e Islam).  He, moreover, 
announced that an animal would be sacrificed in honor f the Shah, gave his assurance 
that the Hidden Imam was well-pleased with the Shah, and prayed God to continue to 
rain “divine confirmations and heavenly favors upon the person of the Shah.”  The day of 
the seizures, which was the beginning of the “suppression and extermination” (qal’ va 
qam’) of the Baha’is, would “henceforth be known as a holy day amongst the other holy 
days.”71  In the Shah’s reply, he expressed joy and gratitude at Behbahani’s praises and 
claimed that he was “always asking God—the Exalted—for the implementation of the 
clear and obligatory prescriptions of Islam.”72 
 In his May 7 letter of congratulation to Falsafi, Borujerdi continues the national 
framing of the Baha’i threat.  The occupations of the Baha’is properties are described not 
in terms of religious dispute or heresy, but as an attempt to safeguard the independence of 
the nation and the safety of the Shah, the government, and the military from internal 
sedition.  Although excited about the government’s efforts, Borujerdi considers this to be 
only the first stage of a larger battle.  He warns that the enemy will not be easily 
overcome as this “political party” has acted under th  guise of religion and, for a century, 
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has been establishing itself and infiltrating the nation through “disciplined and well-
ordered organizations (tashkilat-e monazzam), bombastic use of monies from unknown 
sources, and extensive and blatant propaganda against the official religion of the country, 
which is naturally the cause of unity.”   
As a result of this exaggerated and paranoid vision, B rujerdi insists that actions 
like those of Falsafi and those who rose up in support of him could only go so far, for 
only the “enthusiastic action (jeddiyat) of the government” could succeed in “gradually 
exposing the pernicious networks and saving the country from harm.”  He claims that the 
Baha’is are the most dangerous kind of enemy, the one that pretends to be innocent and 
unarmed.  Despite this outward pacifism, he warns that beneath a “thick veil” this 
“sinister party has infiltrated many positions in the country and the government.”   
As proof of their deep roots in the administration, Borujerdi points to the 
previously discussed Abarqu incident, in which Baha’is nd a Muslim thought to be a 
Baha’i were the scapegoats for the murder of an old w man and her children.  Borujerdi 
claims that on this occasion Baha’is “in a heinous manner used shovels and pickaxes to 
chop them into pieces” and that it was only through intense pressure by Muslims 
nationwide that one Baha’i was executed for this crime, but that despite this intense 
pressure the others were “left alone.”73  The failure to execute more of the Baha’i 
scapegoats was “proof that this sect has completely infiltrated the governmental 
bureaucracy.”  As such, although the seizure of Baha’i properties was appreciated, it was 
perhaps ephemeral and, for Borujerdi, “the most important concern is liquidating 
                                                      
73 They were not “left alone.”  Some of the Baha’i scapegoats spent a decade in Jail, although they were not 
executed, and one died in prison.   
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(tasviyyeh) the members of this sect in the government bureaucracy, the Ministries, and 
sensitive governmental posts.”74 
 In a telegraph to Ayatollah Behbahani regarding his congratulatory telegram to 
the Shah mentioned above, Ayatollah Borujerdi hails thi  message to the Shah as an 
“auspicious” message that “has been the cause of joy.” Repeating his earlier framing of 
the issue, he again claims that action against the Baha’is was done for the Shah.  This was 
because the Baha’i centers supposedly produced propaganda which weakens national 
unity and “opposes the independence of the country and lays the foundation for the 
enfeeblement of the institution of the monarchy.”  He treats Islam and the monarchy as 
partners in a symbiotic relationship whose continued w ll-being was dependent on each 
other.  Borujerdi even describes the co-operation between the state and the clergy in 
seizing Baha’i property as a “blessed state” (vojud-e mobarak), which he prayed would 
continue into the future.75   
 
“An ever-present insult” 
Although the government saved Baha’i properties from the mobs, this was done out of its 
obligations as a client state and not out of concern for the Baha’is.  Prime Minister Ala, in 
particular, had no particular sympathy for the Baha’i victims.  In private meetings, he 
described them as a “disruptive international force” and felt that the very existence of the 
dome of their National Center was an “ever-present insult”76 to Muslims and “an offence 
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to the eye of all good Muslims.”77  Entezam (the Foreign Minister and Acting Prime 
Minister during Ala’s absence) echoed this view, and claimed that the National Baha’i 
Center’s prominent dome was targeted by the anti-Baha’i ctivists because it was 
“symbolic of the view in which the Bahais had got to big for their boots in the last few 
years.”78   
 
 
Figure 4. 1. The dome of the National Baha'i Center.  
 
As mentioned above, earlier in the year plans had been announced for the raising 
of twelve million tomans for the start of construction of the first Baha’i temple in Iran.  
This imposing and prominent structure was to feature a large, golden dome, similar to the 
famous dome on the Shrine of the Bab on Mt. Carmel.79  As Ala and Entezam made 
clear, even the dome on the existing administrative centre was considered to be 
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ostentatious and an offense, despite its relatively small size.  The specter of an imposing, 
golden-domed addition to the sacred skyline, open to all Iranians, was considered an 
unbearable affront by the anti-Baha’i agitators.  It is in this context that the attack on the 
small dome of the National Center should be understood.  Like so much else during this 
pogrom, the tangible dome of the Center was (at least for some) a proxy for the phantom 
dome of the planned Temple.  This is one of the reasons why so many of the less-
informed sources from this period repeatedly make the mistake of referring to the dome 
of the Center as the dome of the Temple. 
During the government’s protective occupation of Baha’i properties, Baha’is were 
prevented from entering their centers across Iran.  O ly the caretaker of the Baha’i 
National Center, Hassan Rezai, was initially allowed to enter.80  Eventually, however, he 
was also removed.81  According to his daughter, Rezai received physical and 
psychological assaults during the occupation.82  This treatment of Baha’is by the military 
occupying their property shows that this occupation was not done out of sympathy for the 
religion, but out of a desire to prevent disorder and to satisfy international pressure.  
When, for example, the Shah’s Baha’i personal physician, Major General Ayadi went to 
investigate the condition of the Center—in full uniform—he was arrested by Bakhtiar’s 
troops and thrown in jail for twenty-four hours, despite his high rank.  After he was 
released, he is said to have  
torn off his rank insignia and given them with a sttement that if his position as a 
general and a servant of the royal court could not be respected in spite of his 
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personal religious beliefs, then he could not propely wear his insignia and serve 
his country.  The Shah dismissed Ayadi, but the queen brought him back...83 
As the international press increased coverage of the persecution of Baha’is in 
Iran, following the seizure of the Baha’i National Center, this caused a great deal of stress 
to the image-conscious monarch.  In a May 11 British report, the Shah “expressed regret” 
for the “outburst” against the Baha’is and for “the bad effect it had on public opinion 
abroad.”  He wished that anti-Greek riots in Turkey “would now deflect attention from 
Persia to the Turks,” and hinted that he would appreciate it if the British embassy could 
do something to control the foreign press.  In respon e, Denis Wright told the Shah that it 
was an “English habit” to champion minorities, and that as such he was “in no position to 
stifle press criticism.”84   
Like the Shah, Falsafi was very upset by the negative reaction abroad to the 
suppression of the Baha’is in Iran.  He was particularly upset that the suppression of 
Baha’is was being used as evidence “that there is no liberty (azadi) in Iran.”  From his 
perspective, the pogrom of the citizens (mardom) against the “foreigners” (the Baha’is) 
was actually a struggle for liberty.85 
 Several days after the mob disorders that prompted th  military occupation of 
Baha’i centers—and increased British and American pressure to end the pogrom—the 
Shah sent General Bakhtiar and Major-General Alevi-Moqaddam to inform Falsafi that 
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the anti-Baha’i pogrom was to end.86  The Shah had desired an immediate end to the 
pogrom, but Falsafi was able to negotiate a limited continuation of the pogrom until the 
end of Ramadan.87   
After this visit, Borujerdi and Falsafi knew that the time for anti-Baha’i action 
was limited, but that although the government was no lo ger a partner in the struggle, it 
was also unwilling to publicly reverse itself over the Baha’i matter or to be perceived as 
their defenders.  In order to take advantage of this opening, they skipped several stages of 
the plans for anti-Baha’i action in order to push immediately for the two most important 
goals: the Baha’i National Center “must thoroughly be destroyed, to the point that it 
cannot be again converted back to a holy building for the Baha’is,” and legislation must 
be passed to explicitly name Baha’ism as illegal and to force the expulsion of all Baha’is 
from the military and the civil service.88 
In public, additional goals were expressed, perhaps to leave room for negotiation.  
Borujerdi announced in Kayhan that he anticipated the resumption of order, but had 
several clear goals that must be accomplished with the assistance of the state.  These were 
(1) “the Haziratu’l-Quds (National Baha’i Center) must be destroyed and replaced by a 
new building,” (2) “all of the Baha’is” employed by the governmental and national 
agencies must be ejected (tard), and (3) parliament must “pass legislation calling for all 
of the Baha’is in the country to be expelled (kharej shodan).”89    
At this time, Falsafi also gave a series of interviws to better explain the rationale 
of the pogrom.  He claimed that the Baha’is had been multiplying in number and that this 
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group was the creation and tool of colonial powers and planned to take over Iran in 1335 
[1956] if nothing was done to prevent this.  He blamed all of the “convulsions of the last 
few years” (such as the oil crisis, the 1953 coup, and the economic downturn) on the 
Baha’is. 90  As a result of the damage that they had supposedly already done, and were 
poised to do, 
His Holiness Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Behbahani, and the clerical societies 
have all of their attention focused on exorcising (tard) the Baha’i sect from 
Iranian society, and are continually in contact with the Court, the government, and 
both chambers of the majles to call for the complete eradication of all of their 
traces.  This effort, which is prompted by the concer  of the public, is done in 
order that the Muslims will attain to peace of mind thereafter.91 
The destruction of the Haziratu’l-Quds (National Baha’i Center) was considered 
an especially important aspect of this struggle and Falsafi claimed that the government 
and clerical delegations had agreed  
that the building of the Haziratu’l-Quds must be demolished, since if the building 
remains, then all of the institutions therein will sti l function and, under the guise 
of a “holy place,” the Baha’is will again use it for propaganda… Therefore, it is 
imperative and obligatory to also erase their traces and vestiges.92 
 
The partial destruction of the National Baha’i Center 
On May 22, just before the conclusion of Ramadan, the government approved the 
destruction of the dome of the Baha’i National Center.  This was a face-saving gesture 
offered to Borujerdi and Falsafi in order to smooth anger at the Shah’s withdrawal of 
support for anti-Baha’i action.  It was also a preventative move, removing the object of 
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provocation (the golden dome) in order to prevent later incidents.  The government 
needed to give Borujerdi some sort of face-saving “victory” to placate him and prevent 
the continuation of the pogrom after the end of Ramadan, and the destruction of the 
Center could accomplish this.   
The government felt that the destruction of a building, particularly one that was 
used for administrative tasks, would not generate much outrage abroad.  Moreover, the 
destruction of a physical structure was a more tangible act than ethereal pronouncements 
or other alternatives.  Destruction could be seen, h ard, and captured forever in 
photographs and ruins.  At the same time, the building could not be completely 
destroyed, since the government was under pressure by the Americans not to concede to 
any clerical demands and to prevent the destruction of Baha’i properties.  In a misguided 
attempt to act in a way that would satisfy both the anti-Baha’i forces at home and pro-
Baha’i opinion abroad, the Shah decided to solve this Gordian knot by slicing through it, 
destroying only the dome while leaving the rest of the massive structure intact.  It was, 
after all, the golden dome, rather than the brick and mortar of the walls, which was the 
cause of insult to Muslims.  Unlike other Baha’i centers, like the one in Mashhad, which 
was discrete and closeted away, the National Center’s dome was bold and “out” and 
could not be ignored.   
The destruction of the dome began in the morning of May 22 and was very clearly 
designed as a photo opportunity.  In addition to Falsafi and other clerics, the press was in 
full force, with photographers busy finding the best angles and vantage points with which 
to capture the moment.  In the early afternoon, Falsafi was joined by General Bakhtiar 
(the military-governor of Tehran) and Major-General B tmanghelich (the army chief of 
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staff).  The two high ranking officers joined Falsafi on the roof and posed for several 
pictures.  In one of the most famous photographs that resulted from this spectacle, 
General Batmanghelich is captured swinging a pick axe that a reporter provided as a prop 
for the photo session.  The pick axe was symbolic, with cranes and other heavy 
machinery from the army’s engineering section doing the real destructive work.  Since 
the dome was highly reinforced with iron and concrete, its demolition proved difficult 
and protracted.93 
 




               Figure 4. 3. Interior view of damage to the dome of the National B ha’i Center. 
 
                                                      




This striking cooperation between the clergy and the military was captured in a 
series of famous photographs that showed some of the government’s most senior military 
officers working in concert with Falsafi to hack awy at the dome of the most important 
center of the country’s largest non-Muslim minority group.  This desire for publicity 
seems to have originated with the military command was not approved by the 
Cabinet, providing yet another example of the “extrme lack of coordination in 
government throughout the campaign.”94 
Batmanghelich was apparently not authorized to takepart, but “for some 
unexplained reason the chief of staff… took it upon himself to wield a pickaxe on the 
first brick or tile… he did this on his own authority and the shah is very angry about it.”95  
His unauthorized participation may have been motivated by his desire to erase his 
effeminate reputation.  Even two years after the 1953 coup, his “strong character” was 
still the subject of ridicule after his failure to deliver a ferman (order) of appointment 
from the Shah during the coup, instead running away and crying in his car after 
encountering pro-Mosaddeq guards. 96  He did not hate the Baha’is as proxies for 
America; and was actually himself in the middle of immigration paperwork to move to 
the United States, where his daughter was already living.  He also did not have any 
particular animosity for the Baha’is themselves andjust days before the demolition of the 
Baha’i headquarters he had been chatting with the British military attaché and had spoken 
“in deprecating terms about the attack on the Baha’is.”97 As a result, the photograph 
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capturing his smiling attacks caused shock in those who knew him well.  It would seem 
that his involvement was not the result of any religious or even xenophobic sentiment, 
but was instead a macho act perhaps aimed at reversing hi  effeminate image.  As the 
photographs show, more than any other participant Chief of Staff Batmanghelich took 
special pleasure in being photographed in this macho t, smiling widely below what the 
Americans—behind his back—called his “Hitler moustache.”98   
According to the Acting Prime Minister (Entezam), “the crazy and unauthorized 
action of the Chief of Staff in personally taking a h nd in knocking down the dome of the 
Bahai [Center]” was one of the three big errors of incompetence that the government had 
made over the whole affair (the other two being starting it at all, and not having better 
oversight over General Bakhtiar).  According to him, the Chief of Staff’s participation 
“was quite inexcusable and the Shah was very angry about it indeed.”99  Alam felt 
likewise, and the “spectacle of cofs [Chief of Staff] Batmangilitch swinging his pick on 
the Bahai concrete dome brought expressions of disgust.”100    
On the day of the Center’s destruction, Alam sought a meeting with Fearnley (of 
the British embassy), to discuss the “Baha’i question.”  Alam explained the government’s 
thinking, pointing out that the National Baha’i cent r was the only Baha’i property with 
the offending prominent dome and that, although seized, the other Baha’i properties 
would not be destroyed.  Instead the other “public properties” of the Baha’is would be 
held for awhile and then eventually sold, with “the money going to the Baha’i 
communities concerned.”  This distant compensation, h wever, was rather dodgy and 
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when Fearnley asked for details “Alam became rather obscure, saying that he had no 
doubt that buyers could be found for them.”101   
 
 




             Figure 4. 5. Batmanghelich posing with a pickaxe while Bakhtiar watches. 
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A “national” pogrom? 
Almost all residents of major towns and cities in Iran were aware of the anti-Baha’i 
campaign, either through hearing Falsafi’s broadcasts themselves or by receiving 
information about them indirectly at the bazaar or m sque, through the press, or in other 
ways.  Despite this wide saturation, the response to the pogrom was not homogenous and 
there was a great deal of variation at the provincial and city level.  While in Shiraz the 
situation degenerated until martial law was imposed, in most areas there was a less robust 
response, and in others there was little to no interes  at all. 102 
Iranian Kurdistan, for example, met Falsafi’s call to action with apathy.  This 
area, which has a relatively large Sunni Muslim population, had been the site of the most 
intense manifestations of anti-Semitic violence in the years immediately following the 
creation of Israel, but had little interest in what Sunnis perceived as a Shi’ite issue.   
Contemporary Kurdish sources confirm that most people in that region simply did not 
care about the campaign one way or the other, saw it s just another attempt by the 
central government to loot the helpless, and believd that the most that would occur in the 
region as a result of the campaign would be some tok n dismissals of Baha’is. 103   
In Tabriz—the city where the first prophet of the Babi-Baha’i tradition was 
executed a century before—there was widespread theoretical support for the campaign, 
but little interest in actually joining it.  There were no significant, organized attacks on 
Baha’is during Ramadan.  Rather, the occasion was used as an excuse to engage in 
political speculation about the “real” origins and motives of the pogrom.  Despite 
nominal participation, the pogrom was generally popular, except for among the well-
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educated, who mostly disapproved of both the pogrom and the clerics behind it, albeit 
without having any sympathy for the victims.104  The regional government remained 
silent on the whole affair, exercising caution and restraint.  When orders came from 
Tehran informing the provincial leadership that the government had changed its mind and 
was now opposing anti-Baha’i action, the provincial government ordered clerics to 
comply with the new directives and abstain from all inf ammatory actions.  Tabriz’s chief 
of police was determined to prevent disorders and all but a few clerics complied with the 
local authorities.  On May 29, however, two Tabrizi clerics were arrested and sent to 
Khorramabad for condemning the government’s inaction on the Baha’i front.  In a nearby 
town, a local mullah called for all Baha’is to be exp lled from his city, only to be told to 
cease this behavior, or he would find himself exiled.  Although exceptions like these 
occurred, they either failed to find traction, or were effectively intercepted by the security 
forces.105 
 In Tehran, reaction was mixed, although it was felt that “No event in the past year 
has stirred up public opinion so much as the Bahai controversy.”  Large crowds gathered 
in the bazaar and at other popular centers to listen together to Falsafi’s radio broadcasts, 
and crowds also took to the streets to seize the National Baha’i Center, and to observe the 
later military occupation of this Center.  As was typical for Tehran, attitudes were split 
between the affluent north and the poorer, more traditional southern areas.106  The 
economic disparity between these two parts of the capital was particularly heightened in 
the years leading up to 1955, as the population of the city had increased 150% in the 
decade since the end of World War II, with 85% of the city’s inhabitants lacking regular 
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employment and most families surviving on less than $75 a year.107  In the South, there 
was strong support for the pogrom due to the traditionalism of the more recently 
urbanized and the deference many extended to the decisions and leadership of the clerics 
and Islamic associations that assisted them when the state did not.  Although anti-Baha’i 
mobs in the capital were made up of “lower class” individuals, Tehranis of all classes 
believed that the Baha’is “constitute a political movement hostile to Shia Iran.”108 
The mainstream Tehran press was in support of the pogrom and shared, on a daily 
basis, all of the inflammatory statements made by Falsafi and others, disseminating the 
pogrom’s propaganda to whoever had not received it over the airwaves, and further 
editorializing in support of its goals.  The May 11 issue of Dad, for example, claims that 
Bahais are a political group whose objective is to pread dissension and disrupt the 
country’s security.  To guard against this, it calls for a general purge of Bahai elements in 
government offices and public institutions.   It goes on to frame the Baha’is as equivalent 
to the Communists, and to claim that the pogrom against the Baha’is has the same 
justification as the anti-Communist drive. 109 
In a 1955 investigation for AUFS, Bayne notes that despite reports of rampant 
fanaticism, he found little evidence of this on theground in Tehran.  The soldiers 
guarding the seized Baha’i properties were “listles” and many of the anti-Baha’i crowds 
seemed “herded” rather than spontaneous.   Although anti-Baha’i spectacles, such as the 
destruction of the Baha’i National Center’s prominent dome, were staged to stir the 
masses, “the city did not ring with cheers.”  He notes that for every expression of support 
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for the pogrom that he came across, he encountered an qual number who expressed 
“sadness and shame over the stupidity of it.”  Not only did many working class Tehranis, 
including the clichéd example of the taxi driver, express disapproval of the campaign, but 
so did several prominent individuals, including theShah’s half-brother and the head of 
the National Bank.  One cook expressed disapproval, albeit without sympathy, saying 
that while he could understand the attacks on the Baha’is themselves, the attacks on their 
building’s dome perplexed him, since “the dome never hurt anyone.”110    
In Mashhad, Hedayatollah Rahimi (the legal advisor of USOM and the American 
consulate’s local Baha’i contact) was “naturally disturbed” by the pogrom, but did not 
feel that Mashhad would face serious violence since Am rican pressure had prevented 
anti-Baha’i riots in Tehran and Mashhad always took its lead from the capital.111  Indeed, 
most coverage of the Baha’i issue in Mashhad did not treat it as a local issue, instead 
denying the existence of Baha’is in this holy city and seeing the controversy as primarily 
a problem for Tehran and other cities.112  A few papers did, however, stress the 
immediacy of the Baha’i threat.  Nur-e-Khorasan, for example, claimed that Mashhad 
was a “fortress for the Baha’is” and that their numbers had greatly increased in recent 
years, “especially in the Government departments.”  Nur-e-Iran made similar claims and 
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threatened to list the names of all Baha’is in the city working for the government, banks, 
and factories.113 
Rahimi’s analysis proved correct, since, although there was widespread support 
for the pogrom and strong and diffuse negative feelings towards the Baha’is, there was 
only limited anti-Baha’i action in Mashhad.  Still, there was in this pilgrimage center “a 
considerable feeling of satisfaction that Baha’is were under attack.”  In terms of active 
involvement, the most significant episodes were orchestrated by Afsah al-Mutakallimin, 
who organized an attack on the Mashhad Baha’i Center.  As a result, he was arrested in 
late May for “anti-government statements” which was the new euphemism for anti-
Baha’ism.114   
 Anti-Baha’i hostility within Mashhad was complicated by the close proximity of 
several military divisions whose leadership was generally supportive of the Baha’is.  
Assistant military attaché, Lt. Colonel Erwin Forsythe (the commanding general of the 8th 
Division), expressed his concern over the attacks on Baha’is, since “some of his most 
capable officers were of that sect.”  Major Mohammed-Ali Arsham (the acting chief of 
G2) and Colonel Behseresht likewise expressed opposition to the pogrom and 
apprehension about the consequences of the loss of Baha’i officers.  General 
Shahrokhshahi expressed similar views and claimed to be “embarrassed” by the 
military’s participation in the pogrom. 115 
 In Isfahan, despite the large Baha’i population (twenty thousand members in the 
greater Isfahan area),116 there were only a handful of occasions in which the harassment 
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of Baha’is crossed the threshold into organized violence.  The most significant incident 
occurred on May 7, when a large crowd gathered at a mosque in north-western Isfahan 
and then moved toward the Baha’i Centre located on Seyyed Ali Khan Street, near the 
American Consulate, with the stated intention of destroying the center and then burning 
it.  The police heard of the agitation, however, and preemptively seized the property on 
the pretext of “protection” and dispersed the mob.  After that, police guarded and 
occupied the building and neither clerics nor Baha’is pproached it.  Another significant 
incident occurred in the nearby village of Ahfoos, in a Bakhtiari tribal area eighty miles 
west of Isfahan.  In this incident, a village mob attacked a local Baha’i Centre (which had 
been too small and too rural to warrant being occupied by security forces), and burned it 
to the ground.  Although no one died in the attack, the Baha’is of this village, as well as 
those in nearby Najafabad, were made to suffer various “unpleasantries.”117  Najafabad 
was also one of the few places in Iran that enthusiastically took up Borujerdi’s call for an 
economic boycott against the Baha’is.118  Later, in the village of Ardestan, the “Baha’i 
Quarter” was attacked and male Baha’is were beaten and ordered to curse their religion 
and their ancestors or else witness assaults on their female relatives, who were hiding 
underground.  After the humiliation of the attacks, a saults, and tortured dissimulation, 
most left their ancestral home for the anonymity of the cities, leaving only a handful 
behind.  The same tactic was used in Zazereh, but in this village no one would recant 
under torture.  After this incident, that village’s Baha’i community also tried to flee to the 
anonymity of the cities but was prevented from leaving and the persecution continued.  
An elderly Baha’i woman, for example, was led through the streets on a leash and made 
                                                      
117 Ibid., Iraq, 1955-1959, Reel 15: 141. 
118 Ibid., Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 2:79. 
166 
 
to name all the Baha’i women in the town and graphically slander their morality.  The 
gendarmerie were called in and, despite their new orders to protect the Baha’is, they 
made no efforts to do so and demanded food and bribes from the Baha’is for simply 
being there.119 
These rural incidents were in sharp contrast to the relative calm in Isfahan itself 
following the active involvement of security forces.  This was partly because of the 
superior security forces in the city, but also because Isfahani Baha’is maintained a low 
profile and were not segregated and immediately ident fiable, as was often the case in the 
rural areas.  Unlike some other Baha’i communities that were more bold and assertive in 
making their existence felt and seeking converts, the Isfahan Baha’is did not strongly 
proselytize and were “content to render themselves as inconspicuous as possible by 
leading quiet and orderly lives.”120  They worked mostly for the government, with about 
one-fifth employed in the civil service.  The number would be higher, but “both the army 
and the civil service seem almost to have an unofficial [upper] quota of Baha’is.”121  
Despite the handicaps that it faced, the Baha’i community in Isfahan was growing rapidly 
in this period, a development that met the approval f the American consulate since  
…their increases in numbers should mean an improvement in ethical and moral 
standards of the community… [since they] are persons of greater honesty and 
higher ethical standards and with a more “Western” way of life…They are most 
noteworthy for their higher moral standards and ethics, and if their adherents do 
increase, the effect on the general life should be invigorating and proportionally 
tend to pull the people in general out of their backwardness and corruption.122 
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Col. Enayatollah Sohrab, the “leader” of the Isfahani Baha’is (i.e. an elected 
member of the community’s local leadership), who discussed the pogrom with American 
diplomats, claimed that according to “his people” with inside information, the pogrom 
occurred because the Shah was taking a page from his fat er’s playbook and was feigning 
to the Right before attempting a major move to the Left.  In his analysis, the Shah was 
attempting “to prove his religious zeal and increase his popularity before inaugurating an 
unspecified but possibly unpopular policy [of progressive reform].”123  The implication 
being that the planned reforms would be to the detrim nt of the clergy and would 
probably be criticized as un-Islamic, i.e. land refo m.  Sohrab pointed out that before 
Reza Shah made anti-Islamic reforms he had followed th  same pattern and first 
“launched a campaign against the Bahais, closed down their schools, and threw them out 
of government jobs.”  He was able to “weaken the influence of the Moslem clergy by 
[first] setting the stage with a demonstration of himself as a staunch Moslem.”124  Of 
course, this pre-emptive demonstration of Islamic credentials did not ultimately help 
Reza Shah, but Sohrab was rather convinced of the veracity of his sources. 
Despite the uneven distribution of anti-Baha’i violence, there was a general 
acceptance in Iran of the idea that the Baha’is deserv d what happened to them.  There 
were expressions of regret, disgust, and disapproval, but these were almost always made 
in private conversations.  Public criticism of the pogrom within Iran was mostly limited 
to objections to the disruption of order, to the damage that was allowed to be done to 
Iran’s reputation abroad, and to the Hidden Hand of the British supposedly again sowing 
internal dissent.  There were many critics of the pogrom, but almost none of them 
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defended the Baha’i victims, with most going in theother direction, prefacing their words 
with the caveat that they had no sympathy for the Baha’is.  A notable exception to this 
was Mujtaba Minuvi, the editor of the periodical Yaghma, who opposed the pogrom on 
moral and humanitarian grounds.125  Another prominent defense of the Baha’is came 
from Tehran’s imam jom’eh.  He had led the mid-day prayers before Falsafi’s sermon 
over state radio but, upon hearing Falsafi’s lies and calls to violence, he showed his 
disapproval by voting with his feet, standing up and walking out on Falsafi.  In his view, 
the Shah should have done likewise and “taken decisiv  action as soon the tone of 
Falsafi’s sermons became apparent.”126 
 
The impact of the pogrom 
Looking back on the 1955 pogrom several years later, Alam judged that this episode 
brought Iran “to the brink of catastrophe.”127  The disaster that was barely averted 
concerned more than just the fate of the Baha’i minority or Iran’s international reputation 
and relationships.  Iran’s economy was also seriously endangered.  
 Prime Minister Ala was worried that the anti-Baha’i pogrom would scare away 
potential American investment.128  This fear was also expressed by Minister Saleh and 
others.  While in the United States, Saleh had been confronted about the anti-Baha’i 
violence in the headquarters of a vacuum company and was humiliated as he attempted to 
apologize for his government.  After that, he avoided public appearances in America 
because “he was ashamed of the Baha’i mess in Iran.”  He later met with the Shah and 
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convinced him that the anti-Baha’i pogrom was causing a withdrawal of confidence in his 
government.  As an example, he noted that the Squib Corporation was going to cancel 
plans for drug-manufacturing operations in Iran dueto the anti-Baha’i violence.129   
  The potential dismissal of Baha’i employees was also  major cause of concern, 
as it would negatively impact the government’s ability to function, because of the high 
percentage of employees who were Baha’is.130  Although they were often blocked from 
the most senior positions, Baha’is often attained mi -level positions in both the civilian 
and military hierarchies.  According to Tehran’s imam jom’eh (Friday prayer leader), for 
example, there were about one thousand Baha’i officers in the army alone (with his 
British interlocutor adding that this number “may well be correct”).131  There were over 
two hundred thousand Baha’is in Iran according to Bayne’s 1955 research, with forty 
thousand of these living in the greater Tehran area.  Despite their relatively small 
numbers, they “constitute an important segment of the middle class and much of its 
administrative strength.”132  Although Bayne’s investigations led him to believe that only 
1-1.5% of Iran was Baha’i, “the quality of the membership makes the group 
important.”133  According to his information: 
The army, for example, has several hundred Bahai officers, at least one of whom 
is a major general.  The National Bank employees score  of Bahais, as do most 
government agencies.  Payrolls of Point IV134 activities include several hundred 
Baha’is.  The American Embassy and other embassies u e Baha’is.  It is safe to 
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assume that there are more Baha’is in official agencies than there are members of 
any other minority group…135 
 Due to their crucial mid-management positions, the typ  of wholesale dismissals 
of Baha’is that Borujerdi requested would have impaired the government’s ability to 
function.  In connection with this, the British Ambassador believed that it would be “most 
unfortunate” if Baha’is were removed from the country’s civil and military infrastructure 
as this would be “depriving Iran of valuable servants i  these critical times.”136    
 There was also displeasure in the bazaar and the financial sector because of the 
anti-Baha’i pogrom.  Baha’is had a reputation for hnesty and trustworthiness and it was 
felt that, in general, “Baha’is are more competent.”137  In Bayne’s view, the Baha’is in 
Tehran played the same vital and prominent role that the Jews of Baghdad played before 
their forced exodus.   Because of their reputations f r honesty, they were given “positions 
of some importance” and this was analogous to “finding Chinese cashiers in Japanese 
banks and vice versa."138  They were allowed to rise to positions of some prominence, but 
typically barred from the highest positions.  Bayne ev n reported hearing from an 
associate that "As a Muslim banker, I tell you that t e Bahais are the most reliable 
element in the bazaar.  Being a Bahai is a good creit rating in itself.”  The same source 
noted that the “utter nonsense” of the pogrom was a symptom of the government’s 
incompetence in general and, as a result of this folly, the bazaar “is in great difficulties 
now.”139  The pogrom caused large numbers of Baha’is to simultaneously liquidate their 
assets out of uncertainty about what the future held for them.  In so doing, they were  
                                                      
135 Bayne, “Bahais Again” pp. 7-8. 
136 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1 / 55, Confidential Memo by Stevens, May 10, 1955. 
137 Bayne, “Bahais Again” p. 9.  
138 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
139 Ibid., p. 2. 
171 
 
drawing substantial funds from the operating capital of the bazaar.  The result has 
been a series of major bankruptcies, carrying with them a score of minor crashes, 
because the bazaar is a sensitive center of Iranian commerce in a country always 
short of operating capital.140 
 
“The fire now burning” 
Despite the government’s reversal on anti-Baha’i action, violence continued sporadically 
into the summer, especially in more provincial locations.  Since it was widely believed 
that the Shah reversed himself due to American pressu , anti-Baha’i activists began to 
target not only the Baha’is but also the Americans d even the Shah himself. 
The first significant anti-Baha’i action following the end of Ramadan occurred in 
Shiraz on May 26th.  On this occasion, Ayatollah Shirazi’s Brotherhood Party attacked 
Baha’i properties on the very day that the Shah was visiting Shiraz.  The attack on the 
soft target of the Baha’is was actually a proxy attack on the Shah himself, since the 
timing was deliberate and the spectacle was staged in such a way that the Shah would 
witness it during his visit.  Anger had been building over the Shah’s reversal on the 
Baha’i issue, but the anti-Baha’i forces were said to have been “biding their time” until 
the Shah’s visit.  The spectacle shocked, scared, and angered the Shah, who recognized 
that he was the true target of the protests.  Up until this point, the Shah had been 
lukewarm in his response to British and American calls for him to turn against the clergy, 
doing the absolute minimum needed to satisfy his patrons while limiting the damage that 
was being done to his relationship with his conservative base.  After May 26, however, he 
                                                      
140 Ibid.  This is also mentioned in a Russian source, which claims that, as a result of fear generated by the 
pogrom, Baha’is collectively withdrew 1.5 billion rials in a short period of time.  See Akhavi, Religion and 
Politics, p 220 n51. 
172 
 
accepted Alam’s advice that firm opposition to the clergy was needed, promising Alam 
that he would “treat them rough” and “no longer compromise.”141   
 In order to break the ties between the Baha’is and the Americans, anti-Baha’i 
activists began to push for Baha’is to be removed from positions in American and 
international endeavors, such as Point IV.  There were hundreds of Baha’is employed by 
these agencies and, although there is no indication that any Baha’is were dismissed from 
these positions as a result of the clerical push, there was a great deal of fear that, when the 
Iranian government took over these projects, most Baha’is would be fired.142  In British 
discussions of this American problem, they noted their own small number of Baha’i 
employees when compared to the Americans, who “have quite a number of Baha’i 
employees in this country.”143  According to a consulate report, Point IV initially wanted 
to conduct its activities through Baha’is exclusively, but after strong local objections they 
were forced to abandon this plan and include Muslims as well as several hundred 
Baha’is.144  It was because of this large Baha’i presence in Poi t IV that, as part of the 
Ramadan pogrom, a Point IV vehicle was attacked and its windows smashed.145 
Some clerical polemic continued Falsafi’s earlier attempts to use Cold War scare 
tactics to cause the Americans to break with the Baha’is.  The Americans were warned 
that Baha’is were at every Tudeh meeting, that theyw re a political tool of Communist 
irreligion, and that there was no distinction between Baha’is and Communists.  They 
were portrayed as inveterate liars and Communist deceiv rs to be rooted out.  In the June 
18 issue of Tufan, for example, this verbose headline appears: 
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By propagating their party and communistic Bahaism and Babism (the 
inseparable parts of the Tudeh party), the communists make efforts to strengthen 
their influence in the Islamic countries.  Meanwhile, the Baha’i spies work to 
deceive the great personalities of the United States of America in order to put the 
foundation of this dangerous objective in the U.S. president’s White House.146 
In this article, Baha’is are portrayed as not only co-sponsors of Iranian 
Communism, but also part of a vast international conspiracy that aimed to subvert not 
only Iran but also the White House.  The article continues its attempt to warn America 
about Baha’ism by fabricating a story in which an American Consul was at a party and 
mentioned casually that there were a million Baha’is in Iran.  Ignoring the fact that 
Falsafi himself used the same figure, the article’s author claims that when he heard the 
American mention of Baha’i numbers he knew that it was the product of “the clever 
Bahai propagandists whose job it is to make false statistics.”  He claims to have 
confronted the American Consul and told him that, if that number were true, then out of 
every twenty people in Iran there would be one Baha’i, and he challenged the Consul to 
find anywhere near that number.  In response, the apocryphal Consul (which the writer 
later admitted he invented) tore up the information fr m his Baha’i sources and said that 
“this party is really the champion at making false statements and big lies.” The article 
goes on to demand that: 
No matter what position they (the Baha’is) have occupied in the towns or villages 
they must be immediately dismissed.  The adulterated drugs imported by Bahais 
should be destroyed and the purchase of such drugs forbidden.  They must be 
removed from whatever villages they have entered, an  they must be exiled to far 
distant places so that they will have no organized political party.  Thus, the fire 
now burning which was sponsored by the Bolsheviks in this country can be put 
out and the ones responsible for it hanged according to the country’s laws… And 
anyone, in whatever position or rank, who is supporting the so-called Baha’is who 
are led by their dirty boss, [Shoghi Effendi], must be assumed to be a partner in 
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this crime and must be punished.  Transactions with Ba ais or Babis have been 
forbidden by Ayatollah Borujerdi and other authorities.  No such barters or 
transactions, therefore, must be practiced with this party.  Otherwise nothing will 
have been gained from the closing of their [Center] and all the recent talk about 
this disastrous party which has ruined the life andreputation of this country.147  
This article, clearly coming from a supporter of Borujerdi, is calling for the 
violent extermination not only of the “dirty” Baha’is, but of anyone “of whatever position 
or rank” who supports them (i.e. potentially the Shah or Americans in Iran).  It also 
clearly expresses frustration at the possibility that “nothing will have been gained” by the 
pogrom, even though it “has ruined the life and reputation of this country.”  
In a June 28 meeting between the paper’s editor, Jafar Fesharaki, and Robert 
Berret, the American Vice-Consul in Isfahan, the editor admitted that he had fabricated 
the encounter with the American officer, and agreed to print a retraction.  In the rest of 
the meeting, he attempted to lobby the Americans to cease their protection of the Baha’is.  
In this effort, he tried to “minimize the number of Baha’is in Iran and to maximize their 
subversive activities.”  He said that there were only twenty thousand Baha’is in Iran and 
that they “were the same as Bolsheviks.”  He claimed to have been told by General 
Zarqam that in every Tudeh meeting he raided he had found Baha’is among them.  He 
used this Cold War rationale to urge the Americans to dismiss all of their Baha’i 
employees.  When he sensed this approach was not working, he tried to urge Baha’i 
dismissals by appealing to the perceived new “Great Game” between Britain and 
America for control of Iran.  “He said that close association between the Americans and 
the Baha’is enables the English to enlist more easily the aid of devoted Moslems in 
furtherance of the British policy to frustrate American objectives in Iran.”  When he was 




informed that the Consulate had no intention to fire Baha’is merely for their religious 
identity, he threatened to contact Falsafi and force the firings of the Baha’is in Point IV 
after it was transferred to Iranian control, promising that “the campaign against Bahaism 
would continue just as the one against the Tudeh and the Communists.”148 
 When the Americans remained steadfast in their support for the Baha’is, lobbying 
efforts of this sort were abandoned and there was a rhetorical shift towards directly 
targeting America and its institutions.  The clerical perception of the Shah also shifted in 
this period.  Whereas he was previously seen as a sympathetic young ruler who suffered 
the growth of the Baha’i threat out of ignorance, his reversal on the Baha’i issue and 
active turn against the anti-Baha’i cause caused him to be perceived as no better than the 
Baha’is, i.e. he was seen to be acting as an agent of foreign powers, placing self-interest 
over national interest, by continuing to allow Baha’is in high positions despite now being 
thoroughly familiar with the arguments against them.   
This led to a blurring of anti-Baha’ism, anti-Americanism, and anti-regime 
sentiment that was best expressed in the plans for an Islamic coup later in the summer.  In 
this plan, which was done in the name of Borujerdi but apparently without his approval, 
cleric-led forces were to seize power during the commemoration of Ashura [August 
1955] and demand that the Shah immediately remove the Americans who were in Iran 
with Point IV and the Baha’is in government.  If the Shah did not immediately turn 
against the Americans and the Baha’is—who were treated s twin targets—Islamic rule 
would begin.149  This episode is treated in more detail in Chapter VII.  Although the 
Islamic coup was not viable, it shows how anti-Baha’ism and anti-Americanism were 
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conflated and how the regime as a whole came to begin to be marked as “Baha’i” and 
“American,” and targeted as such, with Islamic rule pr sented as a viable replacement for 
the existing regime. 
 
Conclusion 
Although ostensibly an attack on a religious heresy, the anti-Baha’i pogrom served 
primarily as a catalytic agent, stripping away the superficial calm of the post-Mosaddeq 
years to reveal the deep fissures and conflicted foundations of Iranian modernity.  It was, 
moreover, the trigger behind a series of important reversals, as the ulama’s strategic bond 
with the new Shah, which had survived even the Mosaddeq years, collapsed under the 
weight of the Shah’s obligations to his foreign patrons, and the earlier British and 
American plan to use the ulama in the struggle against the Left was sidelined by new 
policies emphasizing stability and reform, both of which were perceived to be threatened 
by clerical activism.  It also served as a test of power not just for the Shah’s first attempt 
at direct rule, but also for Borujerdi’s symbolic capital and for the strength of American 
influence over her new client.  It was designed as an object lesson to put Baha’is “in their 
place,” and it was largely successful in this—as Baha’is retreated from the public sphere 
and the idea of a large Baha’i temple became unthinkable—but it had the unintended 
consequence of disrupting the ulama’s place in Iran, as the clergy’s relationship with the 
Shah unraveled due to British and American pressure for him to put the ulama “in their 
place.” 
Tavakoli-Targhi has identified the short-lived Court-clergy partnership in the anti-
Baha’i pogrom as both the “peak” and the “beginning of the end” of Court-clergy 
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collaboration in the Pahlavi period.  For fourteen y ars, the clerical hierarchy and the new 
Shah had been growing closer together through common opposition to Tudeh and 
Mosaddeq and a mutually beneficial relationship in which the Shah allowed the reversal 
of his father’s anti-Islamic policies and in exchange won the loyalty and the legitimizing 
political support of the clergy.  As a result of the clerical revival and political activism 
that the Shah had allowed, an “Islamic public sphere” merged that, with the anti-Baha’i 
drive, “became united and of one mind.”  By initially joining in this political movement, 
the Shah won unprecedented popularity in clerical circ es but, by suddenly changing 
course and sabotaging this phenomenon that he had helped to construct, he completely 
destroyed this relationship and “annulled the histor c union between the state and 
clergy.”150  As a result, the ulama broke with the regime.  Although this new orientation 
was not explicitly expressed until 1963, Tavakoli-Targhi claims that the anti-regime 
stance of 1963 was actually a continuation of the post-1955 turn against the Shah.  His 
conclusions are accurate although they are mostly speculation and he does adequately 
support this claim.  Subsequent chapters of this study provide some of the missing pieces 
that connect 1955 to 1963 and add further support to this argument. 
 
                                                      





“A Characteristically Messy Compromise”: 
The Failure of Borujerdi’s Loyal Opposition 
 
Introduction 
The anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955 officially ended with the symbolically-charged 
destruction of the dome of the National Bahai Center on the last day of Ramadan (May 
22).  Despite the outward appearance of a month-long p grom, governmental support had 
actually been withdrawn earlier in May after Anglo-American pressure caused the Shah 
to abandon support for the campaign.  After this loss f active governmental support, the 
anti-Baha’i campaign died a slow death as closed-door attempts were made to persuade 
Falsafi and Borujerdi to accept and abide by this cessation voluntarily, so that the regime 
would not be made to publically appear as defenders of the Baha’is.   
 The public spectacle of the destruction of the prominent dome of the Baha’i 
national Center was a face-saving gesture by the gov rnment to smooth over clerical 
anger at the Shah’s abrupt reversal on the Bahai matter.  It did not work.  Borujerdi 
continued to insist that the government legally commit itself to dismiss all Bahais from 
the military and the civil service.  A test of wills resulted, as Borujerdi intensely 
pressured the government on this issue during the interregnum between the conclusion of 
Ramadan in May and the beginning of the holy month of Moharram (August 20 – 
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September 18).  Eventually a weak compromise was reched, which not only failed to 
meet Borujerdi’s demands, but was not enforced by the regime. 
 This chapter explores the long series of demands, standoffs, compromises, and 
betrayals over the Baha’i issue from the beginning of May until the end of August.  
Borujerdi ultimately failed in this standoff with te state, I argue, because of his inability 
to realize that the Shah had made the strategic decsion to privilege Iran’s obligations as a 
client state over the benefits of continued clerical support.  While Borujerdi was slow to 
come to grips with this new political reality, and continued to believe that results could be 
achieved by working within the system, some of the Islamic associations that acted 
autonomously, such as the Brotherhood Party, were more successful in their 
confrontation with the state due to their more combative stance and better mobilization 
and party discipline.  Borujerdi’s exposure as a paper tiger paved the way for the Shah’s 
turn against the clergy (discussed in Chapter VII), while the relative success—albeit 
short-lived—of the combatant associations provided inspiration for the post-Borujerdi re-
positioning of clerical activism discussed in Chapter VIII. 
 
“Trying to face both ways” 
In the first week of Ramadan, the Iranian government was fully supportive of Falsafi’s 
calls for violence on state radio.1  As objections began to be raised from London and 
Washington, however, the government began a cautious reversal, with Alam in the lead 
and the rest of the Cabinet more circumspect.  Frustrated by escalating foreign pressure 
over the pogrom and the Cabinet’s slow and cautious approach, Alam took matters into 
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his own hands.2  In the second week of the pogrom, Falsafi received th  first indication of 
the government’s change of position through a phone call from Alam.  Alam reportedly 
said, “Mr. Falsafi, I do not permit you to speak in this way concerning the Baha’is.” He 
further indicated that he would not let Falsafi “disrupt security and become the cause of a 
bloodbath (khun-rizi)!”  In his memoir, Falsafi claims that he chastised Alam for his 
disrespectful tone.  Following this admonition, Alam framed the government’s objection 
in terms of security and stability, and indicated that they were receiving reports from the 
provinces concerning attacks on the Baha’is and that this strike at the Baha’is was also 
resulting in a “strike at order and security (nezam va amniyat).”  Falsafi responded with 
the argument that his aim was only “to unveil the depravity (gomrahi) of the Baha’is” 
and that this revelation was simply stirring up the “s lf-protection of the people.”3  Still, 
Alam’s warnings had some effect, and Falsafi’s broadcasts began to feature the caveat 
that order must be maintained in the anti-Baha’i efforts.  Alam called him back to express 
approval of this shift in tone, and to arrange a meeting to discuss how order could be 
maintained moving forward.4   
On May 9, shortly after the mob action in Tehran that led to the seizure of the 
Haziratu’l-Quds (National Baha’i Center), Alam met wi h Falsafi and attempted to 
intimidate him into halting all calls for anti-Baha’i ction, issuing an ultimatum. When 
Falsafi ignored his threats, Alam was forced to take the matter to the Shah and seek the 
support of other cabinet ministers. In a characteristically dramatic way, he let it be known 
                                                      
2 At first, Alam was hesitant to take action to resolve the Baha’i matter because of his impression that the 
Americans might still wish to use the clerics as a bulwark against communism, but Fearnley (of the British 
Embassy) assuaged his fears and informed him “that the impression I gathered was that the Americans 
were worried in the opposite direction, namely that t e mullahs might become even more reactionary” 
(TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 18 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Fearnley, May 24, 1955). 
3 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 201.   
4 Ibid., p. 202. 
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“that he was quite prepared to sacrifice his own office if it were necessary to bring this 
nonsense to an end.”5  This was not necessary, however, since he was able to rally 
adequate support for his position.  Still, the Cabinet felt that it was best to avoid a public 
break with the ulama.  As such, it was agreed that Falsafi would be allowed to speak 
about purely religious issues during his radio broadcasts for the remainder of the holy 
month, but that he would be instructed to call for the cessation of all anti-Baha’i activities 
and for the restoration of order.  After rallying some support from the Shah and other 
ministers,  
They sent word to Burujerdi in Qum not to encourage Falsafi further… [and] will 
tell Falsafi this morning to omit reference to Bahais in his sermons, failing which 
he would be literally taken off the pulpit.  The threat is to be communicated to 
him by Gen. Bakhtiar who is also the one to carry it out, if need be.6 
Falsafi describes this surprise meeting as the point at which the government’s 
reversal on the Baha’i issue became obvious to him. He relates that he was reading one 
morning when, without prior warning, he was visited by General Bakhtiar (the military-
governor of Tehran and Iran’s intelligence czar) and Major-General Alavi-Moqadam (the 
national police chief).  They told him that they had just seen the Shah and that “he 
ordered that the two of us come here together and notify you that from today onwards 
you are no longer to speak concerning the Baha’is.”  In his typically self-congratulatory 
and somewhat dubious style, Falsafi claims in his memoirs that he remained calm and 
rational in the face of their aggression, as he had before in the face of Alam’s harsh 
words.  In reply, he “gently said” that removing him from the airwaves “is not in the best 
interest (maslahat) of the people” and “is not well thought-out.”  Denying the public his 
                                                      




message, he argued, “will be to the detriment of the public good.”  Faced with his 
intransigence, the pair took on a “dictatorial manner” and insisted: “No, His Majesty 
explicitly gave us the message that you were to speak no more.”  Just as Falsafi was 
about to respond angrily, he claims to have received divine inspiration (khoda tafazel 
kard), enabling him to call their bluff.  He announced that there were only four options 
before them: they could imprison him before he could resume his sermons, they could 
allow him to resume preaching and simply not broadcast it, they could allow him a final 
broadcast to explain that the Shah had sent them to instruct him to not speak against the 
Baha’is, or they could allow him to continue as befor .7 
They supposedly replied, “No…  Sir, His Majesty has commanded that you not 
say a thing, and that it not be made public that this is done on His command.”  Falsafi 
mocked this glass-jawed bullying, in which all he had to do to gain the upper hand was to 
threaten to say in public what had been said in private.  Sensing that they had assumed 
that he would simply fold before this intimidation, and that they lacked any clear plan for 
what to do if this failed to silence him, Falsafi end d the meeting by telling them to throw 
him in jail, if they dared, or else allow him to complete his broadcasts as before.8 
Lacking the political will to publically stand against Falsafi and appear as the 
defenders of the Baha’is, the Cabinet was internally divided about what to do next, 
which, in practice, allowed Falsafi to continue to speak against the Baha’is as long as he 
continued to also call for the maintenance of order.  The internal divisions of the Shah’s 
government provided a brief opening for Falsafi andBorujerdi, as the government had 
exposed its true intentions but simultaneously demonstrated the unlikelihood that it 
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would completely shut down anti-Baha’i efforts befor  the end of the month, as long as 
order was not further disrupted.  To take advantage of this window of opportunity, action 
on the streets was pre-empted by a political push to ensure that anti-Baha’i legislation 
could be obtained before the bully pulpit afforded by the national radio broadcasts was 
lost at the end of the month.   
In an attempt to explain to the British Ambassador the difficult situation that 
faced the Cabinet, the Acting Prime Minister emphasized  
that the Government was in a cleft stick.  They could not afford to have an 
outbreak of disorder which would be used by their enemies as a basis for 
attacking them and comparing their record unfavourably with that of the Zahedi 
Administration.  A number of General Zahedi’s supporters were already coming 
out actively against the Bahais with the object of embarrassing the Government.  
On the other hand, they would have to proceed very circumspectly in curbing 
Moslem enthusiasm lest they should set the bulk of the country against them.  
They could not respond to the demand for outlawing the Bahais by legislation 
because on legal grounds there was no case for it.  The Bahais, unlike the 
Christians, Jews, or Zoroastrians were not an officially protected minority and had 
no legal status as it was… Government is hoping that by using soft words all 
round they can calm excited spirits, and that the sorm will blow over.  They are 
certainly trying to face both ways, e.g. Mr. Entezam [the Acting Prime Minister] 
admitted that the occupation of the Bahai [centers]—in some of which Islamic 
rites had been ostentatiously performed—was intended to be regarded by the 
Baha’is as a protective measure and by the Moslems as a move against the 
Bahais.  But they hope, by offering to study the subject, to avoid being pushed 
into more extreme measures.  There are signs that Falsafi has somewhat 
moderated his attacks in the last two days.  Whatever happens, there is a danger 
that the position and influence of the mullahs will be strengthened at the expense 
of the Government9. 
As Entezam indicated, the push for new legislation was deflected with the 
argument that existing legislation was sufficient.  This strategy can be seen in a closed-
door majles session on May 10, over the Baha’i issue.  A bill was introduced that 
explicitly conveyed the illegality of the Baha’i Faith.  There were numerous speeches in 
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support of this bill, including several that urged that it must go farther and legalize the 
seizing of Baha’i property.  Speaker Hekmat, however, called for caution and 
moderation, after first qualifying his statements by affirming that he was also opposed to 
the Baha’is.  The calls for restraint were echoed by others, but were not accepted by the 
majority until Deputy Nureddin Emami, a respected dputy from a prominent clerical 
family, argued that the Constitution recognizes Islam as the official religion and 
additionally recognizes the three Religions of the Book (Judaism, Christianity, and 
Zoroastrianism) as “our patriotic brethren.”  In contrast, “all Iranians knew Bahaism for 
what it was: the creature of foreign influence in Iran.”10  Since this was already known, 
he argued, and implicit in the Constitution, there was no need for new legislation, or else 
this would set the precedent that the Constitutional mission was not sufficient, and the 
majles would be forced to draft a new bill for each nd every sect that was not among the 
four recognized religions.   
As part of the rushed and intense push for legislative action, a group of cleric-
deputies in the majles, loyal to Borujerdi and led by Ahmad Safa’i, crafted anti-Baha’i 
legislation that featured the following four articles: 
Article 1 – The wicked group of the [Baha’is], who ave been the opponents of 
the security of the country, are now declared illega .  
 
Article 2 – From now on, membership in this group, its public display (tazahor), 
and dependence on it, in any fashion, will be a crime (bazah).  The convicted 
offender will be imprisoned in solitary confinement for terms of two to ten years, 
and be deprived of civil rights.  
 
Article 3 – Properties which serve as gathering places for this group and are used 
by its affiliated organizations, as well as the revenue that has been spent on affairs 
relating to this group, will be transferred to the Ministry of Culture and be 
                                                      




allocated for the establishment of organizations for education and propagating 
religious [Islamic] education and the tenets of piety.  
 
Article 4 – Individuals from this group who are presently serving as employees in 
governmental departments and their affiliates are expelled from governmental 
service from this day on, and will not in any way enjoy the protection of the labor 
laws.11 
 
Falsafi met with the Minister of the Interior about the proposed legislation and 
was initially optimistic, claiming that Alam had told him that “the full attention of the 
government is focused on the matter of the struggle a ainst the Baha’i sect.”12  He also 
claimed that many of the majles deputies were involved in “their own mobilization for 
the ratification of legislation recognizing the illegality of the Baha’i sect.”  Lobbying 
efforts accelerated as arrangements were made for ltte s, telegraphs and other appeals to 
arrive from the provinces and express grassroots support for “steps to eradicate what 
remains of this sect” and a national desire that the majles honor “the requests of those 
they represent.”  In the midst of this hostile environment for minorities, Falsafi even 
applied pressure on the representatives of the official minorities in the majles, winning 
their support and claiming that even they view the Baha’is with complete anger 
(‘asabani) and hatred (tanaffor) and that they had joined ranks with the Muslim deputies 
in the majles against the Baha’i threat.13 
 Alam and his supporters in the Cabinet had apparently not anticipated that the 
government’s abandonment of the anti-Baha’i cause would precipitate an invigorated 
clerical push for anti-Baha’i legislation.  Particularly troubling for the government was 
the desire for binding legislation that would force th m to dismiss the tens of thousands 
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of Baha’is employed by the government, which could potentially break the nation’s 
administrative infrastructure.  According to the Acting Prime Minister: 
 It was being suggested that punitive legislation should take the form of removing 
the Bahais from all government posts (there are a considerable number of 
distinguished and able Bahais in the Army and the National Bank, as well as in 
Government Departments).  Any move to expel them would therefore have 
serious administrative consequences.14  
 Despite the problems that their removal would cause hi  government, Entezam 
felt that the pogrom was largely the Baha’is own fault s they 
had behaved rather foolishly in recent years; they had increased their propaganda 
and came out more into the open; while many of the accusations they were 
plotting against the regime, etc. were undoubtedly xaggerated they had the 
reputation of being international and of owing allegiance to humanity first and 
Persia second.  This meant that they were an easy target for nationalist 
sentiment.15   
 Stevens, the British ambassador, speculated that the regime’s strong rejection of 
anti-Baha’i legislation was spurred by a fear of what this precedent would mean for other 
groups, since some members of the Cabinet were masons nd  
there had been signs during the previous day’s debate th t Moslem parliamentary 
leaders might also be planning a simultaneous attack on freemasonry and 
[Entezam] clearly fears that a demon of intolerance has been unleashed which 
may devour more than its original prey.16 
In spite of the continuation of clerical pressure for anti-Baha’i legislation, the 
Ministry of the Interior played down concern over the Baha’i issue and suggested that 
there was no reason for protests in this regard, since “suppressing the actions of this sect 
                                                      





is not a new matter,” and there was no need for new legislation since “this sect has not 
been officially recognized… [and] this has been the status quo across the nation for a 
long time; this is not a novel development.”17   
In his May 11 broadcast, Falsafi claimed that he would refrain from calling for 
strong anti-Baha’i action until May 17, on the pretext that elements might subvert the 
“popular feelings for their own ends.”18  This date was announced as the end of his period 
of silence because that was when he had been promised that the majles would take action 
against the Baha’is.  To build up popular expectations, Falsafi claimed that the Shah “had 
seen some mullahs and told them he would support the feelings of all Muslims and fight 
against anti-religious forces [i.e. the Baha’is].”  He asked his listeners to shift the focus 
from the Baha’is to the majles and to “keep up pressure” for action against the Bahais, 
but to also maintain “an atmosphere of calm.”19  His audience was urged to send 
telegrams and petitions to the majles in support of new anti-Baha’i legislation.  As 
Entezam explained to Fearnley, “In the last day or tw  Falsafi has continued to be less 
fiery, but he is speaking in a way which is clearly intended to keep the Government up to 
the mark as regards action against the Baha’is.”20  In Fearnley’s view, “Falsafi is still 
keeping this in play and has promised to let the people know soon what should be done 
about the Bahais.”21 
The government was now placed in a very difficult position.  Although they were 
very worried about negative foreign reactions to continued persecution, they were more 
worried about riots in that capital and afraid of “the consequences here should [the Shah] 
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fly in the face of public hysteria to silence agitators or protect Bahais.”22  They had, 
nevertheless, succeeded in getting Falsafi to restrain himself and to reject explicit calls 
for violence.  They were also able to delay the various anti-Baha’i bills in the majles, 
although worried deputies were “being deluged with le ters and telegrams urging strong 
action.”   
The Shah’s inner circle was split into two camps.  The conservative group—
which included Amini, Ala, Entezam, and Shapour Reporter—advised that inaction was 
the safest course.23  They suggested that all the government should be oing is “riding out 
the storm.”  The other group, led by Alam, advocated strong action against the ulama.  
The Shah himself, facing the first serious test of leadership during his attempt at direct 
rule, was “apparently undecided” and, unable to choose between the two paths, attempted 
to walk on both simultaneously.    Although he was closest to Alam, the Shah appears to 
have been hesitant to appear to follow the lead of a close associate, having only recently 
distanced himself from Ernest Perron.  In an unusual break from their ubiquitous 
criticism of the Shah’s characteristic indecisiveness, American accounts do not attack the 
Shah for his indecision on this occasion since, in their view, “no matter what course it 
takes,” Iran’s long-term political fortunes had been weakened by its association with the 
pogrom.24 
During this period before the 17th, Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi was in 
communication with the Shah, using Eqbal as an intermediary.  In addition to written 
calls for the dismissal of Baha’is, Eqbal also conveyed the oral message that “unless the 
Shah complied with his request” Borujerdi might “be compelled to leave home,” i.e. 
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move to Iraq.  This was Borujerdi’s ultimate threat, as the loss of face that would be 
caused for the Shah if Shi’ism’s universal source of mulation voted with his feet would 
be devastating.  This would be similar to the insult that would be conveyed if the Pope 
relocated the Vatican out of disgust at the Italian government.  The Shah was upset by 
Borujerdi’s use of this trump card, but announced that he was “prepared to face a 
showdown.”  He claimed that “if you give the mullahs an inch they will take yards and 
yards” and that he was no longer willing to make concessions to Borujerdi.  He realized 
that if Borujerdi quit Iran in protest there would be extensive bazaar agitation, but he also 
felt that “it would be more disastrous to give way.”  He told Eqbal to reply that “He 
would be sorry if Burujerdi decided to leave; he did not expect him to make such a 
gesture as in the past he had always been helpful to the country… [It] would be too bad if 
[he] left but the decision lay in his hands.”25  Borujerdi did not follow through on his 
threat. 
At this time, Alam continued to delay and obfuscate when it came to anti-Baha’i 
action, calling for calm and promising action towards the end of Ramadan, before finally 
addressed the majles on May 17 to deliver the promised response to calls for anti-Baha’i 
legislation.26  In this open session of the lower house, he read a directive from the 
Ministry of the Interior addressed to Iran’s governors and governor-generals.  He began 
with a preamble indicating that the constitution and existing legislation provided 
sufficient authority with which to act against the Baha’is, and that no new legislation was 
required.27  In the body of his proclamation, Baha’is are not mentioned by name.  Instead, 
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Alam condemns fitnah (religious upheaval) and any attempts to disrupt public order.  
Given the context, his words are implicitly damning of the Baha’is, albeit without naming 
them, but the proclamation is carefully worded in such a way that its warnings and 
condemnations could just as easily be applied against the anti-Baha’i forces that were 
disrupting public order, and this is the clear subtext.  According to the directive: 
the formation of societies and associations that generate religious revolt (fitnah), 
irreligion, and disrupt order throughout the country a e forbidden.  Therefore, 
steps have been taken to put into effect the articles of the Constitution.  The 
headquarters of all kinds (har guneh) of societies, which are the cause of religious 
revolt and irreligion, and are the cause of disruptions to order and security, have 
been closed down… Take action to prevent all kinds (har guneh) of political 
demonstrations and actions by these sorts of groups that are forbidden according 
to the law.  At the same time, taking steps in these matters and implementing laws 
is the duty of government officials, and the interference of other individuals and 
groups will be responsible for causing the disruption of order and security…28 
The repeated use of the vague plural (“all kinds”) when referring to groups and 
organizations, the emphasis on the government’s monopoly on the use of force, and the 
centering of criticism on disorder and protest rather t an on the alleged crimes of the 
Baha’is clearly indicate what Alam is conveying betw en the lines.  The remainder of the 
proclamation is even more explicit in its criticism of, and warning to, the ulama.  Alam 
admonishes “certain individuals” (i.e. Falsafi and Borujerdi) for inciting the public under 
“the pretext and guise of battling with the sinister (gomrah konandeh) sects.”29 
Alam’s vagueness and back-peddling on the Bahai issue enraged Borujerdi’s 
representatives in the majles.  Safa’i openly opposed Alam’s directive, claiming that the 
government must be “explicit” in its opposition to the Baha’is.  “Do not be bashful 
concerning this sect that is responsible for religious and worldly upheaval,” Safa’i 
                                                      





cautioned.  He feared that some would be hesitant to deal with the Baha’i question and 
would use the excuse that opposing the Baha’is “is contrary to the U.N. charter,” but that 
by this logic one must also free the Leftists.30  Alam ignored these criticisms. 
In his tough-sounding, but ultimately non-binding directive, Alam did not actually 
promise any of the legislative interventions demanded by Borujerdi and Falsafi.   Instead, 
all he really did was limit both Baha’i and anti-Baha’i gatherings.  With less than a week 
remaining until the end of Ramadan, this legislative bone was a stop-gap measure that the 
Cabinet thought might offer the ulama a face-saving “victory” that would keep things 
calm at least until the month was over.  As it was, violent incidents had largely ceased as 
a result of the pressure that was brought to bear on Falsafi and other clerics.  Alam’s 
directive was an attempt to maintain this new statu q o and to conclude Ramadan in a 
way that would not leave the ulama with nothing to sh w for their efforts, but which 
would also satisfy Western insistence that violence cease and that the Baha’is not be 
declared illegal or dismissed en masse.  
In his continuing Ramadan broadcasts, Falsafi triedo put a positive spin on 
Alam’s condemnation of the Baha’is in the majles.  He congratulated all involved for 
their “wise decision,” and hailed it as the “fruition of the anti-Bahai campaign.”   Still, he 
expressed doubt about the intentions of the governmnt to make good on its tough words 
and urged his listeners to report to Borujerdi “any failure by police to take action against 
Bahai assemblies.”31  Very quickly, however, it was realized that Alam had not actually 
committed the government to any of the clerical demands and, instead, his directive was 
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vague enough in its restrictions that it could be us d against the Islamic movement.  
Borujerdi decided that Alam’s offering was unacceptable.   
On May 19, one of the mullah-deputies in the majles made it known that the 
Grand Ayatollah was not happy with government action hus far and that he demanded a 
bill that specifically named the Baha’is, identified them as illegal, and bound the 
government to dismiss them all from the army and the civil service.  Borujerdi, he 
threatened, would introduce his own bill in the majles if the Shah and the Cabinet did not 
act quickly.32  The publications of the Islamic associations were also very vocal in their 
demands for more governmental action and continued to demand that action be taken 
against the Baha’is, who “should all be expelled from [Iran].”33   
In his May 19 radio broadcast, Falsafi spoke about the Baha’is for ten minutes.  
After first linking them to Tudeh, he called for them to be specifically named illegal, 
charged that several large areas of land were given as (tax-free) endowments to the 
Baha’is, and lamented that the Baha’is enjoy tax-free profitable land while some Muslim 
peasants are landless.  He demanded that the government seize Baha’i property and 
distribute it to Muslim peasants.  This call for ending endowments and engaging in land 
redistribution is fascinating, given that within four years of this call to action the Shah 
would himself begin a program of land reform that would call for the tax-free lands 
enjoyed by religious groups to be redistributed to peasants.  Despite Falsafi’s enthusiasm 
for this plan when it involved Baha’i land, he was somehow less than thrilled when this 
populism later targeted clerical interests. 
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The Shah’s government had no intention to give in to Borujerdi on anti-Baha’i 
legislation, but strong popular pressure prompted a revised compromise.  According to 
Fearnley, the president of the majles informed him on May 19 that he had been acting as 
the intermediary between the Cabinet and Borujerdi’s representatives in the majles to 
hammer out a new compromise “in order to calm down the present excitement in the 
majles and elsewhere.”  The pressure for resolution was intense because Falsafi was “still 
keeping the Government up to the mark in his sermons, a d the deputy–mulla, Safa’i, in a 
pre-agenda speech in the majles two days ago, threatened to reintroduce his Bill for the 
outlawing of the Baha’is and the confiscation of their property unless the Government 
themselves took similar action soon.”  What was eventually produced was a plan that did 
not really satisfy either side, in which the government would permanently seize and 
rehabilitate the “more obvious Baha’i public properties” and remove from employment 
“the more outstanding and better-known Baha’is.”34 
The first stage of this face-saving compromise involved the previously discussed 
destruction of the dome of the Baha’i National Center on May 22, the last day of 
Ramadan, under the joint supervision of Falsafi, General Bakhtiar, and Army Chief of 
Staff Batmanghelich, before a large crowd that had g thered to watch the spectacle.  In 
the British view, “The government did not want to play into the hands of the mullas, but 
equally they did not dare to stand up to them too much…They made the gesture of 
destroying the dome of the Baha’i [Center] in Tehran but stalled on the question of anti-
Baha’i legislation.”35  The British Ambassador saw the partial destruction of the national 
Baha’i center as proof of the hollowness of the Shah’s early moves against the clergy. 
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Although the Shah is going about saying that he intnds to fight it out  with the 
mullahs who are bidding for real power, the Governme t, no doubt under his 
instructions, continues to try and abate the storm by bowing to it.  As a 
demonstration of virtuous intention they decided at the weekend to tear down the 
dome of the Bahai [Center] in Tehran…36 
 
The ongoing push for Baha’i dismissals 
Borujerdi considered the destruction of the Baha’i dome to be too small a face-saving 
gesture to merit an end to anti-Baha’i efforts, andcontinued his push for anti-Baha’i 
legislation past the end of Ramadan and into the summer.  In his final radio broadcast, 
Falsafi relayed Borujerdi’s call for further legislation against the Baha’is, vowed to 
revive the issue in summer during Moharram, and urged an economic boycott of Baha’is 
in the interregnum between the holy months.37   
At the end of Ramadan, the Acting Prime Minister (Entezam) went to Qom for 
what was, according to Ettela’at, “confidential discussions” concerning the propaganda 
(tablighat) said to be coming from the Baha’is and the social convulsions (tashannojat) 
that had resulted thus far and may occur again.  Borujerdi had solicited this meeting with 
the governmental leadership in order to see his counterparts face to face and “respectfully 
bring to their attention” the dangers posed by the Baha’is.  Borujerdi met directly with 
Entezam for about thirty minutes and communicated th  implicit threat that if the 
government did not do what was necessary against the Ba a’is, this “intensified the 
likelihood of the outbreak (boruz) of more dangerous incidents.”  Ettela’at—expressing 
the government’s opinion—downplayed this assessment and claimed that the 
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aforementioned (ambiguous) declaration by Alam was sufficient to prevent further 
“unpleasant (nagovar) incidents.”38 
In this period, there were a series of clerical gatherings for “settling once and for 
all the Baha’i matter.”  While ultimately inconclusive, these gatherings led to further 
pushes for legislation in conjunction with renewed public appeals for action.  One such 
public appeal came in an open letter to the majles, published in Neda-ye Haqq, which 
urged the government to deal with the Baha’is just as it dealt with Tudeh sedition, i.e. 
they should be executed, as this would be in “the best interests of the nation.”39 
Alam continued to deflect all calls for further legislation by claiming that this was 
unnecessary, since Baha’i property could be seized under Articles 15 of the Supplemental 
Law, which said that religious law could supersede property rights as long as 
compensation was paid, and that Baha’is could be dismissed under Articles 20 and 21, 
which banned “heretical books and materials hurtful to the perspicuous religion” and 
“societies and gatherings which… give rise to religious or civil disorder and are… 
prejudicial to public order.”40  
Despite its promises to act under these laws, the gov rnment “has not applied any 
overt policy of discharging Bahais from government service.”41  The Cabinet did not 
initially have any serious plan to enact more than token dismissals of Baha’is, but 
Borujerdi’s continued intransigence on this issue dring the summer became an ongoing 
concern and the Prime Minister eventually warned the Americans that the government 
might actually be forced to dismiss many Baha’i employees.  There were persistent 
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rumors of an imminent purge of Baha’is in the military, in which “several high ranking 
army officers who are Bahai [were] being retired or resigning;” there were also rumors of 
a “large-scale purge of Baha’i civil servants.”42  
Anticipating Anglo-American displeasure with these dismissals, there was an 
attempt to spin them as unavoidable and even beneficial for the victims.  Entezam 
informed the British that the planned dismissal of many Baha’is under existing laws 
(Articles 21 and 22) was actually a protective move and primarily aimed at blocking 
clerical calls for new and more explicit legislation and more thoroughgoing dismissals 
that “would make the position of the Bahais even more difficult.”43  He argued that a few 
Baha’is needed to be sacrificed to protect the rest, and “it would probably be necessary to 
remove a few leading Bahais from high places” but tha , he hoped, “it would not go 
further than that.”44   
Likewise, the Shah claimed that conceding to the demand to dismiss many 
Baha’is was almost unavoidable since, legally speaking, the Baha’is were not and have 
never been a constitutionally recognized group in Ira , and that as a result of this there 
were many vestigial anti-Baha’i laws on the books that made it very difficult to ignore 
clerical demands when they had the law on their side.  As Alam put it, only Islam, 
Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity legally exist, and formally “we recognize no 
other.”45  
Even the doggedly anti-clerical Alam became convinced that there was a need for 
high-level dismissals of some Baha’is to allow the ulama to save face and cease pressing 
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the issue.  The Shah supported this call for show dismissals in the short term, saying that 
the goal was just to smooth things over until after th  conclusion of Moharram (anti-
Baha’i activists had earlier promised a second-wave of attacks during the holy month).  
Once this danger period passed, he would “take drastic ction” against the clergy.  
Explaining how the plan was to unfold, the Shah shared that he intended 
to make some kind of communication, either a Governm t announcement or a 
letter to Borujerdi which the latter might publish, saying that Baha’i gatherings 
were being prohibited, that anyone who declared himself to be a Baha’i would not 
be allowed to hold a Government position and that tere was, therefore, no further 
issue between the Government and the mullas.  He went on to explain that it was 
perfectly open to Baha’is to declare themselves as Mo lems since they regarded 
their church as an off shoot of Islam.46 
In other words, he was advocating a type of “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in which 
the government would encourage silence or dissimulation nd would only impose 
penalties on those who expressed a Baha’i orientatio  in a way that could not be 
overlooked.  Alam claimed that only those “who made themselves prominent by not 
hiding their religion would be dismissed.”  The Shah’s personal physician, General 
Ayadi, was put forward as an example of an “out” Baha’is who would be dismissed.  In 
his view, “this man would definitely have to go.”47   
Believing that mass dismissal of Baha’is was within reach, Borujerdi began to 
distance himself from the violence and disorder of Ramadan, and even from Falsafi, 
pretending that he had not given Falsafi the green light to begin a pogrom.  To better 
position himself as a voice of calm, Borujerdi “is now backpedaling hard,” to play to the 
perception that he was “different from the others” in that he could be reasoned with, and 
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was not a slave of passions.48  Borujerdi believed that clerical interests could be pursued 
through legislation and was more than willing to try the political route when other options 
became untenable.  The Shah was agitated by this atempt to force action in the majles, 
however, and believed that Iran’s parliament was “a rel tively insignificant body whose 
job it was to make laws and obey orders.”49 
In the middle of June, with no agreement reached, mullah-deputies who spoke on 
Borujerdi’s behalf again renewed calls for anti-Baha’i action. This led to a rebuke by the 
Speaker of the majles, which in turn led to angry press interviews by clerics and a series 
of heated communications between Borujerdi and the Shah.  Several hundred clerics 
gathered in Tehran and passed a resolution calling for further anti-Baha’i legislation, 
while couching this defiance with praise and gratitude for all the efforts that the 
government had taken thus far against the Baha’is.  Tensions were very heated, but 
according to American military reports the Shah andhis cabinet were now “believed to 
be able and willing to deal firmly with Mullahs.”50  
 On June 15, Wright learned from Hamzavi that the Sah 
had decided to parley with Borujerdi.  The latter had insisted that he would only 
speak with Dr. Eqbal for whom Borujerdi claims to have a high respect, enhanced 
by his building of the mosque at the university.  Dr. Eqbal, after a difficult 
conversation with Borujerdi, managed to reach a modus vivendi with him on the 
Baha’i business and, according to Hamzavi, seems reasonably satisfied that he 
will not cause trouble in the future.  Hamzavi also reported that Falsafi had been 
bought off and would probably be leaving the country [during Moharram].51 
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The Shiraz Massacre 
The tenuous rapprochement with Borujerdi only exacerbat d widespread clerical 
frustration with the nominal concessions that the Sah was offering and did not assuage 
skepticism of his willingness to follow through with dismissals.  According to an 
American political report from June 24: 
Uneasy peace prevails between the Government and the Mullahs, while the 
Government attempts to split leading Mullahs and Mullahs continue their barrage 
with letters and telegrams.  A mullah deputation is to ee the Shah next week with 
a renewed though moderately worded demand for the expulsion of Bahais from 
public service, the Shah is expected to do and say nothing in response.52 
It was in this context that Shiraz became the epicenter of clerical dissatisfaction 
on June 27, when Ayatollah Shirazi organized a further attack on the House of the Bab 
(the most important “Baha’i” holy site in Iran), whic  had been damaged in May and was 
occupied by security forces.53  This attack was triggered when security forces attempted 
to repair some of the damage that had been done to th  holy site.  In light of Borujerdi’s 
recent settlement with the regime, these repairs wee mistakenly seen as a prelude to 
returning the building to the Baha’is.  In reality, he caretaker of the holy site had been 
forced to pay the cost of the repairs even though he was not even allowed access to the 
building, nor given any indication that it would bereturned.  When Shirazi learned of the 
commencement of repairs, he feared that the results of hi  first attack were about to be 
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undone, and the property returned.  He decided to quickly attack the holy site again, this 
time finishing the job so completely that it could not be repaired.54 
On June 27, Shirazi personally led a mob of about five hundred members of his 
Brotherhood party, and others, to the House of the Bab.  The area’s governor-general, 
Major General Seifollah Hemat, would later claim that Ayatollah Shirazi called him to 
request permission for this attack but that after he, of course, refused, the ayatollah did 
not accept this and continued to say that he would move forward with his plan, “even if I 
must lay down my life to do it.”55  It is doubtful that Shirazi actually asked for pemission 
and it is more likely that the governor-general inve ted this phone call later, in order to 
make the case that he was not culpable since he had ordered Shirazi to abandon his plans.  
In any case, the mob was intercepted by security forces before it could destroy the Baha’i 
holy place.  
 According to the American Consul’s interview with Governor-General Hemat, 
more than two weeks after the event, the security forces were cursed and pelted with 
bricks and a policeman and an army officer were supposedly knocked out.  Hemat denied 
that there were any fatalities in the incident, or that any bullets were fired.  Instead, he 
claimed that only rifle butts were used to beat back the crowd and that no deaths 
occurred.56  His story, however, is contradictory, self-serving, and less reliable than 
earlier eyewitness accounts that discuss the use of live ammunition leading to fatalities.   
The eyewitness accounts that contradict the governor-general’s apologetic 
account were obtained two weeks earlier by the American Consul, less than three days 
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after the riots, through Colonel Enayatollah Sohrab, a Point IV employee and the 
chairman of his community’s Baha’i Local Spiritual Assembly.  Sohrab is described as a 
“reliable source” and he collected and shared the eyewitness accounts that came to him 
immediately after the riot.  According to these accounts, Shirazi advanced on the House 
of the Bab surrounded by an inner core of followers [from his Brotherhood Party].  Along 
the way, the group snowballed as it picked up a number of men, some of whom were 
supporters of the anti-Baha’i cause, while others were merely curious.  The mob began to 
attack the holy site, but a police major tried to stop them, only to be pushed aside.  The 
chief of police arrived and tried to placate the crowd by slapping and chastising the police 
major for disrespecting the Ayatollah.  This only spurred the mob on, as it was taken as a 
sign of high-level police acquiescence.  The crowd returned to demolishing the holy site, 
found its caretaker, and attempted to beat him, and a few Baha’is who tried to protect 
him, to death.  The caretaker was beaten to the edgof death before he could be rescued 
and taken to a nearby hospital, where he was not expected to live.  As the scene 
descended into chaotic violence, the army was finally c lled in by the exasperated police.  
Upon arrival, the army ordered the crowd to disperse.  Shirazi’s supporters did not leave, 
believing that the chief of police had indicated governmental acquiescence.  When their 
orders were not followed, the army troops were ordere  to shoot into the crowd.  Four to 
six individuals were killed and fifty to sixty wounded in the massacre that followed, 
according to the earliest eyewitness reports.  The army immediately dispersed the 
survivors, arresting many, and placing the city under martial law.57    
Rumors reached Tehran within hours of Baha’i-related clashes in Shiraz that had 
led to the imposition of martial law.  The Cabinet d nied all of the stories coming out of 
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Shiraz and cancelled a previously-scheduled press conference by Alam and Minister of 
War Hedayat in order to avoid being questioned about the events in Shiraz.  The press 
was threatened and told not to publish anything about what had occurred in Shiraz except 
for the official line, which admitted that martial l w was imposed but completely omitted 
all details relating to the massacre or that the agitation was over the Baha’i issue.   
Representatives of the foreign press were also warned against reporting on what had 
really occurred in Shiraz.  Only the Reuters correspondent did not stay silent in the face 
of government pressure.  His report, although bold, was vague, second-hand, and did not 
touch on the massacre; merely pointing out that it was anti-Baha’i rioting that had led to 
the imposition of martial law.  Within Iran, “News stories were brief, vague and sketchy, 
with no mention of the key anti-Bahai aspect of incident.”  The only editorializing 
occurred in Farman, which expressed confidence the “trouble makers” would be 
punished and regret that just as Iran began the path of reform the “activities of foreign 
and Iranian agents” worked to “provoke bloody incidents.”58  This article was allowed 
since its comments were couched in support of the gov rnment’s reform program, it was 
vague, and the incident was, as always, attributed to nebulous foreign forces.  After the 
immediate danger passed, several papers were allowed t  bring up the anti-Baha’i nature 
of the Shiraz riots, although they of course did not mention the massacre and used the 
event as a pedagogical tool to condemn street mobs and instruct readers “that this is no 
way to defend Islam.”59   
On the night of the riots and massacre, the Cabinet held an emergency meeting.  
Alam wanted to “crack down hard” on the Shiraz defiance—which had ruined a hard won 
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compromise— by making an example out of Ayatollah Shirazi.  He had the support of 
everyone but Prime Minister Ala, Dr. Amini, and Motamedi.  The Shah was non-
committal.60  The cabinet met several times over the matter before reaching the opinion 
that, despite Alam’s desire to make an example of Shirazi, it was unwise to exile him 
permanently since, according to Shiraz deputies and the security chiefs, such a move 
would cement the “general hostility of mullahs.”  Alam’s minority maintained that 
“mullahs will create far worse trouble later if government fails to crackdown now.”  
When it seemed possible that there might be no arrest at all, Alam again threatened to 
resign, saying that if Ayatollah Shirazi was not arrested then this would be a show of 
weakness that would make his job of ensuring security impossible.  Alam’s mulishness 
resulted in the order for the Ayatollah to be brought to Tehran and detained without being 
formally charged.  Shirazi refused to cooperate, but was taken forcefully on the Shah’s 
insistence.  Alam rescinded his threat to resign and expressed satisfaction at the 
compromise since, despite the moderate nature of the punishment for Shirazi, he was 
pleased by “the fate of the many lower-ranked clergy under him who were arrested and 
sent away to suffer imprisonment and worse ‘in torrid southern areas.’”61   
In a majles session in July, while Alam was again discussing the government’s 
policy of opposing all kinds of propaganda leading to disorder, the events in Shiraz led to 
outbursts during his speech.  When he mentioned the gov rnment’s punishment of 
oppositional elements, Safa’i asked if this was now t  the point “of punishing Muslims 
instead of Baha’is.”  Alam said that this would never occur, but that the government 
forces would do what was necessary to maintain order.  This was too much for Mir 
                                                      
60 Ibid., 128-9; FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 36 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Stevens, June 28, 1955. 
61 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 1: 128-29. 
204 
 
Ashrafi, who exclaimed: “Provided they do not shoot the [Muslim] people in front of the 
house of… the Bab!”  Alam replied condescendingly, saying: “my dear sir, they have told 
you the wrong things.”  Mir Ashrafi replied that the government’s denials “have not been 
convincing.”  Alam dismissed this and said, “They have convinced the majority.  You are 
in the [unconvinced] minority.  Is that my fault?”62 
The Shiraz bazaar closed down completely for some ti  to protest the detention 
and exile of Shirazi.  Some began to assume that Govern r-General Hemat and General 
Azidi were themselves crypto-Baha’is, as they could conceive of no other explanation for 
why a crowd of Muslims led by the city’s most-revered ayatollah would be fired upon to 
protect a Baha’i site.  Many bazaaris demanded not o ly the return of the ayatollah but 
also the removal of both the governor-general and the general responsible.  Shirazi also 
demanded their dismissal when he was taken away to Tehran.63   
 
The Brotherhood Party 
When Ayatollah Shirazi was taken away to Tehran as a prisoner, over three thousand 
people showed up to show their support.  His supporters were mainly urbanized villagers, 
the unemployed urban poor, lower-class artisans, and shop owners.  According to 
Governor-General Hemat, Shirazi’s supporters “for the most part,” belong to “the same 
people who…were used in the Tudeh or National Front demonstrations.”64  His courting 
of this urban underclass was said to be motivated by a driving ambition to become the 
“next Kashani” as well as a “local hero.”65  The 1955 attacks were not Shirazi’s first 
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political “gambit” involving minorities.  He had earlier gained notoriety by inciting anti-
Jewish riots in 1944.66   
Shirazi was generally recognized as the senior cleric in Shiraz.  He was very 
politically engaged in this period and in Shiraz especially “he is extremely strong in his 
position” and, unchallenged locally because he is the “richest in qualifications and 
experience.”67  The main source of Shirazi’s influence and authori y was not his position 
in the clerical hierarchy or his popular support in he bazaari classes, but rather his 
authority and influence as the founder and leader of the Brotherhood Party, also known as  
the Society of Islamic Brothers (Jam’iyat-e-Baradaran-e-Islami).  This organization, 
which has been discussed in Chapter II, gained popularity after the abdication of Reza 
Shah and, according to General Azidi, was organized and consciously modeled on the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 68  The Brothers were a tightly-disciplined, well-organized 
politico-religious group that displayed extreme loyalt  to Shirazi in the same way that the 
early Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was intensely personally loyal to Hassan al-Banna. 
The Brotherhood Party boasted thirty thousand members—although the British 
believed ten thousand was more accurate—all of whom were personally loyal to Shirazi 
and were said to be prepared to fight and die for him.  The Brotherhood was recognized 
as the most powerful party in Iran at the time, especially in terms of party loyalty and 
discipline.  Supporters of the Brothers included the Speaker of the majles, all the majles 
deputies from the Fars province, and Tehran’s imam jom’eh (state-appointed leader of 
Friday prayers), Dr. Emami.  Although the clerical hierarchy could not protect Shirazi, 
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his party was able to do what Borujerdi could not.  The Speaker of the majles and 
deputies loyal to the Brotherhood lobbied for his release, as did his close friend Dr. 
Emami and those like Prime Minister Ala who did notwant to have to deal with the 
repercussions of angering the Brotherhood.  As a result, although Shirazi was detained in 
Tehran, the government “could not touch him” and when e arrived he was met by 
several majles deputies and served his “detention” as the pampered guest of the Speaker 
of the majles, Sardar Fakher Hekmat.69   
The Speaker and other allies of Shirazi pressured th  government to abandon the 
plan to keep him detained in Tehran until after the end of Moharram.  It was argued that 
in order for Shiraz not to fall into rioting again, Shirazi needed to be on the ground since, 
without him, his Brotherhood would act on their own, ithout direction or a single head, 
and this would lead to widespread violence.  Shirazi’s advocates vouched for his ability 
to restrain and discipline his followers and the British also approved of this change of 
plan.70   
As a result of the pressure brought to bear by the Brothers, Shirazi made his 
triumphant return “in all his glory” a month early, on August 11, and was met by a crowd 
of at least two thousand.  Embarrassed by this hero’s welcome, the Shah assured the 
British that the reported crowd was not a sign of the cleric’s popularity, but was instead 
merely composed of members of his party who were obliged to be there.  (The Shah did 
not realize that a group of thousands compelled by strong party discipline was a more 
serious threat than the popularity of an individual).  Despite the Shah’s claim that the 
ardor of the crowd was insincere, according to a British eyewitness account the crowd 
                                                      
69 Ibid. 
70 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 49 / 55, Confidential Minute by Fearnley, September 1, 1955. 
207 
 
that arrived to meet Shirazi at the airport was jubilant and “in a fanatical mood,” such that 
it could only be safely observed from the safety of a nearby rooftop. 71  Sheep were 
slaughtered before the plane as “the Imam” exited it and led an exuberant procession 
through the city, in a scene that could very easily be seen as a foreshadowing of 
Khomeini’s triumphal return to Iran twenty-four years later. 
When Shirazi was forcefully taken away in June, he had claimed from this 
position of apparent weakness that he would refuse to r turn to the city until Governor-
General Hemat was removed.  After his hero’s return, Shirazi gloated in his Friday 
sermon over both the early end of his detention and his success in having the governor-
general removed.72  It appears that, in exchange for his early releas and the removal of 
Governor-General Hemat and General Azidi, Shirazi agreed not to engage in revenge 
attacks against the Baha’is and to lend his Brotherhood organization to assist in the 
crackdown against the Qashqai tribes.   
The British regretted the removal of Governor-General Hemat since, although “he 
is not a strong character,” he was “a decent man.”73  The governor-general’s removal was 
almost unavoidable because of the widespread belief that he was actually a secret Baha’i 
and that this was the reason why he had allowed the massacre.  Although it was common 
in Iran to accuse political enemies of secret Baha’ism, in this case the accusation carried 
more weight “due to the fact that at one period of his life he was a member of the Baha’i 
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movement.”74  As a result, there was no way to shield him and he was removed from the 
governorship and assigned to direct the resettling of the Qashqai tribes.75 
When the Reuters correspondent in Iran (Buist) met with Ayatollah Shirazi in 
early July, the Imam was very angry and remonstrated with him, attempting to convince 
the foreign press to take his side in the Baha’i matter.  When he asked Buist about public 
opinion abroad, he was surprised to hear that “the impression was bad, intolerance and 
persecution being odious to the British public.”  Hearing this, Shirazi got angry and was 
“much put out.”  Buist, in turn, was very unimpressd by this “slippery person” who in 
his “tirade” made a point to link the British and the Baha’is and to stress that their senior 
local employees were always Baha’is.  Shirazi also expressed his anger at the Iranian 
government for obstructing the push against the Baha’is, and said that he would accept 
from them “nothing less than the outlawing of the Baha’is and the confiscation of their 
property.”  In his opinion, “matters could not be left as they were.”  If the government did 
not at least do this much, then he “would consider leaving the country for a real sanctuary 
for Islam.”76   
 
A “satisfactory agreement” 
During a June 28 conversation with the British ambassador, the Shah put on a brave face 
regarding the events in Shiraz and said that Ayatollah Shirazi had been brought to 
Tehran, but was evasive about whether or not he would be formally arrested and seemed 
to not really know what to do with the Ayatollah.  He also seemed unsure if Shirazi was 
still being utilized by the British and was relieved to hear that this was no longer the case.  
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Looking ahead, he stressed that, in the aftermath of Shiraz, the provincial leadership had 
been empowered to act against the clerics without needi g to seek approval from Tehran 
first, in order to forestall further miscommunications and hesitancy, as had been the case 
in the Shiraz disaster.  He pointed out that General Bakhtiar was already arresting 
ayatollahs on his own initiative and described thisautonomy in the security regime as a 
positive development.  Turning to Borujerdi and the larger Baha’i issues, the Shah 
seemed pleased with the negotiations and reported that the Prime Minister had personally 
seen the Grand Ayatollah and that Borujerdi had promised to give up on his demands for 
legislation explicitly excluding Baha’is from government employment.  The Shah 
explained his strategy vis-à-vis Borujerdi by claiming that he was planning an anti-
clerical campaign, but that this required careful preparation as he did not want “to go off 
at half cock” since “once an operation against the mullahs started it would have to be 
carried out all the way.”77   
This shift in attitude towards his former political base is also evident in a summer 
speech in which the Shah went off-script while addressing landlords and other members 
of the traditional elite.  In an emotional rant that contemporaries thought might be 
symptomatic of a minor mental breakdown, he warned that the traditional and 
“backwards” classes would be "crushed like dry stick  beneath the wheels of progress.”78   
Despite earlier progress with Borujerdi, the confrotation in Shiraz revived 
tensions and caused a renewed push for anti-Baha’i ction during Moharram.  Borujerdi 
made it clear that, in light of mounting pressure from below, the situation was “getting 
beyond his control and that mullahs insist upon expropriation of Bahai property and 
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dismissal of Bahais from government services.”79  He claimed that clerical resentment of 
the government’s “inaction on the Bahai question was now beyond his control, and that 
he threatens to leave Iran unless the government takes up the anti-Bahai measures as 
proposed by the Mullahs.”80   
Like his mentor, Grand Ayatollah Ha’eri-Yazdi, Borujerdi considered voting with 
his feet by leaving Iran for Iraq to be his ultimate trump card.  He had already made this 
threat in May to no result, but, unable to get his followers to accept the weak compromise 
that he had worked out, especially in light of the ev nts in Shiraz, he had few other 
options besides returning to this threat, which he considered to be his trump card.  
Unfortunately for Borujerdi, British and American pressure for “firmness” against the 
clergy were considered more important than the problems that would be caused by 
Borujerdi quitting Iran, and concerns about meeting he “test” of Moharram to Western 
satisfaction far outweighed anxiety about the collapse of relations with Borujerdi.81 
American observers felt that “with [lower level] Mullahs angry” and unwilling to 
acquiesce to Borujerdi’s compromise, the likeliness of renewed violence during 
Moharram had “become more ominous.”82  Security forces spent the summer targeting 
various “small-fry mullahs” who acted as rogue elements and refused to fall in line and 
accept Borujerdi’s terms for cessation.  These combatant clerics had essentially given up 
on the possibility of working through the majles, where ulama-backed bills were 
constantly being blocked and the deputies introducing them rebuked.83  While Borujerdi 
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was trying to work within the system, such as it was, those who broke away from his 
authority had lost faith in the viability of a diplomatic approach. 
 The Shah’s government, although not budging on clerical demands for legislation, 
again expressed a willingness to possibly compromise on the call for significant 
dismissals of Baha’is.  On July 14, Alam again addressed the majles on the Baha’i issue 
and said that the government would act firmly against the Baha’is under the existing laws 
and would “deal with” the presence of Baha’is in government employment by utilizing 
thirty-year-old statutes that call for the dismissal of any employee engaged in propaganda 
against the “official religion.”84  That is to say, clerical calls for the religion to be 
explicitly named and banned were rejected yet again, as were calls for wholesale 
dismissals and demands that Baha’i identity alone should warrant dismissal, rather than 
“propaganda against the state religion,” which was really a euphemism for an “out” 
Baha’i identity.  This performance by Alam was largely a repeat of his earlier address, 
tough but non-binding words in concert with ambiguous directives that did not really 
commit the government to anything.  It was a reification of the Shah’s aforementioned 
belief that a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to Baha’ism was desirable. 
 Borujerdi had been promised more by Alam, and was expecting more explicit 
measures to be outlined in the majles speech, but Alam ran this original plan by the 
British at the last minute and, based on their firm rejection, he backpedaled and again 
failed to deliver on his promises to the Grand Ayatoll h.  In a July 13 meeting, Alam told 
Wright that a “satisfactory agreement” had been reach d with Borujerdi over the Baha’i 
question.  Falsafi would be sent out of the country until after Moharram on the pretext of 
a pilgrimage and a compromise deal was to be made public through a staged event in the 
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majles.  First, there was to be an exchange of public letters, followed by a pre-arranged 
questioning on the Baha’i issue in the majles, after which the government’s spokesman 
(Alam) would respond by saying that the existing leislation was enough to prevent 
Baha’i propaganda and gatherings, and that the government would employ only Muslims 
in government service.  That is to say, it would promise to dismiss all Baha’is.  Alam told 
Wright that he liked the plan, but wanted to get Bri ish feedback before settling the matter 
with Borujerdi.85   
Wright made his disapproval clear and said that the government had to maintain a 
“firm line” and could not engage in any concessions that “looked like weakness.” He 
further warned that any concessions would by criticized outside of Iran and publicized by 
the international press to the detriment of Iran.  He asked Alam if the government really 
intended to dismiss Baha’i employees, or if the spectacle in the majles and the face-
saving compromise were just hollow words designed to placate Borujerdi in the short-
term to get past the Moharram danger.  Alam said that the promise to dismiss all Baha’is 
would be mostly rhetoric, although he expected thatey would have to “dismiss some 
prominent Baha’is.”  He added that, despite the public show, dismissals would not 
actually be wholesale, but limited and select, and even those unfortunate individuals who 
were dismissed as part of this token action would have the opportunity to dissimulate if 
they wished to maintain their employment.86   
Wright replied that even an unenforced threat of full dismissals would still be 
unacceptable “weakness,” since if there had not been any “recent mulla agitation” then no 
one would have lost their job.  In Wright’s view, even a single dismissal would amount to 
                                                      




a “reward” for clerical intrigues.  When Alam heard this, he got worried.  Although he 
did not tell Wright, he had already made a firm commitment to Borujerdi to publically 
call for full dismissals, assuming that this would be acceptable to the Powers as long as it 
was a hollow promise with nominal action.   
Faced with Wright’s displeasure, Alam said that the government could be tougher 
and that the final speech for the majles could still be changed to meet Wright’s 
preferences by phrasing mentions of the Baha’is “diplomatically,” so as to “leave the 
Government free to act as they thought best” by not explicitly agreeing to anything.  
Alam offered to give Wright his new script, based on Wright’s modifications, but Wright 
said that he should not be physically given the text of the final speech since “this was an 
internal affair on which the Persians must act on their accord.”  Alam offered that, instead 
of dealing with Borujerdi, perhaps the government should break with him entirely, since 
that was the only other option besides making some sort of further public gesture in 
exchange for Borujerdi’s cooperation.  He said thate government was willing to do this 
if needed.  Wright was savvy enough, however, to see th  offer to completely break with 
Borujerdi as “brave words” and “completely empty,” since Wright knew that Alam did 
not have the support of the Cabinet.  In his view, “it is quite clear… that a weak 
compromise is all but through with Borujerdi, and that Baha’is will be sacrificed to the 
mullahs.”  Wright talked to his Baha’i contacts about the possibility of those caught in the 
nominal dismissals escaping through dissimulation, but was told flatly that “no self-
respecting Baha’i would dream of declaring himself a Moslem.”87  
Although Alam’s final majles performance was not what e had promised 
Borujerdi, he supplemented it with the scattered use of a questionnaire to verify the 




religious identity of governmental employees (circular no. 7682).  When individuals 
wrote “Baha’i,” nothing usually happened and the forms were generally “misfiled,” even 
though they could occasionally conveniently re-emerge—sometimes years later—in order 
to deny pensions, or fire individuals (due to office politics, budget issues, local politics, 
and a variety of other issues).88 
Alam’s vague support for dismissals was used as the tangible “victory” which 
Borujerdi could use to end his pressure on the Baha’i matter.  According to government 
sources, “this action will meet the minimum demand of the religious leader Borujerdi and 
will free the government to deal roughly with minor Mullahs [not falling in line with 
him] and preserve order during the Moharram holidays.”89  In other words, Borujerdi 
essentially agreed not to take action during Moharram—and to turn a blind eye to when 
the government would “deal roughly” with rogue clerics who did not emulate him—in 
exchange for the non-binding promise to dismiss at least some of the more committed 
Baha’is from the army and civil service.90   
The Baha’is, unaware of the exaggerated nature of the threat of dismissals, were 
planning to affirm their Baha’i identity en masse and be dismissed, and plans were made 
to provide support for the large numbers of co-religionists expected to lose their jobs.91  
The mass dismissal never came, however, although there were many scattered dismissals, 
the intensity of which depended on one’s location and occupation.  In a July 31 
conversation, Prime Minister Ala defended these inconsistent dismissals by claiming that 
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Baha’is “often practice dissimulation” and that closeted Baha’is would therefore be 
unaffected by a partial purge.92   
What was being publicly presented as an enthusiastic dismissal of all Baha’is was, 
in reality, more akin to a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for positions in the military and the 
civil service, with active state encouragement of the closeting of Baha’i identity.  In a 
sense, the official form recording religious identity was “asking,” but the answer was 
generally “misfiled” and Baha’is remained employed unless they were “out” or “outed”  
in a way that could not be ignored.  Baha’is in governmental employment, like gays in 
the military, became an open secret that was officially gnored as long as there was no 




Almost a month after the deaths of about six Muslim n the Shiraz Massacre, about the 
same number of Baha’is were slaughtered in the small, rural village of Hormuzak, in the 
vicinity of Yazd.  In contemporary accounts and later Baha’i literature, the slaughter of 
the Baha’is in Hormuzak is dealt with almost exclusively as a “savage” “eruption” of 
century-old Muslim hatred for Baha’is, divorced of political context.  Chapter VI 
explores some of the Orientalist underpinnings of these markings of “Muslim” violence. 
 Hormuzak was a rural hamlet about one hundred and twenty kilometers south of 
Yazd.  The Baha’is in the town were farmers and only consisted of six families.  For 
several months before the July 28 massacre, they were harassed by other residents of the 
town, as well as by others from nearby larger villages, like Sakhvid.  This pattern of 




abuse began when irrigation water was diverted from Baha’i fields and continued with 
other forms of abuse, such as the refusal to admit Baha’is to the public bath, and 
threatening them with a “general massacre” later that year.93  
 The gendarmerie intervened but, instead of helping, the troops occupied the best 
Baha’i residence, sending its inhabitants to live in the cellar.  They looted this house as 
well as the other Baha’i residences and stored all of the collected valuables in the house 
that they occupied.  This was considered insufficient r compense, however, and the 
Baha’is were told that they must pay a thousand tomans each as protection money.  This 
was an impossible figure for poor rural farmers, who were only able to gather together a 
few hundred tomans between them.94  
 On the night of July 28, a mob of villagers and others gathered to attack the 
Baha’is of Hormuzak.  According to some accounts, there were two thousand assailants, 
but the true number was likely several hundred at most, given the small populations of 
the villages involved, the efficiency of the operation, and the apparent ability to catch 
some of the victims by surprise.  The mob initially set fire to Baha’i houses and threw 
stones at the doors and windows, in order to get those inside the houses to run outside, 
into an ambush.  The first to die was a Baha’i woman who opened her door in response to 
the calls from outside only to be immediately beaten to death with sticks and iron maces.  
Her husband was then pulled out of the house, over his dying wife, and beaten by the 
same crude weapons until he died.  This pattern of luring individuals outside before 
killing them was repeated at several houses.  The attacks sought to mutilate as well as 
kill.  Some victims were first beaten and cut befor being covered in petrol and burnt to 
                                                      
93 Moojan Momen, ed., The Seven Martyrs of Hurmuzak (Oxford: George Ronald, 1981), pp. 3-5. 
94 Ibid., p. 7. 
217 
 
death.  One unfortunate woman had her hands and head sliced open as she attempted to 
fight off her assailants, was covered in petrol, and was to be burnt alive, but was saved by 
defective matches and left to die from her other injur es.95 
 Despite the repeated use of “mob” to describe the a tackers, the attacks were by 
no means spontaneous or the result of a euphoric group-mind.  The attacks were precise, 
telegraphed well in advance, systematic, and almost echanical.  After the initial attacks, 
the assailants made three passes over the area to hunt for survivors and were similarly 
deliberate in their looting of what little the gendarmerie had not already taken from 
Baha’i homes.  Despite the “looting,” there was little left to take and there was no strong 
economic motive for the attacks, unlike many other incidents of anti-Baha’i violence 
where economic motives were rather naked.  The lack of economic motivation can also 
be seen in the manner in which livestock and other animals were not taken as plunder but 
were instead killed and their carcasses left to rot. Simple execution was also not the 
primary intent.  Apart from the initial victims, who were quickly disposed of to press the 
advantage of surprise, the later deaths involved deliberate mutilations intended to send a 
message.  Aside from being burnt, victims were “hacked to pieces” with a cleaver and 
some were set on fire while still alive.  It was not only the human victims that were 
mutilated; the bees belonging to the Baha’is were also burned and their donkeys 
mutilated.   Their buildings were not just looted but also burned and completely 
destroyed as a symbolic expulsion of the Baha’i presence.  Hormuzak was staged more as 
spectacle than slaughter, with the assailants who engaging in the performance carrying 
“trumpets, flags, and drums.”96 
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 Initially, the government attempted to suppress news of the Hormuzak massacre 
and, as late as July 31, the Prime Minister was denying that any such incident had taken 
place.97  The story was documented and publicized internatio lly by the Baha’i lobby, 
however, and after this the Iranian government felt compelled to persecute some of the 
assailants due to intense British and American pressur  as well as embarrassment over 
the harm that this episode did to Iran’s “great tradi ion of culture and tolerance.”98   
 The events in Hormuzak were in clear violation of the government’s deal with 
Borujerdi to prevent further embarrassing episodes of anti-Baha’i violence.  This 
violence, in spite of Borujerdi’s promises, was taken by the Shah as further evidence 
supporting Alam’s insistence on harsher actions against the clergy.   The prosecution of 
those responsible for the Hormuzak massacre was carried out to send a clear message to 
Borujerdi, and armored cars with fifty troops from the Isfahan gendarmerie were sent in 
to restore order and arrest the instigators.99   
In an August 9 letter to the State Department, Horace Holley (writing for the 
governing body of the American Baha’i community) suggests that the Hormuzak attacks 
were organized and orchestrated by the Feda’iyan-e Islam.  He mentions that, 
contemporaneous with the Hormuzak attacks, in the village of Shahreza, Hasan Javid was 
beaten in the center of town by a mob, wielding clubs and canes, which a single Feda’i 
was able to put together.  Likewise, in the same village two other Baha’is were attacked 
by mobs under the inspiration of the Feda’iyan-e Islam, with the support of sympathetic 
local officials.100  
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The Feda’iyan-e Islam explanation for the massacre in Hormuzak seems 
plausible, since the attacks were organized and seemed to be directed by experienced 
individuals.  Although most of the clerical hierarchy under Borujerdi was following his 
lead and avoiding direct confrontation, the Feda’iyan did not emulate Borujerdi and, in 
the face of governmental betrayal and anti-Muslim volence, it was well within their 
modus operandi to sponsor retributive attacks.  Indeed, in November, mere months after 
the village violence, the Feda’iyan attempted to assas inate Prime Minister Ala.  This 
fateful attack on Ala, and the government’s severe r sponse—which destroyed the 
movement—has been explained in the existing literature in the context of the Baghdad 
Pact.  It is my position that this, and many other d velopments around 1955 that have 
been traditionally explained by invoking the Baghdad Pact can be explained equally well, 
if not more satisfactorily, by referring to the aborted anti-Baha’i pogrom and the anti-
clerical campaign that followed (treated in Chapter VII). 
 
Conclusion 
As the August beginning of Moharram drew closer, Wright describes a situation in which 
“Burujerdi certainly seems to have been brought more or less into line,” a development 
that deflated those loyal to him.  The remaining danger “now lies in the attitude of some 
of the other mullas” who might possibly go rogue and take action in spite of Borujerdi’s 
agreement to stay quiet in exchange for some Baha’i dismissals.101  Nevertheless, General 
Bakhtiar confidently stated that “The Baha’i problem is now completely finished.  Now 
that we have Borujerdi on our side, we can deal energetically and roughly with any local 
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mullah agitators.”102  The Shah had made it clear to Borujerdi that he “would not retreat 
another inch” and the Grand Ayatollah had been forced to accept the gesture of partial 
dismissals, even though none of his specific demands were met.103  It was widely 
anticipated that Borujerdi would honor his end of the compromise, but there was also a 
great deal of anxiety that the Grand Ayatollah lacked the symbolic weight needed to 
suppress clerical dissent.   
 Borujerdi had employed every traditional tool at his command, even repeatedly 
threatening to quit Iran, only to achieve nominal results that included none of his stated 
goals and failed to satisfy those who considered him t eir leader.  Even if the government 
actually delivered on its side of the agreement, this was still considered unacceptable by 
those actively engaged in the anti-Baha’i struggle, who were disappointed and 
disillusioned by Borujerdi’s failure, even though they generally remained loyal to him.  
One such Borujerdi loyalist, Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Taqi Sebt-e Ashtiani, claimed 
that although “the Shah knows very well what a debt he owes to the clergy for their firm 
support on the 28th of Mordad [the 1953 coup],” when it came to repaying this debt with 
regard to the Baha’i issue, the Shah made a long string of promises only to break them 
all.  In so doing, in the view of the Hojjat al-Islam, Borujerdi has been “made to lose 
face” and has “been made to look ridiculous.”104 
This anger was exacerbated by the government’s failure to enforce even this weak 
gesture.105  After the danger of renewed violence in Moharram had passed without 
                                                      
102 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 20 / 03-06 / Box 8 / Folder 350 – Memos of Conversation, General 
Bakhtiar, July 18, 1955. 
103 Ibid. 
104 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 2: 141.  
105 There was also a great deal of anger at the Soraya’s continued “irreligious” behavior.  Shortly before 
Moharram, Soraya left Iran for Europe, where she stayed until October.  Her departure was motivated, in 
part, by her souring relations with the Shah.  It was rumored that “the Queen has left Iran and the Shah for 
221 
 
incident, Alam privately discussed the issue of dismissals, saying that although there 
"would probably have to be some," the government “was really doing virtually nothing 
about it at present," and that the majles had now abandoned the issue.  As a result, 
Borujerdi “is upset that nothing seems to be happening," despite the fact that "the 
Government committed itself to him personally.”  Alam further clarified that the 
government did not care about or check what Baha’is wrote on their religious identity 
forms and it was only those who insisted on firmly pushing their Baha'i identity who 
would likely be removed.106  Over time, the hollow nature of the promises to dismiss 
known Baha’is became obvious, and the continued employ ent, and even later 
promotions, of Dr. Ayadi (the openly Baha’i personal physician of the Shah) became the 
most famous example of the continued employment of Baha’is in influential positions.  A 
1959 American report, for example, explains the decision not to intervene—after some 
Baha’is were dismissed—by noting that such cases were th  exception, while in most 
cases the Iranian government “misfiled” religious identity forms where Baha’is honestly 
identified their religion.107 
 In contrast to Borujerdi’s failure to achieve any of his goals, Ayatollah Shirazi 
achieved relative success.  Although his attempts to destroy the House of the Bab were 
blocked, and the property was eventually restored to the Baha’is, he was successful in 
                                                                                                                                                              
good,” and this was supported by reports that she had taken her furs and jewels with her, just as the S ah’s 
first wife had done when she left him.  In apparent r bellion against being lectured to about her behavior in 
Miami, Soraya had “a grand, if somewhat unregal time” in Europe, “water skiing enthusiastically, sunning 
herself in abbreviated swimming suits, wining and dining and night clubbing without much restraint.”  All
of this was done in public during the holy month of Moharram, when even music was frowned upon in 
conservative areas of Iran.  This behavior abroad, months after her scandal in Miami, caused widespread 
disapproval and was said to “wound the patriotism of any Iranians.”  After this “rest,” Soraya returned to 
the Shah (Ibid., Reel 6: 6-8, 31). 
106 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 20 / 03-06 / Box 8 / Folder 350: Memos of Conversation, A. Alam, 
September 14, 1955.  
107 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 21 / 01 / Box 15 / Folder 570.3 Religion, Bowling to Rockwell, June 15, 
1961; Wiley to Holmes, June 14, 1961; Holmes to Wiley, June 21, 1961; and related enclosures. 
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other areas.  Despite being targeted by Alam—with British backing—Shirazi was able to 
use his party to not only protect himself, but also to force his early release from 
“imprisonment,” as well as the dismissal of the general and governor-general who had 
opposed his mob action, just as he had promised to achieve while being taken away.  
While Borujerdi’s call for a boycott of Baha’is nevr really gained traction, the 
Brotherhood was able to shut down Shiraz for days to protest the detention of its leader.  
While Borujerdi’s representatives in the majles were routinely rebuked and made no 
progress, Shirazi’s representatives were more connected, more efficient, and ultimately 
more successful in their lobbying efforts on behalf of the Party’s leader.  While Borujerdi 
was unable to prevent the rogue actions of his subordinates, Shirazi demanded and 
received the full loyalty of the Brothers.  The Feda’iyan-e Islam also acted autonomously 
from Borujerdi and was able to achieve measured success in its anti-Baha’i efforts 
through its organizational strength and tangible focus on direct violence.   
More than just damaging Borujerdi’s prestige, the relative successes of rogue 
efforts, in open defiance of the regime, suggested that the time for Borujerdi’s patient 
diplomacy and loyal opposition may have passed.  At the same time, they provided a 
cautionary tale about the limits of feasible oppositi n.  Neither the Brotherhood nor the 
Feda’iyan-e Islam survived very long after the events of 1955.  The Brotherhood fell 
apart and was absorbed into other groups following Shirazi’s suspicious death in 
February 1957.108  The Feda’iyan likewise dissipated following the execution of Safavi 
after his organization’s aforementioned botched attempt to assassinate Ala late in 1955.  
The lessons learned by these efforts were incorporated into the post-Borujerdi 
oppositional landscape discussed in Chapter VIII.  
                                                      





“A Wave of Emotional Feeling”: 




This chapter explores conflicting contemporary attempts to obscure or explain the anti-
Baha’i pogrom of 1955 in order to promote or defend the particular interests of the 
various actors involved in the episode.  I propose that these contemporary attempts to 
“spin” the pogrom provide valuable insight into the anxieties and assumptions shaping 
the worldviews of the various sides, and reveal a tngle of intersecting authority claims, 
aimed at different audiences, and operating according to different grammars.  Unlike the 
previous chapters, which explored the details of the pogrom and how the Shah and the 
Cabinet sought to negotiate the interstices after being caught between the irreconcilable 
demands of the traditional elite and the West, the present chapter is not concerned with 
historicity, but discourse and perception.  
 I begin by exploring how the pogrom has been staged in the clerical discourse of 
the period, particularly in the memoirs of the campign’s titular leader, Mohammad Taqi 
Falsafi, and in the correspondence of Grand Ayatollh Borujerdi.  I then interrogate 
British and American archival sources and their positivi t inscription of Orientalist 
categories on this “Muslim”-marked violence.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
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representation of the pogrom in the lobbying efforts of American Baha’is.   I conclude 
with an exploration of the Iranian government’s attempts at censorship and obfuscation.    
 
 
The Clerical Discourse 
 
Falsafi’s memoirs  
In spite of his central role in 1955’s anti-Baha’i pogrom, Falsafi’s memoirs of the episode 
are written almost as if he was not there.  His curt na ration is especially elliptic when it 
comes to the Shah’s reversal on the Baha’i issue, which nearly led Grand Ayatollah 
Borujerdi to quit Iran.  Despite being the chief provocateur in Tehran, and deeply 
involved in all aspects of the pogrom and its aftermath, Falsafi claims: “About this, I do 
not remember a thing.”1  This selective amnesia is symptomatic of the problems that the 
pogrom poses to clerical meta-narratives of Pahlavi Ir n.  This issue is taken up in later 
chapters. 
The disjointed nature of Falsafi’s narrative occurs because of an unsuccessful 
attempt at reconciling conflicting clerical narratives, namely the post-revolutionary 
discourse, which formed the creative milieu in which the memoir was written, and the 
contemporary clerical rationale used in the Borujerdi period to justify the pogrom.  The 
first narrative involves the post-Revolutionary ascription of supposed Baha’i privilege 
and ascendency under the Pahlavis.  This discourse relies heavily upon the partially 
fabricated memoirs of General Fardust.2  This source is used to frame the Shah’s personal 
                                                      
1 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 210. 
2 General Fardust was a close friend of the Shah who, after the Revolution, was apparently coerced into 
denouncing the Pahlavi regime and offering insider “evidence” confirming Khomeinist myths, including 
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physician, Dr. Ayadi, as the “true sovereign” of Iran, a Machiavellian figure leading a 
secret Baha’i cabal ruling Iran and insidiously placing Baha’is in positions of power 
throughout the country.   
In this view of the Pahlavi period, Iran lacked agency prior to the Revolution 
because its leadership allowed it to not only become the plaything of external powers, 
such as the British, but to also be exploited internally by the Baha’is, who were cast as 
“the Fifth Column of the foreigners in Iran.”3  General Ayadi—as the most prominent 
Baha’i at Court—is painted as the face of the regim’s corruption, with the Shah 
essentially relegated to a stooge.  In this imagined schema, Dr. Ayadi is the Rasputin of 
the Court.  According to the words attributed to Fardust, Ayadi was “the most influential 
individual in the royal court, and gradually became th  most influential person in the 
country.”4  In this way, he eventually became Iran’s “King without Crown or Throne” 
(sultan bedun-e taj va takht).5  His authority as the chief medical officer of the armed 
forces was overstated and spun into nefarious control over the nation’s vital medicines 
and, therefore, control over the life and death of the nation’s sick and innocent.  His 
various duties and positions were extrapolated and embellished to the point where he was 
said to have nearly a hundred senior-level jobs simultaneously, as well as vast control 
over hiring and appointments, and the ability to remove anyone who did not kowtow to 
his authority.  He supposedly used this tentacular influence to insure that everything from 
                                                                                                                                                              
British control of Mossadeq, Jewish control of America, and Baha’i control of Pahlavi Iran.  The general 
died shortly after these coerced confessions, and a work purported to be his memoirs appeared three years 
later, expanding upon this fantastical staging of the previous regime.  See Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured 
Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), pp.159 -61. 
3 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 209. 
4 Hossein Fardust, Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi (Tehran: Ettela’at Publishing, 1990), p. 202. 
5 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 195. 
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pharmacy stock to fisheries was “continually manipulated for the benefit of Baha’ism.”6  
In this construct,  
Ayadi was the true sovereign (sultan-e vaq’i) of Iran… During Ayadi’s 
sovereignty (hakemiyat) Baha’is were placed in important positions and there was 
no such thing as an unemployed Baha’i.  In the timeof Ayadi’s power (qodrat), 
the number of Iranian Baha’is tripled.7 
Falsafi uses statements such as this as support for his claim that, shortly before the 
pogrom, Baha’is controlled Iran.  Moreover, he claims that this was part of a larger 
colonial conspiracy involving the Zionist movement.  In his view, Zionism and Baha’ism 
are “explicitly related, both serving as the slaves and bondsmen of America.”  They were 
considered to be working towards a common goal, since “the English have made putting 
Palestine into the hands of the Jews the focus of Zionism and, likewise, America has 
made delivering Iran into the hands of individuals like Dr. Ayadi the focus of the Baha’is, 
so that in the Middle East there would be two bases (for the West).”8 
This is a patently post-Revolutionary re-imaging of the context of the pogrom and 
the significance of Ayadi.  In his actual speeches during the pogrom, Falsafi only briefly 
brought up Ayadi, through statements such as: “Our co ntry has so many Muslim 
doctors, and as such the people are upset that a Baha’i individual is the personal 
physician of the Shah.  You need to replace him.”9  The central issue was removing 
Baha’is from governmental employment and Ayadi was not treated as significant in 
himself, but was rather used tangentially as an example of the prominence of some 
                                                      
6 Fardust, Zuhur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi, pp. 202-03. 
7 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 196. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 194.  The Shah reportedly retorted: “What business do they have with my doctor?” 
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Baha’is and as a test of the seriousness of the Shah’s expressions of support for the 
dismissals of Baha’is.   
Falsafi himself acknowledges the disconnect between his treatment of Ayadi 
during the pogrom and his treatment while introducing the section of his memoirs dealing 
with the Baha’is.  He explains that it was not until he read Fardust’s book, decades later, 
that he truly understood that Ayadi was more than a simple doctor.10  He considers the 
“evidence” attributed to Fardust so important that e quotes several pages of this post-
Revolutionary fiction as the context for his discussion of the Baha’i issue, rather than 
using his own recollections.  Throughout this preamble, Ayadi is used as a symbolic 
representation for all Baha’is, and his supposed crimes are given as the rationale for the 
collective retaliation that was the 1955 pogrom, even though none of these “facts” were 
known to Falsafi until more than thirty years later, and most of Fardust’s allegations 
referred to the period after the pogrom.   
Beyond the ahistorical framing of the issue, this approach sidesteps the 
contemporary issues behind the attacks in order to clumsily tie them into Khomeinist 
national myths about the Pahlavi state.  Moreover, after his extensive quoting of Fardust 
and his post-Revolutionary thesis, Falsafi never maintains or supports these ideas in the 
body of his discussion, instead slipping into a nebulous series of disjointed vignettes, 
mostly self-congratulatory, and significant not so much for the little that they reveal, but 
for the salience of the conspicuous silences that they bracket. 
                                                      
10 Fardust, Zuhur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi, pp. 202-03, 374.  In addition, Falsafi’s editor, Ali Davani, 
builds on this theme by pointing to a fellow physician’s comments that “Dr. Ayadi, couldn’t tell a 
surgeon’s scalpel from a gardener’s shovel,” using this as evidence that Ayadi was not really serving in a
medical capacity.  He takes the quote from Alam (Goftoguha-ye Man ba Shah, p. 616). 
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In the second clerical discourse invoked in the body f Falsafi’s memoirs—the 
anti-Baha’i rhetoric of the 1950s—Ayadi is tangential, and the issue is framed in entirely 
different terms.  The chief actors are the people (mardom) and the foreign powers, with 
the clergy acting as agents of the former, the Baha’is acting as agents of the latter, and the 
Shah placed in the middle and called upon to choose between the people and the Powers. 
Baha’is are not only portrayed as a foreign presence, but are framed as the 
opposite of the legitimate citizenry, as the inverse of the nation.  As such, they are 
consciously excluded from, and placed in opposition o, the mardom.  The Persian term 
mardom literally means “people” but can also mean “mankind,” “humans,” “folks,” and 
“the citizenry.”  In the clerical discourse, mardom is used to convey the idea of “the 
citizenry,” or people invested with rights who togeth r compose a nation. Baha’is are 
deliberately excluded from this term by Falsafi, Borujerdi, Behbahani, the clerical 
deputies in the majles, and others, and are instead referred to indirectly as much as 
possible and—if direct mention is unavoidable—described through neutered, 
dehumanized terms such as “individuals” (afrad).   
This usage of “Baha’i” and mardom can be compared to the Nazi use of “Jew” as 
the antonym of the volk (“people”), and the cause of the weakness inflicting he nation.  
Through nationalist propaganda, volk was taken up as a self-identifier and marker of 
difference that no longer meant merely “people,” but was instead restricted to include 
only Germanic or Aryan individuals, simultaneously marking those outside of this 
category as less than human.  Baha’is are likewise excluded from mardom in order to 
deny their citizenship rights and linguistically divest them of humanity. 
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In one of his Ramadan sermons, during an exegesis link ng Baha’is to the 
vainglorious polytheists of previous eras, Falsafi alludes to the dome of the Baha’i 
National Center and the plans for building a larger domed temple in Iran.  He invokes the 
following verse from the Qur’an:  “Do ye build a landmark on every high place to amuse 
yourselves?”11  He claimed to have chosen this verse because of its condemnation of 
similar afrad in an earlier time.  He says: 
The prophet of the time [Hud, of ‘Ad] is referring to the aristocratic life of the 
selfish and extravagant individuals [afrad] and pointing to their palatial buildings 
and showing their tyranny concerning the oppressed. Thus, I spoke concerning the 
Baha’is and their condition in Iran.12   
More than merely being excluded from mardom, the Baha’is were positioned on 
the other side of this binary, and seen as the embodi ent of the forces at work against the 
citizenry.  Falsafi claims that they “lord over the citizenry (mardom),”13 and he entitles 
the section of his memoirs detailing the rationale for the pogrom: “The Complaints of the 
Citizenry (mardom) against the Baha’is.”14   
Falsafi and his associates did not frame the pogrom as a communal issue between 
the Baha’is and the Muslims, but rather as a nationl st struggle between the Baha’is and 
the citizenry.  Violence against this minority was not attributed to religious mobs or 
clerical incitement, but to the natural, organic responses of the citizenry to a foreign agent 
within it.  The pogrom was said to have been brought on by “the frenzy and emotions of 
the citizenry (mardom),”15 and it was claimed that, for some time, “the folks (mardom) 
                                                      
11 Qur’an, 26:128 (Yusuf Ali translation). 
12 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 201. 
13 Ibid., p. 195. 
14 Ibid., p. 197. 
15 Ibid., p. 200. 
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thought of killing the Baha’i leaders.”16  Rather than inciting the people, Falsafi claims 
that he was actually a calming influence, since he xpounded upon “the method that must 
be used by the folks (mardom), and made them aware of the need to preserve security.” 17  
When murders did occur, it was not due to the actions of the clerics or the Muslims 
specifically, but rather because “the citizens (mardom) slaughtered several Baha’is here 
and there.”18  Falsafi claims that the delays and reversals on the Baha’i issue were the 
result of the Shah’s attempt to hold back the will of the people, since “from the very first 
day that the citizenry (mardom) arose in protest, the government kept the people’s 
revolutionary emotions leashed and gagged.”19 
 
The “People’s Movement” 
Falsafi’s framing of the issue was part of a larger cl ical discourse, which was even 
occasionally taken up by the government.  When, for example, the Shah seized Baha’i 
centers, Ayatollah Behbahani called for the recognitio  of the occasion as “a national 
holiday (‘eid) for the citizenry (mardom).”20  Even Falsafi’s reports of what Alam said to 
him in private are consistent with this framing.  Falsafi claimed to remember Alam 
saying that anti-Baha’i violence was likely to erupt nationwide because “the people 
(mardom) are nervous and angry.”21   
General Bakhtiar likewise employed the terminology f the clerical discourse in 
his public statements announcing the seizure of Baha’i properties.  This act was framed, 
for external audiences, as an act designed to protect th  Baha’is from wild Muslim mobs, 
                                                      
16 Ibid., p. 198. 
17 Ibid., p. 202. 
18 Alam, Goftoguha-ye Man ba Shah, pp. 66-67 
19 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 208. 
20 Ettela’at, 18 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 9, 1955]. 
21 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 202. 
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while simultaneously being sold locally as a sign of the Shah’s support for the “people’s 
movement.”  Bakhtiar claimed that the seizure was necessary  
since the propaganda and unabashed displays (t zahor) of the Baha’i sect have 
come to be the source of the agitation (tahrik) of the public’s emotions.  
Therefore, for the preservation of discipline and public order, the disciplinary 
forces have been directed to occupy this sect’s propaganda centers, which have 
been called ‘Haziratu’l-Quds,’ so that all possible eventualities will be prevented.  
At this time, the military governor of Tehran also expects from every patriot that 
they exhibit consideration in this matter for discipline and public order, and that 
they diligently refrain from all demonstrations and on-sanctioned actions that are 
disruptive to public order.  Instead, they should feel confident and be assured 
that… [the Shah] has noticed the emotions and sentim ts of the people (mardom) 
and is always considering the welfare and meeting the needs of the public.22 
Here General Bakhtiar explicitly adopts the terminology and rationale of the 
clerical discourse, much to the chagrin of Entezam and Alam, who were selling the 
seizure as a protective move on the international scene, and did not anticipate having the 
nation’s security chief releasing a statement that explicitly contradicted their explanations 
and made common cause with the aggressors.   Entezam would later describe Bakhtiar’s 
public statements as one of the government’s three main blunders related to the pogrom.23 
Despite the disingenuous nature of most of his statement, Bakhtiar was sincere in 
his prefacing statements regarding anger over Baha’i identity in public, and his personal 
discomfort over this issue has been treated elsewher .24  He was also, in the Reza Shah 
tradition, fiercely opposed to Muslim public religiosity.  Both threads of his discomfort 
with public religion are evident in the statement, and this gets at the fundamental irony in 
the clerical demands for action against perceived Baha’i flamboyance in the public 
sphere.  In making the case against the intrusion of a disruptive religious identity into the 
                                                      
22 Ettela’at, 16 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 7, 1955]. 
23 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 20 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Stevens, May 25, 1955. 
24 See Chapter VII. 
232 
 
public sphere, the anti-Baha’i campaign itself came to involve the flamboyant insertion of 
Shi’ite identity into the public sphere in ways that were judged disturbing and 
unacceptable by the government and its foreign sponsors, leading to powerful blowback 
against the clerical establishment. 
The elements in the government and military that were most likely to find 
common cause with the nationalization of anti-Baha’ism were also those who were most 
influenced by Reza Shah’s emphasis on the homogenization of the public sphere and the 
erosion of religious particularization.  These indivi uals, including Ala and Bakhtiar, 
were sympathetic to many of the goals of the anti-Baha’i pogrom, and were uneasy about 
an “out” Baha’i presence, but when American pressure fo ced the Shah to stall or reverse 
himself on the Baha’i question, this led Borujerdi and Falsafi to demand continued anti-
Baha’i action by resorting to particularistic Shi’ite entries into the public sphere, in ways 
that the government judged to be even more undesirable than the Baha’i presence.   
General Bakhtiar’s expression of common cause with the clergy could not have 
occurred in earlier anti-Baha’i movements, which did not have this nationalist sense of 
oppositional spatiality, and which instead relied primarily on blood libels, local feuds, 
and an Islamic rationale.  In 1955, unlike the lastwidespread anti-Baha’i “outbreak” in 
1903, the initial appeal to action was made in terms of the citizenry, not the Muslims, and 
the rhetoric was constructed in a proto-nationalist vernacular inspired by competitive 
borrowing from Tudeh and other groups.   
The 1955 pogrom was branded as “the self-protection of the people (mardom)” 25 
and “the people’s (mardom) movement.”26  These phrases conjure up images of the 
                                                      
25 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 202. 
26 Ibid., p. 196. 
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populism of the Left and are “Islamic” primarily interms of the choice of target and 
framing of self.  In this populism of the Right, mardom does not refer to the masses in 
general, as with the Leftist use, but is instead used to equate the Shi’ite “nation” within 
Iran with the nation itself, and to promote the idea that, since there is no difference 
between the two, there is no need to add the qualifier “Muslim,” as it should be accepted 
as an unmarked feature of the nation. 
 
Phobic and epidemiologic responses to Baha’ism 
In the clerical discourse, mardom is conceptualized not just as the citizenry, but as an 
anthropomorphized embodiment of the nation, a body that is infected by Baha’ism.  This 
“foreign” presence is treated as a cancer to be eradicated, down to the last cell.  This 
concern with a final eradication in order to purify and strengthen the nation is somewhat 
similar to the Nazi view that the Jews were like a cancer that must be eradicated before 
the nation could assume her true, healthy and authentic form, and move ahead to 
greatness.27   
According to clerical-deputy Ahmad Safa’i, Baha’is must be explicitly targeted 
because “they pervert the citizens (mardom), take them off of the path of chastity, and are 
the ones who disturb the country’s security.”28  In Falsafi’s view, this perversion was like 
a demon possessing the nation, and was a matter so s rious that “His Holiness Ayatollah 
                                                      
27 Hitler’s rhetoric against the Jewish “disease” is very similar to that used by Borujerdi and Falsafi in their 
attacks on the Baha’is.  He repeatedly asserted that "Jews are a cancer on the breast of Germany" and, in an 
August 1920 talk, he warned:  “Do not think that you can fight against an illness without killing the g rm, 
without destroying the bacillus; and do not think that you can fight against the racial tuberculosis without 
making sure that the volk gets free from the germ of the racial tuberculosis.  The effects of Jewry will never 
perish, and the poisoning of the volk will not end, as long as the germ, the Jew, is not removed from our 
midst.” Quoted in Richard Weikart, Hitler's Ethic: the Nazi Pursuit of Evolutionary Progress (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 190.   
28 Ahmad Safa’i, Mazakerat-e Majles-e Shura-ye Melli, 11th year, Doc. 2995, 3 Khordad 1334, pp. 1-3. 
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Borujerdi, Ayatollah Behbahani, and the clerical societies, have all of their attention 
focused on exorcising (tard) the Baha’i sect from Iranian society.”29  The goal was not 
merely “liquidating (tasviyyeh) the members of this sect in the government 
bureaucracy,”30 or even “the necessity of repressing and clobbering (sarkubi) the 
Baha’is,”31 but rather “the complete eradication of all of their traces”32 and “the 
extermination of the roots and traces of the Baha’is from the country.”33   
Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi was the most powerful advocate of this final solution 
to the Baha’i problem.  In an interview with Kayhan, for example, he reaffirmed the 
necessity of exorcising (tard) and exiling (kharej shodan) Baha’is.34  In a clerical bill put 
forward by his supporters, harsh criminal penalties w re called for against Baha’is, 
penalties which seem drawn more from epidemiology than from any Islamic rationale.  
One article of a proposed bill, for example, insists that if anyone manifests (tazahor) 
outward symptoms of Baha’ism, “the convicted offendr will be imprisoned in solitary 
confinement for terms of two to ten years.”35  Not only is the Baha’i religious identity 
treated like a disease, but it is treated like a contagious one, with infection requiring 
quarantine or expulsion.  Although the Baha’is are marked pacifists, Grand Ayatollah 
Borujerdi is described in Falsafi’s memoir as "afraid" (bimnak) of them.36  This is not due 
to any possible violence on their part, but rather o an existential dread of their very 
                                                      
29 See the series of interviews in Kayhan, 16, 19, and 20 of Ordibehesht 1334 [May 7, 10, and 11, 1955]. 
30 Letter to Falsafi from Ayatollah Borujerdi, dated 15 Ramadan 1374 [May 7, 1955], published in 
Ettela’at, 18 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 9, 1955], and Kayhan, 19 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 10, 1955]. 
31 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 201. 
32 See the series of interviews in Kayhan, 16, 19, and 20 of Ordibehesht 1334 [May 7, 10, and 11, 1955]. 
33 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 203, n1. 
34 See the series of interviews in Kayhan, 16, 19, and 20 of Ordibehesht 1334 [May 7, 10, and 11, 1955]. 
35 Kayhan, 20 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 11, 1955]. 
36 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 202, n1. 
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presence within the embodied nation.  This phobic reaction is staged as natural and 
attributed to the nation as a whole.   
 
The “astonishing wave” lifting the nation 
For both clerical and governmental actors, framing the pogrom as a “natural” reaction 
allowed for the diffusion of blame and responsibility, as such a reaction was leaderless 
and spontaneous.  No single actor claimed responsibility, with agency instead being 
conferred on the amorphous citizenry.  Even the clerical leadership, who Shi’ites were 
supposed to emulate (taqlid), claimed a passive role and maintained that they w re 
themselves forced into emulating the will of the peo l .  This placement of the will of the 
masses over the independent decisions of those vestd with religious authority is not 
without precedent (the most striking example being the Tobacco Protest), but openly 
acknowledging this and explicitly framing matters in this way was a novel development.  
In the time of the Constitutional Revolution, it was this very issue of subordinating the 
independent authority of the clerics to the will of the people that conservatives like 
Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri raised in order to denounce democracy, seeing this inversion of 
the flow of taqlid to be patently anti-Islamic.37 
The citizenry, although being framed as the active ag nts of the movements, are 
also described as being themselves caught up in the thrall of larger forces.  They are said 
to have been lifted up and moved by “an astonishing wave (mawj) in the country,” which 
was created after “some people (mardom) had seen tyranny (setam) done by the hand of 
                                                      
37 See, Vanessa Martin, "The Anti-Constitutionalist Arguments of Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri," Middle East 
Studies 22 (April 1986): pp. 181-91. 
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that devious sect.”38  This, naturally, led to the citizenry “becoming impassioned” (beh 
hayajan amadan)39 and filled with “agitation” (tahrik)40 until a public “frenzy” (shuur / 
hayajan)41 developed that escalated into a “destructive rage” (khashm-e virangar).42  This 
idea of a “wave” initiating the violence is bracketed by the description of the conclusion 
of violence as a “subsiding” (forukash kardan) of this supposedly natural, national 
reaction.43 
 
Sexual dominance and national hegemony 
There is a sexual subtext to the words used to describ  the motivations for anti-Baha’i 
violence.  Phrases such as beh hayajan amadan (“becoming impassioned”) can also refer 
to becoming sexually stimulated, or achieving an orgasm.  Also, the term shur 
(“emotion”) can also allude to sexual passion, and hayajan (“frenzy”) can refer to sexual 
stimulation and orgasm.  Likewise, Falsafi’s excitement of the masses is described as 
mohayyej (“stimulating”).44 
This sexual subtext occurs not only in the descriptions of the citizenry, but also in 
the senior clergy’s description of their own perception of and reaction to the pogrom.  
Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, for example, refers to Falsafi’s assault on the Baha’is as the 
ripping away of “a certain amount from [Baha’ism’s] thick veil.”45  He continues this 
feminization of the Other, and the use of imagery invoking sexual assault, by 
                                                      
38 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 201. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ettela’at, 16 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 7, 1955]. 
41 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, pp. 200 n1, 202. 
42 Ibid., p. 203 n1. 
43 Ibid., p. 200 n1. 
44 Ibid., p. 203 n1. 
45 Letter to Falsafi from Ayatollah Borujerdi, dated 15 Ramadan 1374 [May 7,1955], published in Ettela’at, 
18 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 9, 1955], and Kayhan, 19 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 10, 1955]. 
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congratulating Falsafi for having “pulled up the veil [or hem] to reveal a peek at their true 
nature [or hidden form].”46  This concern with feminizing and sexually dominatg the 
Other becomes even more disturbing because of the Grand Ayatollah’s claim that this 
forced ripping away of the veil to sexually expose an embodied Baha’ism “has become 
the cause of pleasure for this lowly one and for the generality of Muslims, and has even 
brought pleasure to his Holiness, the Guardian of the Age [the Twelfth Imam].”47  The 
fetishistic concern with ripping away the veil to dminate and assert authority, of course, 
goes back to the Reza Shah period, when Islamic dress was prohibited and the tyranny of 
forced de-veiling became the most infamous aspect of the enforcement of this provision.  
This aggressive act feminized and humiliated the conservative opposition to this law.  
The choice to perceive of the struggle against the Baha’is in these terms seems to indicate 
a desire to reverse this previous degradation and reclaim masculinity by inflicting similar 
humiliation on another group. 
The clerical discourse is, moreover, infused with phobic paranoia, and the desire 
to assert dominance over the source of this mental disquiet.  This can be seen in several 
ways: the aggressive imagery of sexual assault chosen t  refer to the feelings stirred up 
by exposure to Baha’ism, the immense discomfort with the external manifestations 
(tazahorat) of this alternative identity, the push for Baha’is to return to closeted 
existence, and the intense desire to remove any and all reminders of Baha’i identity.  
Taken together, these desires and reactions suggest that omething about an “out” Baha’i 
identity elicited a violent response that was somewhat comparable to the violent 





manifestations of homophobia that have arisen in some who view any public display of 
homosexual identity as an existential threat to their terosexuality. 
There are, of course limits to this analogy, but it gets at the idea that any form of 
concession regarding the legitimacy of the identity of the Other can be taken as an 
existential threat, a challenge to the foundational demarcations that form the basis of 
one’s world view.  In this instance, Baha’ism was a threat to what would become the 
founding myth of Iranian Shi’ite nationalism.  Namely, that the Iranian nation is 
fundamentally Shi’ite (containing within it niches for Sunnis and the recognized 
minorities) and that Shi’ism is the most unifying foundation for a national identity, since 
Iran supposedly enjoys relative homogeneity in its religious identity, but is irreconcilably 
diverse in terms of ethnicity and language.   
This rationale is comparable to that used by the Hindutva movement in India, 
which justifies a majoritarian, Hinduism-based nationalism along similar lines.  The 
Hindutva movement also finds places within its discourse for most religious minorities, 
except for the largest one, the Muslim “other,” which complicates and threatens Hindu 
nationalism just as the presence of the Baha’i “other” complicates and threatens Shi’ite 
nationalism.  Iranian Baha’is and Indian Muslims are p oblematic for attempts at 
religious nationalism because there is no acceptable role for these groups in the 
nationalist cast.  As a result, some in the Hindutva movement, in order to maintain the 
illusion of homogeneity, have put forward egregious lie  about the Muslims in India, 
framing them as primarily the descendants of Muslim invaders, and thus perpetually 
“foreign” (rather than being primarily the descendats of Indians who willingly converted 
to Islam).  In reality, as the descendants of local converts, they are an authentically local 
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segment of the population that have opted out of the Hindu umbrella and which, by their 
very existence, threaten the supposedly natural link between India and Hinduism. 
Because of their ancestors’ choice to convert, contemporary Muslims have been 
targeted by some Hindu Nationalists as “national apostates,” despite the novelty of 
nationalism and the antiquity of their families’ conversion.  These earlier family 
conversions are nevertheless re-imagined as a contemporary betrayal of the nation.48  The 
Baha’is, likewise, cannot be satisfactorily assimilated into the Shi’ite Nationalist model 
and are similarly coded as “national apostates” because of their ancestor’s decision to 
convert out of Shi’ism in the pre-national period.49  Their existence is a fundamental 
challenge to the myth of the naturalness of Shi’ism’s role as the foundation for the newly-
imagined nation, and their history poses several problematic questions.  If, for example, 
Shi’ism was the natural basis for Iranian nationalism, then why did approximately a 
million Iranians convert out of Shi’ism in favor ofBaha’ism in the very period in which 
Iran was transitioning from empire to nation?50   
The conservative reply has been that the Baha’is are not the religious group that 
they pretend to be.  They have been, instead, describ d as a foreign-backed political 
party, neither local nor authentic, funded and directed by the Power du jour, who were 
their true benefactors (hamian-e vaq’i).51  There have also been polemical attempts to 
claim that Baha’ism was a colonial conspiracy from the very beginning.  This polemic 
                                                      
48 van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, pp.  8-10. 
49 I am simplifying things somewhat.  Of course, a small inority of Iranian Baha’is in the 1950s were 
themselves converts into the religion and were not the descendants of converts and, although most converts 
in Iran have come from a Shi’ite background, there were also many converts from Jewish and Zoroastrian 
backgrounds. 
50 See Appendix I. 
51 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 209. 
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has never been able withstand close scrutiny, but is nevertheless widely accepted in 
Iran.52 
The point is that, for Shi’ite nationalism in Iran, Baha’is have been one of the 
fissures disrupting the structural integrity of theimagined nation, just as Muslim identity 
problematizes Hindu nationalism, Palestinian identity undermines Israeli nationalism, and 
Kurdish identity challenges Turkish nationalism.  Although Baha’is have never employed 
violence against the state, they are nevertheless seen as a threat to the nation’s security 
because of the challenge that they represent in the contestation over who owns the nation.  
 This challenge was to the foundations of the natiolist myth, but it was perceived 
as a tangible assault in the clerical discourse.  Speaking of the perceived Baha’i threat, 
Falsafi claims that “the Muslims of Iran, who are th  owners (malek) of this land 
(sarzamin), are like the Palestinian Muslims who are the owners of Palestine—except 
that they do not suffer prolonged exile, bondage, and misfortune.”53  In other words, they 
are like the Palestinians in none of the characteristics that define them, but are similar in 
that they are “owners” of a land coveted by a rival people, who have prevented proper 
nation development. 
Borujerdi, writing to Behbahani, describes the Baha’is s not only the cause for 
Iran’s weakness, but the reason for its failure to successfully transition to nationhood.  He 
begins by applauding the closing of the Baha’i headqu rters, since it “was exclusively 
engaged in propaganda against the holy religion,” ad claims that it is this Baha’i 
propaganda “which—naturally—is the cause of disunity with regards to nationality 
(adam-e vahdat-e melliyyat), and which, instead, opposes the independence of the 
                                                      
52 See Yazdani, “I'tirāfāt-i Dolgoruki.” 
53 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 210. 
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country and lays the foundation for the enfeeblement of the institution of the 
monarchy.”54  Although Borujerdi supports the institution of the monarchy, he makes it 
clear that he sees Shi’ism as the basis of Iranian ationalism, taking the extra step of 
emphasizing the “naturalness” of this assertion.  Writing to Falsafi, Borujerdi again 
reemphasizes that it is Shi’ism that is “naturally the cause of [national] unity.”55 
 
Staging “Muslim” violence 
Although a Saidian exploration of the Orientalism on display in the British and American 
documents from this period is beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that the 
available documents confirm the attitudes and practices that one would assume.  There is 
no shortage of gems such as: “[The Shah] appears to be far too civilized and too 
Occidental to admit of such Oriental deviousness.”56  Through descriptions of this nature, 
we see civilization and civility elided with the West, while the “Oriental” is staged as 
beyond the boundaries of civilization and its restraints, embodying deviance.  My 
concern is not with such general attitudes, but rather with the specific ways in which anti-
Baha’i violence is marked as “Muslim” in contemporary British and American reports. 
 Throughout the thousands of pages of diplomatic reports relevant to the anti-
Baha’i pogrom, certain tropes are repeatedly invoked to explain the violence in Iran, 
which is almost always coded as “Muslim” violence.  As with the clerical discourse, this 
popular violence is framed as comparable to forces in nature, primordial and reactive.  
Unlike the clerical discourse, the diplomatic record does not speak of the citizenry 
reacting in these primordial ways, but only the clergy and the fanatical elements.  Rather 
                                                      
54 Ettela’at, 19 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 10, 1955]. 
55 Ettela’at, 18 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 9, 1955]; Kayhan, 19 Ordibehesht 1334 [May 10, 1955]. 
56 Bayne, “We are Losing Heart,” p.7. 
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than representing the natural instincts of a citizenry under invasion, the diplomatic record 
casts the Baha’is and the educated classes as the “ci iz ns” of the drama—those who 
were busy leading the nation forward— and frames th religious elements as the inverse 
of this, an anti-civilizational force pulling the nation chronologically backwards, away 
from “progress” and towards “medievalism.” 
 The most common metaphors involve comparing Muslim violence to an 
“eruption” or a “wave.”  In both cases, the implication is that this violence is natural, 
spontaneous, and lacking both rationality and agency.  The implicit message in these 
documents is that, no matter the superficial civility of the Muslim majority, there exists 
beneath this superstructure a true essence that is profoundly violent and that may “erupt” 
in the right circumstances.  The idea of the “wave” likewise assumes that Muslims are 
insincere in their modernity and that, although they may move with the progressive trend, 
they could just as easily be caught up in a “wave” in the other direction, if left to 
themselves.  In the same vein, the idea of a sudden “storm” expresses the supposedly 
natural and nascent nature of Muslim communal violence.57   
Another common image invoked in diplomatic sources is that of Muslim violence 
as an “outbreak” that needed to be controlled, or a “flare up” of a chronic affliction.58  
The implication, again, is a lack of agency and the idea that this violence was natural, 
pre-existing, and ahistorical.  This danger is also represented as “a demon… unleashed,” 
an ancient, supernatural force that threatens Iran’s emerging rational modernity.59  The 
imagery of a demon to be exorcised, or a disease to b contained, is identical to that used 
                                                      
57 USDS, Iraq, 1955-1959, Reel 15: 142. 
58 Ibid., Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 1: 168; Reel 2: 150. 
59 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 1 / 55, Stevens to FO, May 12, 1955. 
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in the clerical discourse, but it is here applied to the Muslim combatants rather than the 
Baha’i targets. 
A particularly interesting turn of imagery, related to this need for controlling the 
demon or disease, is the repeated call to “stem” Muslim violence, which suggests that the 
Muslim community is in need of a gardener to train it and shape its wild and savage 
natural inclinations into a more appealing aesthetic.60  This idea that violence is due to the 
lack of firm supervision—which caused reversion and“backsliding” into a wild state—is 
also implicit in the repeated calls for “firmness” and not showing “weakness” or 
“timidity” before fanaticism.  Without this firm control forcing Muslims to “act… 
civilized,” the documents suggest a natural state em rges, which is “savage” and 
“barbarous.”61   
The constant instructions to the Shah to not show fear and to instead confidently 
express authority is reminiscent of the instructions that one would hear while being 
instructed on how to treat a dog at obedience school.  Indeed, when Alam permitted 
Falsafi’s anti-Baha’i rhetoric, this is described in a British account as Alam having “let 
Falsafi have his lead [leash].”62  Another report notes that the Shah “never got the 
Mullahs back to heel again.”63  This animalistic, sub-human assessment of the ulama by 
the British and the Americans is also evident in the repeated claims that harsh discipline 
is the only thing that will be understood, the pooh-poohing of diplomacy as a waste of 
time, the idea that they should not “reward” the ulama for bad behavior, and the fear that, 
without strict discipline, the ulama will, naturally, revert to their wild and violent 
                                                      
60 Ibid. 
61 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 1: 294; Reel 3: 212. 
62 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 2 / 55, Margin notes, stamped received May 17, 1955. 
63 Ibid., FO 371 / 127075 / EP 1015 / 30, Notes on Meshed, June 1957,” June 27, 1957. 
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nature.64  As with pets, clerical misbehavior was described as a “show” they were putting 
on, or as a “game,” and humorous adjectives like “nonsense” were used to describe hate 
crimes as high jinks.65   
As a result of being given a loose “leash,” Falsafi is described as having acted 
according to his nature when he “let the Bahais have it hot and strong.”66  The 
homoerotic subtext of this imagery is not uncommon.  The male combatants are 
described as experiencing “outbursts,” episodes of “release” and sporadic “eruptions,” 
which were almost like ejaculations of hatred and desire that was built up beneath the 
surface.  Mobs are described as “aroused” and said to participate in a “religious orgy.”67  
The sexuality projected into the “Muslim” desire for violence can also be seen in its 
description as a burning “fire” and as a fevered desire that the government had “to damp 
down.”68   
There was, moreover, the claim that the violent episodes were manifestations of 
“medieval ways” and that, while the Westernized classes under the Shah were moving 
forward in time, the clerics were an anachronistic class pulling Iran backwards along the 
temporal axis, towards “medieval ways.”69  It was argued that “modern day nations do 
not permit… fanaticism,” the implication being that to permit this violence was to reject 
the historical moment and to be exiled to the “Oriental Middle Age,” which was a 
temporal state of mind independent of objective chronology, “a different world, centuries 
                                                      
64 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 40 / 55, Wright, “the Bahais,” July 13, 1955. 
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and civilizations apart,” which Iran had been “at last emerging from” prior to being 
returned to medievalism through “Muslim” violence against the Baha’is.70   
 
 
The Baha’i Discourse 
 
The “bloodthirsty” clergy 
Baha’is themselves often obscure the historicity of the violent episodes in which they are 
persecuted.  There is a long-established tendency to onflate any given incident of anti-
Baha’i violence with all previous instances of anti-Baha’i violence, and even with the 
earlier violence against members of the Babi faith, and to see this violence as natural, 
fated, and based on emotion and prejudice rather than rational thought or incident-
specific causes.  There is an almost Zoroastrian tendency in official Baha’i literature to 
see everything in binary terms, bifurcating groups into the forces or light and those of 
darkness, and trends and developments into processes of integration and disintegration.71  
The clergy are cast as the perpetual aggressors and the Baha’is as the perpetual tragic 
heroes experiencing constant tribulation.  It is history as ta’ziyeh, Karbala stretched over 
a century and a half of history.72 
In a Baha’i account of the previously treated Hormuzak massacre, attackers are 
said to have been “in a swarm” and acting “in an orgy of unrestrained fanaticism.”73  The 
term “orgy” is particularly telling, betraying the view that the anti-Baha’i forces were 
                                                      
70 Ibid., FO 371 / 127139 / EP 1781 / 3, Russell, “Moharram in Tehran”, September 7, 1957. 
71 Consider, for example, this exploration of the subject of “world-shaking crises”: “Such simultaneous 
processes of rise and fall, of integration and of disintegration, of order and chaos, with their continuous and 
reciprocal reactions on each other, are but aspects of a greater Plan, one and indivisible, whose Source is 
God.” Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, Letters from the Guardian to Australia and New Zealand (Australia: Bahá'í 
Publishing Trust, 1971), p. 123. 
72 A Ta’ziyeh is a type of passion play in which the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn at Karbala and the 
villainy of Yazid are annually recreated, in a manner designed to create intense sympathy and sorrow in the 
audience as they witness the tragic drama. 
73 William Sears, A Cry from the Heart: The Baha’is in Iran (Oxford: George Ronald, 1982), p. 42. 
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caught up in an ecstatic wave that they could not con rol.  All anti-Baha’i forces are seen 
in this light, as largely driven by the larger forces of destiny, largely indistinguishable and 
derived from the same mold.  “Hand of the Cause of G d” William Sears, for example, 
describes the persecution of Baha’is after the 1979 Revolution as just one part of the 
ulama’s “one-hundred-and-fifty-year-old goal” of genocide, and the completion of the 
“grand butchery” that began with the persecution of the Babi religion.74   
In the Baha’i view, the eternal religion of God (whic  includes every faith 
tradition around the world that came before it) moves in progressive cycles, with each 
new prophet-founder tasked with upending the status quo and reviving the moral 
teachings of the previous religious dispensations, while at the same time bringing new 
social laws relevant to the exigencies of the historical moment.  In this expanding spiral 
of civilizational growth, there are certain archetypal roles arrayed in support of and in 
opposition to each new prophet.  At the archetypal level, the persecutors of Moses, Jesus, 
and the Shi’ite Imams were all made from the same mold and played similar ontological 
functions, in the Baha’i schema.75  This cyclical understanding of time and religious 
persecution can perhaps be best relayed through Baha’u’llah’s own contextualization of 
the persecution that he faced: 
At one time Thou didst deliver Me into the hands of Nimrod; at another Thou hast 
allowed Pharaoh's rod to persecute Me…  Again Thou didst cast Me into the 
prison-cell of the ungodly… And again Thou didst decree that I be beheaded by 
the sword of the infidel. Again I was crucified for having unveiled to men's eyes 
the hidden gems of Thy glorious unity… How bitter the humiliations heaped upon 
Me, in a subsequent age, on the plain of Karbila! How lonely did I feel amidst 
Thy people! To what a state of helplessness I was reduced in that land! 
Unsatisfied with such indignities, My persecutors decapitated Me, and, carrying 
                                                      
74 Ibid., p. 98. 
75 For an introduction to this aspect of Baha’i thought, see Juan Cole, “I Am All the Prophets: The Poetics 
of Pluralism in Baha'i Texts,” Poetics Today, Vol. 14, no. 3 (Fall 1993): pp. 447-76. 
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aloft My head from land to land paraded it before th  gaze of the unbelieving 
multitude, and deposited it on the seats of the perverse and faithless. In a later age 
[that of the Bab], I was suspended, and My breast w made a target to the darts 
of the malicious cruelty of My foes. My limbs were riddled with bullets, and My 
body was torn asunder. Finally, behold how, in thisDay, My treacherous enemies 
have leagued themselves against Me, and are continually plotting to instill the 
venom of hate and malice into the souls of Thy servants. With all their might they 
are scheming to accomplish their purpose....76 
The opponents of the “forces of light” are de-historicized along these lines and are 
immediately plugged into these archetypal slots.  Although despised, in a sense, these 
enemies are also seen as almost necessary and fated, with their violence and the Baha’is’ 
willing martyrdom treated as proof of the new religion’s validity.  Likewise, the 
religion’s founders claimed that the new faith would grow through the ink of the pen and 
the blood of innocent martyrs, and would expand through alternating cycles of crisis and 
victory.  The tragedy of Iranian Baha’is’ suffering has been, and is presently, treated not 
only as an opportunity to promulgate the religion, but also as the source of spiritual forces 
that, if seized upon, could lead to successes for the eligion in other locations around the 
world.  Any local or political motivations that would particularize and historicize an 
episode of anti-Baha’i violence in Iran are rendere almost invisible when viewed 
through the lens of mainstream Baha’i historiography.77 
Even some Baha’i academics fall into this simplistic pattern.  Moojan Momen, for 
example, introduces the persecution of Baha’is in 1955 by claiming that Baha’is have 
been perennial victims in Iran and that, “Despite all the paraphernalia of modern 
civilization…the land of Iran had not risen from the moral and spiritual debasement 
portrayed in the pages of Nabil’s Narrative” [which chronicled the gleeful massacres of 
                                                      
76 Baha’u’llah, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1982), p. 
89. 




Babis a century before].78  A more recent example is Fereydun Vahman’s 160 Sal 
Mobarezeh ba A’in-e Baha’i (160 Years of Combating the Baha’i Faith).79   
There have, however, been some notable exceptions to the ahistorical drift in 
Baha’i studies.  Denis MacEoin was one of the earlist and most significant challengers 
to the practice of preferring martyrology to contextualized, independent historical 
studies.80  He claims, in A People Apart, that the Baha’is’ perennial “religious” 
justification for their persecution is primarily a superstructure to “conceal underlying 
economic and political motives,” and that “political motives, in particular, are plainly 
visible in several later anti-Baha’i outbreaks.”81  He wonders, as do I, why “there has so 
far been little real attempt by Western observers of the current Baha’i persecutions to 
pass beyond the obvious in their explanations of them.”82  He queries the portrayal of 
Baha’is as simply victims, and outlines the ways in which they actually did represent a 
legitimate economic and demographic threat to the ulama.83  He also deconstructs the 
ways in which both Orientalist writings on the persecution of Baha’is and the Orientalist 
tendencies of Baha’is themselves combined to further ali nate the Baha’i community 
from the Iranian nation.84  By separating the Babi and Baha’i religions, he is able to 
correctly situate the 1955 pogrom as an unprecedent development that marked the only 
truly national persecution of the Baha’i religion before the 1979 Revolution.85  
Unfortunately, MacEoin’s approach is atypical and, although it has inspired further 
                                                      
78 Momen, The Seven Martyrs of Hurmuzak, p.  vii. 
79 I discussed this work in Chapter III. 
80 In Debating Muslims, Michael Fischer has provided one of the most nuanced and useful ethnographic 
treatments of the persecution of Baha’is in Iran.  I am discussing historians in this section, however, so I 
have highlighted MacEoin’s pioneering work. 
81 MacEoin, A People Apart, p. 5.  
82 Ibid., p. 24. 
83 Ibid., pp. 3, 9. 
84 Ibid., pp. 18, 21, 24, 25. 
85 Ibid., p. 23. 
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studies in other areas of Baha’i Studies, martyrology is still the standard approach when it 
comes to the history of the Baha’is in Iran.86  A notable exception is the recent book on 
the Baha’is of Iran edited by Brookshaw and Fazel.87  
 
The Baha’i lobby 
It is understandable why the State Department would want to ensure stability in Iran and 
prevent the anticipated massacres of Baha’is at Moharram, but the level of intervention 
and concern went beyond mere concern for stability.  Secretary of State Dulles, for 
example, personally sent a telegram ordering intervention to allow Iranian Baha’is to 
celebrate their holy days, a relatively insignificant internal issue that did not impact 
American interests in the region and which would not be expected to prompt the 
involvement of the Secretary of State.88  Why get involved beyond restoring stability?  
The answer may lie in the success of the lobbying efforts of the international Baha’i 
community.   
The Iranian Baha’is’ plight was internationalized under the leadership of the 
religion’s international headquarters in Haifa, Israel (where its founder, Baha’u’llah, had 
                                                      
86 MacEoin’s academic exploration of Babi and Baha’i istory has been very poorly received by members 
of leading Baha’i institutions.  Administrative discomfort with the unfiltered analysis of MacEoin and 
others (including Juan Cole and Abbas Amanat) has spurred strong administrative pressure in the Baha’i 
community to avoid “materialistic” or “anthropological” approaches to the study of Baha’i history.  Asa 
result, when it comes to the history of the Baha’is in Iran, Baha’i explorations have generally remained 
within the bounds of martyrology and apologetics, or have concerned themselves with attempting to show 
Baha’i influence in Iran (as long as this influence relates to developments perceived as positive, and 
influence is discussed in terms of the outer society coming under the influence of the Baha’is, rather t an 
core elements of the Baha’i Faith being shaped by external influences).   
87 See Fazel and Brookshaw, The Baha'is of Iran.  It is worth noting that most of the more important 
chapters in this collection were written by authors who are not and never have been Baha’is, which can be 
seen as a positive development in that it shows that progress has been made in the integration of Baha’i 
history into Iranian Studies proper, and that Baha’i Studies has advanced a great deal since MacEoin’s 
observation that “myself excepted, there are no non-Baha'is writing seriously on the subject” (Denis 
MacEoin, “The Crisis in Babi and Baha'i Studies: Part of a Wider Crisis in Academic Freedom?” Bulletin 
(British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), 17:1 (1990), p 55.  
88 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 416. 
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died in exile as a political prisoner of the Ottoman Empire).  By 1955, the charisma of the 
religion’s founders had been routinized into a sophisticated administrative system headed 
by the great-grandson of the founder of the religion, Shoghi Effendi Rabbani (d. 1957). 89  
Although fluent in Persian, Shoghi Effendi had never actually been to Iran.  As a result, 
he did not have direct experience with the realities on the ground in Iran, and his 
perspective was sometimes colored by the Orientalist schemas that he became familiar 
with as a result of his Western education. 
When Shoghi Effendi heard of the pogrom, he was alone in Switzerland without 
any advisors.90  This was because, as mentioned previously, the Baa’is were caught 
completely off guard.  He responded to the pogrom im ediately, without being afforded 
the luxury of preparation and careful contemplation of the situation within Iran.  It is 
possible that he would have approached the situation differently if he had the ability to 
properly consult with the Iranian Baha’is and discover the political and economic 
underpinnings of the Ramadan campaign, the lack of interest in the campaign in much of 
Iran, and the likely inability of the ulama to actually follow through with their threats of a 
later massacre.  Threats of an imminent general massacre were largely stock elements in 
campaigns of this type, as seen in Ayatollah Kashani’s previously discussed extortion of 
the Jewish community, or similar threats made against the Baha’is in earlier decades.91  
These threats could not materialize unless the statitself was fully behind the call for 
genocidal acts, a scenario which never occurred during the Pahlavi period. 
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Shoghi Effendi had just approved the designs for a Baha’i House of Worship in 
Iran and the construction of this building was to have been a symbolic “claiming” of Iran 
as part of a larger, highly-ambitious, global missionary “Crusade,” aimed at further 
establishing the Baha’i Faith as a world religion.92  Shi’ite anger at this proposed project 
and the desire to stop this symbolic claiming of Iran through violence has already been 
touched upon in previous chapters.  The Temple plans h d to be abandoned (in favor of 
an African Temple and increased goals elsewhere) becaus  “just as the design for the 
Temple had been chosen and announced…the blow fell” and “a sudden violent storm of 
persecutions against the Persian Baha’is broke loose,” involving rape and “wanton 
murder,” while the government did nothing before “the frenzy of the mobs, who were not 
only unrestrained but actually encouraged.”93   
This violent campaign made the idea of symbolically claiming Iran impossible.  
Baha’is were instead urged to achieve “victories” for the “Crusade” elsewhere in the 
world to upset “the challenge flung down by its bitterest, most powerful and inveterate 
enemies… bloodthirsty ecclesiastical oppressors.”94  In response to the clerical challenge, 
Shoghi Effendi “struck back at the forces of darkness” and “hurled his spears left and 
right in…defense.”95  These “spears” were the lobbying efforts of the highly efficient 
administrative system that he had crafted over the previous decades, and the Baha’i 
connections at the United Nations (where they had been involved since its creation and 
actively involved as an official NGO since 1947).   
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Before treating the lobbying efforts themselves, it is worth noting that many of the 
Baha’i tropes, such as the natural “storm” or the vampiric imagery of the “bloodthirsty” 
clergy being loosed, like wild animals, are identical to those used in the British and 
American documents, and speak to a shared vocabulary and system of coding.  At the 
same time, the use of binary oppositions and ahistoricized, “inveterate” foes, provide 
potent examples of the Baha’i elision of historical p rticularity. 
Shoghi Effendi believed that the only way God would have allowed this crisis 
was if the ulama were being used as instruments to u her in an even greater victory than 
the one he had initially conceived, as part of a cosmic calculus balancing crisis and 
victory.  The pogrom was thus imagined as a “mighty blast of God’s trumpet” that would 
“awaken governments…in both the East and West, to the existence… of this Faith.”96  He 
immediately “rallied the Baha’i world, uniting it in one tremendous wave of protest,” 
with the result that “for the first time in the history of the Faith in Persia, prominent 
figures fully realized this was not a ‘local sect’ but a world-wide, tightly knit, 
independent religious community.”97  Persian Baha’is did not “stand alone” and this wa 
effectively demonstrated as the Iranian government was “bombarded by cables with 
names of cities and towns whose geographic whereabouts they were profoundly 
ignorant.”  This unprecedented lobbying effort aimed to “exert a restraining influence on 
the perpetrators of these monstrous acts.”98 
The biggest concern, however, was the possibility of a “wide-spread massacre” in 
Moharram that had “became very real” and was “openly promised” in the press and in 
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mass anti-Baha’i gatherings.99  Shortly after the beginning of the anti-Baha’i pogr m, the 
State Department was being pressed on this matter by at least one Senator and one 
Congressman, as well as by a flood of mail from across America.100  There were also 
several articles in the press, protest rallies in New York City, and delegations of 
concerned citizens meeting with the State Department.101  At a U.N. conference in 
Geneva, Baha’is showed up with lawyers and ever-growing piles of documents.102  It 
became clear very quickly that although the Baha’is generally avoided politics, this did 
not apply to matters of self-preservation; when pressed, they were a surprisingly effective 
lobbying group.   
 The content of the appeals made by American Baha’is is worth noting, as it 
confirms Denis MacEoin’s claim that the selective language and terminology of Baha’is 
themselves unwittingly lent weight to the ulama’s claim that they are “foreign.”  In the 
letters from American Baha’is, all of the exotic, Iranian elements of the Baha’i religion 
are deliberately ignored, and the appeal for help is made on Christian and patriotic 
grounds. 
 An August 19 letter from Horace Holley (writing for the National Spiritual 
Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States) portrays the suffering of the Baha’is in Iran 
as “one of the most impressive examples of spiritual heroism in the annals of religion – 
only paralleled by the sufferings of early Christians themselves.”103  He further stages the 
attacks on these Christian analogues as “sheer fanaticism constituting an outrage against 
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the modern mind.”104  By rejecting the modernity of the attackers and li king the victims 
to the origin myths of Christianity, Holley is asking Eisenhower to intervene in order to 
block a cyclic repetition of the horrors of the past, to guard progress from a resurgent, 
primeval terror. 
In addition to framing the Iranian Baha’is as religious cognates, they are also 
staged as pseudo-American through the flattering and overtly patriotic nature of some of 
the appeals.  Dorothy Shottis, for example, shares in her letter to the President that “I 
have always prayed for you and your dear family,” and “I shall continue [this so] that 
divine guidance and strength will bring relief from such atrocities through you—whom 
the entire world loves, respects, admires.”105  Fred Morgan’s appeal escalates the patriotic 
appeal by bringing up the Second World War, alluding to the Holocaust and how it may 
happen again in Iran, and concluding with a pointed challenge to Eisenhower’s 
masculinity.  He begins by identifying himself as a veteran of World War II, and warns 
the President that, “Baha’is are being taken away to a special building and no one knows 
the fate of those taken away.”106  He challenges Eisenhower by saying, “If you are the 
man I felt you were when you signed my promotion order in World War II, you will 
promptly give this matter your whole-hearted attention, and…your vigorous 
action…these actions in Iran are not the sort of thing we in the United States wish to see 
perpetuated upon the members of any faith.”107  He returns to the gendered aspect to his 
challenge by saying, “I trust that… as a man you will feel the same way.”108   
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In the lobbying efforts on behalf of persecuted Assyrians a decade before, 
petitioners made ethnicity-based appeals as Assyrian-Americans or ecumenical appeals, 
as American Christians writing on behalf of a foreign congregation.109  The Baha’i 
writers, however, were appealing both as members of the victimized group as well as 
invoking their unmarked, all-American identities and employing the term “we” in such a 
way that it was extended to include both Eisenhower and the Iranian Baha’is, bridging 
the two disparate identities.   
In Vinson and Barbara Brown’s letter to the White House, for example, they 
highlighted their unmarked, All-American identity, collapsing what was happening in 
Iran into their Rockwellian 1950s existence and making the danger on the other side of 
the world seem like a threat to the heartland.  They describe their little ranch in California 
and tell the President that, “from your interest in ra ching, it is probably the kind of life 
you would like to lead,” full of peace and quiet, with nothing but “crickets and tree 
frogs.”  They say that their life is a “kind of paradise” where “war and strife and hatred 
and prejudice seem far away.”  However, “today the hand of religious prejudice and 
hatred has reached across the sea and into our home.”  That is to say the attacks on 
Baha’is in Iran are portrayed as an attack striking into the American heartland.  The 
Browns identify themselves as Baha’is and say they enjoy the religious freedom of their 
beloved American homeland, but across the world their co-religionists are tortured and 
persecuting for being part of a religion that “only preaches love and understanding 
between men, obedience to local governments, and oneness under the God of all 
religions.”  They also explain the 1955 pogrom by refe ring to the Iranian Baha’is as 
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Christian analogues, saying, “It is like the Sevente h Century when Protestant 
Christians were tortured because of their faith.”110   
  In addition to the letters to the State Department, Congress, and the White House, 
there were also many telegrams, especially to President Eisenhower, and the pace of 
these transmissions was renewed after the atrocities in Hormuzak.  Most of these 
telegrams were similar in structure and resembled th  following example from “the 
Baha’i Group of Vermont,” dated August 25, 1955: 
With burning indignation protest latest atrocity in Iran martyrdom of seven 
innocent members Baha’i community easily provable to be most law abiding 
loyal citizens of nation urgently ask United States government take initiative 
intervene in situation unbearable to conscience of civilized world and creating 
instability in critical area endangering the peace of the whole world.111 
 Some, however, were more heated, such as this August 12 telegram from 
Attleboro Baha’is:   
Pray use your influence for protection of Baha’is of Iran from further massacres 
and atrocities by satanic Moslems we look up to you as the instrument of peace on 
this earth.112 
  This is, perhaps, the most extreme example of the de-contextualization of Iranian 
Baha’is, as they are so absorbed into the “we” of the American converts to this Iranian 
religion that the appeal to help their co-religionists is framed in a way that Christianized 
the tragedy to the point that Islam is demonized as “s tanic,” despite the fact that the 
Baha’i Faith rejects the positive existence of Satan nd devils and, more importantly, is 
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itself derived from Islam, affirms the truth of Islam, and draws much of its content from 
Islam.   
As a point of comparison, it is worth noting that the number of telegrams that 
Eisenhower received in connection with the Baha’i pogrom was more than three times 
greater than the telegrams received in connection wth the murder of Emmett Till.  Till 
was a fourteen-year-old African-American boy whose lynching in rural Mississippi in 
1955 (after supposedly whistling at a white woman) was one of the events that sparked 
the American Civil Rights Movement.  Till’s murder l d to several hundred telegrams, 
while there are well over a thousand telegrams to the President alone about the pogrom 
against the obscure Baha’i minority on the other side of the world, such was the intensity 
of the Baha’i lobby.113   
 Despite the State Department’s awareness of what was happening in Iran and its 
obvious concern and deep involvement in addressing the Baha’i pogrom—it received 
“almost daily attention” in the Department—there was a conscious attempt to downplay, 
outside of the Department, the instability in Iran and the extent of what had happened 
there.  Apparently, this was done out of a desire to prevent public or congressional 
concern that American faith in the Shah, and his CIA-assisted reinstatement, had been a 
mistake.  In the response to a query by Senator Herbert Lehman, for example, the calls 
for the eradication of the Baha’is on state radio was sanitized by the State Department, 
who merely spoke of the sect being “criticized” in some “sermons” that led to a few 
“demonstrations” before the Iranian government ended it.114  No mention is made of the 
government’s role as anything but the restorer of order.  The same letter offered a 
                                                      
113 I did not count individual telegrams.  This is a rough estimate based on a comparison of the height of t e 
stacks of telegrams related to the two tragedies. 
114 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 315. 
258 
 
legalistic rejection of accusations against the Iranian government, claiming that it was 
untrue that the Baha’is were “illegal,” but instead they merely had “no status under the 
law” and that they were not prohibited, but it was ju t that their continued right to exist 
was not recognized.115  In explaining the campaign, there was no mention of its political 
and economic aspects, or the initial participation of the Shah.  Instead, everything was 
blamed on the fanaticism of Muslims, who rode a “wave of emotional feeling which 
stimulated this brief but unfortunate episode.”116   
The content of the response to Senator Lehman elicited an angry response by Julie 
Chanler of the Baha’i-inspired Caravan of East and West, which angrily denounced this 
“untrue” response as a “glossing over of the facts.”  This rebuttal strongly took issue with 
the State Department’s attempt to pin blame on Oriental passion instead of 
acknowledging to the senator that the pogrom had occurred on the “order of the 
government.”  Her rebuttal called for immediate action on the rationale that the anti-
Baha’i pogrom was the result of fascism taking root in Iran, under a new name and an 
Islamic cover, and that this must be combated quickly as “fascism rides swiftly.”117 
Chanler, although ostracized from the Baha’i community for over a dozen years 
by this point (for reasons that are complicated and irrelevant), was one of the most active 
defenders of Iranian Baha’is, constantly lobbying Congress and the United Nations.  She 
chided the State Department for the “gentle handling” of Iran that had “brought the 
minimum of results.”  She was able to talk her way into meeting Mr. Hanna, the head of 
the Iran division, and urged him to “stir the State D partment to a more bold and definite 
attitude in this matter,” so that it would “bring its mighty influence to bear on Iran.”  She 
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deftly highlighted Iran’s new status as an American lient, and the damage that a rogue 
client posed to its sponsor. “Shouldering our respon ibility in ‘America-backed Iran’ 
would greatly heighten our credit at home and abroad,” she maintained, while “ensuring 
Mr. Nixon a pleasant weekend in Tehran,” and acting cautiously out of concern for 
Islamic countries, “amount to less than nothing.”118  
In a June 9 letter by to the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, she strongly 
lobbies on behalf of Iran’s “one million” Baha’is, pointing out that, despite signing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Shah now allows “one of the crudest and 
most dangerous violations of religious freedom in modern times.” The post-War ideals of 
freedom were now imperiled by the Shah’s “arrogant challenge” to the spirit of the 
United Nations.119  She goes on to list in detail each and every international law violated 
by the pogrom and, like a pioneer for Bush-era politics, challenges the United Nations to 
take action against this Islamic fascism or prove its lf irrelevant.   
The communications from the Baha’i International Community to the United 
Nations made more moderate appeals, claiming that Iran was in “flagrant violation” of 
the human rights agreements that it had signed.120  In an effort to prevent the 
embarrassment that would result from a successful Baha’i appeal at the United Nations, 
the Department of State tried to persuade the American Baha’i leadership that the Iranian 
government was already doing a great deal and that there was no need to actually go to 
the United Nations and that they should instead consider leaking their intention to certain 
officials in Iran, who were slow to protect the Baha’is, and that this threat would have the 
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same result as the actual appeal, and avoid unnecessary blowback.  The Baha’is rejected 
this suggestion, since it “might diminish the publicity value of the UN appeal.”121   
 In August, as Moharram drew closer, there was an “intensified campaign to focus 
world attention on Iranian persecution.”  Telegrams and other communications increased 
to the point that the president received more than 200 telegrams on this matter over a 
three day period.  On the global stage, other natiol communities were engaged in 
similar efforts with their respective governments, and the Baha’is also made their case in 
Geneva, to the United Nations.  In private communications, Entezam claimed that a 
Baha’i victory at the United Nations would actually be beneficial for the Cabinet as it 
“would provide a welcome lever against extremists.”122   
 In this atmosphere of tension as Moharram approached, Dulles wrote to the 
Tehran Embassy and stressed that the Shah should be warn d yet again about the dangers 
of anti-Baha’i action during Moharram, and that he be briefed on the “increased public 
pressure in the US” over the condition of Iranian Baha’is.  The embassy was also to 
discuss the appeal at the United Nations and “emphasize the dangers this holds for Iran’s 
foreign reputation” and that, because of the worldwide distribution of the photographs 
showing Bakhtiar and Batmanghelich destroying the dome of the National Baha’i Center, 
there was global awareness of the government’s participation in the pogrom and, as such, 
if any additional events were to occur, it “might se in motion even more serious world 
reactions.”123 
In Geneva, the Baha’i delegation met with all non-Communist and non-Arab 
countries and also attempted to see the Secretary-General.  There was the sense that time 
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was running out as the “promised massacre drew steadily closer.”124  They retained legal 
representation, quickly amassed evidence of the pogrom, and made presentations to 
sympathetic delegates, NGOs, and others.  Ultimately, however, the delegation believed 
that they were not going to be successful.  These sntiments persisted until the American 
delegation and the High Commissioner for Refugees dscended at the last minute—as a 
deus ex machina—backed the Baha’is, and were able to arrange for the Secretary General 
to have the High Commission for Refugees meet, on the Baha’is’ behalf, with the head of 
the Iranian delegation and his brother, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The Entezam 
brothers were shocked, since “Their government had been certain that the UN would not 
intervene to save the Baha’is… [and] the intervention of the Secretary-General astounded 
the Iranian government.”  The combination of American and international support was 
said to have “brought an immediate end to the physical persecution and lifted the danger 
of massacre.”125  Still, Baha’is who were fired were not rehired, the government retained 
possession of all major Baha’i properties, and Baha’is were forbidden from having 
gatherings.  These lingering effects caused the Baha’i lobby, buoyed by its success at the 
United Nations and with the State Department, to continue to press for a complete return 
to the status quo. 
 
The Governmental Response 
 
Managing the press 
The Iranian press was controlled by the government as well as by powerful individuals. 
On one occasion, for example, Ebtehaj (the head of the Plan Organization) forced a 
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reporter to retract a story that he disliked.  When asked why he complied with this 
request, the reporter explained that “He is powerful…What couldn’t he do to me!”126 
During the anti-Baha’i agitations, the foreign press was also censored and threatened, and 
diplomatic pressure was even applied in an attempt to have foreign powers discipline 
their reporters in Iran.   
Before the coup, Iran had been considered a “good news town” due to the high 
drama, and there were over sixty foreign correspondents in Tehran.  After the return of 
the Shah there was still some interest in General Zahedi and the oil agreement.  After 
1954, however, Iran entered a state of relative calm and it was felt that there was no 
compelling reason to maintain a media presence in Iran.  As a result, “by the spring of 
1955, there were no American reporters in Iran.”127  Reuters and Agence France Presse, 
however, had one reporter each, but neither submitted frequent reports.  Other agencies 
maintained local “ringers.”   
During the 1955 pogrom, the Reuters agent (Buist) posted a rather short and 
straightforward report.  As a result, he was summoned to see Minister of the Interior 
Alam and Parviz Adl, the acting director of the Press and Information Department.  Both 
men questioned him about why he would cover the story, particularly the government’s 
participation in the destruction of the dome of the Baha’i headquarters in Tehran.  The 
two men, speaking in a “meanly-mouthed way,” tried to bring “as much pressure as they 
dare exert” on a well-connected British citizen.128  Faced with pressure to censor 
himself—both by the Iranian authorities and elements i  his own embassy—Buist 
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consistently refused to back down, insisting that he was not willing to censor a story “off 
his own bat.”129  
Alam was especially incensed at Buist after the BBC broadcasts into Iran relayed, 
in Persian, information originally submitted in Buist’s Reuters reports, circumventing 
internal censorship.  He raised the issue with Adl and was assured that the BBC had since 
“amended” their coverage.  But, according to Fearnley’s embassy report, “This is sheer 
daydreaming on Dr. Adl’s part.  I made it quite clear to him that we will convey his 
requests to the BBC but that there was no guarantee of th  BBC agreeing to it—as in fact 
they didn’t.”130   
According to Adl, the objectionable material in the broadcasts also included the 
claim that “disorder reigned” in Iran and that it was in a “very serious economic 
crisis.”131  He believed the BBC had “attacked” Iran by transmitting Persian reports, 
“criticizing social conditions and religious intolerance in Persia.”132  In Adl’s view, the 
BBC was just another word for the British government a d he interpreted their reporting 
as an indirect attack by the British government against the Iranian government, over their 
own airwaves.   
Ambassador Stevens was somewhat sympathetic to this point and, although he 
expressed understanding of the BBC’s refusal to retract he story, and the Foreign 
Office’s disinclination to intervene with the news agency, he nevertheless asked the 
Foreign Office if it is “really sound policy” to broadcast in Persian to a general Iranian 
audience “news or comment on Persian internal affairs of a kind which may offend 
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Persian susceptibility or lead to undesirable interpr tations of the British (including, as 
they see it, Her Majesty’s Government’s) attitude.”  It was, in his view, hopeless to try to 
try to convince the Iranians that the BBC did not directly reflect the view of the 
government and complaints like this would continually resurface, “particularly with a 
Government as jittery as the present one.”133  Although the BBC Persian service was 
trying to be “comprehensive and objective,” from the embassy’s view  there are “clearly 
occasions when we should prefer the picture not to be too comprehensive or objective as, 
for example, when a friendly Persian Government are trying to play down an 
embarrassing affair.”  In such a case:  
reference to local riots, or economic crises, or social backwardness or religious 
intolerance, however carefully worded and even if attributed to non-BBC sources, 
are not calculated to help, at any rate with the Government of the day and their 
supporters.  We have already seen a malicious article in one paper about the BBC 
Baha’i report.134   
Stevens felt that the “Persian Government is rattled and thoroughly embarrassed 
by the Baha’i question…and are doing their best to play it down.”  He hoped that the  
BBC can be persuaded to broadcast a denial and to eschew this sort of news in 
future in their Persian language broadcasts.  If outright denial is too unpalatable to 
BBC, denial attributed to ‘competent Persian authori ies’ (but not the Persian 
Government) would be better than nothing.”135   
In London’s response to Stevens, they acknowledge the hegemonic nature of the 
belief that the government controls the BBC, but make it clear that they “do not wish to 
foster that belief by conveying any impression thatprotests to H.M. missions will bring 
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governmental influence to bear” and as such “The BBC cannot be asked to bring itself 
into disrepute by denying, apparently spontaneously, the truth of this report.”136 
Coercion was less subtle with Iranian reporters.  Parviz Medi, an Iranian 
employed by the Associated Press, was summoned to General Bakhtiar where he was 
abused for the length of his coverage of the pogrom (2000 words) and was threatened and 
scared into silence, his photographs of the pogrom c nfiscated.  The local reporter for 
Time magazine, however, was not summoned, since his report, though longer (7000 
words), did not include any comments or analysis and did not discuss the government’s 
culpability.  As for reporters and editors from thelocal press, they only wrote what was 
acceptable to the government.  As one local reporter explained it,   “The Government 
kicked them out [i.e. foreign reporters in previous years]; it would kick us ‘in.’”137 
The biggest test of this attempt to control the press came with the June 27 anti-
Baha’i riot in Shiraz, during which security forces shot into an anti-Baha’i mob in order 
to protect a Baha’i holy site under their control.138  British archival sources confirm that, 
within hours of the incident, informed sources in Tehran were aware that there had been 
mob violence in Shiraz over the Baha’i issue and that ere were at least three deaths and 
fifty total casualties, resulting in the imposition f a curfew and martial law and an 
emergency meeting of the cabinet.  The initial information was, however, vague about the 
two parties in the clash, which camp the victims came from, and the circumstances in 
which the clash occurred.139 
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That night, General Bakhtiar’s office “immediately phoned correspondents and 
made it clear that they were to file nothing but the official communiqué” in relation to the 
Shiraz episode.  All local and foreign reporters complied with the press blackout except 
for Buist, who sent a short report about chaos in Shiraz, although he did not know the 
specifics of what had occurred and did not know of or mention the massacre.  Buist 
bravely chose to send the story despite threats from Bakhtiar’s assistant and a call from 
Dr. Adl begging him not to disseminate the story “for Persia’s sake” since it “would do 
so much harm.”140   
Although Buist apparently sent his telegram, it is po sible that it did not make it to 
the home office, or only did so in potted form.  AnIranian working on behalf of the 
Associated Press and the Daily Mail also believed that he filed a telegram to the home 
office on the day of the Shiraz incident, only to have it handed back to him later that 
night by a policeman who said “you won’t be sending this will you?”  The following 
morning all Iranians employed by foreign newspapers were “sent for” by General 
Bakhtiar and explicitly forbidden from reporting onthe actual events in Shiraz.  A 
“special warning” was given to Mozandi of the Daily Express who had gotten in trouble 
with the press controllers in the past.  The local press was similarly warned.  The only 
permitted coverage—based on two official communiqués—made vague mention of 
rioting and said that martial law had been imposed, or er restored, and the (unnamed) 
responsible parties punished.  In these official versions there “was no mention of the 
Baha’is.”141  Everyone complied with Bakhtiar’s demands. 
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Despite the threats against him, Buist was protected by the British and did not 
suffer for his actions.  He immediately informed the British embassy of the situation, and 
it was decided that he “should be supported if there is any trouble.”142  The situation 
remained tense between the government and the press until the security situation was 
stabilized in summer and the government promised th return of good relations “provided 
you reporters behave.”143  Burrows, of the British Embassy, was quite annoyed by the 
treatment of Buist and met with Hamzavi, the Shah’s consultant on media matters, to 
express his anxiety “at the way this Bahai business is being handled, as regards the 
foreign press.”  Although internal censorship and discipline did not concern him, he 
warned that “muzzling of foreign correspondents” was unacceptable.  He also took issue 
with Hamzavi over his government’s “attempts to delu  foreign opinion by such letters 
as that to the “Times” from the Second Secretary of the Persian Embassy,” which he 
warned would likely “cause unfavourable reactions in informed and free countries.”144    
 In this June 17 letter to The Times, Sanandaji (of the Persian Embassy in London) 
attempted to respond to the negative press concerning the anti-Baha’i pogrom.  In the 
letter, it is claimed that there is complete freedom of religion in Iran, but that this was not 
relevant to the Baha’is as they are “a political sect” and no government on earth would 
allow freedom of religion to be used as an excuse wh reby “under the guise of so-called 
religion” such a group could “carry out deeds of dissension and violence inspired by its 
leaders from without.”  The letter also makes the claim that there were no more than two 
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144 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 34 / 55, Burrows to FO, June 29, 1955. 
268 
 
thousand Baha’is in all of Iran and that “it is completely untrue that the Baha’i and their 
homes have been attacked.”145  
Burrows was so annoyed by this letter that he felt tha the British should not “let 
these lies go by without comment” since “The Persians re very lucky not to have stirred 
up a hornet’s nest by these tactics.”146   Denis Wright agreed with Burrows, and felt that 
it was bad for “mutual confidence” if the Iranian government’s representatives in London 
were “encouraged officially to foist lies on the British public.”147  In his opinion, “This 
will no doubt be torn to pieces by correspondents who know the facts… they will have 
done less damage to their reputation by keeping silent.”148  The absurdity of the “two 
thousand” claim particularly annoyed Wright, who pointed out that even J.R. Richards 
1932 polemic placed the number of Baha’is at thirty thousand, while one hundred 
thousand was the low-end of conservative estimates in more objective studies, like the 
NID handbook from 1945, and the contemporary figure was undoubtedly higher, in the 
six figures.149 
In his reply to the Sanandaji letter, also published in the Times, John Ferraby 
(writing on behalf of the National Spiritual Assembly of the British Isles) gives what the 
British embassy saw as a “sober reply” that “seems fairly factual.”150  Ferraby points out 
that the Baha’i religion is not political and that, in reality, political involvement by any 
Baha’i leads to his or her expulsion.  Furthermore, th  religion is completely peaceful, 
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even when attacked, and this is established by its “record” of twenty thousand martyrs.151  
Regarding the issue of Baha’i numbers, Ferraby claims that the figure of the Persian 
embassy in London (two thousand) and those of the “en mies of the faith in Persia” 
(Falsafi’s claim of one million) are both incorrect, while the truth lay between the two, 
and “hundreds of thousands have registered themselves there, apart from the many who 
have not registered.”152  
In reply to Burrows concerns about the Persian embassy’s letter, especially the 
claim of its author (Sanandaji) that he wrote the letter because he was instructed by his 
government, Hamzavi maintained that Sanandaji was acting on his own.153  
Disassociating himself, Hamzavi “expressed dismay” and assured Burrows that “very 
drastic action” was being taken to avoid a repeat of “this kind of thing.”154  Wright never 
accepted these denials, however, and believed that Hamzavi was “one of the nastier 
pieces of work” that he had met, and that he was “playing a singularly unpleasant game,” 
trying to discredit Sanandaji to protect himself.155  Hamzavi was known to be very 
ambitious and unsatisfied in his position.  To furthe  himself, he tried to have Alam 
removed, jockeyed to be named the Minister of Court, and was known to have spread 
                                                      
151 This number of 20,000 martyrs was originally mentio ed in European accounts but was later repeated 
by early Baha’i leaders (Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi).  Neither figure claimed to be inerrant in 
historical matters, but this number was nevertheless accepted as an unchallengeable fact by many 
adherents.  Later scholarship, however, has establihed that “only” several thousand were killed (if one 
were to include the widows and dependents of those killed, this may approach 20,000).  The scope of these 
Babi massacres is important to Baha’is because, as Amanat points out, “it was a founding tragedy that w s 
permanently etched into Baha’i collective memory and which defined the religion’s identity formation” 
(Amanat, “Historical Roots,” p. 170). 
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155 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 51 / 55, Wright to FO, September 15, 1955. 
270 
 
many “whopping lies.”156  Given his intrigues, it was felt likely that “Hamzavi himself 
was probably personally responsible.”157  
The issue persisted and, as late as October, when Wright met with the Prime 
Minister, he again brought up Sanandaji’s “famous Baha’i letter” and the embassy’s 
impression that, given their dealings with Sanandaji, it was obvious that “he had clearly 
written the letter under instructions” despite the Prime Minister’s assurance that he “acted 
on his own bat.”  As Wright began to untangle the matter, he suspected that general 
instructions came from Tehran but the actual framing of the letter came from Sanandaji 
although “It is difficult to know where the truth lies.”158   
Sanandaji, for his part, attempted to defend himself by showing Wright 
documents proving that he had been “bombarded with instructions” from Iran to say what 
he said.159  Sanandaji was believed to be sincere when he said th t he would have never 
made the ridiculous statements in the letter if he was not compelled to do so.  He claimed 
that, “as a Kurd and a Sunni,” he “was a firm believer in toleration for all minorities.” As 
absurd as the letter to The Times was, it “was nothing compared with what he had been 
told to say.”160 
 The Shah’s government had little concern for negative coverage of the anti-Baha’i 
pogrom in the American press, but was anxiously concerned about the “campaign” that 
the British press was conducting against them over the Baha’i issue.  Most seemed to 
believe that the British government controlled their nation’s press and that in some way 
the press was expressing the opinion of the British government, since some prominent 
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news agencies like the BBC received state funds.  There was also a somewhat less 
widespread belief that the American press reflected th  opinion of Washington, but there 
was less concern about what it had to say, perhaps because it was more remote, was not 
consumed in Iran the way that the British press was, and lacked the prestige of the Times 
or the BBC.   
 
Blaming the British: a “common Iranian psychosis” 
The most common interpretation of the anti-Baha’i pogrom, actively encouraged by the 
Iranian government, was that the pogrom was a British plot to use the clergy to attack the 
Baha’is as a proxy strike against the Americans, in order to scare them away from 
investing in Iran.  The ghost of the Imbrie Affair,161 which was interpreted as a similar 
British ploy, was frequently invoked to support this theory, as was the contemporary 
awareness that the British had traditionally worked through the ulama nd that they have 
traditionally been unwilling to share Iran.   
Declassified British and American documents make it clear that the British were 
not behind the pogrom and that the rumors that they were did not originate with either 
Power.  According to Entezam, these rumors of British authorship “bore all the marks of 
being spread deliberately; perhaps by some of our alleged friends who were 
disgruntled.”162  When asked more about the source of the rumors that the British were 
behind the campaign, Entezam speculated that the ulama themselves started the rumor in 
order to use it as a shield and exploit the governmnt’s confusion and hesitancy to act 
against British interests.   
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It seems, however, that the Iranian government itself was the chief proponent of 
the view that the anti-Baha’i pogrom was a British plot, via the ulama.  This British 
explanation was promoted in the official and semi-official press and was deliberately fed 
to foreign diplomats and informants through minister , governors, generals, and others in 
the state apparatus.  It is not entirely clear when t is strategy was adopted, how far up this 
policy originated, what exactly it hoped to achieve, or if it was done consciously or out of 
habit.  The Iranian governments’ habit of blaming the British when things went wrong 
was (and indeed still is) almost a political reflex during the modern period.  Certainly, the 
British were directly responsible for many of Iran’s problems, but blaming them when 
they were actually not involved was (and is) a mark of a desperate regime trying to save 
face by scapegoating the one group more despised than the Baha’is.   
Blaming the “mortal struggle” between the British and the Americans for the 
pogrom allowed the government to evade culpability while simultaneously allowing it to 
avoid publicly blaming the ulama directly.  The British explanation also had the benefit 
of pushing the Americans and the British into a rivlry that could be exploited, and of 
confusing the general public enough to allow the government the wiggle room needed to 
abandon the pogrom, on nationalist grounds, without appearing to be sympathetic 
towards the Baha’is.   
The stories of British authorship led to reports of a “conflict of emotions” among 
the masses, who were theoretically supportive of attacking the Baha’is, but at the same 
time were wary of being used, yet again, by the British.163  Both American and British 
sources report that whenever they told Iranians that the rumors were false, and that 
America and Britain were actually on the same page re arding Iran and had no intentions 
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of starting a new “Great Game” over it, this was “received with polite skepticism” and 
the Iranian would “smile incredulously at them and think they are naïve.”164 
 According to American consular reports in Mashhad, sources began feeding 
them the theory that Falsafi was paid to attack the Baha’is by the British in order to attack 
“American influence in Iran.”165  The promotion of the British angle seems to have be n 
government-originated, and it was picked up by the military and the press and repeated 
until it stuck.  Governor Masudi, for example, tried to convince the Americans that the 
anti-Baha’i “commotion” was the first “open evidence” of American-British rivalry since 
Britain’s return to Iran after the coup.166  Official support for the British theory can also 
be seen, for example, in the May 19 and 20 editions of Aftab-e Sharq, which repeat the 
accusations against the British.  This paper was owned by a recent Director of Press and 
Propaganda and known to express the government’s point of view.167   
 The Aftab-e Sharq articles begin with stock denunciations of the Baha’is as a 
“misguided sect.”  They are then described as “like Tudeh,” i.e. a political group and one 
that was not merely a heresy within Shi’ism, but rather a political heresy that caused 
offense to the nation and to all Iranians.  The camp ign is then framed as a British 
“economic” plot to regain their oil monopoly and it is claimed that opposing the external 
Other—the British—is more important than giving in to the desire to attack the internal 
Other—the Baha’is—since this would only further theBritish agenda and their hold on 
Iran.  In the author’s view: 
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We feel it necessary to emphasize that the Sect is a misguided one which, like the 
Tudeh Party, has led the people astray and hindered the evelopment of this 
country.  We feel that Bahaism should be resolutely r jected by all Iranians… 
[But] the British Government has for years, even ceturies, carried out a policy of 
ensuring that Iran remains weak and her people reduced to misery.  It has always 
maneuvered to prevent any other power from gaining influence in this country… 
Since the 28th of Mordad, 1953 [i.e. the coup], the British have had to pretend to 
cooperate with the United States in order to get back into Iran.168 
The British were said to have initiated the “dangerous game” of anti-Baha’i 
violence because they were desperate to maintain their oil monopoly and limit further 
American influence, as part of their plan to do “everything possible to keep Iran weak 
and undeveloped.”169  To achieve these ends, they were willing to use their concealed 
“trump cards,” which they saved until the final stages of the game, and “One of these 
trumps is the Baha’i controversy.”170 As part of their sinister plan, they craftily chose 
Ramadan as the scene and “poisoned the devout mind of Mullah Falsafi and saw to it that 
he spoke out against the Baha’is.”171  If Falsafi was sincere in his beliefs, then they were 
manipulated by the British for their own good to ensure that they “suddenly erupted” at a 
politically opportune moment.172   
The articles further discuss how this supposed British ntrigue placed the 
government in the unenviable position of having to undo this foreign meddling without 
giving the false impression that it was taking the side of the Baha’is.  According to the 
author, he was with Falsafi when he received a phone call warning him that “foreign 
elements” were behind the campaign and that he would be held personally accountable 
for any further violence that he might incite.  The article then quotes foreign press 
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accounts to make the case that the anti-Baha’i campaign was discouraging further 
American investment in Iran. “It is evident from this item,” the article claims, “that the 
religious aspect of this crisis is secondary to the economic one.”173 It concludes with the 
warning that next the British will try the same move with other minorities such as the 
Jews, but that security chief General Bakhtiar was actively at work preventing this.174  
Falsafi claimed that the Iranian government was manipulated by the British 
through their Baha’i agents, and that this was why a pogrom against the Baha’is was 
necessary.  In this semi-official article, however, the government makes the counter-
claim that Falsafi and the clergy are the ones dupe and manipulated by the British, and 
that is why the pogrom should be stopped.  In both scenarios the puppet master is the 
same, with the arguments differing primarily over whose strings were being pulled.  Both 
arguments are patriotic and appeal to nationalism and xenophobia, but these forces were 
oriented differently in each case.  The government’s i tent seems to have been to cause 
confusion and doubt among patriotic Iranians in the hope that, not knowing whether they 
were assisting the British or not, most would choose inaction and enthusiasm for the issue 
would fade. 
In Isfahan, for example, it was widely felt that the pogrom was not really religious 
in origin but, rather, that the “Hidden Hand” of the British was the true architect of the 
violence, to scare away America and reclaim their position as the preeminent Power in 
Iran.  According to the American consulate in Isfahan, it was commonly believed that 
the U.S. is the natural supporter of the Baha’is since a minority of this faith exists 
in America; therefore, the British are said to feel that an Iranian attack on the 
Baha’is is indirectly but unmistakably an attack on the Americans, which will 
                                                      




diminish American influence and pave the way for a fi mer British hold on 
Iran.175 
American observers had difficulty understanding what t ey saw as the “common 
Iranian psychosis concerning the British ‘Hidden Hand.’”  Mahmud Rais, the head of 
Bank Melli, attempted to explain the Iranian attitude to the Mashhad consulate.  He said 
that, unlike the Russians, the British ruled by playing religious and ethnic groups off of 
each other and conflict and contention was their bread and butter.  According to Rais, one 
could not understand the effects of this and the “icy contempt” that the British had for 
native peoples unless one was Iranian or from a British colony.  “The Russians may have 
been just as treacherous as the British,” he claimed, “but they never managed to humiliate 
the Iranians in quite the same way… being a proud people, we Iranians resent their 
attitude deeply.”  It was felt that, “As a people whose national pride amounts at times to 
arrogance, the Iranians have been made to feel ashamed of themselves by the English, 
whose sense of superiority amounts sometimes to contempt.”176  According to Rais, since 
the return of the British after the coup, they were mploying the “same old mullahs” and, 
in his view, the stirring up of anti-Baha’ism was just part of this larger process of 
regaining what was lost because of Mosaddeq (i.e. an oil monopoly and unrivaled 
influence).   
In Mashhad, Governor-General Ram shared a similar inte pretation of events, 
saying that the British have “always worked through the Shia clergy” and that they had 
“reopened their channels with the mullas as soon as they returned to Iran.”  Ram spoke of 
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the anti-Baha’i campaign as a British plot and claimed that “everybody” knew that many 
of the top ayatollahs were on the British payroll, such as Ayatollah Kafai.177   
The popular distrust of the concordance between the major Western Powers vis-à-
vis Iran was perhaps best exemplified by General Vaseqi’s August speech, promoted by 
the director of Press and Propaganda, in which he highlighted that “two foreign 
powers…with bloody hands” had “always sought to keep Iran impoverished” and had 
fought each other to do this, only collaborating to “cut up the corpse.”178 
 By promoting the idea that the anti-Baha’i pogrom created by the Shah and 
Borujerdi was actually a British plot, the government was able to frame its rejection of 
the pogrom in nationalist terms, as a rejection of British interference in internal affairs.  
This framing of the issue also had the added benefit of discouraging an American 
withdrawal of faith and investment, as this would be framed as a sign of weakness and 
concession vis-à-vis the British. 
 
Conclusion 
The anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955 is a multivalent symbol, rich in ambiguity and 
contradictions, and not limited to any single reading or interpretation.  Those who 
conducted the pogrom are framed as the embodiment of the nation, the forces of 
medievalism, savages, animals, the archetypal return of the enemies of previous religions, 
and stooges of the British.  At the same time the targets of the pogrom are framed as 
national apostates, a contagious disease, demons, weeds, the progressive part of the 
nation, Christian analogues, tragic heroes recreating cyclic patterns of religious history, 





and proxies for America.  Nationalist rhetoric is used both to spur on the pogrom against 
the fifth column within, and to taint the entire pogr m as an imperial ruse.  Imagery from 
nature is used to naturalize violence against the Baha’is as a national reflex of the 
citizenry, but is also used to cast Muslims as dangerous, primordial, and uncivilized, in 
need of firm discipline to bend them to civility.   
Throughout the various readings, the most common elem nt is the disavowal of 
agency: the clerical discourse speaks of the involuntary, natural reactions of the citizenry; 
the diplomatic literature portrays the “fanatics” behind the pogrom as only doing what 
they are naturally inclined to do when not properly restrained; the Baha’i literature sees 
the “forces of darkness” as a concomitant to the “forces of light,” fated and part of a 
larger plan; and the government’s attribution of authorship to the British “Hidden Hand” 
works to remove local agency, relegating Iranians to pieces in games fought by all-
powerful, external powers. 
In the aftermath of the 1955 pogrom, the two readings that are most important are 
the clerical discourse on authority and the American fr ming of the issue as a failure to 
adequately restrain Islam.  The following chapter explores the outcome of the clash 






“Completely Cowed”: Britain, America, and the  
Making of Shi’ite Nationalism in Iran, 1955-1959 
 
Introduction 
In my previous treatment of the anti-Baha’i pogrom f 1955 as “object lesson,” I have 
explored the idea that one of the main goals of the pogrom was that Baha’is must be put 
back “in their place.”  That is to say, it was hoped that Baha’is would be returned to 
subsisting in the margins as an underground group, r would be removed from Iran 
completely.  In the previous chapter, I discussed how this campaign against the Baha’is’ 
entry into the public sphere—as an “out” and increasingly integrated community— led to 
Shi’ism’s entry into the public sphere in ways that the government and its foreign patrons 
found disturbing and unacceptable.  This led to an intense confrontation between the 
clergy and the state, which can be considered the most significant clerical challenge to 
the monarchy in twenty years,1 since Reza Shah’s bloody 1935 confrontation in 
Mashhad.2  
The Shah’s British and American patrons interpreted th  ulama’s political 
activism, and the bold re-assertion of Shi’ism into the public realm, through the 
Orientalist frames discussed in the previous chapter, seeing their “savage” and irrational 
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but I am speaking in terms of the corporate actions of the clerical hierarchy. 
2.  See Appendix II. 
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“medievalism” as a threat to Iran’s security and ability to modernize.  This chapter 
addresses the British and American intervention in Ira , in the aftermath of 1955, in order 
to undo the problem of “political Islam” and to keep the clergy “in their place.” 
It should be noted that although these chapters ostensibly deal with the pogrom 
against the Baha’i minority and its aftermath, it is clear that, for the groups actively 
involved in this contestation (i.e. the clerics and combatant Islamic Associations on the 
one hand, and the Anglo-American opposition to them on the other), Baha’ism is largely 
a MacGuffin used to push ahead other agendas.  Whatis really at stake is the nature of 
the state and who has the authority to determine its or entation. For the proponents of the 
anti-Baha’i pogrom, Iran’s unmarked national identity is and forever should be Shi’ite, 
with divergent identities either subsumed within Shi’ism (as with the recognized 
minorities) or “weeded out,” as in the case of Baha’ism, which has been considered 
irreconcilable with mainstream Shi’ite doxa.3  From the American perspective, however, 
it was the progressive Baha'i minority—along with oer similarly-characterized secular 
or religiously moderate Iranians in the educated midle class—who were the real Iran, or 
at least should be.4  The ulama and their supporters were seen as relic of the Arab 
invasion—which was believed to have destroyed the glory of Iran’s pre-Islamic 
empires—and were marked as “foreign” and considered incompatible with Iran’s new 
modernity, and in need of strict repression and discipline.  The Shah was tasked with this 
duty from May 1955 onwards.   
                                                      
3 For the “othered” nature of all things marked as “Baha’i,” see Mottahedeh, Representing the 
Unpresentable. 
4 See, for example, W. Smith Murray, "A Consideration of the Bahai Religion” (Documents on the Shaykhi, 
Babi and Baha'i Movements, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1997).  Accessed February 2, 2011.  http://www.h-
net.org/~bahai/docs/smith25.htm).  This diplomatic report dismisses the national potential of Islam, since it 
is “foreign,” and suggests that the Baha’i religion, which is both progressive and “pure Persian,” would be 
the “best solution” for Iran. 
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The chaos of the anti-Baha’i pogrom, and the resulting negative publicity in the 
international press, collapsed any Anglo-American co fidence in the Shah’s experiment 
with “direct rule,” which had begun earlier in 1955.  There were, however, no viable 
alternatives to the Shah, so the decision was made to give the young Shah the opportunity 
to prove himself by addressing the clerical question.  The continued relevance of the 
Shah, as well as incentives such as future military aid, were made contingent on his 
demonstration of resolve in maintaining order and preventing the occurrence of future 
outbreaks of “Muslim” violence against the Baha’is.  It was hoped that the Shah would 
grow into a responsible autocrat, since the British felt that “Iran as a republic would be 
horrible to contemplate.”5 
This chapter will show how a limited humanitarian intervention expanded into 
foreign micro-management of Iran’s internal religious policy.  I suggest that this 
intervention resulted in three significant developments that decisively influenced the 
shape of the decades that followed.  First, it led to the imposition of an anti-clerical 
campaign and agenda that permanently broke the Court-clergy symbiosis, which had 
traditionally been the lynchpin of the Iranian polity.  Second, this repression and betrayal 
of the clergy led to the early articulation of a politically autonomous Shi’ite nationalism, 
which expressed the desire to replace the Shah with Islamic rule.  And finally, Iran’s 
initially scant intelligence and security apparatus was forced to expand and become more 
efficient and organized as part of the effort to discipline the clergy and prevent a repeat of 
the “surprise” of 1955.  This bureaucratization evolved into SAVAK (Iran’s notoriously 
brutal secret police) and fed into the Shah’s growing reliance on security forces to 
compensate for his lack of a political base. 
                                                      




A note on sources 
Clerical sources are largely vague or silent about the anti-clerical campaign of the late 
1950s, as are other important Persian-language memoirs, such as that of Asadollah 
Alam.6  Alam’s silence can perhaps be attributed to the fact that his diary entries do not 
begin until more than a dozen years after these events, but the clerical silence—or rather 
impenetrable vagueness—is harder to explain, especially when it comes to those like 
Falsafi, who were directly targeted and whose extensiv  memoir covers this period.7  
Falsafi does refer to Ayatollah Borujerdi’s anger at the Shah’s reversal on the Baha’i 
issue, and he mentions Borujerdi’s resulting alienatio  from the government (discussed in 
depth in the next chapter), but there is no discussion of the details of the anti-clerical 
campaign that followed the anti-Baha’i pogrom.8  Falsafi only breaks from his vagaries 
and oblique references in a section that relates an occasion when General Bakhtiar 
supposedly acted cowed in the presence of Ayatollah Borujerdi (which is ironic given the 
events discussed below).  In this apocryphal account, Borujerdi “angrily commanded: ‘Sit 
on the ground!’ and Bakhtiar immediately sat on the ground.”9  
In his lengthy study of Islamic movements in this period, Rasul Jafarian is 
likewise silent on the specifics of anti-clerical actions that followed the anti-Baha’i 
pogrom.  He, for example, has an extensive discussion of Ayatollah Nureddin Shirazi that 
includes no discussion of the incident in which government troops fired upon Shirazi and 
his supporters following their attack on a Baha’i holy site, or the harsh treatment, exile, 
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7 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi. 
8 Ibid., pp. 208-10. 
9 Ibid., p. 211. 
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and interrogation that he received after this episode.10  I do not mention this as a criticism 
of Jafarian’s encyclopedic survey, but rather as an example of how even the most 
extensive Persian-language studies are silent on the specifics of anti-clericalism in this 
period, although they do refer to it in general terms.  This can be explained by the 
silences in the extant primary sources.   
 There are several factors which likely contributed to the silence and guarded 
words in clerical memoirs.  First, as will be shown below, the government employed a 
top-down approach to disciplining the clergy, forcing senior Ayatollahs to discipline 
those under them to force their compliance with the regime’s instructions.  This is 
relevant because it was the senior clerics at the tim  that would have directly experienced 
many of the interventions discussed in the British and American sources, and these 
elderly individuals did not live long enough to participate in the post-Revolution memoir 
phenomenon.  Furthermore, the junior and mid-level clerics who did go on to write after 
the Revolution may have had no idea that the senior ulama were coerced into compliance 
and may have seen their actions as attributable to quietism or royalism.  If they did know 
what happened, they could not address the mechanics of what occurred without explicitly 
implicating their mentors in collusion, cowardice, or worse.  Another consideration is that 
the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary milieu in Iran perceives shame in “passive” 
victimhood, such as occurred in the post-1955 years, while glorifying the supposedly 
steadfast revolutionary stance of Khomeini from 1963 onwards.  As such, teleological 
approaches to this period jump from the oppositional activities of Safavi and Kashani in 
the early 1950s to Khomeini’s opposition to the government in 1962/3, explaining away 
the intervening decade as an aberration in the march to revolution—caused by 
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Borujerdi’s old-fashioned quietism—because of an inab lity to admit to being victimized 
without resisting in a way that would be considered sufficient according to later 
standards.   
In addition to the silences in the clerical memoirs covering this period, there was 
no discussion of the anti-clerical campaign in the government-controlled press of the 
time.11  Likewise, the Iranian archives for this period continue to be closed to 
independent research.  Even if this was not the cas, in the initial period being discussed 
Iranian record keeping of the anti-clerical campaign was inconsistent, at best, since 
General Bakhtiar was an intelligence czar who lacked both an adequate support staff and 
adequate filing space for many years (as discussed below).  He also liked to keep 
sensitive files in his personal possession and, following the Shah’s split with Bakhtiar in 
1961, it is not clear that SAVAK inherited all of these files.  It is possible that, for certain 
events in the late 1950s, British and American accounts are the only ones that have 
survived. 
This is all speculation, but silence does not need to be satisfactorily explained in 
order for it to be significant or for it to confirm the occurrence of significant events.  A 
prolonged period of silence and vagaries, accompanied by a profound shift in culture and 
the permanent collapse of the Court-clergy symbiosis, suggests that several significant 
events transpired in this period.  As Piya Chatterjee points out, “conscious silences,” 
although “frustrating,” are nevertheless useful measures of significant resistance, and are 
the result of the “solidarities created by a common [social] experience.”12   
                                                      
11 For a discussion of state censorship on this issue, see Chapter VI.   
12 Piya Chatterjee, A Time for Tea: Women, Labor, and Post/Colonial Politics on an Indian Plantation 
(London: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 237, 250. 
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In terms of selective amnesia in Iranian historiography, Afsaneh Najmabadi has 
demonstrated—with the example of the effacement of the “Daughters of Quchan” from 
later Iranian historiography—that the grand narratives of ideological histories cannot 
accept episodes that threaten the foundational premises on which their ideology rests.  
She notes that “It is precisely the overwhelming presence of the story… that may account 
for its disappearance,” since admitting the importance of a foundational trauma could 
undo the myths upon which an ideology rests.  Small narrative discrepancies can be 
included and explained away, but large and defining traumas would “have threatened to 
take over the grand narrative" and “occupy the overall meaning of the revolution.”13 
Despite the silence or vagaries of the Persian sources, the British and American 
archives leave no doubt that an anti-clerical campaign occurred in the late 1950s, as it is 
clearly, consistently, and explicitly discussed, over a period of years, by dozens of 
writers, in both the British and American archives.  Obviously, these reports can and do 
suffer from bias, and an exploration of repression fr m the perspective of the aggressor is 
undesirable for a variety of reasons.  As such, this c apter represents a preliminary 
intervention based on archival sources and it will hopefully spur further studies. 
 
The Moharram holocaust that wasn’t 
The first test for the Shah, presented by his British and American patrons, was to force 
Borujerdi to acquiesce to the end of the pogrom and discipline those under his authority 
to prevent further disorder.  As discussed in Chapter V, this was achieved in a rather 
ham-handed way, through a series of compromises, threats, and vacuous attempts at 
                                                      
13 Afsaneh Najmabadi, The Story of the Daughters of Quchan: Gender and Nation l Memory in Iranian 
History (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998), pp. 179-80. 
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placation.  Nevertheless, the pogrom was reigned in well before the end of Ramadan 
(May 22) and the matter was mostly resolved, apart from Borujerdi’s legislative 
challenge and scattered, abortive regional challenges between then and the beginning of 
the holy month of Moharram (August 20 – September 18).   
The second test concerned the Shah’s ability to prevent a renewal of anti-Baha’i 
agitation during Moharram.  This planned second wave was announced before the end of 
the Ramadan pogrom but, unlike the former pogrom, it was said to be primarily 
concerned with massacring Baha’is rather than simply evicting them from positions of 
wealth and power.  Reports of this planned violence can be traced to Iranian Baha’is’ 
reports that they had suffered widespread taunting about massacres to come, during 
Moharram.  The Baha’i lobbying efforts to prevent this development framed it as a 
coming “Holocaust.”14   
This scenario became effectively impossible, however, after Borujerdi was forced 
to grudgingly agree to prevent further anti-Baha’i ag tation in exchange for the face-
saving gesture of Alam’s (mostly hollow) promises to dismiss Baha’is employed by the 
government.  Still, although Borujerdi was considered a “universal” marja’, his influence 
was actually far from universal, and there were individuals and groups who acted 
contrary to his directives.  As discussed in Chapter V, these included Ayatollah Shirazi’s 
rogue attempt to demolish the House of the Bab, despite Borujerdi’s order for calm, and 
the massacre of Baha’is in Hormuzak, possibly with the involvement of the largely 
autonomous Feda’iyan-e Islam.  Rogue actors could engage in Moharram violence 
despite Borujerdi’s agreement to calm, although withou  the support of the government or 
                                                      
14 See, for example, USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 366. 
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Borujerdi such action would be limited in scope and would certainly not amount to a 
“Holocaust.” 
The possibility of autonomous action was heightened b cause it does not seem 
that Borujerdi was ever the driving force behind this second wave.  As discussed 
previously, the Grand Ayatollah saw Communism as more dangerous than Baha’ism, but 
nevertheless said that he would never issue a fatwa for the mass killing of Tudeh 
supporters, because this would lead to a bloodbath.15  He believed that Muslims had the 
right to kill Baha’is—and he would defend the right of any who did so not to suffer any 
penalty for this, since he believed Baha’is were mahdur ad-damm (i.e. their blood could 
be spilled with impunity under Islamic law)—but he was not interested in personally 
presiding over mass killings.  This was against his personality.  If anything, the 
postponement of violence until a hypothetical second wave seems like the sort of 
compromise that would be in keeping with Borujerdi’s character, delaying some factions’ 
desire for violence so as not to confuse the issue and hinder his push for anti-Baha’i 
legislation during Ramadan.  If this is indeed the case, and this second wave did not even 
originate with Borujerdi, then this would further increase the likelihood of autonomous 
action during Moharram, with or without Borujerdi.  Thus, in many ways the holy month 
was as much a test for Borujerdi as it was for the S ah, since the persistence of 
autonomous clerical action, along the lines of Shirazi’s mob action in Shiraz, would 
damage the Grand Ayatollah’s authority by throwing further into doubt his authority as 
universal marja’.   
 
“A danger signal” for the British 
                                                      
15 See Chapter II. 
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The stakes were significantly higher for the Shah than they were for Borujerdi.  Less than 
two years after the CIA-sponsored coup that restored him to power, he risked a loss of 
patronage and the creeping specter of regime change, due to his failure to maintain order 
and his inability to discipline the clergy.  Despite these stakes, according to Alam, the 
Shah was initially slow to turn against the clerics, and was only half-hearted in this, until 
he personally witnessed the anti-Baha’i mobs of Ayatoll h Shirazi’s Brotherhood Party, 
which took to the streets while he was in Shiraz at the end of May. These demonstrations 
had been orchestrated by Shirazi to occur during the S ah’s visit and the Brothers were 
rather transparently using the Baha’is as a proxy target in what was really a political 
demonstration against the Shah himself, for abandoni g the anti-Baha’i cause.16  The 
Foreign Minister (Entezam) also confirmed privately that the Shah “had returned from 
Shiraz determined to resist further demands by the mullahs,”17   
 Alam informed Stevens (the British ambassador) that, after witnessing this 
frightening spectacle, the Shah “now realized that a great mistake had been made in 
encouraging the mullahs to agitate against the Bahais and it had been decided that from 
henceforth the mullahs were going to be opposed and Government was going on to 
offensive action against them.”18   According to the Stevens, Alam asked 
how far I thought they should go in that direction—a question which I managed to 
avoid answering…  I asked him what measures for countering the influence of the 
mullahs he had in mind.  He said that every request they made such as for the 
removal of Bahais from high posts would from now onwards be refused and that 
he intended to be rough with them personally, making exception only of Borujerdi 
who was a wise man.19   
                                                      
16 This episode is also discussed in Chapter V. 
17 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 25/ 55, Confidential Minutes by Stevens, June 1, 1955. 




 Alam seemed fully aware that the crackdown on the clergy “might land them in 
some trouble,” but also “appeared fully to recognize that it was essential to crack down 
on the mullahs at this stage if they were not to obtain too much power and threaten the 
position of the Shah and the Government.”  Stevens approved of the new stance by the 
Shah and Alam, seeing it as a commitment to Iran’s We tern-aligned future and a 
rejection of the “medieval.”  In his view: 
it was impossible for anyone, including the Iranian Government, to move in two 
directions at the same time, and if they wanted to engage in a programme of 
development and reform which might be called Westernization, although they 
might not like the phrase, it would not be consistent o return to religious 
intolerance and medieval ways.20  
 Alam agreed with every point.   
 Despite the government’s willingness to orient itself as instructed, and to 
discipline the “medieval,” there were ongoing doubts about the Shah’s lack of potential 
and his inability to become a dictator, along the lin s of Reza Shah, an evolution which 
the British felt was needed in order to maintain order and discipline the clergy.  
According to a June report by Stevens, members of the Iranian elite were also 
increasingly concerned about the Shah’s direct rule, since they also believed that “he has 
neither the temperament of a dictator nor the constructive and administrative capacity to 
provide a driving force behind a puppet Government.” 21  In Stevens’s view, the 
government’s mishandling of the anti-Baha’i pogrom was the main reason for the lack of 
faith in the Shah, but he believed that the subsequent confrontation with the clergy would 
prove a more telling indicator of the regime’s future prospects.  In his view, 





The Baha’i affair was a danger signal; we are only too well aware of the Shah’s 
failings anyhow… The really depressing factor is accumulating evidence of a 
curious combination of weakness and overconfidence o  the part of the Shah; 
this, if maintained is bound to lead to growing oppsition and in all probability to 
eventual disorders… [but] the situation is capable of correction… [and] there is 
some fairly good evidence that the Shah is showing firmness towards the 
Mullahs.22 
 A number of interesting observations were made in passing in Stevens’s analysis 
of the Shah’s state of mind.  Among them, it was noted that despite the growing disquiet 
over the ineptness of his attempt at direct rule, th  Shah appeared entirely unaware that 
his “wire-pulling must be more cunningly concealed,” “seemed extraordinarily 
unconcerned—indeed almost pleased—at the prospect of a bedridden Prime Minister,” 
and recklessly demoted capable individuals out of “jealousy and mistrust.”  The most 
striking moment came, however, in a discussion of how best to exert influence in Iran.  
Stevens expressed a personal preference for a “compact and closely-knit embassy” and 
criticized the bloated network of spies and informants utilized prior to the ending of 
diplomatic relations during the Mosaddeq period.  The Shah could not grasp this attitude, 
saying that the British were wrong to abandon this s adowy network of agents, since it 
was useful and “it made us feared.”23  Here we see that the Shah, from the very first 
challenge during his direct rule, exhibited the traits that would characterize his regime 
until the Revolution, namely confidence built upon a profound lack of self-awareness, 
coupled with a penchant for using intelligence networks to rule through fear. 
Perhaps more than the “failings” of the Shah himself, the British were concerned 
about Alam, who was the Shah’s chief advisor at the tim , to the point that when one 
spoke of Iran’s “government” what was really meant was “the Shah under the inspiration 
                                                      




of Alam.”  Despite his Anglophile reputation, the British considered him good-
intentioned but incompetent, too young (mid-thirties), inexperienced, amateurish, stupid, 
and constantly ill-prepared to deal with strong opposition.  Alam was the cabinet member 
most on-board with the British turn against the clergy, and was hailed as “full of 
reforming zeal” and praised for wanting “to take firmer action against the mullas than 
some of his senior colleagues,” but he was also denunced as “a trimmer [flip-flopper] by 
nature” and one who “failed to carry his point.”24 
Alam was the only member of Cabinet who pushed for anti-clerical action beyond 
that which had been imposed by the British and the Am ricans.  He was, however, 
unwilling to make a stand without soliciting explicit British support, and took advantage 
of his reputation as “a British stooge” to lend imperial weight to his own agenda, often 
with mixed results.25  On the morning after the Shiraz Massacre, for example, Alam sent 
a representative to meet with the British and ask for their support for his position on the 
matter, since the Cabinet was divided over how to punish Ayatollah Shirazi.  Alam had 
put his career on the line and demanded that strong action be taken if he was not to 
resign.  To support his position, he hurriedly sent a representative to solicit explicit 
British support, in such haste that the representative rrived out of breath.  The British 
response was supportive of Alam’s side of the debate, but was deliberately vague and did 
not give Alam the explicit backing he had hoped for, instead calling for action implicitly 
by warning the Shah that “it was impossible for Persia to move in two directions at once 
                                                      
24 Ibid., FO 371 / 114810 / EP 1018 / 24, Stevens to FO, July 13, 1955. 
25 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 2 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Fearnley, May 17, 1955. 
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and the process of Westernization accorded ill withgiving head to religious 
fanaticism.”26 
 This internal governmental confusion over how to discipline and punish the 
clergy caused Ambassador Stevens to question whether, “as a result of the Baha’i 
troubles” the Shah’s “lack of decisiveness” was too big of a liability and if “in the last 
resort this Government can be relied upon to maintain order.”27  The most important issue 
for the Foreign Office was not minority rights, but ra her the pressing need for the Shah 
to develop the iron fist of his father and to use it to prevent conservative forces from 
pulling the nation “backwards.”  Stevens had been previously informed by the Foreign 
Office that, although the violence presented “a rather disquieting picture,” it was as an 
“opportunity” to educate the Iranian government on the need to discipline the clergy.  It 
was observed that “The influence of the mullahs, which [Reza Shah] suppressed so 
effectively with machine guns at Meshad, has always been exerted against any form of 
progress and its re-emergence would be in the interests neither of Persia nor of 
ourselves.”28   
 As Lord Reading explained in an August meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister 
(Entezam), the nature of British concern was not over the suppression of this “cult,” but 
rather over the fact that the suppression was initiated by the ulama—as opposed to the 
state—since clerical influence “was almost always reactionary” and they should not be 
encouraged, since a single success might lead the ulama “to further and probably 
damaging interference in the political field.”  Entezam agreed that clerical influence was 
                                                      
26 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 36 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Stevens, June 28, 1955. 
27 Ibid., FO 371 / 114810 / EP 1018 / 24, Stevens to FO, July 13, 1955. 
28 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 19 / 55, FO to Stevens, May 20, 1955. 
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typically negative and committed himself to giving strict orders to prevent clerical 
disruption of public order.29 
 
“A test of strength” 
The American embassy considered the sporadic, regional agitation against Baha’is during 
the summer of 1955 to be a “continuing campaign” that was being used by the ulama as a 
lever with which to regain the social importance that they wielded before Reza Shah’s 
reign, and that in the pursuit of this target they “will take advantage of any weakness or 
vacillation shown by the government.”30  By the end of July, Secretary of State Dulles 
judged the Shah’s inability to satisfactorily control the ulama and completely halt any and 
all clerical agitation as “continuing evidence” that the government was “unable or 
unwilling to control fanaticism” and, as such, it was felt that there was a high likelihood 
of a new “outbreak” of violence during Moharram.31   
 To prevent this eventuality, Secretary of State Dulles instructed the American 
embassy to inform the Shah that continued governmental “timidity” vis-à-vis the ulama, 
especially outside of the capital, would only “encourage fanatical elements whose 
objectives are antithetical to the announced program of the Shah and Government.”  He 
further instructed the embassy to threaten the Shah by warning him that Iran’s clamp 
down on the ulama was “especially important in connection [with continued American] 
aid programs for Iran.”  After warning the Shah, they were to observe his response and 
inform the Department whether or not the Iranian government was able to “assert its 
                                                      
29 Ibid., FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 41 / 55, FO to Wright, August 5, 1955. 
30 USDS, Iraq, 1955-1959, Reel 15: 147. 
31 Ibid., Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 1:168. 
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authority firmly.”32  Throughout the summer, the Americans continued to express “great 
concern” and made “strong representations” to the Sah about the need to take more 
forceful action to restrain the clergy.33  According to American Consul Gordon King, the 
Moharram period would serve as a test for the Shah, to see if he would rise to the 
occasion, or remain “weak and vacillating.”34 
Despite Iranian assurances that they had “taken extreme precautions,” the 
protection of the Baha’is and suppression of the clergy received “almost daily attention in 
the Department of State.”35  Tehran assured the Department that after their 
representations “in strong terms” about how Iranian-American relations were at stake, the 
Shah had made “specific assurances” to take a “strong stand.”  The Embassy cautioned, 
however, that the actions of both the international Baha’i lobby and the State Department 
itself were perhaps counter-productive.  They highlighted the Shah’s complete 
cooperation and compliance with all instructions in this matter and suggested that 
Washington perhaps temporarily lessen the constant pressure over the Baha’i issue, as 
such unnecessary nagging was likely to cause annoyace nd be counter-productive.  
They further relayed that the Shah “feared” that the international Baha’i lobby would 
make the task of controlling the ulama harder for him.36 
 As Moharram approached, Prime Minister Ala assured th  American government 
that Falsafi would be forcefully dispatched on a “pilgrimage” abroad during the holy 
month, that he was no longer a concern, and that his government  
                                                      
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 380. 
34 Ibid., Reel 24: 335-36. 
35 Ibid., 371. 
36 Ibid., 371, 374. 
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has both the ability and intent to assert its authority to suppress in its early stages 
any anti-Baha’i violence that might threaten public order… [It] genuinely intends 
to terminate the persecution, being well aware of the difficult position in which 
the campaign has placed it.  Nevertheless the government was not ready to appear 
in the role of the protector of the Bahais, an attitude which it considers would be 
politically suicidal.37 
 Falsafi, besides being forced to leave Iran during Moharram, had also received a 
call from General Bakhtiar in which he “in extremely strong language… in the sort of 
terms in which one would address a servant” told Fasafi that ten clerics imprisoned at the 
time would stay in prison and that if there were any more “nonsense” then Falsafi would 
join them.38  Falsafi was also blacklisted from state media and the government chose an 
apolitical, pro-regime preacher to replace the “Bahai-baiting” cleric on state radio 
broadcasts during the holy month of Moharram.39  
 Although Ala and Entezam were confident in their ability to suppress dissent, 
others shared the view of Jahanshah Saleh (the Minister of Health) that the Shah’s new 
anti-clerical attitude was a curious mixture of “actions involving strong-arm methods 
coupled with appeasement and yielding under pressur.”  Saleh privately ridiculed the 
Shah’s inability to “carry through a firm course of action” and “deal firmly” with the 
ulama.  To support his charges, he gave the example of two clerics from Borujerd who 
were taken away for anti-Baha’i activities but, after strong public protest, were returned 
in a cowardly fashion, by dropping them off in the street in the middle of the night.40   
 This fickleness was an exception however, and in ge eral the provincial 
leadership was far more consistent and rigid in their enforcement of the new policies.  In 
Gorveh, for example, Sheikh Hadi Najafabadi distributed a great deal of anti-Baha’i 
                                                      
37 Ibid., Reel 1: 176.  
38 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 26 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Stephens, June 6, 1955. 
39 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 4: 638. 
40 Ibid., Reel 1: 122. 
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literature and was arrested by the military, stripped of his propaganda and sent away to be 
detained in Tehran.   In other areas, security troops had “arrested and expelled to remote 
areas of Iran several Mullahs who disregarded governm nt cautions.”41   
The American insistence that Moharram would be a “test of strength with the 
mullahs,” had been fully taken to heart by the Shah, w o made full preparations for the 
implementation of martial law, even in the provinces, and swore that his government 
would not allow any serious disturbances.42  The Americans were further assured that 
“government will brook no incitement to disturbances on the part of the Mullahs.”  
Nevertheless, the Embassy felt that, although the security forces could control the cities, 
there were not adequate rural police to prevent disor er in the country areas if there was 
renewed violence, since many of the lower-ranking police and military officers were 
sympathetic to the ulama’s cause and the Shah, when called upon to employ decisive 
public violence, might vacillate again.43 
  
Moharram begins 
In a meeting on August 23, several days after Moharram began without incident, the Shah 
met with the American Ambassador [Chapin] and pathetically confessed that 
“incalculable damage” had been done and “a great mis ake had been made” in allowing 
the pogrom earlier in the year, but that “Falsafi hd not played fair.”44  Now, however, he 
claimed that he had taken a “strong stand in the matter” and that the situation was 
“ameliorating every month” because “firm instructions had gone out throughout the 
                                                      
41 Ibid., 48.  
42 Ibid., Reel 9: 331. 
43 Ibid., Reel 4: 640-41. 
44 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 43 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Wright, August 23, 1955. 
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country to the local authorities” and “Government was prepared if necessary to take 
disciplinary measures against Moslem clergy should they attempt to excite people against 
Bahais.”45  Chapin expressed his pleasure at this stand, noting that “there would 
inevitably be repercussions abroad if there were to be disturbances against the Baha’is.”46  
In the following weeks, it was observed that there was order, but that anger was 
building beneath the superficial calm.  In response to this anger, Borujerdi continued to 
push hard for non-violent action against the Baha’is, which would not technically violate 
his agreement to prevent violence during Moharram.  He called for Baha’is to be 
completely shunned to the point that Muslims have no relations of any kind with them.   
As part of this effort, there was an attempt to carry out an economic boycott against the 
Baha’is, which included a prohibition from buying or selling to them.  Despite 
Borujerdi’s best efforts, however, there was little national interest in the boycott, 
although there was scattered regional participation, at least temporarily.  Even in places 
like Najafabad, where participation in the boycott was strong, Baha’is reported that 
sympathetic Muslims would buy food for them and help them to get around the boycott 
in other ways.47  
For the most part, the government was able to maintain peace in Moharram 
through the use of an “iron fist” approach not seen since the days of Reza Shah.  In 
Azerbaijan, for example, the police and military were in effect to an unprecedented 
degree, despite the province’s earlier apathy towards the pogrom.  Every Ashura 
                                                      
45 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 1: 239. 
46 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 43 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Wright, August 23, 1955. 
47 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 04 / Box 141 / Folder 570.3 –Isfahan Consulate to American Embassy, 
September 7, 1955. 
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procession48 was placed under police and military supervision and soldiers lined every 
route.  This, obviously, had a “depressing effect” on religious enthusiasm, and sermons 
were described as being as bland and passionless as the processions, absolutely lacking 
any mention of the Baha’i issue.  This had been achieved because the ulama in 
Azerbaijan, and indeed in every provincial area, had been “sternly cautioned” by the 
security forces to censor their public words, as a zero-tolerance policy was in effect.49   
In Isfahan, where there was more significant anti-Baha’i sentiment, the governor-
general was extremely insecure and severely stressed by the security demands from the 
capital.  He was said to be more anxious about the prospect of anti-Baha’i violence than 
the Baha’is themselves were, since he believed that the Shah would show no quarter to 
any officials unable to discipline the clerics in their jurisdiction.  He was described as a 
wreck, unable to sleep for three days, and so desperate to avoid the repercussions for 
instability that he resorted to bribing the city’s senior clerics out of his own pockets, to 
further reduce the possibility of instability during Moharram.  Unlike General Bakhtiar, 
who had received government allocations to use in disciplining the ulama—since he was 
the military-governor of the capital—the provincial governors were given directives 
without funding.  Thus, in Isfahan the governor-general had to use thirty-three thousand 
rials of his own funds to ensure order, and feared the final bill would far exceed that 
amount.50  The army commander in Isfahan, General Zarvan, was more confident in the 
ability of the security forces, and did not believe that they would meet any resistance, 
                                                      
48 As mentioned previously, Ashura is the tenth day of the month of Moharram.  On this day the martyrdom 
of Imam Husayn at the Battle of Karbala is commemorated in various ways, including processions through 
the streets.   
49 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 376. 
50 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 04 / Box 141 / Folder 570.3 – Religion, Isfahan Consulate, 
Memorandum of Conversation, May 18, 1955.  
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since he had met with the clerical leadership and ma e it clear “that he would have no 
nonsense from them.”51  
 
Preparations in Mashhad 
In Mashhad, a number of local factors complicated scurity arrangements, created 
confusion, and opened up an opportunity for resistance, through public, communal self-
flagellation in the Ashura processions.  Communal se f-mutilation during these 
processions was a tradition that developed as a way to identify with and communally 
participate in the suffering and death of the Imam, but this practice was banned under 
Reza Shah due to its “barbaric” nature.  The practice returned after Reza Shah was forced 
to abdicate in 1941, but was rather limited in scope and severity.  In 1955, self-
flagellation was banned as part of the effort to prevent any arousal of passions which 
might develop into violent, anti-Baha’i mobs.   
 Mashhad was the only city in which there was marked opposition to this 
restriction.  This city had earlier been the site of the infamous 1935 clerical standoff 
against Reza Shah, in which opponents compared him to Yazid (the oppressive ruler 
responsible for the death of Imam Husayn) and were eventually slaughtered when the 
Shah sent in security forces.  Given this history, it is not surprising that Mashhadi clerics 
were especially sensitive to security forces lining the streets as part of an attempt to 
discipline clerical action.  It is also unsurprising that although General Vaseqi was 
“taking exceptional precautionary measures” for Ashura, he still had “concern over the 
possibility of violence.”52  As such, he intended to permit only one procession over the 
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entire Ashura period and to line this route with troops, prevent any deviations, and 
immediately dismiss the crowd once the destination was reached.   
 Despite General Vaseqi’s tough talk, his junior officers, Colonel Soltani and 
Major Arsham, made a point of complaining to the American Consulate that Vaseqi was 
a moderate who had recently replaced the avowedly anti-cleric Shahrokhshahi, and that 
the new governor-general was, likewise, a moderate who replaced a more consistently 
anti-clerical individual.  They believed that this was all orchestrated by the British, who 
controlled the Shah through their lackeys (Alam, Ala, Batmanghelich) and who were 
working in partnership with the clergy.  In their vew, the British had been acting through 
the mullahs for a hundred years and had no desire to cease doing so.  As part of this 
conspiracy, the British wanted there to be Moharram violence in Mashhad, and wanted 
the regional government to fail in preventing it, and this was the reason for the counter-
intuitive weakening of the military and civilian leadership of Iran’s most conservative 
major city just prior to an anticipated campaign of religious violence.53   
 The Consulate rejected such conspiracies, wondering if “perhaps the residents of 
Eastern Iran are so accustomed to having the English regulate their affairs that they 
cannot adjust emotionally to the fact that the U.K. no longer has the interest in this area 
that it had when it governed India.”54  Although their conspiracy theories were fanciful, 
Soltani and Arsham were later proven right about the problems that were likely to arise as 
a result of the freshness and mixed loyalties of Mashh d’s new military and civilian 
leadership, who were likely brought in, in reality, as a gesture to the ulama, to enhance 
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the likelihood of cooperation and to try to avoid the use of force in the conservative 
stronghold. 
 The government’s Mashhad policy also involved an inconsistent alternation 
between the carrot and the stick.  Dr. Manouchehr Eqbal (future Prime Minister and then 
chancellor of Tehran University) for example, came “on a secret mission to constrain the 
clergy in Meshed.”  He was flown into Mashhad by private plane on July 29 and left the 
next day amidst much whisperings.  According to Soltani, he met with Ayatollah Kafai 
and other senior clerics and told them that any further anti-Baha’i outbreaks would 
damage Iran’s prestige abroad and would also be “firmly suppressed by the security 
forces.”  In addition to threats, he offered the “carrot” of fifty thousand tomans.  When 
Eqbal’s brother, Abdol-Vahab Eqbal was questioned to confirm this, he did not answer 
directly, but rather said that he was absolutely confident there would be no anti-Baha’i 
violence in Mashhad during Moharram since “necessary measures had already been 
taken.”  When he was asked if his brother had seen to this, he just smiled and said 
“perhaps.”55  This arrangement was confirmed two weeks later when General Vaseqi—
tasked with playing the “bad cop” to complement Eqbal’s earlier performance—met with 
Ayatalloh Kafai to threaten him personally with dire consequences for any anti-Baha’i 
agitation in Mashhad during Moharram.   
In the final days before Moharram in Mashhad, Ayatoll h Kafai and the 
mainstream clerical leadership remained quiet, but lower-level agitation continued.  On 
the morning of August 15, for example, anti-Baha’i leaflets were anonymously plastered 
around several parts of the city.  In the same period, a rogue preacher in the Gohar Shah 
Mosque preached against the Baha’is.   Major Arsham, the deputy head of G-2 who was 
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married to a Baha’i and very much opposed to the clergy, said that his division’s strategy 
for such disregard for the anti-Baha’i mandate was to hold Ayatollah Kafai personally 
responsible, since he was Mashhad’s senior ayatollah.  As such, Kafai was personally 
taken to task for each infraction.  In the case of the rogue preacher, Major Arsham 
“ordered him [Kafai] to discipline the offending mullah.”56  Through this practice of 
dealing only with Kafai, and forcing the clerical hierarchy to discipline the lower levels, 
“the Army hopes that the ayatollah will be forced to restrain the other members of the 
clergy and refrain from anti-Bahai activity himself.”57  
The Moharram strategy also involved making use of Grand Ayatollah 
Shahrestani, who was considered at the time to be one of the most powerful ayatollahs 
after Borujerdi himself.  Shahrestani lived in Iraq nd was a strong supporter of the 
monarchy.  When the Shah fled Iran in 1953, and his plane stopped in Iraq, no important 
Iranians in Iraq came to greet him, not even the staff of the Iranian embassy, but 
Shahrestani came.  Ever since then, the Shah provided the Grand Ayatollah with a private 
plane for his yearly visits to Mashhad and always arranged for him to be met by high 
government officials during these visits.  In 1955, it was arranged for Shahrestani to visit 
Mashhad for Moharram and to issue a command for calm.  This plan collapsed, however, 
when Shahrestani unexpectedly voted with his feet by returning to Iraq on August 16, 
several days before the start of the holy month.  According to the Governor, Shahrestani 
heard of the planned clerical coup (discussed below) and, not wishing to be held 
responsible or to give his implicit consent to this treason, he simply left to disassociate 
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himself from it, as he deplored violence and did not want to be placed in the awkward 
position of choosing between sanctioning violence or appearing to side with apostates.58 
Faced with setbacks such as the loss of the Grand Ayatollah’s calming influence, 
Major Arsham made it his personal mission to keep the clergy in line, but constantly 
reported only limited support from Vaseqi and repeatedly complained to the American 
Consulate about the loss of General Shahrokhshahi.  T e previous general had been in 
charge during the Ramadan pogrom and was not hesitant to resort to violence, as he 
“would tolerate no anti-Baha’i disturbances in Meshd and was prepared to meet violence 
with force.”  With General Vaseqi in charge now, Major Arsham feared that the clerics 
planned to test his resolve, since he was considered to be weaker than his predecessor. 
Moved by this sentiment, the Consulate sought out and consulted General Shahrokhshahi 
about Mashhad and the policies of his successor.  Shahrokhshahi wisely pointed out that 
General Vaseqi’s extreme focus on Ayatollah Kafai ws misguided, since Kafai was 
guided by self-interest and if he was pushed too hard to discipline the ranks then the 
stigma of being seen as pro-Baha’i would outweigh watever punishments the 
government could inflict on him, since his rank and position were based on prestige and 
the assent of those above and below in the hierarchy, and he could only do the army’s 
dirty work for so long before he would lose the basis of his authority.59 
As Moharram drew closer, the focus did indeed shift from the ayatollahs to the 
body of believers.  As part of this concern, the chiefs of the army, police, and 
gendarmerie called for a ban on self-flagellation, si ce they believed that such ecstatic 
displays had a track record of developing into externally-directed violence.  The 
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premature departure of Shahrestani, however, caused problems when it came to enforcing 
the ban.  Before he left, the Grand Ayatollah had written a statement denouncing self-
flagellation as “barbarous” and against the interests of Islam.60  When the government 
announced its plans for banning self-flagellation, hundreds of copies of this letter were 
distributed to add legitimacy to the new policy.  This plan backfired, however, since it 
was widely assumed that the Grand Ayatollah’s sudden departure was due to his 
displeasure over the security forces’ use of his statement, which led to suspicion that it 
was forged or coerced.  As a result, the Grand Ayatollah’s letter condemning self-
flagellation, ironically, caused support for self-flagellation because of the belief that his 
leaving Iran was to disavow the letter.61 
Public support for self-flagellation also mounted in response to rumors of 
American attempts to manipulate the issue.  A number of rumors were in circulation 
concerning anticipated American espionage activity during Moharram.  These were said 
to include American plans to wear disguises to infiltrate religious demonstrations in order 
to take pictures of self-flagellation to use against the ulama in the foreign press.  This 
story was so widespread that General Vaseqi, Governr Masudi, and Alam were all 
questioned about it and compelled to ask the Mashhad Consulate about its veracity.62   
During the provincial Security Council’s debates over self-flagellation, General 
Vaseqi pushed for prohibiting cutting of any kind rather than just self-flagellation, while 
Ram, the moderate new governor-general, argued that only self-flagellation should be 
prohibited.  The Council sided with the general andgreed to ban all forms of cutting and 
to distribute the Grand Ayatollah’s statement when they announced their policy.  On 
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August 23, a few days into Moharram and several days before Ashura, handbills 
announcing this new policy were placed all over the city and the Grand Ayatollah’s 
statement of support was broadcast on the radio “at intervals throughout the day.”   
The following evening, four to five hundred clerics onverged on the home of 
Ayatollah Kafai demanding action.  “After much emotional pleading, Kafai telephoned 
the Governor General at 11 pm and arranged for a meeting the next day.”  The following 
morning, over two hundred clerics descended on the sympathetic new governor-general.  
Only twenty clerics were allowed in, while the remainder was forced to wait outside and 
pray for the success of those who had been allowed insi e.  Ram had strong ties to the 
clergy and was known to have a “yielding” approach, as evidenced by his advocacy of 
ulama-friendly compromises in the Security Council.  According to a participant in the 
clerical delegation, who belonged to the Devotees of the Shah and was also an informant 
for the American consulate in Mashhad, the clerical representatives “grew more and more 
emotional, the leaders got down on their knees and,weeping, begged to be allowed to 
honor their martyred hero Hossein.”  The tension became so charged that Ram “burst into 
tears” and said that he would see to it that they would be allowed to self-flagellate, as 
long as they limited it to the courtyard of the Shrine, between two and four in the 
morning, on August 29.  The clerical representatives swore in the name of Allah to abide 
by these restrictions and then returned as heroes to the crowd anxiously waiting outside.63 
 
The Islamic Revolution of 1955 that wasn’t 
Although Borujerdi continued to honor his agreement with the Shah, “top Mullahs were 
sulking over what they consider government reluctance to institute a wholesale purge of 
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Bahais from government service.”64  To partially appease this anger, and serve as a 
distraction, Ayatollah Shirazi and the instigators f the Hormuzak slaughter were freed, 
while Governor Hemat and General Azidi (of the Shiraz massacre) were removed.  These 
moves did not quell dissent in the clerical ranks, some of which Borujerdi could not 
contain.  There was, for example, the distribution of circulars in Mashhad that, turning 
from the Baha’is to the Shah, urged a temporary clerical takeover of the government on 
Ashura and Tashura (August 28 and 29), beginning with the occupation of government 
buildings.  Nothing came of this plan, but it indicates the strength of anti-government 
sentiment as a result of their perceived protection of the Baha’is and turn against the 
ulama.65    
 In connection with this plot, one of Mashhad’s chief clerics, Afsah al-
Mutakallimin (who was mentioned previously for his leading role in local anti-Baha’i 
attacks during the Ramadan pogrom, for which he wasarrested) met secretly with a 
representative from the American Consulate (to avoid being seen going to the Consulate 
or meeting with Americans).66  In this August 12 meeting, the pro-Mosaddeq, anti-
Baha’i, and anti-Shah cleric informed the Consulate that, because of his reputation as a 
leading anti-regime cleric, he was secretly approached by two unnamed individuals from 
Isfahan who purported to be brothers.67  They asked him to be the local coordinator of a 
political takeover of Iran during Moharram.  In the plan, on the 8th, 9th, and 10th day of 
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67 The use of the term “brothers” to describe their rlationship suggests that they may have been members 
of Ayatollah Shirazi’s Brotherhood Party. 
307 
 
Moharram (Aug 27-29th) leading ayatollahs would urge their followers to take over the 
telegraph office (traditionally associated with theBritish), the Shrine of Imam Ali Reza, 
and the city’s governmental buildings.  Similar takeovers would occur in major cities 
throughout Iran.  After this was accomplished, they were to demand the following from 
the Shah:   
(1)  Point IV68 must be closed down because “it is a center of adultery between 
Americans and Iranian women, and U.S. citizens who travel about the 
country are distributing propaganda to turn the peasants against Islam.”  
(2)  “As ordered by His Eminence, Ayatollah Borujerdi, all Baha’is employed 
by the Iranian government must be fired in forty-eight hours, or the 
demonstrators will refuse to vacate the telegraph offices, mosques, and 
public buildings all across Iran.”69   
 In other words, anti-Americanism was conflated with anti-Baha’ism and the result 
was used as the pretext for revolutionary religious insurrection.  It should be noted that 
although the earlier Ramadan pogrom included condemations of the Baha’is as agents of 
America, it did not involve any direct action against American institutions or interests 
(apart from the aforementioned attack on a Point IV vehicle).  The American intervention 
to end the Ramadan pogrom further added to the rhetoric eliding American and Baha’i 
interests, however, and American interests and institutions were therefore targeted in this 
new push. 
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To make his risk worthwhile, the “brothers” offered to pay Afsah al-Mutakallimin 
for his participation in this revolutionary take-over.  When he was hesitant, they agreed to 
substantiate their authority and returned later with a letter from Qom in the name of 
Ayatollah Borujerdi (although not signed by him) that “calls for a national anti-Baha’i 
campaign during the coming mourning days… and charged the Baha’is with planning an 
armed uprising in 1335 (1956) to seize power in Ira.”  It reminded readers that Borujerdi 
had “ordered the faithful to rise up against the false sect.”  Instead, it claims that the 
government blocked the action of the people, promising to instead stop the Baha’is itself, 
but then betrayed the cause.  It warns that the government has demonstrated its true 
colors and intent to ignore Borujerdi and o keep Baha’is employed.  As a result of the 
“malice and deceit shown by the Imperial Court,” Ayatollah Borujerdi is now 
disconsolately preparing to leave Iran, since he is prevented from carrying out his 
religious duties.  The letter goes on to claim thate situation is dire and the whole future 
of Islam in Iran is in danger.  For these reasons, the Theological Seminary in Qum is 
calling on all religious leaders to urge their followers to occupy the aforementioned 
buildings at the height of Moharram and insist that the Shah terminate all Baha’i 
employees within forty-eight hours or else abdicate the throne so that “a government can 
be formed that will carry out the wishes of the Muslim  in Iran.”70  It is not clear what the 
alternative government would look like after this cleric-driven revolution, although a new 
government “carrying out the wishes of the Muslims” implies not only the expulsion of 
Baha’is but also the implementation of Islamic law to some extent, and a radical shift in 
foreign policy.   




This planned Islamic coup appears to be the first sgnificant discussion of regime 
change by the ulama during the Pahlavi period.  Although this plan was likely generated 
by lower-level clergy using Borujerdi’s name without his consent, this was not 
unprecedented.  The successful Tobacco Protest in the previous century began in a 
similar way, when Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi’s name was used—initially without his 
approval—to win support for a movement that also sought to shut down the state to force 
the Shah to comply with “clerical” demands.  The Tobacco Protest, however, never 
involved the call for violent regime change in favor of an Islamic state if its demands 
were not met.  Even the early Khomeini-led protests of the 1960s never made such strong 
threats. 
On August 13, the American Consulate in Mashhad shared their information on 
the planned coup with General Vaseqi, only to discover that Iranian security forces had 
already uncovered the plot, although they were unable to trace its origins and leadership, 
since they were assuming that Borujerdi’s name was being used without his consent.  In 
his assessment, Vaseqi believed that the abortive plans for a coup were further proof that 
“there was undoubtedly a great deal of undercover pr paration for an anti-Baha’i 
campaign during the coming mourning days.”71  
As mentioned above, Grand Ayatollah Shahrestani left Iran rather than be 
associated in any way with the coup.  It is not clear if the plot collapsed due to 
Shahrestani’s repudiation, or if it was abandoned after being prematurely uncovered by 
security forces.  It is possible that the plot and the “Borujerdi letter” could have been 
forged by any number of non-clerical groups, although it seems unlikely that Shahrestani 
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would react as he did if he did not first receive some form of confirmation about the 
veracity of the plans.  When questioned, Ayatollah Kafai also seemed to confirm the 
clerical origins of the planned coup, although he did not believe that Borujerdi himself 
was involved.72 
 
A quiet Moharram, save Mashhad 
When Ashura passed without any anti-Baha’i incidents, Denis Wright (of the British 
embassy) met with Alam as well as General Bakhtiar o discuss the successful 
suppression of clerical agitation.  According to Wright, after he had congratulated them 
for the “firm measures” employed by the government against the ulama, “they both 
purred with delight.”73   
 The maintenance of order continued throughout Moharram, which concluded on 
September 18 with no clerical agitation having occurred.74 Prime Minister Ala 
“mentioned with pride” that the ulama had been suppressed and requested that the State 
Department be informed that the Iranian government “had been and was still determined 
to take every precaution, not only in cities but also in villages, which were covered by 
roving security patrols.”  He stressed the new focus on an enhanced security regime and 
noted that, although the Shah reported much lower figu es to Washington, in reality, Iran 
was now spending 60% of its budget on security.75 
 Although anti-Baha’i violence was successfully prevented in Moharram, and the 
requested crackdown on the clergy was enforced in the provinces as well as the capital, 
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74 An Armenian was said to have been killed on the mistaken notion that he was a Baha’i. 
75 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 1: 274. 
311 
 
the British and American assessors eventually determin d that the Iranian response was 
inadequate because of a failure of clerical discipline in Mashhad, despite there being no 
anti-Baha’i violence there.  When Wright met with the Shah on September 17, he chided 
him for his failure to fully discipline Mashhad.  The clerics in that city were described as 
uppity for trying to prevent foreigners from entering its main Shrine, as they had 
previously been allowed to do before the anti-clerial nitiative began.  In response to this 
information, the Shah acted surprised “and suggested that the mullahs were not as strong 
as all that.”76  In response, Wright countered that the government’s ban on self-
flagellation had been ignored in Mashhad to the point that seven hundred were 
hospitalized for self-inflicted injuries.  The Shah claimed to be aware of this and blamed 
the failure of discipline on the provincial leadership.  
 Somewhat confused at how far afield from the Bahai issue he was supposed to 
manage the clergy, the Shah pointed out that from the war years onward it had been 
Britain’s policy—inspired by Oriental Secretary Alan Trott—to “encourage the mullahs, 
at least so far as the Russians were in the country,” but he wondered if it could be that 
now “perhaps this policy was no longer good.”77  Wright confirmed this and said that the 
British now considered the ulama a “bad influence” and told the Shah that in the case of 
the ulama the “principle excuse for encouraging them” was the assumption that well-
supported religious institutions would act as “a safe bulwark against Communism.”  They 
now saw this as a “mistake.”  To support his case, Wright pointed to Italy and said that 
Communism flourished there despite, or perhaps becaus  of, the strength of the Catholic 
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Church.78  The Shah agreed that the ulama “must be kept in their place,” but he thought 
that, “if trouble were to be avoided,” the taming of Mashhad should be done slowly and 
that it “would take about 2 years to get the mullahs in their place,” since “if he went too 
fast he might stir up great opposition.”79  To support his theory, the Shah referred to 
Argentina, implying that problems arose there because Peron had taken too tough a line 
on the church.  Wright countered that the Argentine problem was not because of 
disciplining the church, but rather because Peron had suppressed all freedoms, and “the 
pot had eventually boiled over.”80     
As this conversation makes clear, what had begun in the summer as a concern for 
preventing anti-Baha’i violence had developed, by autumn, into a larger concern over 
disciplining the public expression of Shi’ite identity, which extended to the very bodies 
of the partisans themselves.  As such, although there was no anti-Baha’i violence in 
Mashhad, it was still regarded as a security failure due to self-flagellation, although 
Governor-General Ram had himself permitted this.   
Despite the ayatollahs’ sworn promises to Ram that cutting would be limited to 
the Shrine, between two and four in the morning—so a  to remain unnoticed and prevent 
repercussions for Ram—the thousands that began to cut themselves at the Shrine became 
so “aroused” that they left the Shrine, surged intothe streets, and paraded until five in the 
morning.  Since this public spectacle was not punished, it was repeated around noon.  
When questioned later, Governor-General Ram told the director of USOM that he had 
“deplored” the spectacle but he “had been forced to comply” since he had been informed 
by the clerics that “popular pressure” against the ban on self-flagellation was so intense 
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that they would have been forced to yield to it, even if no permission was given, and that 
this would have had to be put down violently.81   
Ram saw himself as a mediator between strong-willed cl rics and a stubborn army 
and believed that he was disliked because mediators re always unpopular, but that by 
giving permission he had prevented unnecessary bloodshed.  Governor Masudi also 
defended Ram, claiming that a sudden break with tradition would be unwise, but that 
after allowing the compromise of pre-dawn self-lacer tion in the courtyard of the Shrine, 
the limits of the compromise should have been enforced and no further compromises 
made.  “Tension among the mullahs had mounted at such an alarming rate after 
flagellation was banned,” he maintained, “that there might well have been violent 
disturbances if the Governor General had not temporized.”82  Ram was heavily criticized, 
however, by majles deputy Reza Kadivar as well as by Colonel Soltani and Major 
Arsham, who saw him as “thoroughly pliant.”83   
Although Ram won the support of the clergy, the military was “almost 
contemptuous” over the “spineless” actions of the governor-general. 84  This view was 
shared by the pro-regime publication Aftab-e Sharq, which, on August 31 and September 
1, editorialized against him, saying that he had ignored true Islam and that, instead, 
through him “fanaticism” had been “stirred up” by his vacillation and disrespect of the 
law. In so doing, he had chosen “fanaticism” over the side of the army and the 
“enlightened” people of Iran.85 
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 Self-flagellation represented a clerical “victory” in a tangential issue, but this one 
area of defiance was in contrast to forced compliance i  a multitude of others.  As part of 
the security measures in Mashhad, any mosque or private location taking part in Ashura 
had to first register and have their plans and clerics approved.  Moreover, both the 
administrators and the clerics were compelled to sign a document beforehand in which 
they swore to mention “no foreign country or minority group in Iran” [i.e. America or the 
Baha’is] and, despite “considerable grumbling,” everyone complied.  Restrained in every 
other way and unable to direct their anger externally, thousands directed this frustration at 
their own bodies, mutilating them in their ecstatic identification with the suffering of 
Imam Husayn at the hands of the oppressor Yazid. This suffering was embodied and 
displayed to an unprecedented degree and, although self-flagellation had been reemerging 
since 1941, the scale and severity seen in Mashhad in 1955 was on a different level from 
that observed previously and was considered the most extreme in more than a generation, 
“with several thousand persons parading their wounds through the streets” and over six 
hundred needing hospitalization for serious or critical wounds.86 
 In the view of the Mashhad Consulate, after being suppressed for so long, the 
return of self-flagellation “has become something of a symbol of the re-ascendance of the 
clergy after the harsh control by Reza Shah.”  For,“after years of humiliating suppression 
under the late shah,” it was felt that “the mullahs ave apparently no intention of 
abandoning this privilege without a struggle.”  More ver, it was the Consul’s conclusion 
that this issue, although symbolically significant for these reasons, only rose to become 
the issue of the season due to the way in which it was openly fetishized, abhorred, and 
circumscribed by the state, causing it to receive more interest and participation than 
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would have occurred if there had been no attempts at proscribing it.  Instead, “against 
their will,” the Security Council “managed to abet what was probably the greatest display 
of fanatical slashing since the early reign of Reza Sh h.”87   
 
“I hate Mullahs”: Ramadan, 1956 
The Shah’s cognitive dissonance regarding the coercive nature of his rule was considered 
to be an especially problematic element of the emerging royal dictatorship.  Despite his 
regime’s use of closed-door violence, from almost the beginning of direct rule, the Shah 
continued to maintain the public facade that he wasa modern, Western leader who was 
the antithesis of his “illiterate thug” father.  This veiling of the iron fist beneath the 
gentleman’s glove was attacked in the majles by Deputy Haerizadeh in a tirade which 
was described as the first open “sedition” against the Shah in the majles since the 
Mosaddeq period.  In this October 16 rant—which began with the caveat that he hated the 
Baha’is and had no sympathy for them—Haerizadeh described the violence associated 
with the government-sponsored pogrom as “deplorable” and claimed that the Shah had 
“stifled every bit of liberty in Iran.”  He went on to urge the government to take 
responsibility for what it was.  If it wished to bea dictatorship, he advised, it should be an 
open one and accept responsibility for its actions.  Instead, by ruling like a dictatorship 
while professing to be a democracy, the government was acting “like an ostrich” (camel-
bird in Persian). “When we ask it to fly, it says it is a camel.  When we ask it to carry a 
load, it says it is a bird.”88   





 This rare internal criticism had little or no impact on the Shah, beyond prompting 
him to blacklist Haerizadeh, preventing his re-election, along with the re-elections of 
others who had expressed criticism during 1955, such as Deputy Reza Afshar.  Indeed, 
despite the “jittery” first year of the Shah’s dictatorship, the following year was 
characterized by a “continued growth” in the Shah’s boldness and “direct influence,” 
despite “the growing unpopularity of the security regime.”89   
 As the anniversary of the anti-Baha’i pogrom approached, the regime faced 
Anglo-American pressure to prevent a repeat of the previous year’s violence, but it was 
confident that this would be achieved, given the security forces’ complete success at 
Moharram (with the partial exception of Mashhad, which was, in any case, attributed to 
Ram’s mismanagement rather than clerical strength).  The panic and uncertainty of the 
days before Moharram were now replaced by an almost carefree certainty in the new 
security regime.   
 Unlike the previous year, there were only sporadic anti-Baha’i incidents, all of 
which were locally initiated.  The most significant of these occurred in February, well 
before Ramadan, and involved the harsh harassment of ighty to one hundred Baha’is in 
the village of Hessar (48 km west of Torbat-i-Heidar , in Khorasan).  In this village, in 
addition to other forms of persecution, Baha’is were forced to crawl on the ground and 
were fitted with donkey saddles and made to carry their assailants up and down the street 
for the amusement of the crowd observing the spectacle.    As a result of this humiliation, 
“the entire Bahai population of the village pulled up stakes and left, possibly for 
                                                      




Tehran.”90  No one died in this action, but no one was punished either.  It was hoped that, 
given the obscure rural location, this incident would not be noticed by Iran’s foreign 
patrons, who were still pressing the protection of the Baha’is.  Despite being aware of the 
Hessar incident, Governor-General Ram told the area’s American Consul that there had 
been no new incidents.  Ram’s fear of admitting a new incident was not considered 
surprising in the Consulate’s view, as “It is evident that most Iranian officials are 
sensitive about American criticism of the anti-Bahai incidents last year” and, as a result 
of this ongoing pressure, men like Ram “seem to have an exaggerated idea of the size and 
influence of this sect in the United States.”91   
 There were similar attempts at humiliation in Birjand as well as a “mild economic 
boycott” in some locations.  In the major urban areas, however, the security forces 
insured that the streets were calm and it was felt that they would remain calm “in direct 
proportion to the desire of the central government to keep it quiet.”92  In Southern Tehran 
during Ramadan, for example, an associate of Falsafi incited an anti-Baha’i mob, but this 
was immediately suppressed and all the clerics involved imprisoned for the rest of the 
holy month.  Because of the Shah’s new “tough attitude,” attacks and public 
condemnation like this were infrequent, although “there remains among the populace an 
overtone of hatred against this harmless and progressiv  minority group.”93   
 As part of the enhanced security regime, Falsafi had “been muzzled,” since he 
remained brazenly unrepentant and “continues to breathe fire against the Baha’is.”  To 
contain this threat, he was prevented from speaking publically during Ramadan in 1956, 
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even in his own mosque, and was replaced on state radio by a liberal, pro-government 
cleric who assiduously avoided any topics that were r motely controversial.  Like Falsafi, 
“mullas, high and low, still rankle under the ignominious collapse of last year’s anti-
Baha’i campaign.”  It was only in the less-closely-observed mosques, however, that some 
were brave enough to engage in cautious attacks on the Baha’is.94   
The excessive confidence about Ramadan security in 1956, exhibited both by the 
Shah and his inner circle, was perhaps best exemplified by the Cabinet’s Ramadan tour of 
rural areas by train, on the anniversary of the previous year’s attacks.  Ramadan is, of 
course, the month of fasting during which Muslims do not eat, drink, or smoke during 
daylight hours.  During this Ramadan trip, however, the Cabinet (all of whom were 
professed Muslims) seemed to make a point of cavalierly defying the sanctity of the 
month.  As soon as the train left the station, the ministers demanded something to drink.  
After being offered tea or Pepsi, they grew upset and did not become happy until the 
waiter returned with Johnny Walker Red Label, since “almost all” of the cabinet insisted 
on whiskey.95  The only objections that were raised occurred because some ministers 
began to smoke before the train had left the platform and other ministers felt that this was 
too bold and should be avoided.  These objections were dismissed, however and the 
cigarettes were cupped with hands.  Once the train w s out of sight of the platform, the 
others began lighting up cigarettes.   
As the day progressed, the cabinet ministers stopped to visit various rural 
locations, greet crowds, display the requisite religiosity, and shout slogans before 
boarding the train to smoke and drink and enjoy a sumptuous lunch of chelo kabob, eggs, 
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soup, Pepsi, doogh, whiskey, and two types of ice cream.  Alam was less “one of the 
boys” than the rest, more interested in politics and talking with an American officer along 
for the ride than he was in revelry.  When he was asked if the clerics were giving any 
trouble this year for Ramadan, he said that the only trouble with the ulama occurred in 
Shiraz when one cleric organized protests against increased electricity rates “and I had to 
lock him up.”  Alam, apparently somewhat under the influence, confessed, “I hate 
mullahs!”96 
 Although the disregard for Ramadan sensibilities wa  pursued with at least 
nominal discretion, other scandals were less concealed and became the topic of public 
concern in 1956.  Even Ebtehaj, the head of the Plan Organization known for his “widely 
trumpeted moral rectitude,” was exposed as a “gallivanting” “woman chaser.”  He was 
said to have been having an affair with the wife of one of his subordinates before he was 
“amateurishly surprised by a cuckolded husband,” caught in a fight, and both marriages 
endangered.97  Alam also aroused the Shah’s displeasure for mistreating the peasants in 
his villages, cheating with a woman from an aristocrati  family, and involving himself in 
a series of other problems.98  As for the Shah himself, rumors swirled of the Shah’s 
rampant flirtations, an old story about an illegitimate son resurfaced, and there was also 
“a vague tale of a man who possesses obscene photos of the Shah taken in Europe who is 
trying to get the pictures through to Ayatollah Boruje di, but is being pursued by the 
security forces.”  The Shah was also blamed for the actions of his inner circle, since “the 
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bears imitate the bear trainer.”99  These scandals are not important in and of themselves, 
but are mentioned as an indication of the confidence of the regime, as measured by the 
Cabinet’s lack of discretion.  Whereas, in early 1955, the vices of the Court could be used 
as clerical leverage, and the Queen was shipped to Eur pe to avoid further provoking 
Borujerdi, in 1956 there was brazen disregard for religious sensibilities.  This is not to 
say that the Shah and his Cabinet lived model livesbefore this, but rather that in earlier 
periods there was more fear of the consequence of scandal, and thus more discretion, at 
least while within Iran.  
 The new political reality brought on by the security egime can also be credited 
with the mainstream ulama’s abandonment of violent poli ical demonstrations in favor of 
non-violent civil disobedience, especially boycotts.  This can be seen in the May protests 
in Isfahan over electricity rates, which increased from five to eight rials per kilowatt-
hour.  To protest this development, the Isfahani clergy led a successful city-wide 
electricity boycott for several days.  As a result, the leading cleric involved, Seyyed Falli, 
was exiled to Tehran by Governor-General Farokh, prom ting angry crowds to gather 
outside of Farokh’s house.   Faced with this mob, Farokh called General Zarqam, who 
met the crowd alone, his troops holding back.  He was able to calm the crowd and work 
out an arrangement in which Falli would be allowed to return as long as he ceased this 
course of action.  Zarqam warned them, however, that if e was again forced to intervene 
he “would go to that individual and cut off his beard.”  Electricity rates were reduced to 
ease tensions, but Falli only stayed quiet for a few days before resuming his criticisms.  
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Furious, Farokh and Zarqam had Falli and his brothe taken away to Tehran on a special 
army plane.100   
The most interesting aspect of this episode is that, according to prominent Isfahan 
merchant Mohamed Ordubadi, some of the protesters and at least two of the leading 
clerics were consciously employing Gandhi’s passive resistance techniques.  He noted 
that these techniques only worked when they were directed by individuals with immense 
symbolic capital, like leading clerics, who “directd and focused” such movements.101  
The use of boycotts and other peaceful and “civilized” forms of protest during the 
summers of both 1955 and 1956 suggest that Borujerdi—who was well-read and who 
reached out to the larger Muslim world to an unpreced nted degree—could have been 
consciously employing lessons learned in India and elsewhere.  It is, of course, possible 
that his encouragement of boycotts and civil disobedience was instead based on Iranian 
precedents, such as the Tobacco Protest of the Qajar period, despite Ordubadi’s claims of 
Indian influence.102   
 
“Half a loaf”: the arrest of Kashani and the Hormuzak trial 
The trial of those arrested in connection with the massacre of Baha’is in Hormuzak did 
not begin until a year later, on June 12, 1956.  The reason for the delay has to do with the 
vacillating nature of the Shah.  At first, he supported Alam’s desire to prosecute those 
involved, but when the ulama fell in line and there w re no further major incidents of 
violence against the Baha’is, the Shah told Alam to “let the whole question drop out of 
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sight.”103  This was not unexpected, as the only politicians really pushing for an 
investigation, apart from Alam, were Deputies Haerizadeh and Reza Afshar.  The latter 
was the same deputy who had earlier nearly caused the issolution of the majles due to 
his criticism of the government’s participation in the pogrom (he was not permitted to be 
re-elected as a result of this criticism).104  Later in 1955, however, the Shah reversed 
himself yet again, after the attempt by the Feda’iyan-e Islam to assassinate Prime 
Minister Ala in November.  This violence renewed the Shah’s faith in Alam’s council 
and he ordered that the Hormuzak trial proceed and that the government “take a stronger 
attitude toward religious extremists who meddle in politics.”105  The trial of the 
Hormuzak mob was one part of a larger push against the clergy that included the 
destruction of the Feda’iyan-e Islam and a short-lived attempt to bring Ayatollah Kashani 
to justice for the 1951 murder of General Razmara.   
 Although Borujerdi detested Kashani, he intervened on his behalf after his arrest 
because he was a fellow ayatollah, and he did not wan the precedent to be established 
that ayatollahs could be executed for their fatwas.  Modarespur (a religious leader at the 
leading theological school in Isfahan) explained that, despite Kashani being regarded as a 
black sheep, the potential execution of a prominent aya ollah was regarded by the clerical 
hierarchy as “a direct threat to their interests and their power in the country.”  The son 
and representative of Ayatollah Kafai, the most prominent cleric in Mashhad, likewise 
claimed that they were “distressed to see an ayatollah arrested and brought up for 
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questioning before uneducated ruffians” and that “the arrest of any ayatollah was bound 
to hurt the prestige of the entire clergy.”  Still, he said that Kashani’s support “had always 
been stronger in the bazaar” than with the ulama, and that it would be fine with them if 
Kashani was exiled or imprisoned, if it was done with discretion and he was not killed.  
Grand Ayatollah Shahrestani, from Iraq, was more concerned and actively intervened for 
Kashani, saying that the arrest of a prominent ayatollah “disturbed all of us.”  Petitions 
also arrived from Sunni religious leaders in Baghdad, which claimed that the arrest of 
Kashani “incurs the resentment of the Muslim world.”  Despite clerical pressure to free 
Kashani, there was “almost no public sympathy on his behalf,” due to his smeared 
reputation.  Facing pressure from below, Borujerdi personally intervened for his release 
but, as the price for this intervention, he “has notified Kashani that, no matter what the 
outcome of his case, he is never again at any time to b come involved in political activity 
of any sort.” 106    
 When it came to the Feda’iyan, however, there was no attempt to save Safavi or 
the organization.  Hojjat al-Islam Sebt-e Ashtiani po nts out that the Feda’iyan “never had 
much support” among the clerical hierarchy and that t e majority had been silent about 
their feelings earlier because no one dared criticize the group “out for fear of being 
assassinated himself,” but now “the organization lost virtually all support among the 
clergy.”  Although he also disapproved of Kashani and saw the efforts of the Feda’iyan 
and Kashani as similarly repulsive, Ashtiani did not think that Kashani should be treated 
the same as a lay leader like Safavi.  Kashani was an ayatollah and this was “the highest 
rank in the Shia sect, and the position was one that must compel respect or the whole 
religious structure was weakened.”  As such, he was “uneasy about the possibility that 
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Ayatollah Borujerdi’s [own] position might be effect d” by the Kashani precedent, and 
felt that instead of being killed, Kashani should be exiled to Iraq with “as little disrespect 
as possible.” 107  
At first, Borujerdi’s appeals for Kashani were “swept aside by General Bakhtiar,” 
but Kashani was eventually freed as pressure mounted and the Shah vacillated.  The 
release of Kashani was interpreted by the Americans as a loss of face for the Shah, due to 
his “starting with great fanfare a project which was quietly given up after a few months.”  
It was further noted with displeasure that “This procedure is becoming familiar.”108 
 Following the successful defense of Kashani, Borujerdi enthusiastically took up 
the defense of those involved in the Hormuzak massacre.  Even though this massacre 
took place in violation of his call for calm, Borujerdi felt that Baha’is could be killed with 
impunity according to Islamic law, and he opposed any state efforts to hold Muslims 
accountable for this action.  In any case, many of th se accused were not actually 
involved in the massacre.  Muslim and Baha’i sources both confirm that none of the three 
local instigators were being tried.  Instead, the forty-four selected for trial represented a 
cross-section of the villages involved.109  That is to say, it included innocent or 
marginally involved individuals and the trial was an exercise in collective punishment.  
This was, in many ways, similar to what happened in the aftermath of the 1924 murder of 
American Vice Consul Robert Imbrie (following accusations that he was a Baha’i).  In 
the Imbrie episode, many leaders of the mob action were not charged and a cross-section 
of those on the scene was instead punished to satisfy American pressure for justice.110 
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 Included in the forty-four facing trial for the Hormuzak massacre were a seventy-
year-old man, a forty-year-old woman, and a youth of eighteen.  The accused individuals 
were from a very rural area and were apparently “bewild red” by both Tehran and the 
legal proceedings during the trial.  The legal complexities of their trial were magnified by 
the presence of additional lawyers representing the relatives of the victims, lawyers hired 
by the Baha’i community to support the lackluster prosecution, and twelve lawyers that 
Borujerdi hired to defend the accused villagers.  Borujerdi also provided funds for all 
additional costs related to the defense, including providing for the transport and other 
expenses for the families of the accused to attend the trial.  He also seems to have 
provided funds to support the pro-defense enthusiasts among the audience and 
immediately outside of the courtroom.  These crowds ere organized by senior ulama 
and featured impassioned preachers “constantly going through prayers for the salvation 
of Islam and the confounding of its enemies, with the result that it is often difficult for 
other spectators to hear what is going on.”111  In response to the intimidation of the 
crowds, the five judges on the Tehran High Criminal Court “look slightly nervous and 
may be wishing they were somewhere else.”112  
 In their coverage of the trial, many Iranian papers cited the “unbearable 
provocations” that the Baha’is “offered” to the Muslims of the village, leading to the 
murders.113  There was little sympathy for the Baha’is among ay other group, and the 
trial of the participants in the mob (and others), ather than the instigators, only further 
dissipated what little sympathy existed. 
                                                      





Religious leaders and many of the lower classes who are influenced by the 
religious leaders are already beginning to look on the case as a plot by the Bahais 
to murder innocent Muslims, and popular feeling over th  trial is building up 
somewhat in Tehran.  The leaders of other classes and most educated people, who 
were and are horrified by the details of the crimes, t nd to express an opinion that 
the perpetrators should all be hanged, but then, considering the character of the 
accused, who were evidently driven like sheep to their crime, they state that the  
accused weren’t “really responsible.”114 
 As the trial proceeded, there was little indication of how it would be resolved, 
given that it had evolved into a proxy war between Borujerdi and Alam, with the Baha’is 
also employing every resource available to them in order to overturn the idea that they 
could be killed without legal consequence.  It was felt that: 
This trial represents another minor crisis point betwe n the Shia clergy and the 
Shah’s Government… [The ulama] will bring all possible pressure to bear on the 
Shah and Ala both at high Court levels and through public opinion.  The Baha’i 
community is equally determined to see that the murderers are punished, and the 
Interior Ministry [Alam] reportedly agrees with them at present.  Whether he or 
the Shah will change his mind is another question; certainly neither Alam nor His 
Majesty is known for perseverance and single-mindedess… A verdict of death or 
life imprisonment for any significant number of the d fendants would be a blow 
to the political power of the Shia clergy.  Religious sanction would no longer be 
certain to save a man from the consequences of the criminal code, and the 
practical political power of mullahs would almost certainly decline 
proportionally… An acquittal or purely nominal penalties would be regarded by 
the mullahs as a green light for further persecutions and similar activities in the 
future , and would rouse the deep resentment of the Bahai community, other 
religious minorities, and the larger part of the educated urban classes, as well as 
causing a drop in Iranian prestige abroad if picked up by the foreign press.115 
Conservative politicians, however, felt confident that the Shah “will give way 
under religious pressure,” and would  
typically, attempt to compromise the issue, ordering the judges to free some of the 
defendants and sentencing some of the others to terms as long as five years.  





While this would satisfy no one, neither would it enrage anyone, but would most 
probably set the problem to one side for a time.116 
 It is very telling that—just a year into the Shah’s emerging dictatorship—it was so 
easy for his political opponents to so exactly predict the messy and ineffectual 
compromise that the Shah’s indecision would compel him to make.  On July 9, 1956, the 
trial concluded and, of the forty-four accused, only twenty-one were found guilty and 
these received jail sentences ranging from seven months to four years.117   The judgment 
was universally viewed “as a compromise typical of the present Government”118 and a 
“political not legal decision, not satisfying either side.”119   
These nominal sentences, although preposterously light for serial murder, shocked 
the large conservative crowds that had gathered in sol darity with the prisoners.  In the 
context of the proxy struggle with Alam, what was a relative victory for the accused 
villagers amounted to a humiliating defeat for Boruje di, since anything less than a full 
acquittal was seen as a legal victory for the Baha’is and a blow to clerical prestige, given 
the amount of time and resources that had been invested, the expectation of an acquittal 
that the ulama had promulgated, and the establishment of the precedent that Baha’is 
could no longer be killed with impunity. 
The Baha’is were equally angered, having expected that the guilty would be 
appropriately punished, since the government had gone t  the trouble of moving ahead 
with a trial at all.  The verdicts failed to provide a definitive resolution to their status in 
Iran.  If anything, it indicated that Baha’is could no longer be killed with impunity (as 
occurred earlier in the decade, most famously with the murder of Dr. Berjis), but at the 
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same time the penalty for their death was far less than would result from the killing of a 
non-Baha’i Iranian.  As it was, their lives were not worth less than seven months 
imprisonment, but were not worth more than four years in jail. 
The State Department’s Division of Research feared that the guilty verdicts might 
lead the ulama to assassinate the Shah.  The American Embassy rejected this analysis, 
however, and claimed that, although angry, clerics were not yet enraged to this point, but 
such an eventuality could have occurred if sentences of death had been handed down.  It 
was felt, however, that the remnants of the Feda’iyan-e Islam might attempt to kill the 
Shah in response to the sentencing of the Hormuzak assailants, but that if this occurred 
Borujerdi would disassociate himself from them and leave them in the cold.  The 
Feda’iyan was effectively dead, in any case, since the execution of its leadership 
following the attempt on the life of the Prime Minister, and all that was left were a few 
former members loitering in the bazaars.  In any case,  
The Embassy believes that Ayatollah Borujerdi… would be quite frightened and 
horrified should the Shah be killed or die a natural death, although he is 
undeniably angry and resentful over the Shah’s conduct and policies.  Borujerdi 
and his cohorts are probably well aware that while t e Shah’s regime may be far 
from perfect from their point of view, most successor regimes would, in the long 
run, probably be worse.  A military fascist regime, nationalism of the Mosaddeq 
variety, or even a republic would probably be detrimental, in varying degrees, to 
the status of the clergy.  Borujerdi also knows that, while he cannot control the 
Shah, he can always exert strong influence on him if he screams loudly enough.  
Half a loaf is better than none.120 
 
Continued firmness 
As the summer of 1956 continued, the government’s ati-clerical policies were judged to 
be “firm and wise.”  Clerics across Iran continued to be arrested and brought to Tehran, 
“in accordance with current policy,” for distributing anti-Baha’i literature and agitating 
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against them.121  Still, the British and Americans felt that a strong government was 
needed in order to implement a sufficiently firm attitude towards the ulama, but that the 
Shah was merely stable but not yet “strong.”  To prove this assessment wrong, the Shah 
was constantly insisting that “the Mullahs were now firmly under control.”122   
 The problem, however, was that the definition of “control” was constantly 
expanding and shifting.   On June 27, for example, Secretary of State Dulles told the 
embassy that they should insist on the Baha’is being able to celebrate their holy days, 
since suppression of these rituals “if carried out… would eventually result in the 
strangulation of the Baha’i religion without actual violence.”123  These instructions came 
at the same time that other directives from Dulles w re calling for the Shah to be pressed 
to stop Shi’ite rituals during Ashura (which, by Dulles’ logic above, would cause the 
strangulation of Shi’ism).  What had begun as a strightforward attempt to stop 
communal violence had expanded into a larger project to deny conservative Shi’ites the 
same religious freedoms that the intervention had supposedly been about to begin with. 
 In their reply to Dulles, Tehran stressed that the Baha’i issue is “not a simple one” 
and that the type of large Baha’i gatherings that Dulles wanted his embassy to push for 
would, in their opinion, “almost certainly fan up hatred of the minority.” The claim that 
the denial of the right to assemble amounted to a “strangulation” of the Baha’i 
community was characterized by the embassy as an exgg ration.  On the contrary, they 
maintained that Baha’ism would survive even “under the handicaps which it faces at 
present” and “absolute religious freedom for the Bahais would result in widely-supported 
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mullah countermoves which might seriously endanger int nal security.”  In any case, the 
problem was not religious freedom for the existing Baha’i community but, rather,  
the real issue, as far as the Shia clergy is concerned, is the threat of numbers of 
conversions of young Muslims to Bahaism.  It has been reliably reported that high 
government officials and others have urged the Bahais to cease proselytization 
pointing out that if Islam did not feel threatened by Bahaism, the position of the 
Baha’is would be analogous to that of the safe and respected Zoroastrians.124 
   Prior to Dulles’s intervention, Baha’is had been r stricted to meeting in private 
homes in groups of five or less.  When restrictions eased, larger gatherings and 
celebrations resumed.  Some of these larger gatherings included the welcoming of new 
members who had converted in the previous year but who had not yet had a chance to be 
formally welcomed into the community.125  This continued proselytization during the 
worst period of Baha’i persecution in the Pahlavi period and, more significantly, the 
ability to actually win converts in this environment, seem to legitimize the contemporary 
view that the Baha’i Faith presented a unique threat to the ulama.   
 Since the hard-won promise to exclude Baha’is from the civil service and military 
leadership was “loosely enforced,” Baha’is continued to be perceived as being as much of 
a religio-economic threat as they had been before the previous year’s pogrom.126   As a 
result of this failure to enforce dismissals, and his turn against the ulama who had 
previously been his most loyal supporters, Borujerdi and others continuously raised the 
cry that the “Shah cannot be trusted.”127   
 Hojjat al-Islam Ashtiani informed the American consulate that “what was really 
resented was the Government’s equivocal attitude towards the established religion.”  The 
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government had “promised the clergy to take definite, f rm steps to discharge all Bahais 
from official positions and curb their proselytizing in this country.  Then no sooner had 
these promises been made then every effort was made to avoid them.”  Instead, “the 
officials only made promises which have not been carried out.”  Ashtiani was not 
personally interested in either violence or anti-Baha’ism, but claimed that he was 
nevertheless “disgusted” by the lack of respect and explained that  
What enlightened mullahs want is a Government which treats the Shia religion 
with honesty and respect.  The Shah knows very well hat a debt he owes to the 
clergy for their firm support on the 28th of Mordad [1953 coup].  No other group 
was as unanimous in backing the monarch,.. and the Shah should recognize and 
be grateful for their continuing support… [One] cannot buy such loyalty at any 
price… All that religious circles want is to be treat d honestly and with respect… 
[but] the Government had given definite promises to His Eminence which they 
have failed to carry out.  If they had not intended to do so all along, then they 
should never have taken such a position.  But once the Government gave such 
promises, it should have made every effort to fulfill them.” 128 
 He further adds that while the clergy should avoid politics, it is also the case that 
“the Government should not meddle with religion” and that “if foreign diplomats 
[Americans] attempt to persuade them to do otherwis” then this intrigue should be 
exposed.129 
 It should be noted that, despite its turn against the clergy, the government still 
retained Baha’i properties seized the previous year.  Under American pressure, however, 
scattered Baha’i properties in the provinces began to be returned, although the fate of the 
most important seized assets in Tehran remained “cloudy” more than a year later.  The 
most important seized property was the Tehran Haziratu’l-Quds building (the National 
Baha’i Center), which had been damaged during the Ramadan pogrom.  Despite the 
                                                      




spectacle of the destruction of its dome, which Prime Minister Ala described as an “ever 
present insult” to Muslims, the building itself was left intact.130  It was occupied by the 
forces of General Teymur Bakhtiar, who was Iran’s security czar as well as the military 
governor of Tehran and the head of the 2nd Armored Division. 
 Bakhtiar was known to be pro-American, very much opposed to the British and 
the Russians, and to be filled with ambition, to the point that he spent much of his time 
trying to secure American support if he were to carry out a coup against the Shah, whose 
unpopular regime he denounced as “by and for the upp r class.”  He argued that if the 
Communists were to be prevented from taking Iran, he should be the new man in charge, 
as the Shah did not inspire the people as he would, and Iran could not be free of the Left 
until “people are given genuine hope that the natio is on the march.  They do not have 
such hope at present.”131  Bakhtiar’s scheming eventually resulted in the Shah turning 
against him in 1961, and ordering his assassination in 1970.  In the late 1950s, however, 
Bakhtiar’s importance was second only to Alam, since he was the chief architect of the 
Shah’s security regime, founding and initially heading the secret police upon which the 
regime grew dependent.  Bakhtiar gained his trusted position through the successful two-
year crackdown on Mosaddeq supporters and Tudeh members that followed the 1953 
coup.  As a result of his efforts in this regard, he became the youngest three-star general 
in modern Iranian history (at the age of thirty-nine).  It was also during this period that 
Bakhtiar developed a strong working relationship with the Americans, despite their low 
opinion of him.132   
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132 The British were also weary of Bakhtiar and expressed disgust at his use of torture, but decided that 
since they did not say anything to America about lynchings and other human rights violations, they should 
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 With the anti-clerical crackdown, ostensibly to prevent further anti-Baha’i 
violence, Bakhtiar again worked with the Americans to pursue their policy objectives, 
despite the fact that this time he was sympathetic wi h the anti-Baha’i views of his 
clerical targets, and rather despised the Baha’is that he was protecting.  His “very real 
personal feelings against the Bahais fairly shines through” whenever he addressed the 
subject.133  Like Prime Minister Ala, he had a profound dislike for them, particularly 
when they were “out” as Baha’is.134  Bakhtiar felt that “Bahais may keep their faith, but 
certainly should not be allowed to propagate it.”135  While discussing several high-
ranking Baha’i officers (still in place, despite 1955’s supposed purge), the American 
officer noticed the barely-concealed look of disgust on Bakhtiar’s face.   In the General’s 
view: 
The people are upset… We have religious freedom in this country, but the Bahais 
are not willing to keep quiet and enjoy that freedom; n the contrary, they are 
always trying to spread their own religion, and as a consequence, they hurt the 
feelings of Moslems and upset them.  We have recently tried to persuade Sabet [a 
Baha’i who was one of the wealthiest businessmen in Iran] and other prominent 
Bahais not to proselytize, but up to now they have not indicated that they are 
willing to abandon their previous attitude… At this point Bakhtiar listed several 
members of the Bahai Spiritual Council in Tehran—out of five names mentioned, 
all but one were army officers, colonels and generals.136 
 He went on to speak approvingly of Ala’s plans to ummon Baha’i leaders and 
tell them to “change their tactics” and cease proselytizing.  Like Ala, Bakhtiar was 
primarily offended by the Baha’is’ positive assertion of their identity in public and by 
                                                                                                                                                              
likewise not apply pressure about human rights issue  in Iran (TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1569, Secret minutes 
(and margin notes), March 11-14, 18-19, and 29, 1956). 
133 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 2: 83. 
134 This anti-Baha’i attitude of Bakhtiar, Ala, and other secular nationalists in Iran is described in American 
diplomatic reports as being roughly analogous to the negative attitude shown by Sunni nationalists in 
Pakistan towards the Ahmadis. 
135 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 2: 83. 
136 Ibid., 84. 
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attempts to share their religious beliefs.  He, for example, spoke angrily of the initial 
period after the takeover of the Haziratu’l-Quds, when the Baha’is had left a caretaker 
behind to be present during the occupation.  This continued for some time before 
Bakhtiar “found out that he was trying to subvert the Muslim faith of some of my enlisted 
men and even some of my officers in the Military Government, and I had to send him 
away for his own good.”137  Still, despite his personal feelings, Bakhtiar was committed 
to protect the Baha’is as he had been ordered, and assured the Americans that he was 
“ready to use any means to stop any disorders which may emerge.”138    
 After the security forces’ success in Ramadan 1956, Ashura commemorations in 
the conservative south of Tehran were permitted to be larger than ever, as a 
demonstration to the Americans of Bakhtiar’s success in disciplining the clerics and proof 
of the government’s claim that “it could control any situation.”  Although “bigger and 
more intense” than previous years, there was no anti-B ha’i agitation and there was “no 
disorder” or violence of any kind, due to the actions of the security forces.  In the 
American view, it was felt that “the display of grief was more for their own unhappy 
lives than for their martyr’s death” and the swelling spectacle of staged suffering was 
actually “a way of protesting against the grinding and growing poverty of the Iranian 
masses.”139   
                                                      
137 Bakhtiar added the following digression: “I found a paper in the temple when I took it over, which, in 
beautiful calligraphy, “denounced the Prophet as a liar and bastard”.  I immediately locked the paper up in 
a safe, because if it were made public, it would greatly inflame the mullahs and the people.”  It is unclear 
what he is referring to, but the context and use of fine calligraphy suggest that the text was a passage by the 
Bab or Baha’u’llah that challenged a sacrosanct Muslim belief, such as Muhammad’s station as the last 
prophet.  It could also be that the passage in question alluded to the belief that Baha’u’llah was the“Sender 
of the Messengers” and the “King of the Messengers,” which could have been read by Bakhtiar as a 
diminution, or “bastardization” of the station of Muhammad. 
138 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 2: 84-85. 
139 Ibid., Reel 24: 410-11. 
335 
 
 In the provinces, the security forces were similarly successful in their ongoing 
disciplining of the Islamic movement, with only rare, abortive resistance.  In Tabriz, for 
example, a June article in Payam-e Azerbaijan attempted to “out” the governor-general’s 
chief advisor as a Baha’i.  As a result, all copies of the offending issue were immediately 
confiscated by security forces, the paper lost its license, and the editor was arrested for 
several days.140  As a result of continuous pressure of this sort, by Ashura the population 
was well-disciplined by the state, and processions were subdued and limited. There was 
strong recognition that any form of demonstration, particularly of an anti-Baha’i nature, 
would not be tolerated, and none occurred.  The only disturbance that year took place for 
unrelated reasons, when two processions met from opposite directions and got into a 
scuffle over who had precedence.  Previously, such battles for prestige had ended in 
fatalities, but there was little prestige to fight over during the depressed 1956 
commemoration, and the episode passed with nominal drama.141 
  
Mashhad, 1956 
In 1956, the issue of self-flagellation was again fetishized in Mashhad and used as an 
indicator of the extent to which the clergy was under control.  And, again, there was a 
security “failure” due to the government’s internal conflicts and inefficiencies.  The first 
major misstep involved the decision, shortly before Moharram, to replace Governor-
General Ram, since he was too sympathetic to the clergy.  The new governor-general, 
Farokh, was under orders to prohibit self-flagellation, but did not know how to 
accomplish this, being newly-installed right before Ashura and hearing from the chief of 
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police and others that it was too late to do anythig about that year’s celebrations.  
Despite these handicaps, Farokh’s inability to revese Ram’s tolerance on this matter was 
interpreted by some in the military, and by American observers, as showing lamentable 
indecision “before the entreaties and threats of the mullahs.”142 
 The head of the gendarmerie, disregarding the govern r’s hesitancy, ordered his 
troops to enforce the ban on self-flagellation in the rural areas.  This confusion over the 
government’s attitude was heightened by Tehran’s intrusion at the last minute, instructing 
General Sardadvar—on the seventh day of Moharram (August 14)—to not allow any 
self-flagellation while at the same time telling the governor-general that he was free to 
allow or disallow the practice, and it was his decision.  On August 15, the eighth day of 
Moharram and the beginning of activities, the governor-general received word from 
Tehran that he was to ban the practice, and the issu was no longer up to his personal 
discretion.  Given the miscommunications and chaotic environment, the new governor-
general decided to allow the ritual, since a change at the last possible occasion would 
only lead to confusion and violence.  Thousands again ecstatically participated in the 
ritual of collective suffering through self-flagellation and other forms of self-cutting.  In 
addition to the slicing of the arms and back and head, some even inserted padlocks 
through their muscles.  There were two near-fatalities and for three days the hospitals 
were busy attending to serious injuries.  According to one observer, “the observances this 
year were bigger and better than ever.”143  
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 In response to this display of religiosity in Mashhad, in violation of Tehran’s last-
minute instructions, General Moqadam, the national Chief of Police, was dispatched to 
enforce stricter discipline.  In General Moqadam’s opinion: 
Fanaticism is contrary to the tenets of Islam… Religious teachings and dogma 
should be brought up-to-date to appeal to all classes.  It should be in tune with 
modern-day life.  Educated people cannot accept the reactionary principles 
advocated by many of the clergy, which is a hold-over from Safavid times.  The 
Government is determined to stop these practices…  The manner in which to 
correct these deficiencies is to guide the mullahs toward more enlightened views.  
Since the Quran is most adaptable to these exigencies, their ideas and 
presentations will gradually be improved so that they will be more in accordance 
with the tenets of modern life.144 
During his mission to see that Mashhad more closely followed the new direction 
of the central government, General Moqadam expressed di pleasure at Governor-General 
Farrokh’s “weak stand.”  To show how he believed the government should treat clerical 
sensibilities, he ordered that the cinemas, which had been closed in deference to the holy 
month, be immediately re-opened, and let it be known that there was to be a “firm policy” 
of non-appeasement.  He met with the city’s ayatollhs, was “very firm” and told them 
that unless they did whatever the government asked, “h  would tie their hands behind 
their backs, like bandits, and take them to Tehran.”145 
 
The Baha’is of Mashhad 
Despite the security “failure” in Mashhad, it should be pointed out that there was no anti-
Baha’i violence there during the holy months of 1956.  Although the disciplining of the 
clergy began the previous year in order to prevent anti-Baha’i violence, the issue of self-
                                                      




flagellation completely eclipsed this concern, and ti-Baha’ism, or its prevention, fell 
off the radar.  Even the Mashhadi Baha’is themselves reported that their biggest problem 
was not the clerics, but rather the security forces’ ongoing occupation of their school and 
local center.   
Since the holy city of Mashhad houses the Shrine of Imam Ali Reza, it is a center 
of pilgrimage and has a reputation for conservatism.  As such, the twenty-five hundred 
Mashhadi Baha’is “have been forced to be even more discreet than in the rest of Iran.”  
Despite this caution, which precluded direct visits to the Consulate, arrangements were 
made to interview two prominent local Baha’is, Mr. Javad Quchani (a high school 
teacher still employed by the state despite the supposed dismissal of Baha’is) and Dr. 
Eshrag (a wealthy physician).  Both individuals had been members of the Local Spiritual 
Assembly that administered the affairs of the city’s Baha’i community.  In their view, 
“the Baha’is in Khorasan have always made a practice of being as inconspicuous as 
possible since Meshed is the site of the holiest Shia s rine in Iran.”  They managed to 
avoid incidents and “have been particularly discreet since the anti-Bahai campaign.”   As 
part of this ongoing attempt to avoid notice, the local Baha’i center was not prominent 
like the Tehran headquarters, and instead had been “located on a back street off Jannat 
Street,” next to which they maintained a small school inside of an inconspicuous four-
room house.  During the previous year’s Ramadan pogrom, both properties were seized 
by security forces.  In the year since then there had been no indication that the properties 
would be returned.  No compensation had been given, and the furniture and other 
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valuables housed within the properties had been taken way and used to redecorate the 
local army headquarters.146   
When asked about the composition of the community, the Consulate was 
informed that “some are flour mill owners or shopkeep rs, others doctors, photographers, 
teachers and mechanics.”147  In addition, the community used to include two prminent 
brothers, landlord Hosein Ghani and Professor Ghasem Ghani.  Hosein Ghani owned a 
number of cotton gins in Mashhad and throughout the region and was an avowed Baha’i 
until a recent conversion to Islam—although most Mashhadis doubted that this was 
sincere and saw him as a crypto-Baha’i seeking to avoid anti-Baha’i hostility that might 
threaten his continued prosperity.  His late brother, Dr. Ghasem Ghani, was a former 
Cabinet member and member of the Shah’s traveling entourage.  He had also taught 
Persian at Columbia and was in the Iranian delegation at the founding of the United 
Nations.  Apparently, Ghasem Ghani had a Baha’i ident ty earlier in his life but 
abandoned or dissimulated this identity later in life.148  There were also numerous Baha’is 
in the gendarmerie as well as many Baha’i officers among the military forces stationed in 
the area (who were not included in the reported 2,500 Baha’is in the city, due to their 
impermanence).  The defining characteristic of thisrelatively affluent community was 
that, unlike the illiteracy of the general population, they were “100% literate.”  This was 
described as an indication of the “predominantly middle class appeal of the Bahai creed,” 
since the educated middle class were “shut out of the closely-interrelated aristocracy” but 
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148 Ghani’s family now denies his Baha’i identity.  See Cyrus Ghani’s A Man of Many Worlds: The 
Memoirs of Dr. Ghasem Ghani (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2006).  The American Consulate in 
Mashhad, however, considered Professor Ghani to have been a Baha’i, and only mention conversion to 
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occurred “recently,” i.e. most likely a conversion f convenience after the 1955 pogrom.  
340 
 
could instead find a shared community and upwardly-mobile worldview through “the 
ideals of Baha’ism.”149   
When asked if Baha’is had really been dismissed as promised by the government 
the previous year, Quchani and Eshrag claimed that this was not really enforced and that 
the matter had been dropped by both the government and he clergy after the previous 
year’s partial dismissals.  They claimed that out of all the Baha’i officers that they were 
aware of in the area, none had been fired, although some had been transferred and some 
had quit.  Of the thirty Baha’is employed by the Department of Education, fourteen were 
dismissed, while the majority remained.150    
 
“Centuries and civilizations apart”: Ashura in South Tehran, 1957 
Despite nominal anti-Baha’i threats, pressure continued to be applied to the ulama in 
1957.  The focus shifted, however, to the larger issue  of “progress” and the path that Iran 
needed to take to satisfy American demands that fanticism be firmly dealt with as a pre-
requisite for reform and for continued American faith in the Shah’s government.  In this 
context, rituals like self-flagellation during Ashura, which have no direct connection to 
vigilance on the anti-Baha’i front, were nevertheless again thrown into the mix as part of 
an ever-growing definition of the “firm” steps that the Shah needed to take against the 
clergy.  The Shah was made to retain “the knowledge that modern day nations do not 
permit these barbaric practices” but instead exhibit “revulsion towards fanaticism,’ for 
“too powerful a reactionary clergy bodes ill for the Nation.”151   
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 Although typically less hands-on than their American counterparts, the British 
were similarly concerned about clerical discipline and returning the clergy to its “place.”  
In connection with this, arrangements were made for a representative to witness and 
report on Tehran’s security arrangements for the 1957 Ashura commemoration.  On the 
holy day, J.W. Russell, along with his wife in full chador, a plainclothes police inspector, 
and a local tough employed by a labor boss who helped organize the Ashura processions 
in Southern Tehran, all set off to the south of the city to observe the event.   
 In his fascinating report, Russell begins by pointing out that the Shah’s father had 
“greatly disliked anything [like Ashura] which smacked of the picturesque and 
unprogressive past, [and] did his best to put an end to the whole thing.”  He noted that 
Mohammad Reza Shah, although at first allowing the return of prohibited rituals early in 
his reign, had now greatly restrained them.  He expressed approval that there was no 
longer any self-cutting, unlike previous years, when one would see “a man snap a 
padlock shut through his biceps!”152  In the collective mourning, he noted, participants 
used to draw blood freely before the new policy, “but now the police (and military police) 
with fixed bayonets who march with each group contrl this strictly and curb the more 
violent excesses… At the end of the mourning you see a good many of the chain men 
with bare backs like pieces of raw beef, but it is rare nowadays to see blood actually 
flowing.”153  Still, he faulted the Shah for continuing to allow the “emotional release” of 
other Ashura rituals that his father had forbidden, and was confused because “Persians as 
a whole dislike and despise the Arabs and it is curious and illogical that they should 
mourn with such violence the death of a remote Bedouin Sheikh [Husayn].”  Eventually, 
                                                      





he concluded that “in reality they are mourning the architect of the Great Schism, who 
gave them over the years some sort of spiritual independence from the conquerors.”154    
Russell reported that he was lucky enough to see Shaban Jafari—better known as 
Shaban “the Brainless” (bimokh)—during the processions.  Shaban was perhaps the most 
infamous tough used during the 1953 coup.  He was “a vast oafish giant of a man about 
seven feet tall, with shoulders and arms like a gorilla, and more than one assassination to 
his credit.”  But at this point, he had become involved in the women’s suffrage movement 
and was also spotted “in the improbable costume of a Scout master.”  Russel found this 
kind of people watching, and the general atmosphere of the south of the city, to be far 
more interesting than the religious events, since “most of the sermons are revivalist stuff 
of a high emotional and low intellectual standard.”155  In his opinion: 
…the greatest fascination in this spectacle was the rev lation of a world new to 
me in the heart of the city where we live and have our being; but of which we 
know so small a part.  The Tehran that we saw on the Tenth of Muharram is a 
different world, centuries and civilizations apart from the gaudy, superficial botch 
of Cadillacs, hotels, antiques-shops, villas, tourists and diplomats, where we run 
our daily round.  The Shah, Point IV and the Seven-Y ar Plan have little place in 
this close world of dusty alleys that lie between the bazaar and the birch-fields.  
But it is not only poverty, ignorance and dirt that distinguish the old south of the 
city from its parvenu north.  The slums have a compact self-conscious unity and 
communal sense that is totally lacking in the smart districts of chlorinated water, 
macadamed roads and (fitful) street lighting.  The bourgeois does not know his 
neighbor: the slum-dweller is intensely conscious of his.  And in the slums the 
spurious blessings of Pepsi-Cola civilization have not yet destroyed the old way 
of life, where every man’s comfort and security depend on the spontaneous, un-
policed observation of a traditional code.  Down in the Southern part of the city 
manners and morals are better and stricter than in the Villas of Tajrieh…And 
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against the outside world—which includes all Tehran north of Gulestan—the 
front is close and firm.156 
 To support his argument about Southern Tehran, Russell uses the example of the 
“communist adventurer” Khosre Ruzbeh, who was openly living in the southern slums 
for seven years even though he was wanted for half-a-dozen murders and there was a 
reward on his head.  Still, in Southern Tehran  
…no-one betrayed him: whatever his politics he was one of them: he belonged: it 
was his town… [Unfortunately] all this, I suppose, will go soon, as education, 
hygiene and a higher standard of living begin to penetrate the foetid alleys of the 
slums…[but] perhaps, though, it no longer has a place in a city now at last 
emerging from the Oriental Middle Age.157  
 In his romanticized and condescending descriptions, Ru sel writes as if he made 
his journey in a time machine rather than an automobile.  For him, the south of the city 
represented a living museum, a window into a romanticized past that inexplicably 
persisted in pockets into modern times, but which would soon disappear with the spread 
of modernity.  These “relics” of the past are treated as a source of nostalgia, but also as a 
source of fear and revulsion.  For him, whatever benefits the south of the city had, this 
was irrelevant as progress was perceived, in Hegelian terms, as unidirectional, moving 
from magic to religion to the age of science, or “Pepsi-Cola civilization,” as Russel terms 
it (interestingly so, given that the Pepsi brand has B ha’i connotations in Iran, since an 
Iranian Baha’i ran the franchise).  As a result of the wholesale acceptance of the myth of 
unidirectional “progress,” he is able to, without a second thought, link the introduction of 
hygiene to the willingness to sell out a neighbor for money.   





 It is also worth noticing that the South is described as not simply being 
“medieval” or in the “Middle Ages,” but rather as being in the “Oriental Middle Age.”  
The implication being that while for Europe the Middle Ages was a specific, concluded 
period, in the Middle East the “Middle Age” was a st te of civilization that was 
disconnected from any specific historic period, andwhich was instead measured by the 
degree of Westernization.  Whereas in Europe, “Middle” referred to the period between 
the classical and the modern, in Iran the “middle” referred to the period between ancient 
Iranian civilization (i.e. the pre-Islamic)  and the emerging Westernized client state (post-
Islamic).  That is to say, the “middle” or “medieval” was actually a euphemism for Islam 
and a pejorative that simultaneously marked it as civilizationally inferior, barbaric, 
doomed to expiration, and chronologically displaced from the modern world, in which it 
was felt to have no place. 
 
“How much better it was to act civilized”: Mashhad, 1957 
Following the failure to fully discipline Mashhadi clergy in the first two years of the anti-
clerical initiative, Tehran was eager to prevent a hat trick.  They managed to accomplish 
this through an unprecedented security push in the holy city.  As a result, Ashura in 1957 
was a somber and temperate affair, despite the record number of fifty to sixty thousand 
pilgrims.  It took place “without the usual high religious feeling and self-flagellation” that 
had existed every year since 1941.   Very few onlookers were allowed to gaze on the 
processions and, instead, police and army troops lined every route and participants were 
“shunted in and out of the Shrine expeditiously andthen dispersed.”  As a result, “the 
ardour of the groups was considerably dimmed.”  A few individuals encouraged self-
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flagellation despite the troop presence, but they wre immediately seized and imprisoned.  
Further back, tanks were manned and “strategically stationed” at Chahar Bagh Square, 
near the American consulate,  and at the square leading to the Shrine, in order to show 
that the government would not negotiate or equivocate.158  
 In this context, 
There was much less lamenting and breast-beating…. [And] it became apparent 
that the government’s policy of non-flagellation prevailed this year after failing 
the past two years.  The power of the mullahs [in Mashhad] was broken for the 
first time since Mohamed Reza Shah has taken the mantle of power over from his 
megalomaniac father.159 
Although some of those Mashhadis who were opposed to traditional “excesses” 
were grateful and self-congratulatory for having a “bloodless wake” and “agreed how 
much better it was to act more civilized,” the success of the Ashura measures was 
something of a surprise to the regime, given the events earlier in the year.160  In the 
months leading up to the Moharram “test,” religious sensibilities had been enraged and it 
was widely assumed that the “powder keg might explode.”161  This danger was enhanced 
by the long-awaited completion of the Mashhad-Tehran railway, which further raised the 
danger level because, although it facilitated the easy introduction of tanks and outside 
troops, it also allowed outside agitators ease of access to the city. 
The controversies in Mashhad included persistent rumo s about Jews kidnapping 
Muslim children and selling them to Americans and others to experiment on.  It took the 
intervention of Bakhtiar’s intelligence forces stop the publication and circulation of such 
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reports. 162  Another cause of controversy was the May 26 “toile  Koran” incident.  This 
occurred when numerous Qur’ans were found at the bottom of a large public toilet near 
the Shrine, immersed in feces.  The incident was used by Ayatollah Kafai’s camp in order 
to embarrass, and force the removal of, the anti-cler cal administrator, Dr. Shademan, 
who was the Shah’s appointee and representative at th  Shrine.  Surprisingly, Shademan 
won this contest, leaving the ayatollah “somewhat sken and chastised.”  Kafai’s loss of 
face, and the toilet incident in general, was an object lesson that shook the city’s clergy 
and likely “affected their morale and will to resist.”163 
 Following this incident, General Bakhtiar himself came to Mashhad to reinforce 
the call for firmness made earlier by his rival, Moqadam.  He came with orders to finally 
and decisively prevent clerical “excesses” in Mashhad during Ashura.  With the arrival of 
Bakhtiar himself, it was felt that the tide would turn, since “mullahs are notorious for 
their propensity to stay in the background at the first sign of trouble—in contrast to their 
beloved Hosein.”164   
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“agreed that the best solution would be to find some mentally incompetent person, put the blame on him 
and shunt him off to some inaccessible place.  Witnesses would be obtained to substantiate that such a 
person had, in fact, done the dead.”  Kafai publicized this discovery of the “guilty” party through telegrams 
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doctor examining him refused to find him insane.  Later, there were rumors that the British were behind the 
toiled incident, and further rumors that “the Americans had instigated the Bahais to perform the deed with 




 While congratulating himself over his role in the success during Ashura, 
Governor-General Farokh pointed out how difficult his task had been, as he was 
following a weak and vacillating man.  He claimed that Ram had so empowered the 
clergy that they at first failed to recognize that the tide had changed and were completely 
disregarding the government’s insistence on banning self-flagellation during Ashura, 
instead buying white clothes (used to dramatically highlight and display the blood spilled 
by the wearer), as well as swords and other equipment.  Moreover, Farokh claimed that 
he achieved this victory despite being surrounded by people who “lacked confidence and 
were unsure of their capabilities in enforcing the ban.”  But, as a result of the clergy’s 
humiliation and loss of face during Ashura, he feltthat “the government will have less 
trouble in the future enforcing its will…The power of the mullahs has suffered a blow.”  
Dr. Shademan also gloated over the cowing of those who had attempted to frame him 
over the “toilet Qur’ans” incident, and expressed pleasure that they had been “put in their 
place” and their power “shattered.”  Even the American consulate joined in the 
backslapping, declaring that “the imposed peace was delightful.”165 
 
“Completely cowed”: the emergence of SAVAK 
In 1957-58, the informal intelligence and security services that had been operating under 
the direction of General Bakhtiar during the 1953-5 repression of Tudeh and the post-
1955 repression of the clergy became formalized with the creation of SAVAK.  This 
infamous organization, also known as the National Itelligence and Security 
Organization (Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), was led by General Bakhtiar 
from its inception until the Shah turned against Bakhtiar in 1961.  Although this new 
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organization was an expansion of the security initiatives between 1953 and 1957, the new 
organization allowed for greater reach, resources, training, manpower, and efficiency.  
Moreover, the organization benefited from training by Mossad and the CIA, which 
regularized and greatly enhanced the professionalism and coercive capabilities of Iran’s 
security forces. 
 This enhanced espionage training was obviously useful, but the formal creation of 
SAVAK provided a number of more mundane, but necessary, resources, such as office 
space.  In the years immediately before the creation of SAVAK, for example, General 
Bakhtiar largely directed the nationwide effort to discipline the clergy from out of the 
Baha’i National Center, which his men had occupied since 1955.  He had agreed to return 
this building after the end of martial law, but did not follow through on this.  His excuse 
for maintaining the property was that he needed the office space and that he kept his 
intelligence files and “personal dossiers” there.166  He was very much opposed to the 
American insistence that the building be returned, and instead wanted to use the National 
Baha’i Center as his permanent office, renovate it, and use it as the headquarters of the 
newly-created SAVAK.  His desire to usurp the property was understandable, since this 
imposing structure was reportedly worth millions when it was seized.167  Upon hearing of 
the planned reconstruction of the property, Colonel Khosrovani (a Baha’i and the wealthy 
head of a sports club) tried to save the property by offering to buy it.  He wished to use it 
as a business place rather than see the landmark renovat d for Bakhtiar’s use.168  This 
                                                      
166 Ibid., Reel 24: 425. 
167 Ibid., 326. Presently, this building is being used to house one of the sub-offices of the present regim ’s 
Department of Islamic Propaganda (Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat-e Hojjat al-Islam Falsafi, p. 165 n4). 
168 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 425. 
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was ultimately unnecessary, however, as American pressure eventually secured the return 
of the property to the Baha’i community.169  
 Moharram 1958 was the first Ashura commemoration snce the full establishment 
of SAVAK and, with that year’s coup in Iraq, the new intelligence agency was eager to 
prove itself.  Even in 1957, before the formal establishment of SAVAK, there had been 
no anti-Baha’i violence or objectionable ritual excss, so there was a conscious attempt to 
go even further in 1958 and ensure that under SAVAK clerics were “completely 
cowed.”170  Although the situation in Iraq strengthened this re olve, the plan for a 
demonstration of power during Moharram was initiated b fore the coup and fit into the 
ongoing disciplining of the clergy treated above.   
 As part of the management of Moharram, there were ord rs “to permit no 
disturbances, parades, or public flagellations,” and “the orders were thoroughly carried 
out.”  In Abadan, for example, the result was a “morgue-like stillness” in which believers 
were only allowed on the street in order to attend mosque and then return home.171  When 
the mayor expressed his fear that the transformation to a police state would provoke 
rather than restrain the masses, this was rejected by the American Consulate who very 
much approved of the new show of strength vis-à-vis the clerics.   
 To keep participants in the allowed, temperate processions in line, religious 
leaders were forced to sign sworn statements promising not to engage in prohibited 
                                                      
169 At a breakfast meeting on May 28 (1957), General Bakhtiar explained to American officers that the 
Tehran Baha’i Center, which he had held for over two years and was scheduled to have been returned ten 
days before the meeting, would instead be returned ten ays later.  There was limited transfer of posses ion 
earlier, but an army sentry was placed in front of the property and there was the condition that Baha’is were 
not to engage in “public demonstrations” on the property.  This condition was felt to be purely academic, 
since this large center located off of Takht-e Jamshid had never been used for demonstrations of any kind 
and the only large crowds there were for conventions (i  which the Baha’is’ National Spiritual Assembly 
was elected) and for sports matches (Ibid., Reel 11: 338.). 
170 Ibid., Reel 24: 448. 
171 Ibid., 446. 
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excess.  Clerics were sternly threatened with harsh consequences for “fanatical excess,” 
and SAVAK conducted extensive spying on all religious leaders and organizations, while 
the police and military jointly supervised the public proceedings.172  Government officials 
were, for the first time, no longer allowed to participate in religious processions, while 
religious leaders who refused to sign agreements not to engage in “excessive” religiosity 
were imprisoned.  Security forces were stationed throughout the city, were instructed to 
use their bayonets on violators, and they enforced th se orders “as if their very futures 
depended on it—which was no doubt the case.”  At every religious gathering, in the 
background “the hand of the government (SAVAK) was obvious.”   With this new tough 
attitude, the government finally showed to Western satisfaction “that it was willing to 
knock heads and put people in jail to enforce its policy.”173 
 The groups most negatively impacted by the new security regime during Ashura 
were those who were deprived of ritual-based income, any of whom now became 
dependent on government bribes.  This suited official plans, since “by keeping them in its 
pay by opening up the cash boxes at… the SAVAK office,” the government “has shown 
that it intends to dominate the mullas.”174  Through this strategy, many clerics and lesser 
religious figures became de facto employees of the government, following its instructions 
and feeding it information.  Even Ayatollah Kafai (Khurasani) acted as an informant for 
SAVAK, feeding the agency information on which of his followers expressed approval of 
the fall of the Iraqi monarchy.175 
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SAVAK’s management of Moharram continued in 1959 and security forces were 
able to maintain “strict control” despite the unusually large crowds (since those who 
would have gone to Najaf and Karbala were now compelled to stay home due to the 
difficulties traveling to Iraq).  Despite the crowds, observances were “even more 
restricted than last year.”176  Security details were placed on every train, on every street 
used by the processions, and at every religious building.  There were also additional 
allotments of troops to protect foreigners and other argets.   
As a result of SAVAK’s infiltration, observation, and system of informants, 
threats to Jewish and Baha’i interests were discovered arly and dealt with through the 
deployment of additional troops tasked with protecting hese minorities. 177  Even before 
SAVAK, the security forces’ post-1955 focus on the cl rics made it almost impossible for 
any organized anti-Baha’i campaign to reemerge (as evidenced by the aforementioned 
series of abortive attempts); with the emergence of SAVAK, such developments became 
impossible.   
In response to this new climate, anti-Bahai activities ook place primarily through 
the Hojjatiyeh Association from the late 1950s until shortly after the 1979 Revolution.  
This group (discussed in the following chapter) hada non-violent agenda aimed at 
peacefully blocking conversion to Baha’ism and convincing Baha’is to “return” to Islam.  
It went through the appropriate channels and receivd SAVAK approval, with the 
understanding that opposition remain strictly non-violent and “cultural.”178  With this 
shift, we see that even anti-Baha’ism became nationlized and subsumed under state 
control, in sanitized form. 
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 Under SAVAK’s direction, restrictions on Shi’ite public ritual were increasingly 
accompanied by the use of state propaganda that claimed that the religious practices 
targeted by the government were actually “inimical to the precepts of Islam.”179  Not only 
was this rhetoric ineffectual and patronizing, but it surped the clerical prerogative to 
determine what was and was not “Islamic” and arrogated it to the state.  This 
nationalization of the ability to speak for Islam was different from what occurred under 
Reza Shah, when Shi’ite identity was marked as opposed to national identity, and many 
symbols of Shi’ism (such as Islamic dress) and many of the functions of the clergy (such 
as education and law) were replaced by newly created national symbols (such as the 
Pahlavi cap) and national institutions (such as state schools), through coercion.180  
Mohammad Reza Shah was not attempting this.  The gov rnment’s new plan was not to 
excise Shi’ism, but to instead slowly replace traditional, “reactionary” Shi’ism with a 
“modern” and passive variant that could be co-opted by the state and used to promote a 
Shah-centered nationalism.  This attempt to nationalize nd control Islam and its 
traditional institutions actually has more in common with the policies of Nasser, the 
Shah’s contemporary and rival, than it did with those f his father.181   
In the 1959 Moharram commemorations, this co-option and re-purposing of the 
clergy was further expanded.  SAVAK expressed a strong desire to make use of the 
sufficiently “cowed” ulama by using them as instruments of state propaganda during the 
holy month.  Before the beginning of Moharram, for example, General Bakhtiar visited 
the previously defiant Mashhad to meet with the leading clerics and make arrangements 
                                                      
179 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 24: 447. 
180 See Appendix II. 
181 In Egypt, this state co-option of traditional Sunni institutions (such as al-Azhar) eventually contributed 
to the rise of alternative Islamic movements opposed to the state, and the same occurred in Iran, althoug  
with very different results due to the differences b tween the regimes and due to differences in the 
dynamics of religious authority  in Sunnism and Shi’ism. 
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for what they were to say.  Leading clerics were made to stress love for the Shah and 
hatred of the Soviets, and this was broadcast on state radio.  All major clerical addresses 
were at least partially scripted by SAVAK.182 
 
Conclusion 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s turn against the clergy, at first glance, seems similar to his 
father’s anti-clerical action a generation before, especially given the key oppositional role 
played by Mashhad in both instances.  The similarities were superficial, however, as Reza 
Shah’s anti-clerical efforts were undertaken as a rel tively free agent, in emulation of 
Ataturk, and with a genuine disdain for the religious class.  His son, on the other hand, 
had a laissez-faire attitude towards the clergy for the first dozen years of his reign, 
allowing the reversal of most of the religious restictions that had been put in place 
during his father’s time and, with the Mosaddeq crisis, he even came to rely on the 
traditional clergy as his most important domestic supporters, to whom he was indebted 
for the important roles that they played in the plot to restore him to power in 1953.  
Unlike his father, Mohammad Reza Shah’s turn against the clergy was not (at first) 
motivated by deep personal beliefs or any guiding ideology.  He turned against them 
because his patrons told him to do so and warned him of the devastating politico-
economic consequences of non-compliance.  Whereas Rza Shah was the driving force 
behind his anti-clerical policies, Mohammad Reza Shh was an insecure and confused 
participant in an anti-clerical agenda that was foited on his regime by its foreign patrons, 
with the young Shah often expressing unease and unsucce sfully suggesting delay or 
compromise (at least in the early period).   
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It was in this context that what began in 1955 as aWestern attempt to end 
embarrassing communal violence in a key client state developed, by the end of the 
decade, into a far more important series of policy shifts relating to Iran’s internal 
religious policy.  The initial pressure that was applied to the Shah’s government in order 
to suppress the clergy vis-à-vis the Baha’i issue snowballed as time went on until it 
included a push for a more wholesale disciplining of the clergy, for their removal from 
politics and public space, and for their eventual inc usion as “cowed” mouthpieces for the 
regime, by the end of the decade.  This series of events contributed to the development of 
many of the most defining—and eventually damning—features of the Pahlavi state, 
including the expansion of General Bakhtiar’s informal intelligence forces into the large, 
efficient, and bureaucratized secret police upon which the regime came to rely for its 
survival.   
It was, moreover, this taming of the Right, added to the earlier suppression of the 
Left, which provided the rationale for pushing ahead with the series of nationwide 
reforms that began in 1959 and which were eventually formalized and expanded in 1963 
as the “White Revolution.”  The anti-clerical implications of this program were serious 
enough to cause the ulama to return to large-scale anti-government protests.  This return 
to public revolt, which will be explored in the foll wing chapter, was sparked by the 
White Revolution, but this was not its origin.  Rather, this explosion of dissent developed 
out of a very specific context which must be understood if one is to accurately assess the 
clerical anger that fed into these developments.  Khomeini’s early political rhetoric 
(against the Americans, the Baha’is, and the regime) was more than just paranoia-laced 
appeals to xenophobia and communalism; these emotive appeals spoke to the years of 
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frustration, suppression, and betrayal experienced by his generation.  This chapter has 
attempted to get at this crucial context by de-centeri g the Shah-clergy binary and instead 






“I Am Reza Shah!”: 
Revolution from Above, 




When Mohammad Reza Shah began to assume direct control f Iran in 1955, he finally 
stood up to his mother.  During a heated conversation with her he “banged his fist on the 
table and shouted:  ‘I will be Reza Shah!  I am Reza Shah!’”1  This desire to emulate his 
father’s legacy can most clearly be seen several years further into his dictatorship, in the 
Shah’s ambitious series of reforms known collectively as the “White Revolution,” later 
renamed as the “Shah and People Revolution.”  While Reza Shah’s initiatives suppressed 
surface-level markers of Muslim identity, his son’s reform program was seen to threaten 
the very foundation of Islam in Iran.  The “White Rvolution” initially involved six 
points (later expanded to nineteen) and while some f them were innocuous (such as the 
nationalization of forests) others, like land reform, were seen to directly threaten the 
ulama by removing income derived from endowments and by weakening the power of 
the traditional elite.  Other reforms, such as the enfranchisement of women, were seen as 
patently anti-Islamic measures, were marked as “Baha’i,” and were perceived to be part 
of a larger attempt to do away with Islam and the ulama.   
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Although the White Revolution was not formally initated until 1963, the two 
most controversial elements (land reform and the enfranchisement of women) were raised 
in the majles in 1959.  These issues caused Ayatollah Borujerdi to return to the political 
realm, uniting the clergy and successfully forcing the Shah to indefinitely delay his plans.   
After Borujerdi died in 1961, these issues and others were reintroduced in 1962 
and 1963, with the ulama again rallying in oppositin.  In this second wave, Khomeini 
became famous for his caustic criticism of the regime and for his subsequent 
intransigence, even after facing imprisonment and exile.  Khomeini’s growing network of 
supporters then developed a military wing, which attrac ed former members of the 
Feda’iyan-e Islam.  One of these Feda’is-turned-Khomeinists killed Prime Minister 
Mansur in 1965.  Supposedly etched into the assassin’s gun was the message: “Islamic 
government must be created.”2 
Whereas previous chapters discuss the imagining of the limits of the “Islamic 
nation” that was said to constitute Iran, this chapter explores the early articulation of this 
nation’s claim to “sovereignty.”  I argue that the cl rical opposition in this period was in 
many ways a continuation of developments that began in the preceding two decades.  In 
particular, I discuss the continued importance of anti-Baha’ism as a unifying element and 
a potent rallying cry, the continuation of the turn against the clergy that initially began 
following the 1955 pogrom, and the significance of the staging of the 1963 uprising in 
Moharram, in light of the repression in Moharram discussed in the previous chapter.   
Before exploring more explicit confrontations with the state, I discuss the 
“loathing” beneath Borujerdi’s quietude and I explore the Hojjatiyeh Society as an 
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Works of Imam Khomeini, 1995), p. 237 n5. 
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example of passive resistance that worked to promote an exclusivist, Shi’ite sense of 
national identity.  I also address the positivist roots of reform efforts, which were rooted 
in the shift in American foreign policy that occurred following the 1955 pogrom.  The 
rest of the chapter proceeds in roughly chronological order, exploring key episodes of 
clerical opposition while paying special attention t  the continued importance of anti-
Baha’ism up until the uprising of Moharram 1963.  After these revolts were put down 
with a great deal of bloodshed, this founding tragedy was discursively integrated into 
Khomeinism in a way that largely effaced the early importance of the Baha’i issue, and 
acted as a new rallying cry with which to create a united front. 
 
“Loathing for the system”  
After his loss of face in 1955, Borujerdi largely abandoned efforts to force the 
government to take action against the Baha’is.  This left only three options for those who 
wished to continue the anti-Baha’i struggle: operat through peaceful and SAVAK-
approved groups like the Hojjatiyeh (discussed below), defy Borujerdi and engage in 
autonomous anti-Baha’i efforts that would likely lead to a visit by SAVAK, or stew 
impatiently while remaining loyal to Borujerdi.  A number of future revolutionaries fell 
into the third group.3 
 Khomeini later claimed that, during the period after the anti-Baha’i pogrom of 
1955, “I went every day to encourage His Holiness’s anti-Baha’i activity in order to rid 
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issue.  There were also a number of other major areas of concern (such as Israel and American policy) that 




the administration of Baha’is, but by the following day he had gone cold on the issue.”4  
This sense of hopelessness—which had been building in Borujerdi since the early 
attempts at lobbying the regime discussed in Chapter III—was intensified because of the 
reification of the idea that Iranian Baha’is were potected by foreign powers.   Jafarian, 
for example, expresses the persistent clerical viewthat, “without a doubt” Baha’is were 
protected after 1955 because the government “was under pressure from America and the 
Bahai-protecting Zionists.”  For this reason, “the Baha’is were the only group that the 
government did not clash with.”  Instead, he claims that the Baha’is’ consolidation of 
power only increased after 1955.5 
 Despite his lack of active engagement with the state in the years immediately after 
1955, Borujerdi called upon Muslims (including those in government) to shun the 
Baha’is economically and socially.  In 1957, for example, he commands: “Muslims are 
required to give up their mixing together (mokhaletah), social intercourse (mo’asherat), 
and business dealings (mo’ameleh) with this sect.”  But he insists: “I demand calm of 
Muslims, and that order is carefully preserved.”6  Although this approach demonstrates 
Borujerdi’s persistent belief in loyal opposition to the Court, this fatwa was used by anti-
regime activists to legitimize their actions, since th  regime violated Borujerdi’s ruling by 
continuing to do business with, and offer protection t , businesses run by Baha’is, such as 
the Iranian Pepsi franchise.7  
 Although Borujerdi’s ongoing insistence on boycotts was ignored by most 
Iranians, it was very effective in areas where it was actively encouraged.  Montazeri 
                                                      
4 Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (New York: I. B. Taurus, 1999), p. 67. 
5 Jafarian, Jaryanha, p. 369.  
6 Ibid., p. 165. 
7 Ibid., pp. 71-71.   
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relates that after an anti-Baha’i boycott had been successfully staged in Najafabad, the 
Baha’is of the city were forced to leave or go underground to “hide themselves from the 
public gaze.”  In other words, they were forced to retreat from an “out” to a closeted 
identity.  They were still there, but because they no longer had a public existence 
Montazeri could claim that they had been “eliminated.”8  The trauma of the 1955 pogrom 
and ongoing harassment and surveillance by the Hojjatiyeh caused a similar effect 
nationally, as Iranian Baha’is retreated from public space.  A CIA report, for example, 
notes that, by the 1970s, the Baha’i community in Ira  had become a closed community 
that “maintains a compartmented organization and considerable secrecy.”9 
British and American reports confirm that Borujerdi continued to refuse to have 
anything to do with the Shah in the late 1950s because of his failure to follow through on 
his agreement to Baha’i dismissals and his continued closeness to Dr. Ayadi, who 
accompanied him on almost every trip outside of Iran.10  In addition to the Baha’i issue, 
Borujerdi increasingly saw the regime as fundamentally unacceptable and un-Islamic 
because of its rigged elections, encouragement of women’s rights, and the Shah 
“allowing” Queen Soraya to travel around Europe unaccompanied and scantily clad.  
 Borujerdi’s souring on actively lobbying the state should not be read as an 
indication of good relations, as claimed by Akhavi.11  Rather, it was a sign of profound 
alienation and was a rejection of the Shah.  Borujerdi’s student, Davani, shares that, 
although the government had promised to shut down the Baha’is, they instead shut down 
                                                      
8 Montazeri, Khaterat, pp. 94-96. 
9 NFAC (CIA), “Iran after the Shah: An Intelligence Assessment,” August 1978. 
10 See, for example, FO 248 / 1565 / 1957. 
11 Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 24, 102. 
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the Islamic organizations while properties were returned to Baha’is.12  Falsafi made it 
clear that the anger of 1955 did not fade, as the ulama were not “content with just the 
destruction of the dome.”  He blamed the failure to achieve satisfaction in this struggle on 
“the suppression of the feeble (za’if) Shah” who was “under the influence (nofuz) of the 
European and American Powers, that is to say, the true benefactors (hamian-e vaq’i) of 
the Baha’is—the 5th column of the foreigners in Iran.”  As a result of this foreign 
intervention, the Shah “did not carry out what he promised.”  Falsafi claims that his 
opposition to these imperial dictates caused the Shah to refuse to meet with him from that 
time onwards.  He was also prevented from speaking in Masjed-e Shah during the holy 
months and was kept off of state radio until the Revolution of 1979.  Falsafi was proud of 
the “blows” that he was able to level against the Baha’is, but indirectly accepted that his 
efforts ultimately failed, claiming that the Baha’is, who were “American and Zionist 
agents,” did not lose their grip on power in Iran until they were eradicated (az bayn 
bordan) after 1979, and thus prevented from creating a “second Palestine” for the 
Americans.13 
According to Falsafi, after the failure of 1955, Borujerdi “never again trusted the 
government.”  The Shah had “promised” that the clearing away of Baha’i structures 
“would be closely coordinated (ham-ahang) with the sermons that were broadcast over 
the radio,” but, instead, he later claimed to Boruje di that he was “helpless” (nachar) in 
the face of Iran’s obligation to its foreign patrons, who compelled him to protect the 
Baha’is.  This attitude was immensely frustrating for Borujerdi, who was unable to 
achieve his goals despite his best efforts, and claimed: “This situation is unbearable for 
                                                      
12 Davani, Khaterat va Mobarezat, p. 209 n. 
13 Ibid., pp 209-10. 
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me!”  In the years that followed, Falsafi notes Boruje di’s ongoing anger at the hypocrisy 
of the government and its “ capitulation to the colonization of the patrons of Baha’ism."  
This led to his “loathing for the system of the time.”  Falsafi claims that although 
Borujerdi continued to want to take action against the Baha’is in his final years, their 
“patrons in Europe and America were pressuring us so that we couldn’t deal with them.”  
As a result, Davani claims that the Grand Ayatollah fell into cynicism and despondency, 
and Falsafi reports that Borujerdi spent his final years with anxiety and irritation in his 
heart.14  
 
The Hojjatiyeh Society 
After the disciplining of the clergy following the 1955 pogrom, organized anti-Baha’i 
activities were largely limited to non-violent “cult ral” efforts, carried out with 
governmental approval.  The apolitical Hojjatiyeh Society was the most important 
channel for these efforts.  Since the government would not contribute resources to the 
anti-Baha’i “battle,” the Hojjatiyeh developed their own Islamic “troops” to replace those 
of the state, gathered their own intelligence, and e gaged in their own missions and 
operations against perceived threats to the (Shi’ite) nation.  This society was originally 
known to its members as the Anjoman-e Zedd-e Baha'iyat (The Anti-Baha'i Society), but 
is now generally referred to as the Hojjatiyeh (a shortened version of the Benevolent 
Society of the Hidden Imam).15   
The Society was formed in 1953 by Shaykh Mahmud Halabi (1900-1998) in order 
to combat the perceived Baha’i threat.  In addition o opposing the Baha’is, the Society 
                                                      
14 Ibid., pp. 210-11. 
15 Fischer, Debating Muslims, p. 48. 
363 
 
was also very involved in the larger field of Islamic education.  Before forming the 
Society, Halabi was very concerned with Islamic education and studied philosophy, 
literature, and religious education, in addition to jurisprudence.  He gained notoriety in 
Mashhad for his efforts at Islamic propagation and ti-Baha’i activism in the years 
following the abdication of Reza Shah. As part of this attempt to promote and defend 
Islam, he joined with other Islamic activists and associations in the city to form a united 
front and “became systematized (monazam) in their opposition to Baha’ism.”  During the 
Mosaddeq period, Halabi became a “political cleric” and ran in the election for the 18th 
majles.  He was not elected and, as a result, abandoned politics and moved to Tehran, 
where he formed the Hojjatiyeh.16   
 The Society reflected Halabi’s rejection of politics as well as his earlier anti-
Baha’i efforts in Mashhad, which had focused on the ne d to be comprehensive (por 
damaneh) and utilize systematic organizational procedures.17  Halabi saw the Baha’is as 
the greatest threat to Islam in Iran, surpassing Communism, and believed that Baha’is had 
to be “contained” or “eliminated.”18  His fear of the Baha’i threat was partly rooted in h s 
own exploration of the religion as a seminarian.  Abbas Alawi, his close friend and fellow 
student, also investigated the religion and converted to the Baha’i Faith, which caused 
Halabi a great deal of distress and motivated him to work to inoculate Muslim youth 
against this temptation.  He initially wanted to use seminarians in this battle, but when he 
                                                      
16 Jafarian, Jaryanha, pp. 370-1. 
17 Ibid., p. 372. 
18 Vali and Zubaida, “Factionalism and Political Discourse in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Case of the 
Hojjatiyeh Society,” (Economy and Society 14, no. 2) p. 147. 
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failed to convince senior clerics, he recruited from the laity, a practice that he maintained 
even later when his organization had support from Borujerdi.19 
The Hojjatiyeh gained popularity in Tehran and spread nationally with the 
assistance and backing of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi.  Large percentages of religious 
taxes were diverted to this society, whose main program involved instilling in the youth 
an extreme form of Shi’ism as well as an intense hatred for Baha’is and Leftists.20  
Falsafi was a prominent member of the Society and, in his orchestration of the anti-
Baha’i pogrom, it was often Hojjatis who often led persecutions at the local level.21   
 According to a former member:  
The late Ayatullah Borujerdi and the late Ayatullah Hakim and many other 
religious authorities endorsed the activities of the Society.  The Society thus 
managed to expand.  Some religious authorities evenallocated a portion of the 
religious donations (the Imam’s share) to the Society…Gradually it became 
organized at a national level, and since its struggle was against Baha’ism, a secret 
and organized sect, the need was felt to further organize the society.22   
The Hojjatiyeh recruited and unified a broad array of outh in a national struggle 
that instilled a certain brand of patriotic values, in the same way that institutions like the 
scouts or the army foster patriotism and nationalism.  Indeed, the members of the 
Hojjatiyeh called themselves Sarbaz-e Imam-e Zaman (Soldiers of the Imam of the Age) 
and a former member has described their activities as “a kind of war.”23  The young 
“soldiers” in the Association not only trained against the Baha’is, but also received an 
                                                      
19 Mahmoud Sadri, “Hojjatiya,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, Online Edition, 15 December 2004, available at 
http://www.iranica.com/articles/hojjatiya. 
20 Vali and Zubaida, “Factionalism,” p. 148. 
21 Michael Rubin, Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington, DC: Washington 
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extensive Islamic education and were taught sophisticated arguments against all varieties 
of “irreligion.”  According to Jafarian, in addition to its role in the anti-Baha’i battle, the 
Hojjatiyeh was important because of its role in the int llectual nurturing (tarbiyat-e fekri) 
of those who were eventually involved in the 1979 Revolution.24  
As a result of the fresh and untraditional approach of t e Society, and its 
advocacy of modern and scientific methods, it was especially appealing to young men 
who were entering the educated middle class but who came from a conservative 
background and wanted to find a way to maintain this identity.  As Fischer and Abedi 
note, the local chapters of the Society were not led by clerics but by members of the 
educated middle and upper class, such as doctors and te chers.25  As such, the 
conservative ‘Alavi school was a major recruiting ground.  Jafarian describes this school 
as the “source” of many of the religious troops who would later lead the Islamic 
Revolution, after first passing through the Hojjatiyeh.  Although the Hojjatiyeh was not 
itself active in the Revolution, many young men who later became revolutionaries used to 
count themselves among its “troops” and tried out (tajrobeh kardan) Halabi’s 
organization before joining the combatant organizations.26 
In Abedi’s version of his time with the Society, we s e how the violent anti-
Baha’ism discussed in Chapter III is now channeled into a more systematic and 
sophisticated strategy for responding to the perceived Baha’i threat in ways that would 
not lead to disorder or disrupt security.  Abedi states: 
I did not know much about Baha'is before this time. Children in the alleys would 
sometimes chant, Tu pir-e babi ridam ("I shit on the Babi saint"), and my father 
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had told me that "Babis" (he did not distinguish Babis and Baha'is) did not say 
their prayers, and were najes (impure). In the village, the first Sepah-e Danesh 
(literacy corpsman) had been taunted and run out with accusations that he was 
Baha'i.. [My father] had a small book by a mulla named Khalisi, called Crime in 
Abarghu, the story of a Baha'i who had killed some Muslims with an ax.27  The 
book called on Muslims to rise up for justice. It inflamed people like my father 
and youths like myself to think of Baha'is as mercil ss killers… I remember that, 
after having read it, I had nightmares of a Baha'i trying to kill me with an ax. My 
father liked to tell me the stories of the year of Baha'i killing (sal-e babi koshi), as 
if he singlehandedly had killed Baha'is like so many flies or mosquitoes. The verb 
he used was aqqat kardan, the term for beating animals to death. Of course, I 
knew this was all vicarious bravado: he had never killed anyone in his life.  [The 
teacher from the Hojjatiyeh’s] approach was different. He did not share the pride 
of the earlier generations in having physically killed Baha'is. Instead he thought 
the spread of Baha'ism could be halted, bringing the misguided back to Islam, by 
training Muslim youths to challenge the Baha'i missionaries (muballighs).28 
As part of its (usually) non-violent approach, the Hojjatiyeh scrupulously avoided 
politics and instead favored opposition in the cultural (farhangi) realm, the gathering of 
intelligence, and the use of persuasion, coercion, and rhetoric to battle the spread of 
Baha’ism.29  Its articles of association call for the propagation of Shi’ism and charitable 
works, but also for the promotion of a new, more systematic and scientific, vision of 
Islam.  The Society was to publicize and distribute religious-scientific (‘elmi va dini) 
materials, organize methodological religious conferences, and work with Islamic 
societies abroad.  Almost every article of association contained the caveat that every 
action would be done with the approval of the authori ies and in obedience to all relevant 
laws, since the most important principle of the Association was that it “will not meddle in 
political matters at all; this also applies to every kind of meddling, in a political context, 
from individuals connected to the Association.”30   
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The main goal of the Hojjatiyeh was “to harass the Bahá'ís, while attempting to 
convert them to Shi'i Islam."31  In this effort, it combined cult-like secrecy, the cellular 
organization of a terrorist network, and millenarian zeal (Halabi claimed to regularly 
communicate with the Hidden Imam).32  The Society was controlled by an inner core, 
about which little is known, which controlled a national network of independent cells.  
Sometimes there would be several cells in one city operating independent of each other.33   
No one from the higher levels has ever disclosed th group’s secrets, but 
according to former low-level members, their activities were primarily aimed at exerting 
strong, but basically non-violent, pressure on the Baha’is, aimed at causing lukewarm 
members to fall away and scaring away any potential converts.  This occurred through 
the actions of the Islamic forces (niruha) that Halabi was able to gather under his 
personal leadership (the focus on personal loyalty to a millenarian leader was similar to 
rival groups, such as the Feda’iyan-e Islam and the Brotherhood Party).  These forces 
were administered in each city by local administrative assemblies called bayts (Bayt-e 
Imam-e Zaman – the house of the Imam of the Age).  Under each bayt’s supervision, the 
local troops were divided into three main groups: in truction (tadris), intelligence-
gathering (tahqiq), and guidance (ershad).  The first group moved the troops through 
three levels of education: beginning, intermediate, nd advanced.  The second group was 
for intelligence gathering, such as tracking former Muslims who had converted to 
Baha’ism after coming “under the sway (taht-e ta’sir) of the Bahais.”  The third group 
used psychological operations and “their own special methods (shivehha-ye khas-e 
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khod)” for “counseling” (ershad) prodigal Muslims until they returned to Islam.34  There 
were also many smaller groups assigned to a variety of specialized tasks. 
In many ways, the Hojjatiyeh modeled itself after the Baha’is, in addition to 
drawing inspiration from the Left.  The Baha’i administration order is centered on lay 
governing councils, known as bayts (referred to as “Spiritual Assemblies” at present) 
which are formed in each city, and this structure and term was emulated by Halabi.  The 
Baha’is rejected a traditional preacher-audience arrangement in favor of lay leadership, as 
did the Hojjatis.  Other similarities included: claims to a more scientific and rational 
approach to religion, the stated belief that religion should not become entangled in 
politics, recruitment among the educated middle class,  reputation for being very clean-
cut and beardless, a division of tasks between committees and individuals assigned to 
protection and propagation work, an exaltation of the Imamate beyond what is typical, 
personal devotion to an unquestioned leader, semi-screcy, restricting outsider’s access to 
some literature, using chairs and lecterns instead of rugs, and the imagery of members as 
“troops” engaged in a (non-violent) soteriological b ttle.  The Islamic associations’ 
borrowing from the competition, although never acknowledged with regard to the 
Baha’is, has been admitted elsewhere.  The editor of Parcham-e Islam, for example, has 
admitted, “I was fortunate enough to observe the ways in which Christian propagandists 
spread their religion. I closely studied their activities. Luckily, I learned the secrets of 
their resolve and perseverance.”35 
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In their private meetings, Hojjatis would engage in hostile readings of Baha’i 
scripture and learn a “potted history of Bahaism” 36—so as to inoculate themselves 
against Baha’i proselytism—and have mock debates where one member would pretend to 
be a Baha’i and the other would practice his counter arguments against the religion.37  A 
great amount of time was spend studying a Baha’i book known as the Book of Certitude 
(Ketab-e Iqan), which the Society’s leader was obsessed with, wrote extensively against, 
and saw as a great threat to Shi’ism.38  All of the Society’s materials were secret and not 
to be shared or discussed with outsiders.39 
 The Society would also have public meetings in the houses of members, which 
would feature talks by trained individuals from thepublic speaking team (goruh-e 
sokhanrani).  These speakers were not clergy, but lay scholars who gave “scientific” 
presentations that did not involve a traditional cleri -audience dynamic.  These meetings 
were largely derivative of the meetings held by Baha’is, and appealed to the same 
potential pool of converts.  The Hojjati meetings differed in several ways, however, not 
the least of which was that they often featured the confessions and repentance of former 
Baha’is who had been re-educated into Islam.40 
The Society’s activities included the publication of anti-Baha'i pamphlets, the 
disruption of Baha'i gatherings by gangs of toughs, and the general harassment of Baha’is 
and those interested in the Baha’i Faith.  The Society was actively involved in violence 
against the Baha’is during the 1955 pogrom and in the years surrounding the 1979 
Revolution, but violence was uncommon in the intervening period.  This was in order to 
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ensure that no disruption of order could be used by SAVAK as a reason for prohibiting 
their efforts.  Their activities were designed to be almost unnoticed by the wider society 
and international observers.   
Intelligence efforts were largely centered on surveillance and drawing up lists of 
those who were Baha’i.41  Infiltration efforts were carried out by “troops” of young men 
after they had first been carefully inoculated to withstand Baha’i propaganda.  They 
would attend Baha’i gatherings and feign interest, or falsely convert to the Baha’i Faith, 
in order to gather information on the names and activities of Baha’is and pass this 
information on to their superiors.  (SAVAK was also interested in the intelligence 
gathered by the Society, and was known to work withthem on occasion).   
This initiation in the field was designed to test and strengthen the “purity” of 
members’ religious “chastity” by putting them in intimate association with the forbidden 
Other.  This is somewhat reminiscent of the way in which Ghandi would actively test his 
chastity by lying in bed with naked women.42  In both cases, the maintenance of purity in 
the face of temptation was believed to create inner str ngth to be used in a nationalist 
project.  Dr. Soroush relates that it was this insistence on field missions that ultimately 
led him to leave the Society: 
I joined the Hojjatiyeh Society (which was called the anti-Bahai society then). I 
was taught a potted history of Bahaism… I attended Mr. Halabi’s classes. All this 
took less than one year. Mr. Halabi’s classes consisted of the exposition and 
criticism of the book Iqan, which is the Bahais’ most important book. It was 
written by Mirza Hoseyn ‘Ali, known as Baha’ollah. That’s when I felt that this 
material was of no interest to me and that I could spend my time better studying 
the Koran and the Nahj al-Bilaghah, which is exactly what I did. So I left them 
and my bonds with them were severed to this very day. As I said, during my time 
there, they didn’t teach us any of the laudable ideas you mentioned. Maybe that 
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came later. I learnt a bit about the history of Bahaism, the books Iqan and Bayan, 
and then I left, realizing that it wasn’t my cup of tea. The reason I say it wasn’t 
my cup of tea is because the anti-Bahai society didn’t confine itself to educational 
activities. They demanded other things from people and from their members: 
turning up at Bahai gatherings, pretending to be enraptured by Bahaism and 
mixing in their circles over a period of time under false pretences, following in 
their footsteps and occasionally beating people up or being beaten up or becoming 
embroiled in fierce arguments and counter-arguments. Not my sort of thing… I 
should add that the Hojjatiyeh Society did not justoppose Bahaism; it was not just 
concerned with negation, but with affirmation as well. It bred very pious 
individuals.43 
When recruits passed these initiations, they were sometimes transferred to other 
cells and promoted from undercover work to covert action to intimidate and harass 
potential converts, often through the use of psychological operations.  Abedi relates an 
example of the manipulation and petty harassment that was involved in field operations:  
I had a beard and a black suit, and he gave me a black attaché case. He took me to 
an alley in the Zoroastrian quarter, and told me to kn ck on a particular door and 
ask for Abbas. Abbas would not be there. I was to pretend I was an anti-Baha'i 
activist from Tehran asked by Abbas to come and answer questions he was not 
capable of answering.  Whether or not I was admitted nto the house, I was to 
deliver the message that they should not think what they were doing was secret, 
but that we knew everything that went on. When I knocked, a [Baha’i woman] 
with a Zoroastrian accent answered without opening the door, "Who is it?" 
"Engineer Imami," I said.  Members of SAVAK were said to use the titles 
Engineer or Doctor… [After the message was delivered and the Baha’i woman 
scared] I turned and walked away.  Fattahi [A more senior Hojjati] was waiting 
around the corner with his bicycle and took me on it back to his office. There I 
reported the conversation and asked him what it was all about. Abbas, he said, 
was a poor painter who had been seen repeatedly in the shop of this Zoroastrian-
Baha'i tailor [to learn about the Baha’i Faith]. The ruse worked when Abbas next 
went to the house, he was turned away despite his protestation that he did not 
know any Engineer Imami. A few days later Fattahi sent someone else to Abbas 
to hire him to paint a house. As the contract was being made, this emissary asked, 
"You are not a Baha'i or a Jew are you; paint after all is a liquid and conveys 
impurity, we cannot use a najes painter." "No, no," Abbas assured him. Then later 
while painting, the emissary said, "Sorry I asked you, but you know these Baha'is 
are such hypocrites and liars." And with such prepaation, often an Abbas would 
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spill his own story out of bitterness. So, Fattahi said, we turn potential enemies of 
the Mahdi into soldiers of the Mahdi.44 
Taheri claims that Halabi’s ultimate goal was to create “a national register of 
Baha’is” so that everyone on the list could be pressured to convert to Islam or, failing 
that, “ be put on a black list and boycotted by the Muslims” and perhaps eventually, in 
the cases of the most stubborn, “ be put to death.”45  This is contradicted by reports that, 
after the Revolution, Halabi was upset by the widespr ad execution of Baha’is, claiming: 
“This is not the way, this is not our way.”46 
The mission of the Hojjatiyeh was largely successful.  As a result of the trauma of 
1955 and ongoing “petty terror” from groups like th Hojjatiyeh, the Baha’i community 
in Iran became less bold and more inward-looking in the period between the pogrom and 
the Revolution, never again contemplating the massive campaign of growth and entry 
into the public sphere that was occurring before the 1955 pogrom.  As some Baha’i 
communities experienced little or no net growth, the Hojjatiyeh grew rapidly and 
“disproportionately to the Bahai threat,” which, “bred resentment among other Islamic 
organizations, that intended to mimic its success or to recruit from the same pool of 
talented religious youths.”47 
The government permitted and tacitly encouraged the Hojjatiyeh, since it allowed 
anti-Baha’ism to be channeled into efforts that were non-violent and did not lead to 
disruptions of order that would generate American criticisms.  There is clear 
documentary evidence showing that the Society operated with the approval and 
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occasional assistance of SAVAK.48  This cooperation was based on the understanding 
that there would be no “provocation and disturbance.”49 
 After the Revolution of 1979, the Society became a source of controversy because 
of its links to SAVAK, its rejection of political involvement, and the “infiltration” (nofuz) 
of its former members to the highest levels of power in the Islamic Republic.  This 
perception of secret Hojjati control developed because the Society was able to attract, at 
least briefly, many of the most important characters who came to prominence in the 
Islamic Republic.  Ayatollah Khomeini was a lifelong friend of Halabi.50  Iran’s present 
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei vigorously defended th Society and was said to have 
taken part in the Hojjatiyeh.51  Even liberals like Dr. Soroush were members of the 
Society in their youth.  According to Dr. Soroush, the Society “recruited heavily” among 
his peers, and several of his schoolmates who later ros  to great heights in the Islamic 
Republic (including five ministers) were also part of he Hojjatiyeh.  He notes that even 
those who went on to join leftist groups often passed through this Society.52   
Even though the Society was disbanded shortly afterthe Revolution, rumors 
persist that it continues to operate.  Recently, Ahmadinejad and his mentor have been tied 
to the Hojjatiyeh in a number of media reports.53  There is presently not enough reliable 
information to accurately assess the role of the Hojjatiyeh after 1979.  It is interesting, 
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however, that the Society spent so many years attacking the supposed infiltration of 
Baha’is and denouncing them as tools of imperialism, only to themselves be attacked 
after the Revolution for having secretly infiltrated the government and for having been 
the tools of imperialism (via SAVAK). 
 
 “Dying on the vine”: positivism and the myth of clerical decline 
Governmental and diplomatic sources for the late 1950s and early 1960s portray Shi’ism 
as “dying on the vine” and “falling rapidly” as a relevant or effective force in Iran.  This 
decline was generally blamed on the “cowing” of the ulama discussed in the last chapter, 
urbanization, and the younger generation’s lack of interest in traditional Shi’ism.  It was 
felt that this process was likely to continue since, after the anti-Baha’i campaign, the 
government had largely exorcised the conservative voice from public space and crucial 
media outlets such as the radio.  Falsafi was replac d on state radio by a liberal, pro-
regime preacher and, although Ayatollah Behbahani railed against this man as “no more 
than a pantheist,” such criticisms were claimed to have little effect without a national 
platform.  The ulama only had access to public space in government-approved ways and, 
in the American assessment, could not stand up to the hegemonic force of popular media, 
which was touted as a “potent weapon” against them.54  This was considered especially 
true in the cities, where the ulama lacked the direct contact with the people that they 
enjoyed in rural areas.  Since the clergy lacked access to the urban population through the 
media, secularization was seen as a concomitant of urbanization.  It was observed that 
while only 5% of urban Muslims paid religious taxes, 60% of rural Muslims did so.55 
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American diplomats saw the modernizing trend in Ira as inevitable and thought 
that this meant the end of the ulama.  This impression was supported by anecdotal 
evidence from the capital, where “the great majority of fairly well-educated Tehranis, 
excluding the Baha’is, is agnostic or even atheist.” 56  Members of the educated upper 
class were also observed to “hold no strong religious convictions at all, even though some 
of them may be obliged by their positions to play lip service to religion” and “have not 
consciously renounced their nominal faith.”57  But, for the new generation, “Islam has 
ceased to have any real meaning,” although “nothing of value palatable to these Iranians 
is available to replace it.”58  Religion was felt to be falling fast and only important for 
“third class people.”59 
The root of the problem was identified as the ulama’s inability to adapt to 
changing circumstances.  This was not unique to Iran but part of “the classic conflict 
between reaction and progress.”60  In Iran, the ulama were “regarded by the educated elite 
as benighted or at least hopelessly behind the times.”61  An analysis of Iran’s officer 
class, for example, judged that the ulama “have been singularly unsuccessful in their 
feeble and sporadic efforts to restate Shia Islam in terms which will enable it to come to 
grips with Western techniques and ideology.”62  A 1957 British report compares the 
“grafting,” “obscurantist,” and “nefarious influence” of these “creatures” to the 
“Pharisees” at the time of Jesus, the outdated face of a previous era.63   
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In 1965, when some accused American policies in Ira of producing “fanatics,” 
the response was that terrorism was just the act of dead-enders who were “lashing-out 
against the 20th century—inevitably a secularist 20th century which the American 
presence in Iran may epitomize.”64  American reports note that even though some clerics 
may be progressive, they too must be opposed since the ulama "must not be allowed to 
stand in the way of the twentieth century… the ‘clergy’ as an institution are inherently 
enemies of the twentieth century."65  For, as “most educated people are aware,” the 
“fanatical, conservative and reactionary attitudes g nerally held by the clergy are a drag 
on progress.”66   Iran was thus considered handicapped because it had spent so long 
“wedded to a religion in which the clergy for the most part reject the necessity for any 
adaptation to the requirements of a modern world.”67  This “refusing to adapt” included 
the insistence on retaining “discredited religious laws” and “quasi-superstitious 
traditions.”68 
This idea that Iran was inevitably moving towards secularism, and that the clergy 
were incompatible with modernity, is the result of he wholesale acceptance of 
Modernization theory, which involves a Comtean understanding of the “progress” from 
religion to science.  In this linear and unidirectional perspective, the ulama were seen as a 
soon to be vestigial class, doomed by their inability to evolve.  These ideas were not only 
misguided, but they blinded their proponents to the ways in which Shi’ism was actively 
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adapting to the new environment and to its creation of ational networks and systems of 
mobilization and information distribution, despite b ing denied an unscripted voice in the 
public sphere.  This process relied heavily on youth-driven Islamic associations and 
secret societies, which provided networks for information distribution and organizations 
capable of distributing the leaflets and handbills generated by a clandestine Islamic press. 
 
Alam’s “White Revolution” 
In the late 1950s, the Shah continued to increase his direct control of Iran.  It was 
observed that the government was “dominated by the asc ndancy of the Shah, not merely 
over his ministers, but over every organ of governme t” and that “the pattern of his 
personal rule is steadily becoming clearer.”  Such that, “he alone determines policy; all 
the strings of control are firmly in his hands.”69  The Shah’s inconsistency was still a 
running concern, however, and it was felt that he was establishing an “intermittent and 
hesitant dictatorship.”70   
One of the main issues moderating his ambitions was the lack of dynastic 
stability, since he had been unable to produce an heir with Soraya.  This pressure to 
conceive, in conjunction with a variety of other issues, caused the couple to divorce in 
1958.  The Shah took the loss hard.  After losing Soraya, he was described as “a man in a 
sensitive, delicate mood, a lonely man with scarcely one really intimate friend, and few 
relaxations, plunging himself still more deeply into his work.”71   
 At this time, in reaction to the fall of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, Asadollah Alam 
came up with the idea of preventing a popular revoluti n in Iran by preemptively staging 
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a revolution from above to address the needs of the low r classes.  This idea, which grew 
into the “White Revolution” of 1963, is later attributed to the Shah or the Americans, but 
1958 documents clearly identify this plan as “Asadollah Alam’s theory of the White 
Revolution.”72  Alam’s “brainchild” included land redistribution, the enfranchisement of 
women, and other elements that were eventually included in the 1963 referendum on the 
White Revolution.   
Although Alam was persistently “working upon His Majesty’s mind to this end,” the 
Shah was hesitant. 73  He felt that drastic reforms were not needed, since the Iranian 
people could not really be unhappy, as the economy was improving.  Any dissatisfaction, 
he believed, must be the result of Soviet intrigues.  When the Shah was told that this was 
not the case, “he could not understand it” and felt tha  “people really had nothing to 
complain of.”74  As one regime supporter put it on a different occasion, “Just because 
people are complaining, you must not think that the regime is unpopular.  Iranians always 
complain; they would be unhappy if they were not complaining.”75 
The outgoing British Ambassador, Roger Stevens, was pes imistic about the 
Shah’s ability to successfully follow through on any kind of reform. In Stevens’s 
assessment, the Shah is “incapable of formulating, let alone executing, a really 
constructive policy of any kind…  As long as he is on the throne of Persia it is hard to 
imagine that there will be a decent Government, let alone social justice.”  He did not 
believe that this situation was likely to change, since the Shah “is psychologically 
incapable of surrendering power or presiding over a genuine popularly based 
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Government.”76  The American National Security Council was similarly pessimistic 
about the likelihood of genuine reforms, observing that the Shah “was the type of 
individual who started off a course of action very boldly but usually did not stick to it.  
Accordingly, we should be aware that in our present policy we are probably living on 
borrowed time and that ultimately there will be a sh ke-up in Iran.”77  In another meeting, 
it was said that the United States was “dealing with an individual (the shah) of very 
uncertain quality” and that although there was some “fri ndly urging” to break with the 
landlord class, no pressure was applied since the Shah “was so exceedingly 
temperamental that the State department feared that if we really attempted to put the heat 
on him, he might very well tell us to go to hell and proceed to play ball with the other 
side.”78 
Although his advisors pushed social reform, the Shah w s primarily interested in 
growing the military to face an external threat.  In 1959, Iran’s national police chief 
lamented the Shah’s neglect of domestic security.  He claimed that this obsession with 
the military was because “He likes to believe that all his subjects love him and that his 
only enemies are foreigners.”  Mocking the Shah’s priorities, he said that it was “as if a 
man were to set up a machine gun in his front door and leave the back door unlocked and 
unguarded.”  He noted that if an emergency should arise, he could arm at most a third of 
his forces, since the military had all the weapons a d would likely have to be deployed 
domestically in the case of revolts. 
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For some reasons that I can’t understand, he becomes more narrowly interested in 
the Army every year.  He can’t see that an efficient, high-morale, properly 
equipped police force is more valuable to him than divisions and air squadrons.  If 
they try to send the Army into the bazaar to stop a fan tic mob this coming 
Moharam, it will be a tragedy, and it will seriously hake the regime.79 
The specter of revolt by a “fanatical mob at Moharram” had been anticipated 
since the fear of a “holocaust” of Iranian Baha’is in Moharram 1955.  In 1959, such a 
revolt was again feared because of the conflict with Borujerdi over the government’s 
discussion of women’s enfranchisement and proposals for imited land reform.   
 
Borujerdi’s last stand 
The question of women’s rights came to the forefront when former Prime Minister 
Matin-Daftari created an uproar by publicly asking the Cabinet what it intended to do to 
bring the status of women in line with Article VIII of Iran’s constitution (which could be 
interpreted as allowing both genders the right to vote) and with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.  In connection with this demand by Matin-Daftari, there was some 
vague talk of women voting in the next majles elections. 
The enfranchisement of women was said to be supported by the educated middle 
class, army officers, Mosaddeq supporters, the Baha’is, and other minorities, but opposed 
by most other groups.  One of the groups most actively nvolved in supporting the 
emancipation of women was the followers of assassinted intellectual Ahmad Kasravi, 
who was also the founder of a nebulous “world religion” movement “vaguely resembling 
Bahaism.”  This organization believed in the “complete emancipation of women” and its 
                                                      
79 USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 4: 99. 
381 
 
members “have become more noisy and courageous since the mullahs suffered their 
rebuff at the hands of the Shah in 1955 following the anti-Bahai campaign.”80  
In response to the debate over women’s enfranchisement, Borujerdi claimed that 
the constitution of Iran required that its laws notc ntradict Islam, and the Grand 
Ayatollah considered Matin-Daftari’s appeal to be contrary to Islam, “which has never 
recognized equal rights for women.”  Under his leadership, the ulama “which has been 
nursing its wrath ever since the Shah hoodwinked it and smothered the anti-Bahai 
campaign of 1955,” allowed this anger to “burst out in great indignation.”  Sermons all 
over Iran denounced this call for female equality until the Cabinet “took fright” and 
dropped the issue.  Instead, Prime Minister Eqbal was sent to Qom to explain that Matin-
Daftari was speaking on his own and that the governm nt had no plans relating to the 
status of women.81   
Although he never called for reform himself, it was generally believed that the 
Shah had been defeated by Borujerdi’s efforts because of his “lack of backbone.”82  In a 
January 1959 conversation with former Prime Minister Tabataba’i, for example, 
Tabataba’i refers to the Shah’s “surrender” to Borujerdi over the issue of women’s rights 
as “shameful,” feeling that “Borujerdi is consistent, at least.”83  In reality, diplomatic 
sources confirm that the Shah had no interest in improving the status of women and that 
Matin-Daftari acted alone in “rousing a slumbering dog.”84  Rather than seeking 
confrontation through controversial issues, the Shah w s actually trying to cultivate good 
relations with the clergy at this time, to use them as ideological weapons if Iraq were to 
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be used against him by Moscow or Cairo.  Borujerdi “is aware of this, and accordingly 
feels more secure in the knowledge of his value to the regime.”  This new security gave 
the ulama the confidence to again enter the politica  arena.  A number of younger clerics 
were not opposed to women voting, but loyally backed the opinion of Borujerdi and 
“kept quiet as mice” for the sake of clerical unity.  Even though he remained blacklisted, 
Falsafi also joined the resistance by, for example, taking to the pulpit (during a large 
funeral) to attack women’s rights as a “foreign teaching” contrary to Islam.85   
Alam believed that social reform provided a far more effective national defense 
than utilizing the clergy and he opposed the Shah’s willingness to lose face over the 
women question.  In his opinion: 
One must step a fine line between buckling to the mullahs in Iran and needlessly 
angering them.  I admit that we mishandled the 1955 anti-Bahai campaign, but I 
can say that I myself tried to persuade the Cabinet to silence Falsafi 6 days before 
they actually voted to do so.  I think that these 6 days might have been decisive.  
Also, there was insufficient contact between Borujerdi and the government and 
too many government officials allowed themselves to be browbeaten.  I myself 
will not get into a feud with the mullahs over something relatively minor (such as 
women’s rights), but I would never do as [Prime Minister] Eqbal did two weeks 
ago and go begging to Borujerdi at the Shah’s command.  The Shah has asked me 
to see Borujerdi several times, but I have managed not to do it.86 
Land reform was introduced later in 1959, causing Borujerdi to become 
convinced that the Shah intended to eviscerate Islam in Iran.  The Shi’ite clergy were 
independent from the state largely as a result of the income that they received from 
endowment land and donations from the landlord class.  Land reform threatened to 
remove crucial revenue streams and in so doing threaten d the independence of the 
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ulama.87  To combat this policy, Borujerdi issued a fatwa that denounced land reform and 
claimed that it was against Islamic law.   
The Shah responded with the argument that other Muslim nations (Iraq and 
Pakistan) had carried out land reform, that it only impacted a few landlords, and that it 
was needed to fight Communism.  Borujerdi replied that Iraq and Pakistan were republics 
but Iran was a constitutional monarchy and that it was the Shah’s job to follow the 
constitutional mandate to protect Shi’ite Islam.  The legitimacy of the Shah’s rule was not 
a settled matter, but rested on this point and “the enactment of a godless measure such as 
the present bill would shake the foundations of the T rone.”88  Borujerdi’s implicit threat 
to unseat the Shah was not relayed, since his repres ntative “has not found the courage to 
make these points to the Shah.”  When his (undeliver d) threat was not responded to, 
Borujerdi sent copies of his fatwa denouncing land reform to members of the majles and 
distributed it nationally through the clerical network, forcing a confrontation with the 
Shah in which “unhappily boats are burnt on both side .”89  By widely distributing his 
fatwa, Borujerdi forced the issue, since it could not be aken back, and his opposition 
could no longer be kept secret by a press blackout or o her means.   
Ayatollah Behbahani informed the speaker of the majles that it was shocking that 
land reform was even being discussed, and warned that if it became law against 
Borujerdi’s wishes, it would be illegal, as the united opinion of the ulama overrides the 
decisions of the majles (according to the never-enforced supplement to Iran’s 
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constitution).90  The Shah warned Borujerdi that if he did not stop his “black” reactionary 
ways, he would have to carry out a “white coup d’état,” in which he would dissolve 
parliament and “shear the clergy of their remaining privileges.”91   Borujerdi cautioned 
that if the government went ahead with land reform it “could spark a broad general 
uprising.”92  All the while, “The Government was careful to allow no word of the more 
serious clerical opposition to be reported in the press.”93  General Ahmadi found the 
whole episode regretful, but claimed that since Borujerdi had forced the issue, the army 
was ready to meet any opposition.  As the confrontation mounted, the clergy again 
formed a united front behind Borujerdi.  As a result of the collective clerical “furor,” the 
bill was diluted to the point that it accomplished nothing.94  
Although this episode was a major political victory for Borujerdi, immediately 
following the earlier victory over the issue of women’s enfranchisement, Borujerdi has 
nevertheless been cast in later historiography as being “almost totally inactive in political 
matters.”95  In reality, Borujerdi made at least three major plitical interventions.  He died 
before the White Revolution proper was introduced, but there is no doubt that he would 
have opposed it even more intensely than he opposed the reforms of 1959.  When he 
rallied the clergy in 1962 and 1963, Khomeini was not originating a movement, but rather 
maintaining the clerical opposition by building upon the fatwas and mobilization 
employed by Borujerdi in his final years. 
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An heir, at last 
Following the setbacks of 1959, the Shah ended the year by marrying again, ever 
concerned by the need to secure the dynasty by producing a male heir.  The new queen, 
Farah, became pregnant early in 1960, which caused the Shah to grow more confident.  
After a son was born in October 1960, the Shah recommitted himself to securing the 
dynasty.  Whereas clerical opposition was allowed in 1959, by the end of 1960 there was 
“little evidence that religious speakers are at present able to preach freely along lines not 
approved by the regime…In general religious leaders are not able today to criticize the 
regime or its policies openly.”96  Despite the illusion of calm, there was widespread 
political and economic dissatisfaction, such that “a small outburst from any source could 
be contagious even in the absence of a specific issue.”97   
When challenged about his increasing autocratic rule in this period, the Shah 
defended himself by claiming that successor regimes would be just as autocratic, as the 
only alternative to him was a dictatorship of the Right or a dictatorship of the Left.98  In 
1961, he warned that he must rule as an autocrat bec us  most of the world’s oil was 
either in Iran or within 500 miles of her borders.  If Iran fell, the entire region’s oil wealth 
would fall into Soviet hands.  In order to stop theappeal of Communism, he maintained, 
he needed to conduct social reform, and he would be hindered in creating significant 
reform if he had to deal with an independent majles.  So, in his opinion, the only choice 
was to rule without a parliament, or to give token elections in the “form to which the 
Iranian people were accustomed (i.e. rigged).”99    He made similar arguments the 
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following year, rejecting free elections based on the (unintentionally hilarious) 
observation that “if the elections were uncontrolled, no one could tell what the result 
would be.”100  
 Despite his new projection of confidence, the Shah occasionally fell back into his 
characteristic malaise.  A confidential American report expressed concern about the 
Shah’s “defeatist talk about his job” and his suggestion that “if he sensed that Iran was 
fed up with him, he would simply clear out.”  He confided that he was friendless and 
alone and admitted to bouts of depression.  He claimed that “sometimes the job seemed 
absolutely overwhelming.”  The author of the report, af er spending some time with the 
Shah, came to a realization about him. 
All of a sudden, I realized the kind of man with whom I was talking.  He is a 
modern Hamlet, a Hamlet in a remote part of the world, a man with all the right 
instincts, intelligent, capable of understanding what t e game is but with a 
fundamental, temperamental reluctance to play the game to the fullest.  
Unfortunately, this trait, this temperamental quirk o  defect communicates itself 
down to the people, through an elite layer of administrators who take advantage of 
this soft and sad side. 101  
 
 “The dust of mourning settles on the Iranian nation” 
Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi died in Qom on March 30, 1961.  There was a three day 
period of national mourning and the government made a great show of respect although 
this was said to be insincere and merely “the regim’s attention to the forms.”102  
Government offices and the bazaars were closed, radio an  television suspended, 
mosques and public buildings covered in black, and special editions of newspapers 
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released with black borders.103  The Isfahan consulate reported that the city was in shock 
at the loss, despite Borujerdi’s age (eighty-six), and that the streets were full of mourners 
as the sounds of weeping echoed throughout the city. On March 31 and April 1, 
processions of flagellants in black moved through the city, beating themselves in time 
while wailing.  Among the mourning chants, it was claimed that “the ship of Islam is 
again storm tossed, the dust of mourning settles on the Iranian nation.”104  When the 
weather worsened, it was said that “the sky was weeping for the late Ayatollah 
Borujerdi.”105 
It was sometimes the case that a universal marja’ would indicate his preferred 
successor before he died, but Borujerdi did not do this.  Before his death, he divided 
some of the administrative and financial aspects of leadership between four of his junior 
associates.  Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Golpayegani were assigned the most 
prominent tasks, and Khomeini—who was primarily know  as an educator at the time— 
was charged with the supervision and support of the theological students.  Despite this 
confidence, Khomeini was not in the running to succeed Borujerdi.  The primary contest 
was, first of all, over whether the new leader would be from Iran or Iraq, and, 
secondarily, over who was the leading marja’ within Iran.  As the struggle to succeed 
Borujerdi began, several camps emerged, based in Mashhad, Tehran, and Qom.  It was 
observed that, because of the "feuding and back-biting among the senior clergy,” a simple 
transition was “a virtual impossibility."106 
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In an April 1961 report, Ayatollah Hakim in Iraq was considered the frontrunner, 
while Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Iran was also considered a strong contender, although 
the fact that Borujerdi failed to name him—despite extensive association with him—
worked to his disadvantage.  By the end of April, diplomatic reports identified grassroots 
pressure for the next leader to be based in Iran, because of a desire to maintain the status 
of Qom, “national prejudice” against losing out to Iraq, and a desire to keep religious 
taxes within Iran rather than having to send money to a leader based in Iraq (Borujerdi 
received over half a million pounds a year in religious taxes).107  The regime’s position 
was initially unclear, with some reports indicating that the Shah had instructed SAVAK 
to do “everything possible” to make sure the positin remains in Iran, while other reports 
indicated that the Shah wanted the new leader to bebas d in Iraq, since having the Shi’ite 
leadership in Iran had inhibited his ability to reform.108   
 With Borujerdi gone, and a new Prime Minister (Amini), the Shah decided to ease 
restrictions on the clergy, since he did not feel threatened.  He ordered less strict 
discipline in the 1961 Moharram observances.  A July 1961 report on Moharram in 
Mashhad relates that there were no SAVAK-scripted sermons and the government tried 
to win goodwill by providing services for mourners, such as distributing water.  There 
were less security forces present, with more police than soldiers, and they “were 
cooperative rather than repressive.”109  
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In October 1962, clerical opposition arose in relation o a new law regarding local 
government councils, which did not explicitly restrict voting or membership to men.  The 
possibility of women’s enfranchisement initially generated clerical opposition, but closer 
inspection of the law revealed that oaths could be sworn on a “holy book” and not on the 
Qur’an specifically.  This was already the case in the majles, where representatives of the 
recognized minorities were allowed to be sworn in on their own holy books.  
Nevertheless, the lack of specificity regarding religious identity and the use of a “holy 
book” instead of the Qur’an were interpreted as evid nce that the real purpose of the law 
was to allow Baha’is to take over local governments across Iran.   
Khomeini believed that the local election law was for “the delivery of Iran to the 
Baha’is,” who were marked as the representative of Zionism and the West.110  An 
American report notes that this anti-Baha’i turn was unsurprising, since, for the ulama, 
the Baha’is are "the perennial scapegoats when things are not going their way."111  The 
Baha’is were seen as not only an existential threat to Islam, but also as a cause for mass 
opposition to the regime, if it did not reverse itself, since “this danger to our religion is 
intolerable.”112  This opposition was the first major political intervention by Khomeini, 
and his first public criticism of the government, and it was over the threat of Baha’ism.   
Clerical opposition to this measure largely blamed Alam, who became Prime 
Minister in 1962 and was still hated for his role in ending the anti-Baha’i pogrom and 
lying about Baha’i dismissals, as well as for his anti-clerical disposition and desire to 
push through reforms that were considered anti-Islamic.  A close associate of Khomeini 
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claimed that his opposition to the government did not begin until the Alam premiership, 
when they believed “that ‘Bahai and Jewish influence’ in the Court was getting too 
strong.”113  Behbehani blamed Prime Minister Alam for refusing to negotiate with the 
ulama over the “holy book” issue, and claimed that any “grave consequences” that may 
result rested on him personally.  Khomeini attacked Alam’s policies as “totally 
inconsistent with Islam” and appealed to the Shah, on behalf of the “Muslim nation,” to 
remove all anti-Islamic reforms.  These messages were idely distributed and protests 
were held in Qom.114 
The two most vocal critics of the local election law were Behbehani and 
Khomeini, who were working together.  According to a CIA study, Ayatollah Behbehani 
wanted to succeed Borujerdi but had “no chance” because of his tainted reputation.  To 
get around this, he settled on promoting a symbolic leader that would allow him to be the 
power behind the scenes.  At first he considered working through one of the ayatollahs in 
Iraq, but by 1962 decided to back Khomeini, whom he “apparently considered to be weak 
and pliable.”  To support Khomeini as a symbolic lead r, Behbehani “began to activate 
his organization in support of Khomeini, and many i the religious community swung to 
the Behbehani-Khomeini coalition.”115  By taking the lead in opposing the local election 
law, and elevating the issue by giving it a Baha’i spin, Behbehani was able to increase 
Khomeini’s prominence, since the frontrunners to succeed Borujerdi were forced, by 
pressure from below, to join in the agitation, causing them to take a secondary role to this 
junior cleric.   
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With Behbahani’s support, Khomeini framed this minor issue of definitions 
related to local government as a battle for the survival of Islam itself, actively challenging 
the ulama to stand up for their religion.  He warned: 
We are talking about Islam being in danger. The ulama of Islam cannot remain 
silent… If the day should come when, with your help, we decide to take action 
against the government, then the number of the people who will be actively 
involved will far outnumber those gathered here. On that day, the crowd of people 
will be so huge that it will have to gather outside th  city of Qum, for there will be 
insufficient space here. But having said that, we expect the government to bear 
the possible consequences of their actions in mind and not to delay any further in 
reaching a decision.116 
Protests arose initially in Tehran and Qom, but by late October Mashhadi clerics 
were being pressured from below to join the opposition.  In early November, for 
example, the four main ayatollahs in Mashhad (Khorasani, Sabzevari, Milani, and Qomi) 
“were repeatedly approached by theological students, mullahs, preachers and members of 
religious societies to make known their views on this subject and to stimulate effective 
protests to the Government.”  As a result of this pressure from below, Ayatollah 
Khorasani wrote Tehran on behalf of the Mashhad clergy, objecting to the local election 
law.  In his reply, Prime Minister Alam clarified that only Muslims and the recognized 
minorities would be allowed to serve, but that thiswas “a matter of civil rather than 
religious concern.”    
As agitation continued, Ayatollah Milani (a faithful supporter of the Shah) felt 
compelled to act in response to pressure from below, and sent a telegram of protest in his 
own name.  Ayatollah Milani was “somewhat liberal minded” and did not care about the 
law himself, but “appears to have been under considerable pressure from his followers 
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and the influence of his coequals.”  Major protests were scheduled for November 29 and 
this “caused some anxiety to the Government” especially since “it had become clear that 
Ayatollah Milani had been forced onto the stage.”117  Seeking to avoid a confrontation 
with a clerical asset, it was announced on November 27 that the law would be amended, 
and telegrams were sent to leading clerics in Mashhd on November 29, which resulted 
in the cancelation of plans for further protests.118   
After the issue had been resolved, Khomeini compared th  resistance against the 
Baha’i entry into provincial councils to Ali’s fight against Mu’awiya, Shirazi’s 
opposition during the Tobacco Protest (1890-92), and the opposition of Iraqi ulama to 
British colonial rule.  In each case “revolt was a divine duty” because “a cruel 
government was coming to power,” which threatened Islam.  He claimed that quietism 
was the norm and that “Whenever one of the Imams saw th t revolt was not appropriate, 
he stayed at home and propagated Islam instead. This was the way from the beginning of 
Islam.”  But, when the government threatened Islam itself, revolt was required, even if 
forces were few and defeat assured.119 
The government engaged in a “triumphant retreat,” as one paper called it, and 
reform efforts were postponed until the following year, since Alam did not want the main 
goal of land reform to be derailed by peripheral issues like procedural matters for district 
councils.  Behind the scenes, the Shah was “even more vehement in his criticism of the 
Clergy than Alam had been” and felt that “the Mullahs were desperately trying to 
maintain a position of power in the country which he would not permit.”120  A November 
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1962 report notes that the government “plans to quiet the mullas" through a crackdown 
and threats to redistribute endowment land if they did not fall in line.121   
 
1963  
In January 1963, the Shah introduced the “White Revolution.”  This ambitious series of 
reforms would eventually include nineteen elements, but only six points were initially 
discussed: land reform, the enfranchisement of women, th  privatization of government-
owned businesses, profit sharing, the formation of a literacy corps, and the 
nationalization of forests.  These six points were voted on in a national referendum on 
January 26, 1963.   
Land reform was the main feature of the Shah’s “revolution from above,”122 
which was designed to pre-empt and co-opt a peasant revolution (although it largely 
ignored the danger of the exploding population of urban poor).  The Shah’s acceptance of 
Alam’s brainchild “took form slowly in his mind, and initially it lacked direction.”  He 
was finally motivated to take specific action because of the Kennedy administration’s 
pressure for reform, nervousness about opposition from the Right and the Left, and “the 
unusual display of affection and loyalty he received from the peasantry” in areas where 
small-scale land reform had occurred.123 
The Shah wanted changes that were radical enough to distract from the lack of 
political reform, but “conservative enough to avoid extensive disruption and a truly 
revolutionary situation.”124  As a result, the White Revolution’s main feature is “its lack 
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of any attempt or even thought of political reforms.”125  As the Shah explained in an 
interview, “my job is to prepare my country for democracy, but we cannot yet have 
democracy—American or British style.  It is not time… our people are not ready for that.  
Our people need the king.”126 
The main opponents of land reform were landlords as well as the ulama, “who are 
watching their former positions of power and prestige crumble around them.”127  The 
clergy opposed land reform because it would reduce their income by taking land away 
from their biggest financial supporters, and would also involve the direct loss of income 
if they were no longer able to hold large areas as tax-free religious endowments (15% of 
arable land in Iran was held by the ulama as endowments).128  They urged a “no” vote or 
a boycott, but there was little organized protest.  Clerics and landlords were unsure of 
how to respond and were internally divided, a problem that was made worse by the 
regime’s policy of using bribes and threats to keep the opposition under control.  The 
major problem was that “thus far no one leader has been allowed to emerge who could 
symbolize opposition to the Shah as Mosaddeq did in 1951-53.”129   
The clerical leadership also rejected the enfranchisement of women called for by 
the White Revolution, and this issue was a major sou ce of controversy, although it was 
overshadowed by the economic threat of land reform.  Both points, taken together, were 
seen as proof of the regime’s underlying desire to wage war on Islam itself.  The Shah 
responded to these criticisms by calling the ulama par sites and saying that he was better 
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suited to interpret Islam than them.130  The Shah’s direct involvement caused Khomeini 
to shift his focus from Prime Minister Alam to the dynasty itself, noting that the rise or 
fall of administrations mattered little if the monarchy itself was to blame.  He calls on his 
audience to  
realize that this event cannot be compared to the former disturbance (concerning 
the Provincial and District Councils Bill) nor can we respond to it in the same 
way.  On the face of things that disturbance concerned the government…In this 
case however, that with which we are now confronted an  against which we are 
directing our grievances and opposition is the Shah himself—someone who now 
finds his life hanging in the balance; and as he himself stated, to succumb on this 
occasion would mean his downfall and ruin 131 
The Shah is not attacked for his surface intentions, but rather his hidden intent to 
“delude and mislead” and lay an “elaborate trap” at the end of a “series of deceptive, 
misleading moves.”132  This history of betrayal and deception goes back to his betrayal in 
1955, after which he never regained the trust of the ulama. 
In order to overwhelm and overshadow the clerical opposition, large rallies were 
organized throughout January in support of the White Revolution.  These rallies were 
largely filled by government employees and workers from certain companies, like Pepsi, 
who would gather to praise the Shah and the reform initiatives.133  The fact that a Baha’i 
ran Pepsi helped neither the regime nor the Baha’is. 
When a delay in the national referendum on the White Revolution was suggested, 
because of bad weather, the Shah rejected this and insisted that it must be held before 
January 27 (the first day of Ramadan), since  
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information had been obtained that the Mullahs may launch a campaign against 
the Baha’is during the fasting period of Ramadan.  Mr Alam reminded me that 
the Mullahs had attacked the Baha’is during Ramadan some ten years ago and 
that a number of people had been killed.  He did not expect a repeat in 1963 but 
concluded that stern measures might have to be taken nd, if so, it was much 
better to have this occur after the referendum had been completed.134 
On the eve of the January 1963 referendum, the Shahwas praised by American 
representatives for having finally “made a clean and irrevocable break with the traditional 
moneyed, land-owning, and religious elites on whom he relied so heavily in the past.”135  
On the day of the referendum, Khomeini accepted that little could be done to stop 
its approval, but found hope in the idea of eventual victory.  He told the opposition to 
take heart, saying: 
Do not let these rusty bayonets frighten you, they will soon be broken. This 
government cannot oppose the demands of a great nation wi h bayonets, and 
sooner or later it will be defeated. … Instead of bullying and using bayonets, they 
should accept the wishes of the people and realize that they cannot silence the 
people or make them surrender with bayonets, nor can they use coercion to 
prevent the clergy from performing the duties with w ich Islam has charged 
them.136 
The referendum, which was generally considered to have been rigged, passed 
overwhelmingly.  Although women were not originally going to be allowed to vote until 
later elections, this was changed at the last minute and they were told to “set up their own 
ballot boxes” and several special polling places were r served just for women.  This was 
disregarded, however, and women were seen “intermingling in queues with men and 
casting votes in the same ballot boxes” and “women appeared elated rather than awed by 
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the experience of voting.”137  The landlords and clergy, on the other hand, were said to be 
“frightened, confused and furious” and to be “demoralized” and unsure of what to do 
next.138   
In the first meeting with Alam after the passage of the referendum, he was 
described as “elated” and said that the Shah was “in a state of exhilaration and great 
confidence.”  On January 24, immediately before the ref rendum, the Shah had gone to 
Qom to “show his defiance of the Mullahs in one of their most important strongholds.” 
Alam said that the Shah made this decision himself and it showed his astuteness and 
courage.  The Prime Minister “felt that the political power of the Mullahs in any national 
terms had been destroyed.”  He clarified that “it was not the Shah’s purpose nor that of 
the Government to destroy the institution of the Moslem clergy” but insisted that it 
“could not allow them to remain as a political obstacle to progress.”  He related that the 
Shah was so elated by the outcome of his gambit that he was thinking of allowing 
“completely free elections,” although this “may well mean one thing in the United States 
and quite another thing in Persia.”139  
When Sir Geoffrey Harrison (the British Ambassador) left his post in April 1963, 
he noted that “The Shah seems suddenly to have acquired a new sense of purpose.  He is 
now more firmly convinced than ever before of his personal mission to lead his country 
through the difficult transition from a feudal to a progressive State.”  In his first dispatch 
in April 1963, however, the new British Ambassador (Denis Wright), who had extensive 
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previous experience serving in Iran in the 1950s, was more pessimistic, and felt that “the 
country is waiting for leadership which… the Shah never quite provides.”140   
In the months after the referendum, despite being blacklisted by the press, the 
ulama attacked the Shah and his policies through leaflets, posters, and sermons.  At the 
end of February, on Eid al-Fitr (the holiday marking the conclusion of Ramadan), there 
were anti-government sermons and a clerical boycott of the Shah’s celebrations.  Just 
before the Persian New Year (at the end of March), leaflets called for mourning instead 
of celebration.141  All major clerics supported this initiative and major ayatollahs released 
statements condemning the enfranchisement of women.  Although they did not have 
access to the radio or mainstream media, the messag of the clerical opposition was 
successfully spread nationally through sermons and leaflets created by a clandestine 
Islamic press.142  In early 1963, several Islamic organizations formed a coalition to 
coordinate protest action, and began to collectively target the Shah directly.143 
The Shah responded to clerical opposition by sending more than a thousand 
troops into Qom on March 22, 1963.  In this attack, SAVAK utilized a motley crew of 
agents, toughs from South Tehran, peasants, and employees of the Tehran bus 
company.144  The attack was (rather unconvincingly) staged as an attack by peasants in 
favor of land reform against the “black reactionaries” blocking Iran’s progress, and is 
most widely remembered for the storming of the Fayziyeh madrasa (religious school) 
and the brutal assaults on Khomeini’s charges.  This was part of a larger "harassment 
campaign of the government aimed at weakening the mullahs in fact and in the public 
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eye."145  An April 1963 report notes that SAVAK carried out a number of similar staged 
episodes in order to make the clergy look bad, a tactic that the CIA had used earlier 
against Tudeh.146  In the same month, the Shah claimed that he had "broken the back" of 
the religious opposition.147   
In response to these anti-clerical initiatives, Khomeini released a leaflet claiming 
that Islam itself was being destroyed “by the filthy hand of the foreigners” who were 
controlling the Shah, and that he should be removed in favor of a regime that would rule 
according to the Qur’an.148  A CIA report notes that for the first time the Shah was 
personally targeted (rather than the majles or the Cabinet) and that a major theme of these 
unprecedented attacks on the person of the Shah was the ccusation that he “had become 
a puppet of the Baha’is, a sect that in turn was controlled by the Jews.”149   
 In a March letter to merchants and guilds in Qom, Khomeini emphasized the 
“Baha’i” aspects of the struggle.  He warns: 
The noble Qur’an and Islam are in danger, the independence of the country and its 
economy are in the clutches of the Zionists who in Ira are manifest in the form of 
the Baha`i party, and in no time at all, if the Muslim  maintain their lethal silence, 
they will, with the help of their agents, seize all the economic institutions of this 
country and the presence of the Muslim nation in all the country’s affairs will be 
eliminated.  [Baha’i-owned] Iranian television has become a base for Jewish 
spies, and the government is aware of this and supports it. The Muslim nation will 
not be silent until this danger is removed, and if anyone is silent, then he will be 
responsible before God the Almighty and will be condemned to ruin in this 
world.150 
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Khomeini saw the SAVAK-led attack on the Fayziyeh madrasa, and the general 
terror inflicted on Qom in general, as inhuman and u forgivable.  On the commemoration 
of this event, forty days later, he claimed that the Shah was worse than Genghis Khan, 
since he engaged in similar behavior (destroying centers of learning, killing, wounding, 
humiliating, and terrorizing the clergy), but he did so while simultaneously claiming to be 
a Shi’ite Muslim.  This new assessment was projected backwards, to the beginning of his 
rule: 
It must be said that this is not a recent matter relating to the past few months only, 
but rather it is one which has a long history, having f rst developed several years 
ago. If not forty-odd years, then it was at least twenty years ago that it was 
decided that Qum must be wiped out.  It was during the lifetime of the 
late Ayatollah Borujerdi (May he rest in paradise) that they in fact decided to do 
away with both the Ayatollah as a religious authority and Qum as a 
religious center. 151  
 He briefly acknowledges the problem some had with Borujerdi’s leadership, 
saying that he “was seen by some in a certain light; but this is not the place to elaborate 
upon this.”  In spite of problems with his policies, Borujerdi was recast as the shield of 
the Islamic nation against the secret plans of the S ah.  In this new narrative:  
They realized that trouble would arise if they took action whilst [Borujerdi] was 
alive. Once he had ascended to the abode of the blessed, they immediately began 
to attack this religious center of Qum… because they wanted Qum not to exist. 
Qum was a thorn in their flesh…they made plans to destroy the clergy and then to 
destroy Islam and afterwards to realize the interess of Israel and her agents [i.e. 
the Baha’is].  This was the case from the beginning but it was concealed, their 
plans not being publicized. To a certain extent they ad in fact informed the 
public of their intentions, but they spoke of their infidel programme in very mild, 
diluted terms.152   
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Mourning the March attacks on Qom, in which the Shah’s men “beat and broke 
the limbs and necks of our children and loved ones, killing some by flinging them from 
the roof,”  Khomeini admonishes the Shah for turning against Islam and for ignoring the 
clerical counsel that had traditionally advised the Iranian monarchy: 
In fact, in the past it was the ulama… who were the ministers and advisers to 
the Muslim rulers. But who are the advisers now? Israel! Our counselors are Jews 
[i.e. Baha’is]! In the Dunya newspaper they themselves acknowledged the 
donation of five hundred dollars to each of two thousand Baha'is (the wretch 
hadn't better deny this since it was actually in the press); that's five hundred 
dollars from the wealth of this Muslim nation—in addition to offering a one-
thousand-and-twenty toman discount on each of their air fares. And what was this 
for? It was for their journey to London to participate in an anti-Islamic meeting. 
They were thus afforded the highest respect.  On the contrary, our pilgrims have 
to bear the most severe hardships and sometimes even ha  to offer bribes just to 
obtain permission for their journey; and even then only a few are actually 
successful… My God man, are you indeed a Jew [Baha’i]? And our country, is 
that Jewish [Baha’i] too?153 
 It is clear from the context that when Khomeini says “Jews” he is actually 
referring to Baha’is.  The event in London that Khomeini refers to is the 1963 Baha’i 
World Congress, which celebrated the religion’s firt century of existence.  Later in the 
same speech, he makes it more explicit that he is really referring to Baha’is when he says 
“Jews,” since he believes the Baha’is to be the medium through which Israel operates in 
Iran.   
Woe to those mute ulama and to the silent cities of Najaf, Qom, Tehran and 
Mashhad.  This deadly silence will cause our country and our honor and dignity to 
be trampled beneath the boots of the Israelis by means of these very Baha'is. Then 
woe to us; woe to this Islam; woe to these Muslims… Do not choose to remain 
silent since to do so today is to support the tyrannical system. I was informed that 
[Habib Sabet, a prominent Baha’i] was given a discount in a deal made between 
himself and the Oil Company, in which he made a profit of twenty-five million 
tomans; or in truth it was those who were sent to the anti-Islamic meeting in 
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London [i.e. the Baha’i World Congress] who actually profited. That is the 
current state of our oil industry, our foreign currency, our national airline and our 
ministers; and that is how things are for all of us. Then are we still to say 
nothing?! Ought we really remain silent and not complain?154  
 Despite the failures and persecution of 1963, Khomeini claims that it was a good 
year, because “It made the world realize that it is the clergy alone which speaks out 
against and confronts both oppression and the oppresso  and injustice and the unjust.”  In 
the conclusion of this oration, the Baha’i issue is again raised: 
So why don't you (the ulama) speak out and say whatthey are actually doing? 
Now that Islam is threatened by Judaism and the Jewish Party, which in fact 
constitutes the Baha'i Party, it is time for all of the ulama of Islam to speak with 
one voice; and for the orators, speakers and religious students to unitedly declare 
unequivocally that they don't want Judaism [Baha’ism] to determine the destiny 
of their country.155 
 In a later proclamation in May, Khomeini again raises the Baha’i issue: 
Know that the danger facing Islam today is no less than the danger posed by the 
Umayyads. The tyrant’s government, with all of its forces, assists Israel and its 
agents (the misguided and misguiding [Bahais]).  It has handed the information 
media over to them.  In the royal court, they receive whatever they want.  It has 
opened positions for them in the military, the ministry of culture and all of the 
other ministries and given them all of the sensitive posts.  Remind the people of 
the danger posed by Israel and its agents [the Baha’is]… Express your disgust at 
this treacherous government for mobilizing and sending several thousand [Baha’i] 
enemies of both Islam and nation to London to participate in an anti-Islamic and 
anti-nation assembly [i.e. the First Baha’i World congress]. These days, to be 
silent is to support the tyrant’s government and to succor the enemies of Islam.156 
Also in May, Ayatollah Shariatmadari wrote a letter to the ulama in Kerman in 
which he lamented that the government continued to strengthen and support the Baha’is 
and allowed them to hold high and influential positi ns.  He claimed that the Baha’is 
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were a political party, not a religion, and that they were the agents of imperialism within 
Iran.  A June 1963 statement by the Society of Iran’s Clergy, likewise argues: 
[Baha’is] are the middlemen of the Israeli state in our government… [and] have 
infiltrated the most sensitive organizations in government and, every day, their 
influence increases in all of the departments, even th  prime minister’s cabinet… 
[T]he clergy can never accept this great shame to be brought on the Muslims of 
Iran and can never tolerate the influence of the agents of Zionism and their 
middlemen, i.e. the Baha’is, in their government.157 
The most interesting part of this is the admission of ot being able to accept the 
“great shame” of growing Baha’i influence, and the c astisement of various clerical 
audiences for their “lethal silence,” which allowed this to happen.  Even in 1963, the 
sting of the failure of 1955 was still there.  This persistence of the status quo vis-à-vis 
Baha’ism was a continuing source of stress and embarrassment, as this issue had become 
fetishized as the standard for measuring Iran’s Islamicization or lack thereof.  The idea 
that this continued presence was unbearable is also evident in the increasing use of 
euphemisms, such as “’imperialism’s instruments and Zionism’s agents,” to avoid direct 
reference to Baha’is.158  There is no hesitation to use words such as “Jew” or “Zionism,” 
but “Baha’i” was avoided, and Baha’is were referred to indirectly on almost all 
occasions, except when explicitness was needed for the sake of clarity, or when the 
symbolic power of the word could be invoked to great and damning effect. 
 The conflict between the clerical opposition and the Court continued to escalate 
until it reached a climax in Moharram.  On Ashura (June 3, 1963), Khomeini directly and 
crassly attacked the Shah in the powerful setting of the Fayziyeh madrasa (that had been 
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attacked in March).  In his infamous speech on this occasion, Khomeini compares the 
Shah to Yazid (the one responsible for the cruel killing of Imam Husayn and a number of 
innocents, about thirteen centuries before, on that very day).  It was this rhetorical 
escalation that resulted in Khomeini’s arrest shortly thereafter.   
 Looking beyond this famous comparison, the rest of the speech contains many of 
the themes repeated throughout the year, including the Baha’i issue.  Khomeini at first 
indirectly refers to Baha’ism by attacking the “agents of Israel,” which was a common 
euphemism for the Baha’is, as discussed above. 
It was Israel that assaulted the [Fayziyeh madrasa] by means of its sinister agents. 
It is assaulting us too and you, the nation; it wishes to seize your economy, to 
destroy your trade and agriculture and to appropriate your wealth leaving this 
country without. Anything, which proves to be a barrier, or blocks its path is to be 
removed by means of its agents [the Baha’is].159 
 Later in the same speech, he explicitly names the Baha’is as the agents of Israel 
and discusses the danger that he believes they represent. 
Is Israel His Majesty’s friend? Israel will cause th  country’s collapse. Through 
its [Baha’i] agents, Israel will cause the dissoluti n of the monarchy; but beware, 
for one thing is certain—if, gentlemen, you take a look at the Bahai [publication] 
of two or three years ago, you will read: “Abdu’l-Baha advocates equal rights for 
men and women;” and this is the line that has been adopted by them. Then the 
ignorant Mr. Shah also steps forward and talks of equal rights for men and 
women! You poor wretch, they have purposely set you up so that they can say 
that you are a Baha’i, and so that I in turn denounce you as an unbeliever and you 
are finally got rid of. Do not continue in this way, you fool; do not do it.160 
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 The assumption that his audience is fully familiar with the name and position of 
‘Abdu’l-Baha (the son of the founder of the Baha’i religion) is itself a powerful indicator 
of the extent and naturalization of anti-Baha’i polemic.   He continues: 
Enfranchisement for women is what ‘Abdul Baha advocates. The [Baha’i book] in 
question is available, so why not read it. Has the S ah not seen this? If not then 
those who have seen it and have set this poor wretch up to say these things are to 
be rebuked… Both our country and our religion are in jeopardy. You repeatedly 
tell the ulama not to mention that our religion is endangered; but if we do not say 
this does that mean that our religion is in fact not i  danger? If we do not mention 
what the Shah is like, does that mean he is not like that? Indeed, you must do 
something to change this situation. You are being blamed for everything. You 
helpless creature, you do not realize that on the day when a true outburst occurs, 
not one of these so-called friends of yours will want to know you.161 
 The speech also implicitly acknowledges SAVAK’s hitory of controlling the 
ulama at Moharram, discussed in the previous chapter.  Khomeini does not refer to 
previous years, but discusses SAVAK’s attempt to dictate content in Moharram 1963.  
This could be openly admitted because, unlike earlir years, SAVAK scripts were not 
followed in 1963.  Khomeini relates the events of that morning: 
I was informed today that a number of preachers were taken to the offices of 
SAVAK and were told that they could speak about anythi g they chose other than 
three subjects: they were not to say anything bad aout the Shah, not to attack 
Israel [i.e. her Baha’i agents], and not to say that Isl m is endangered.  The 
problem is that if we do not concern ourselves with these three subjects then what 
else is there to talk about? All of our difficulties without exception stem from 
these three issues.162 
As a result of his attacks on the Shah, Khomeini was arrested on June 5, along 
with other leaders in Qom.  These arrests led to riots in Tehran, Qom, and elsewhere that 
were put down violently, with anywhere from several hundred to several thousand killed.  
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The revolts included crowds in the tens of thousand, led by those wearing the black 
mourning colors of Moharram.  The rioters targeted symbols of authority like power 
plants, police station, radio offices, telephone booths, the semi-official Ettela’at 
newspaper, and properties owned by Jews and Baha’is.163   
Although this uprising is often remembered as involving the nation as a whole, it 
was actually limited to a few cities.  A June 18, 1963 report, for example, notes that in 
Isfahan there was a mixture of apathy and state coercion that prevented any significant 
demonstrations.  The senior clerics in Isfahan were d scribed as cowed, while more 
minor clerics attempted to get involved but were censored and pressured into silence.164 
SAVAK agents were embarrassed by the extent of the 1963 protests, especially 
since they had supposedly been so overconfident that hey had not even bothered 
translating their training material on what to do in the case of mass demonstrations.165  In 
a June 24 conversation about the riots, the Shah said that the lesson that should be taken 
from the uprising is that they should have fired into the crowd earlier and been less 
lenient, and that SAVAK was not adequate and needed to be improved and expanded.  
He insisted that the clergy were not in a position o say or do anything vis-à-vis the 
government and that the White Revolution would continue.  He might allow them some 
face-saving gesture, but they were not in a position of strength and he intended to bring 
religion fully under governmental management through the White Revolution, and that 
this would be a final solution to the clerical problem.166 
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 Denis Wright, looking back on his long service in Iran, identifies two key 
moments in modern Iranian history: the aftermath of the anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955, and 
the riots of June 1963.  He recollects how, months after the conclusion of the anti-Baha’i 
pogrom, he was at a farewell dinner that the Shah had t rown in his honor in 1955, before 
he left Iran for the first time. On this occasion: 
I remember… sitting after dinner in the moonlight at S adabad and suggesting, on 
instructions from London, that he should follow hisfather’s example by taking a 
much firmer line with the reactionary Mullahs who had been responsible for a 
violent anti-Baha’i outburst earlier in the year.  The Shah then told me that he was 
not strong enough to do this.  But in June 1963 when t  Muharram riots, inspired 
by the Mullahs and conservative land owners, broke out he showed unexpected 
resolution in dealing with the trouble makers.  I believe his action then will come 
to be regarded as the turning point in the history of modern Iran…  In my 
judgment, if he had not so acted he might well have lost his throne; certainly his 
reform programme would have been jeopardised, if not completely destroyed.”167  
 
1964 
After ten months of imprisonment, Khomeini was releas d in April 1964.  He initially 
avoided active engagement with the regime, but continued his criticisms, again returning 
to the Baha’i issue.  In his view: 
The entire country's economy now lies in Israel's hands; that is to say it has been 
seized by Israeli agents [i.e. the Baha’is]. Hence, most of the major factories and 
enterprises are run by them: the television… Pepsi Cola… Make firm your ranks. 
These are the agents of imperialism and they must be uprooted… They have taken 
everything from us. They have taken the television and radio from us. The 
television lies in the hands of that fraud and the radio is in the hands of the regime 
itself; and as for the press, that too is corrupt.168 
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 Again, he is here referring to the Baha’is by mentioning “Israel.”  By “that fraud” 
he is referring to Habib Sabet, a prominent Baha’i who ran the Pepsi franchise in Iran and 
also brought television to Iran.169  The reference to radio access being taken away is  
reference to the blacklisting of politically active clergy after the anti-Baha’i pogrom of 
1955.  In this same speech Khomeini notes that the regime has tried to use the press to 
create the impression that the ulama were now in support of the White Revolution being 
conducted by “the Shah and the nation.”  Rejecting this, he asks, “Which nation? Is this 
revolution really anything to do with the clergy and the people?”  He also notes that the 
regime has tried to mark him as "Khomeini the traitor" when, in his view, they were the 
ones who had betrayed the nation.170 
 By 1964, the tragedy of the regime’s public violenc  in Moharram 1963 had 
started to replace anti-Baha’ism’s discursive importance as the unifying issue of the 
Islamic movement.  Anti-Baha’ism was not totally abandoned (and is, indeed, still very 
much on display in the Islamic Republic), but it was discursively replaced by the 
Moharram massacre and faded somewhat in importance.171  This re-positioning of 
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not strengthen the façade (j bheh) of irreligion. 
 Likewise, Ayatollah Milani ruled that: “Every individual who is attached to Islam and believes in 
the Holy Mahdi, the Imam of the Age, must abstain from drinking, buying, or selling the following 
beverages – Pepsi Cola, Schwepps …” (Jafarian, J ryanha, p. 378 n2.). 
170 Khomeini, Kauthar, pp. 138-39. 
171 In later years, when Khomeini was in exile in France and in Sunni areas, he rarely mentioned the 
peculiarly Iranian Baha’i issue, instead usually framing the Revolutionary movement in ways that were 
comprehensible to an international audience.  When he did bring the Baha’is up, they were treated as a
symptom rather than the cause of Iran’s problems (whereas in the 1950s they were identified as the source 
of the problem). 
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Moharram 1963 can be seen in the April 1964 speech quoted above, which was 
Khomeini’s first public opportunity to address the tragedy.  He swears: 
As long as the nation lives it will mourn the events of the 15th of Khordad [June 5, 
1963, the day of the riots and their brutal suppression].  A government official 
once said in a speech that the 15th of Khordad was a disgrace to the Iranian nation; 
I wish to complete this statement: the 15th of Khordad was a disgrace to the nation 
because weapons were procured with the money of this nat on and it was with 
these very same weapons that they killed the people!172 
In a speech five days later, Khomeini again referenced the uprising and claimed 
that “The nation of Islam has arisen and will never again acquiesce. Even if I make a U-
turn or compromise with you (the Shah), the nation surely will not.”173   
Despite Khomeini’s tough words, the religious oppositi n was strictly disciplined 
in 1964, although it was felt that the ulama had “shot their bolt" the previous year and 
had little chance of ever repeating such a scenario.  M harram was strictly regulated and 
the Shah made it clear that any resistance in the holy month would be "dealt with 
severely," and that the military was to maintain "order at any cost."  With strict discipline, 
and many leaders of the previous year’s uprising still imprisoned, there were no large 
demonstrations in Moharram 1964, since the previous year’s massacres had made it clear 
that “force will be decisively used by the government when necessary."174   
Despite the lack of overt opposition, the ulama remained critical and repeatedly 
demanded the release of clerics arrested the previous year.  Ayatollah Qomi, for example, 
claimed that the people were alienated from a governm nt which "is maintained by force" 
and fills its jails with those "whose only crime was support for religion."  He proposed 
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that the only possible explanation was that the government is controlled by "Jews and 
Bahais."  In his view, these two groups "have a vast and pernicious influence in Iran and 
in the world," are “enemies of Islam," and, in Iran, "a large part of commerce is in their 
hands."175  It was (falsely) claimed that Alam was a Baha’i, nd the regime was 
repeatedly smeared by mentioning the prominence of Baha’is like Ayadi and Sabet and 
those with Baha’i backgrounds, like Ebtehaj.   
As part of their opposition, the ulama “still caters to the prejudices of many 
devout Iranians against Bahais, Jews and foreigners i  general.  At present, it uses these 
issues primarily to embarrass the regime.”  This strategy was effective because, unlike 
previous opposition to “un-Islamic” policies, the cl rgy were now practicing populism 
and, in so doing, were no longer "isolated from the mainstreams of articulate Iranian 
political opinion," since they were avoiding religious rhetoric and instead attacking the 
regime “on such issues as corruption, unconstitutional ty, foreign control of oil resources 
and ‘imperialism and colonialism,’ about which non-religious sectors of Iranian society 
are also concerned."176   
Khomeini’s network also used the Baha’i issue in its expansion and recruitment 
efforts.  In 1964, his supporters began to travel across Iran, denouncing the regime for 
corruption, immorality, and support of Baha’ism.  Two supporters from Qom, for 
example, traveled to Abadan and Khorramshahr to denunce local officials as corrupt and 
immoral, and to condemn Pepsi as a Baha’i product.177   
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 In a speech on September 9, 1964, Khomeini himself again returns to the Baha’i 
threat, using euphemisms such as “Israeli” and “worse than a Jew”: 
In this country, the television is independent and is controlled by an Israeli [i.e. a 
Baha’i, Sabet]. He says whatever he wants…Here, someb dy "worse than a Jew" 
should control the television and propagate whatever he wishes, yet we are not 
free to propagate our ideas! "Oh no, these reactionaries should not speak," is what 
they say, but where is the reaction? All we are saying is that you should be united; 
all Muslims should be united.178 
In the same speech he continues: 
These people, these Israeli agents in Iran [the Baha’is], wherever you look in the 
country they are there. They occupy all the key posts, the sensitive posts in the 
country, and this, by God, could prove to be dangerous for the throne of this man 
[the Shah]. They do not realize this. It was these people who plotted in Shemiran 
[a district in northern Tehran] to kill Nasir al-Din Shah and take control of the 
country.179  Look at history; it relates how they plotted, how a few people tried to 
assassinate Nasir al-Din Shah in Niavaran, and how a group of people in Tehran 
tried to seize power. These people think that they should govern. They have 
written in their books, in their articles, that governance belongs to them, that they 
should create a new monarchy, a new government, a just government. These 
people who have such malicious ideas and evil intentions are found throughout 
the country from the court down. Sir, you should be afraid of these people, they 
are such animals. Some of them can be found in the ministries. I pointed one of 
them out to one of the ministers and he told me I was mistaken. Then I sent him 
documented evidence to prove my claim, but the man, I shall not mention his 
dirty name, is still there. They are in the ministries and they are in the army.  O 
you respected army personnel, you are Muslim, hit these people in the mouth!  A 
lot of the army leaders are good people and they sometimes contact me, they send 
messages to me. Most of them are good people, and so they should intervene and 
stop these people who are against their religion, who are against their throne and 
crown, their country, their independence, their economy. You have to stop them. 
Go and ask that they be thrown out of the army, ask your superiors to throw them 
out. I swear to God I want your well-being. I am worried that one day you will 
open your eyes and see that they have destroyed your wealth, your being. I'm 
worried about this. If you will not stop them, then l t us destroy them. I shall 
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destroy them one day. I do not want to create disturbances. If you do not want to 
have trouble you should destroy them yourself; if you do not, you'll see that one 
day something else happens in some other way and at that time neither I can stop 
them nor you. This is the situation that we are faced with; you see it and we see it. 
I don't know what we should do about it or how we should put it right.180   
On October 26, Khomeini again directly denounced the S ah, this time for a bill 
that he believed sold Iran’s independence in exchange for a loan that would only benefit 
the corrupt upper class.  This “status-of-forces agreement” gave American forces in Iran, 
and their dependents, immunity from Iranian law.  Khomeini claimed that, under the new 
law, an American servant could kill the Shah and not be punished, while the Shah would 
be taken to task for killing even a pet of the Americans.  As part of his attack on the bill, 
Khomeini claimed that the government targeted the clergy while giving a free hand to 
Israeli agents in Iran [i.e. the Baha’is].  With the new law, the Shah was supposedly 
confirming that Iran was a “colony” and its people “enslaved.” In his opinion the Shah 
and his associates “are all traitors and betray Iran."181  He states: 
So, the influence of the religious leaders is harmful to the nation? No, it is 
harmful to you, harmful to you traitors, not to the nation! You have realized that 
as long as the influence of the religious leaders exi ts you cannot do everything 
you want to do, commit all the crimes you want, so you wish to destroy their 
influence…Why did you do this? Why have you sold us? Are we your slaves that 
you sell us? We did not elect you to be our representatives, and even had we done 
so, you would forfeit your posts now on account of his act of treachery. This is 
high treason! O God, they have committed treason against this country. O God, 
this government has committed treason against this country, against Islam, against 
the Qur'an. All the members of both houses who gave their agreement to this 
affair are traitors. Those old men in the Senate are tr itors, and all those in the 
lower house who voted in favor of this affair are traitors. They are not our 
representatives. The whole world must know that they ar  not the representatives 
of Iran! Or, suppose they are, now I dismiss them. They are dismissed from their 
posts and all the bills they have passed up until now are invalid… We do not 
recognize this as a law. We do not recognize this Parliament as a true Parliament. 
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We do not recognize this government as a true governm nt. They are traitors, 
traitors to the people of Iran! …O God, destroy those individuals who are traitors 
to this land, who are traitors to Islam and to the Qur'an.182 
In addition to sermons, Khomeini distributed his message through handbills and 
called for the Shah to be overthrown.  He demanded that the "rule of the bayonet should 
cease" and the state become "the true representatives of the people."  He also denounced 
America for waging a war on Islam, claiming that "America considers Islam and the Holy 
Koran to be against its interests and is determined to destroy them and the clergy who are 
subjected to imprisonment and torture."  America "trea s the Moslem nations as savages" 
and has created a "medieval condition" in Iran by directing the Shah to imprison and 
torture religious leaders.  Again, this is a reference to the aftermath of 1955, discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
Although the clergy were often divided, Khomeini claimed that they had been 
united by the massacres of 1963 and the fact that Islam itself was in danger.  To support 
his claim, he pointed out that a history textbook in Iran taught the young that eliminating 
clerical influence is in the best interests of the country, and that the clergy should be done 
away with permanently.  He claimed that, with institutional survival at stake, the ulama 
would not go quietly, but would knock the teeth outf hose who were trying to destroy 
them, and would not “remain silent while the Holy Koran is sold away."183   
Because of his fierce opposition to the status-of-forces bill, Khomeini was 
arrested a few days later, on November 4, and exiled to Turkey.  By 1965, this 
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arrangement was proving unsatisfactory, and Khomeini was transferred to Najaf, Iraq in 
October 1965.   
 
Why Khomeini? 
Americans diplomats increasingly identified Khomeini as the “leader” of the ulama in 
1963 and thereafter, and this identification became  s lf-fulfilling prophecy.  Because of 
his prominent opposition to the regime, and to American interests in Iran, American 
officers became increasingly obsessed with Khomeini, and constantly asked everyone, 
from taxi drivers to ayatollahs, whether they thought Khomeini would succeed 
Borujerdi.184  The answer was always “no,” but the American obsession with his possible 
candidacy served to further increase Khomeini’s prominence and importance because of 
the perception that the Americans were afraid of him.   
One American report found it strange that Khomeini opposes change even though 
he is the leading expert on ejtehad (the mechanism for adapting Islamic law to changing 
circumstances).185  The important part of this observation is that Khomeini is framed by 
these American reports as Shi’ism’s leading expert in jurisprudence, when in reality no 
informed person ranked Khomeini this highly in this area.  Khomeini’s leadership in 
opposing American interests was transferred to other areas as he became framed by the 
Americans as the “leader” in all respects. 
An American report noted that the government mishandling of Khomeini was also 
making him popular and leading others to imitate him.  As Khomeini became more 
popular, ayatollahs realized that they had to support him or else risk their own popularity 
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and standing.186  After he was arrested and faced possible execution, the pressure to 
protect him compelled the senior ayatollahs to label Khomeini a marja’ in order to give 
him a degree of protection, regardless of his lack of scholarly qualifications.187  
Khomeini’s promotion to the top tier was further enha ced when Behbahani, his 
benefactor and silent partner, died, and Khomeini took over his patron’s network of 
supporters.  As his organization developed a military wing, he also won over many 
former members of the Feda’iyan-e Islam.188   
In a May 1964 conversation about Khomeini’s popularity, Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
cautioned that although Khomeini is a decent man, "the man whose picture hangs in 
every shop and home in Persia" is  
a result of circumstances that Khomeini himself did not in any significant way 
influence or control… The government's actions over th  past year have pushed 
Khomeini into the role of the leader of Shia Islam…Under normal circumstances, 
Khomeini would not have been a candidate for the position of leader of Shia 
Islam.189   
He noted that Khomeini’s scholarship was subpar and "Until the last year, 
Khomeini was removed by his own temperament and his intellectual bent from any 
religious political activity.”  Unlike the later myth of Khomeini’s supposedly lifelong 
revolutionary bent, restrained by Borujerdi, Nasr notes in 1964 that Khomeini was 
apolitical previously and that he did not always emulate Borujerdi.  In his experience 
with him: 
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Khomeini possesses one unusual character trait that largely accounts for his 
spectacular rise to prominence, Nasr said.  Once Khomeini has made up his mind 
on any subject or philosophical position, he will defend this position against all 
opposition.  Nasr said many mullahs—most mullahs—will give in if a mujtahid 
(learned mullah) of higher rank or respect disagrees with a given opinion or 
conclusion.  Khomeini apparently would not yield even to Borujerdi (the late 
leader of Shia Islam).190 
Nasr felt that Khomeini was “politically naïve” and “had no understanding or real 
interest in the changing political situation in Iran."  Since the chain of events of the 
preceding year had propelled him to be the mouthpiece for a movement, however, 
Khomeini has in fact been forced to take a political attitude ill-suited to his 
character and training… Khomeini's speeches reflect the political views of the 
leading politically minded mullahs and not Khomeini himself.  Khomeini, Nasr 
maintained, by his position of necessity must say these things.191 
At the same time, Isfahani clerics identified Khomeini as the “leader” of the 
clerical opposition, but rejected the attempt to "stampede them into a premature 
consensus for Khomeini as pishva [leading marja’],"192 and considered other Ayatollahs, 
like Hakim and Shariatmadari, more suitable choices.  Senior clerics did not think 
Khomeini’s candidacy was viable or realistic, but younger clerics, religious students, and 
elements in the bazaar largely supported his candidcy.    
In 1965, Khomeini’s myth grew larger in his exile, and he was described as “the 
most popular man in Iran," although many believed that he government had helped him 
to reach this position.193  Former Prime Minister Sharif-Emami, for example, claimed that 
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“Khomeini was of no importance until the government forced the issue with him.”194  
Mehdi Haeri-Yazdi (the son of the great marja’ who reinvigorated Qom and taught 
Khomeini) also explained that Khomeini’s prominence was the result of intense 
governmental pressure and that "The government's oppressive actions have made him 
more popular and very probably have made it inevitable that Khomeini will be the pishva 
[i.e. the leading marja’]."195   
 
From Mansur to Hoveyda 
While Khomeini was settling into his life in exile, his followers in Iran sought revenge.  
On January 22, 1965, Prime Minister Mansur was shoteveral times in an assassination 
attempt, and died from his injuries five days later.  The assassin, Mohammad Bokhara’i, 
was a former member of the Feda’iyan-e Islam who had joined the military apparatus of 
Khomeini’s organization.  He later confessed that he had killed Mansur because of his 
actions against Khomeini.196  In addition to Bokhara’i, several other former Feda’is were 
executed for the assassination and for conspiring to kill other targets, including the Shah.  
Many of Khomeini’s lieutenants, like Hashemi Rafsanjani and Morteza Motahhari, were 
also rounded up and imprisoned.197 
Mansur was replaced as prime minister by his protégé, Amir-Abbas Hoveyda.  
This appointment was problematic because Hoveyda’s gr ndfather was a prominent 
Baha’i and his father had also been a Baha’i until he was forced out, in the early Shoghi 
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Effendi period, for political involvement, which is forbidden for Baha’is.198  In 1965, the 
general assumption was that Hoveyda was himself a Baha’i, although he denied this.  
British diplomatic reports at the time note that although Hoveyda appeared to be “an 
agnostic” and “is not a practicing Baha’i,” this did not change the fact that “his father 
certainly was, and this fact is already proving ammunition for the opposition,” since his 
Baha’i background "set clerical teeth on edge."199 Alam even warned the Shah not to be 
out of the country long, since he feared that the opposition to Hoveyda could get out of 
hand.  Despite this initial skepticism, Hoveyda surprised everyone by becoming the 
longest serving Prime Minister in the Pahlavi period.  He was later judged to be 
successful because of "his knowledge of his limitations."200  For this reason: 
Mr. Hoveyda is seen as the best example of what it t kes to survive in 
contemporary Iranian politics.  He is a manipulator of the system, finely attuned 
to the political realities of Iran and, most importantly, knows his position in 
relation to the shah—a low-profile administrator with no overt pretensions of 
aggrandizing his power.201 
During the long period of Hoveyda’s premiership, several individuals rose to 
prominence who, like him, came from Baha’i families but were not themselves enrolled 
Baha’is.  These included Mahnaz Afkhami, Minister for Women’s Affairs, and Parviz 
Sabeti, SAVAK’s head of internal security and the organization’s public face.  There was 
also General Sani’i, who was a practicing Baha’i, but was cast out for holding a political 
office (after he became the Minister of Defense).  In any case, it was the Shah who 
selected who was to advance, not Hoveyda, and Sabeti was the only person on this list 
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who may have been directly promoted by Hoveyda because of a shared identity.  An 
internal CIA study, for example, notes an unusual closeness between Hoveyda and Sabeti 
and speculates that they were united by their shared Baha’i background.   Hoveyda had 
been friends with Sabeti since they were youth, and had given money to Sabeti while he 
was a student.202   
Although only a small number of “Baha’is” advanced to prominence in the 
Hoveyda period, the clerical perception was that the promotion of Hoveyda and the rise 
of others from a Baha’i background was part of a deliberate strategy to de-Islamicize 
Iran.  As discussed previously, even Alam faulted the Shah for allowing the impression to 
be created that “half” the Cabinet was Baha’i. 203   During the Hoveyda period, Baha’ism 
and Pahlavism were increasingly conflated.  Whereas, in earlier periods, this conflation 
caused the regime to be smeared with Baha’ism, now,as the regime itself became 
targeted, Baha’is became increasingly smeared as roy lists.  Thus, at the beginning of 
Khomeini’s opposition, he called the Baha’is traitors because they supposedly sought to 
topple the Shah, while, on the eve of the Revolution, he considered them traitors because 
they did not want the Shah to be toppled.204 
Conclusion 
In earlier periods, individual politicians or elements in the government were accused of 
being Baha’i, but it was not until 1963 that the entir  governmental system was 
denounced as “Baha’i.”  Whereas earlier accusations of Baha’ism were made with the 
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aim of disciplining or replacing certain factions, or opposing specific policies, the 
wholesale denunciation of the regime as a whole involved the implicit call for the entire 
structure to be removed.  It was, in short, a call for a change of regime.   
This represented a new stage of anti-Baha’ism’s evolution, as Baha’is were 
equated not only with Zionism and imperialism, but also with the regime itself.  Since the 
regime was marked as ‘Baha’i” and “Zionist,” all of its attempts at social reformation 
were tainted as anti-national, catering to imperialism, and opposed to Islam.  At the same 
time, this equation with the regime caused Baha’is to be blamed for the misdeeds and 
tyranny of the Shah, as they were already blamed for the actions of Israel.  As a result, 
despite being avowedly apolitical and non-violent, the crimes and tyranny of the regime’s 
secret police were etched into the side of the community.205  This conflation was a rather 
brilliant strategic move, as it greatly inhibited the regime’s ability to engage in social 
reform while simultaneously limiting the appeal of the Baha’i Faith. 
Despite continued concern over the Baha’i issue, aft r the events of Moharram 
1963 this threat largely faded into the background as the Shah was directly targeted and 
Baha’i influence was seen as a symptom rather than a cause of the regime’s corruption.206  
As the Moharram 1963 massacres were discursively integrated into the clerical narrative 
as the opposition’s birth in fire, the earlier currents of the Islamic movement became 
increasingly blotted from the collective memory.  In a January 1978 speech, for example, 
Khomeini constructs a sacred history of the Islamic resistance that jumps from the 
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oppression of the Reza Shah period to the oppression of 1963, ignoring the crucial 
developments of the 1940s and 1950s.207    
In the standard translation of Khomeini’s pivotal Ashura speech in 1963, found in 
Hamid Algar’s Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam  Khomeini, the 
concluding section, concerning the Baha’i Faith andAb u’l-Baha (the son of the founder 
of the religion), is missing.208  This is a very curious omission, as it is the only theme of 
the speech that is edited out.  This is not entirely Algar’s fault, as the Baha’i elements are 
missing in the Persian source that Algar chose to use, although the complete version was 
available elsewhere.209  The concluding anti-Baha’i section is an extremely important part 
of this infamous speech, as Khomeini claims that it is Baha’ism that would cause the 
dissolution of the monarchy, since it would lead him to denounce the Shah as an 
unbeliever, and the Shah would be “finally got rid of” on this basis.  There is no reason 
why this section would have been omitted, other than t t it threatened the larger 
revolutionary narrative that Algar (and his source) w re crafting, as Khomeini supporters.  
This erasure from the historical record speaks to the problematic positionality of the anti-
Baha’i current in the movement for Islamic Iran.  This “forgetting” of the importance of 
anti-Baha’ism was part of the cultural re-orientation nvolved in nationalizing the Islamic 
movement, as collective amnesia is the glue that holds nations together.  
 Nationalism involves the imagining of a political community that is “both 
inherently limited and sovereign.”210  The Islamic movement established the “limits” of 
the Iranian nation between 1941 and 1963, clearly equating it with the Shi’ites in Iran, 
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with a space allowed for the “patriotic” and recognized minorities, and framing it in 
contradistinction to the Baha’is.  This early movement did not, however, involve claims 
of sovereignty (with the possible exception of incosistent bravado by the Feda’iyan-e 
Islam).  It was not until 1963 that claims of sovereignty were first articulated, and it was 
not until 1964 that claims of sovereignty were articulated in a consistent way.  According 
to Anderson, the articulation of sovereignty involves the rejection of the idea that rule 
should be “dynastic” and the belief that, instead, the nation should exercise political 
autonomy and self-determination.  This was expressed op nly for the first time in 
Khomeini’s opposition to the status-of-forces bill, when he denounced the Shah and the 
government as “traitors” in a false government.  They were “dismissed” from 
representing the nation by Khomeini, who instead identifies the ulama as the authentic 






                                                      






Nationalisms are not constructed quickly and their taken-for-granted origins rarely, if 
ever, withstand close historical observation.  In the case of Shi’ite nationalism in Iran, I 
have tried to problematize the origins of this discourse, as expressed in the 1960s, most 
prominently by Khomeini, by treating it as a cultural artifact and attempting to untangle 
the earlier cultural productions that were re-oriented as part of this national discourse.  I 
asked: why was it that the ulama were firmly in the royalist camp in the early 1950s, but 
largely opposed to the regime by 1963?  Finding none of the standard explanations 
satisfactory, I engaged in a careful exploration of the institutional history and discursive 
currents of the Borujerdi period, and have framed the opposition of the early 1960s as the 
later stage of a decades-long process.  Broadly speaking, there were three main stages to 
this development. 
The first stage involved the imagining of Iran as a Shi’ite nation and the call for 
the state to reflect the values and enforce the limits of this nation.  Important elements of 
this process included: the Islamic revival that followed the 1941 abdication of Reza Shah; 
a newly invigorated clergy, united the leadership of B rujerdi; the creation of numerous 
Islamic associations; British and American patronage of such groups as a bulwark against 
Communism; the establishment of an alternative Islamic press; the (partial) 
standardization, in this alternative press, of a discourse promoting the construct of a 
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Shi’ite nation; and the appeal for the state to reflect the values of this nation by 
reaffirming its Shi’ite orientation by weeding out the Baha’i “infiltration”  that polluted 
and endangered it. 
Anti-Baha’ism acted as a counter-melody to the movement for “Islamic Iran.”  As 
the diverse organizations and individuals involved in the Islamic movement pursued 
different priorities, and had different visions and understandings of what an Islamic Iran 
would be, anti-Baha’ism acted as a centripetal force holding together a movement that 
was united by little else.  While Islamic Iran was a nebulous and distant utopia, the 
Baha’i “threat” presented an immediate, tangible soft target that could be attacked with 
impunity in order to make a larger point about the ne d to Islamicize the nation.  When 
the Shah seized direct control in 1955, Borujerdi demanded a pogrom against the Baha’is 
as a boon for clerical support of the Shah in the 1953 coup that returned him to power, 
and threatened to expose and target the immorality of the royal family if he did not 
comply.  The anti-Baha’i pogrom that followed, short-lived as it was, was nevertheless 
effective as an object lesson demonstrating Shi’ite territoriality, with the most prominent 
public marker of the existence of Baha’is in Iran removed from the sacred skyline of the 
capital. 
Juergensmeyer and Friedland have argued that this kind of religious violence is a 
way of embodying the Durkheimian distinction between the sacred and the profane, of 
tangibly marking the line between us and Them as an incommensurate divide based on 
“absolute, non-negotiable differences.”1  In Iran, the violence against Baha’is and their 
property was intended to demonstrate this division by marking Baha’ism as irreconcilable 
with Iranian identity and beyond the limits of the Shi’ite nation.  By “limits,” I am 
                                                      
1 Friedland, “Religious Nationalism,” p. 139. 
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referring to Anderson’s definition of nationalism, which involves the collective 
imagining of both the limits and sovereignty of thenation.2  At this stage, the Islamic 
movement did not claim sovereignty, but was instead actively constructing the limits of 
the nation, both discursively and tangibly. 
The second stage involved the permanent rupture between the state and the 
imagined Shi’ite nation as a result of British and American intervention, initially over the 
persecution of Baha’is, and the Shah’s subsequent attempt to dominate and discipline the 
ulama, who were now marked as a threat to national rder and an impediment to 
progress.  The intervention to prevent the disaster of an imminent “holocaust” in 
“American Iran” was primarily to protect British and American interests in Iran, although 
there were clear humanitarian concerns as well, at leas on the American side.  As the 
initial danger passed, however, the intervention evolved into a larger policy reversal, as 
the combative ulama and Islamic movements that had been patronized to fight 
Communism were now seen as a security threat and a chronological drag on Iran, 
hindering its ability to carry out the reforms needd to counteract the appeal of the Left.  
The Shah, who had initially been praised for his liberalism and willingness to play the 
role of a constitutional monarch, was now seen to be too “weak,” and was pressured to 
become a strong man like his father, with the disciplining of the clergy being the litmus 
test for his continued usefulness on the throne.  The disciplining of the clergy began with 
the abortive ending of the anti-Baha’i pogrom and continued with the closing down of 
Islamic organizations, the imprisonment of anti-Baha’i activists, the inhumane conditions 
that they faced in exile to Bandar Abbas and elsewhere, the massacre of Shirazi’s mob in 
June 1955, and the harsh and occasionally violent repression of religiosity at Moharram.  
                                                      
2 See Chapter I. 
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In the late 1950s, these efforts expanded as the ad oc efforts of General Bakhtiar were 
expanded and bureaucratized in the form of SAVAK, cleri al resistance at Mashhad was 
stomped out, and Moharram came under the control of the state, with “cowed” clerics 
reading SAVAK-scripted sermons.  Borujerdi, who in the early phase of the anti-Baha’i 
pogrom had praised the Shah and indicated that the Hidden Imam was pleased with him 
as well, was left full of “loathing for the system.”   His optimism about the new Shah had 
turned to alienation and disgust, due to his betrayal, which was blamed on American 
pressure.  As suppression of the ulama continued, th  regime, the Americans, and the 
Baha’is became increasingly conflated and seen as itent on destroying the ulama. 
The third stage involved the attempt to remove the financial basis of clerical 
autonomy through land reform and to further secularize Iran through the various “anti-
Islamic” initiatives grouped with land reform.  The Islamic movement felt compelled to 
resist and, eventually, to rhetorically dismiss the regime and claim symbolic sovereignty.  
Although Khomeini was the one to explicitly assert sovereignty in 1964, the ulama’s turn 
against the state began in 1959 when Borujerdi mobilized national clerical opposition to 
women’s enfranchisement and land reform, successfully blocked these reforms, and 
caused them to be set aside until after his death.  Alt ough Borujerdi considered these 
reforms to be anti-Islamic, his opposition was not against them specifically, but, rather, 
they pushed his patience past its breaking point, following several years of betrayals and 
anti-Islamic initiatives that, taken together, caused land reform to be seen as the climax of 
a larger attempt to weaken and destroy Islam in Ira.   
When land reform was revived after Borujerdi’s death, in association with other 
“anti-Islamic” initiatives like the enfranchisement of women, and laws thought to allow 
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Baha’is onto local government councils, there was widespread opposition by the ulama 
and the Islamic organizations, who, like Borujerdi, saw these developments as simply a 
new stage of an anti-Islamic project that had been goi g on for several years.  The 
difference was that, unlike 1959, clerical oppositin was unsuccessful in blocking these 
reforms, for a number of reasons.  Most important, was the Shah’s insistence that the 
White Revolution was to be his crowning achievement, a d the subsequent 
unacceptability of the loss of prestige that would result from a failure to follow through 
with his announced goals.  When religious opposition c ntinued, despite the passage of 
the White Revolution, the Shah—over-confident in his security regime—turned SAVAK 
loose on Qom and, when anger at this violence fueled further clerical opposition on 
Ashura, he arrested those responsible and turned the military loose on the massive crowds 
that protested, leading to a bloodbath.   
This decisive display of public violence was able to suppress overt resistance, but 
it caused the regime to be marked as the irredeemabl  enemy of the movement for 
Islamic Iran.  The violence of Moharram 1963 caused th  Shah to be cast as “Yazid”—
the killer of Imam Husayn, the Other of the Shi’ite nation—while the 1964 capitulations 
to the Americans led to the “dismissal” of his sovereignty and the claim that the leaders 
of the Islamic movement were the true representatives of the Shi’ite nation that 
constituted Iran.  Although the Shah’s public violenc  and capitulation to America 
triggered the articulation of Shi’ite sovereignty, this claim was predicated on the previous 
imagining of the nature and limits of the Islamic nation in Iran, a process that occurred 




Dominance without hegemony, hegemony without dominance 
Ranajit Guha has pointed out how imperialism can produce a historical paradox, as the 
world’s foremost Western democracies create and sustain autocracies in other regions of 
the world under their control.3  He was referring to colonial India, but his points are also 
valid for Iran.  In the United States, dominance is maintained through persuasion, rather 
than force, because of the hegemonic nature of the stat .  In Iran, the Shah ruled not 
through persuasion, but through coercion (increasingly so as his reign progressed).  He 
was able to achieve dominance through the loyalty of he military and the transformation 
of Iran into a police state, but he never achieved h gemony.   
In the Indian case, Guha points out that domination by foreigners was exchanged 
for domination by local elites, after the traditional cultural deference shown towards the 
upper castes was re-oriented for nationalist purposes and these local elites discursively 
imagined a nation, one in which they were its “natur l” representatives.  By mobilizing 
certain segments of the population with this discourse, Indian elites were able to achieve 
independence and sovereignty, but the nature and scope of their hegemony has been 
limited.  It has largely ignored the segments of the population not appealed to by the 
initial nationalist mobilization, who were never really integrated into the nation that was 
imagined by the Indian nationalism of the elites.   
A similar process occurred in Iran, with the ulama in the place of upper caste 
Hindus.  They challenged imperial domination by creating an alternate hegemony, 
persuaded large segments of the Iranian population to mobilize under (or alongside) their 
banner, and eventually gained control of the state.  After the Revolution, however, it 
                                                      
3 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997). 
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became very clear that the clerics did not wield hegemonic power, and that the 
Revolution merely replaced one system of rule through domination with another system 
of rule through domination.  It created a system perhaps even less hegemonic than that of 
the Pahlavis, given that the Islamic Republic has impr soned and killed more political 
prisoners in its first decade than Mohammad Reza Shah did during his nearly four-decade 
reign.4   
Although these later developments are beyond the scope of this study, I have 
made the extended comparison in order to point out hat the early Shi’ite nationalist 
movement created an alternate hegemony that was useful for the purposes of mobilizing 
resistance, but which was ultimately unsuitable as the basis for creating a state that could 
be ruled through persuasion rather than domination.   
The early Shi’ite nationalist movement used fear of the Baha’i Other and outrage 
over the corruption and the public violence of the Shah to mobilize a large segment of the 
population.  Many of those who initially responded to this appeal were attracted by its 
populism.  The Shi’ite nationalist movement was framed, at first, as rule by the people, 
i.e. rule by the Shi’ite masses instead of the “Baha’i” elite, and it did not initially involve 
the idea of clerical rule or theocracy.  Such ideas are actually diametrically opposed to the 
mardom-centered discourse of the 1950s that I have discussed.  The later desire to spread 
the revolution beyond Iran’s borders is equally alien to the origin of the movement and its 
strict focus on Iran.  As the dissonance between th actual nature of clerical rule and the 
                                                      
4 Under Khomeini, tens of thousands of political prisoners were executed in less than a decade.  See:  
Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantation in Modern Iran (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999); Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran: Abuse of Cultural Relativism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); and Darius Rejali, (1994). Torture and Modernity: 
Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). 
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initial populism of the Islamic mobilization became ore apparent over time, it became 
increasingly clear that the Islamic Republic could not rule through persuasion alone.  
These discrepancies between the movement’s early populism and later theocracy 
can be explained by separating Khomeini from the movement that he inherited.  Like 
Kashani, Khomeini was a transnational pan-Islamist (in the tradition of al-Afghani) who 
patronized a religious nationalist movement whose cor values he did not share.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, Kashani was often mistaken for a Shi’ite nationalist because he 
co-opted the language of his clients, the Feda’iyan-e Islam, although close analysis of his 
own ideas reveals that he was actually a pan-Islamit and did not share the beliefs of the 
movement that he patronized or those of the audience to whom he sometimes crafted his 
rhetoric.  Khomeini was the same.  He highlighted points of agreement with his audience 
while de-emphasizing or obscuring the ways in which his worldview differed radically.  
Whereas the early Islamic movement, coming out of the lay organizations, stressed the 
centrality of the mardom (i.e. Shi’ite citizenry) and the peripheral role of the clergy, 
Khomeini was always a strong supporter of the ulama s n institution and an advocate of 
the preeminent role it must play in leading the peopl .  Nevertheless, he deemphasized 
this at first and instead appealed to the Islamic populism of the Islamic movement that he 
sought to lead.  In so doing, he advanced clericalism through the gift horse of populism. 
 
The Shi’ite nation and historical amnesia 
The catalytic role played by the Baha’is in the movement for “Islamic Iran” is 
comparable to the role that “the daughters of Quchan” played in encouraging the 
Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911).  In this episode, immortalized in Najmabadi’s 
431 
 
work, Iranian girls near Iran’s eastern border were being taken by foreign raiders.  This 
led to a national sense of shame and weakness and to the idea that something must be 
done to ensure that the Shah defends the interests of the people.  This sentiment often led 
to support for the constitutional movement in Iran.  Despite the strong emotions over 
Iran’s lost daughters, the constant evocation of this issue, and the clear importance of this 
thread of constitutional history, it was essentially ignored in all major treatments of the 
constitutional revolution.  In her intervention, Najm badi attributes this effacement to 
ideological historiography and its use of grand narratives that cannot accept episodes like 
this, which threaten the foundational premises on which their ideology rests.  She notes:  
the more prominent the story, the more it may become necessary to ignore it… It 
is precisely the overwhelming presence of the story of the daughters of Quchan 
that may account for its disappearance from Adamiyyat’s history.  Had it been a 
brief episode… Adamiyyat could have allowed it to enter his story for a brief 
moment then leave the scene.  The story would not have threatened to take over 
the grand narrative of his history and occupy the ov rall meaning of the 
revolution.5 
 As discussed in Chapter VIII, many of the most important discursive currents of 
the Borujerdi period, like anti-Baha’i populism, were later forgotten as the Shi’ite 
nationalist myth was slowly reified in the 1960s and thereafter.  Whereas, in the 
Borujerdi period, the Shi’ite nature of Iran was a m tter of contestation, and Iran was 
feared to be in danger of reorienting itself to Baha’ism, with the development of Shi’ite 
nationalism this earlier contestation is consciously forgotten and it is taken as a given that 
the nation is, was, and always will be Shi’ite.  The arena of contestation was moved from 
the orientation of the nation to the need for the nation to assert its sovereignty vis-à-vis 
the “false” government of the Pahlavis.  
                                                      
5 Najmabadi, The Story of the Daughters of Quchan, pp. 179-80. 
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Iranian Shi’ite nationalism, like all nationalisms, necessarily needs to deny that it 
has been historically produced.  This is to be expected, as nationalism involves the 
purposeful forgetting of beginnings to reach certain ends.  History is the enemy of this 
process since, as Renan notes, “forgetting and even the historical error are an essential 
factor of the formation of a nation.”6  Despite the ubiquitous nature of anti-Baha’ism and
its rhetorical importance in the creation of the Islamic movement, this importance could 
not be acknowledged, and its history could only be remembered in ways that served the 
larger needs of a teleological revolutionary narrative.   
Given nationalism’s universal need to deny and obscure its true origins, it is very 
telling that, until recently, Baha’is have existed in the blind spot of Iranian 
historiography.  Algar’s (deliberate?) omission of Baha’i references from Khomeini’s 
infamous speech of Ashura 1963 speaks to the importance of the anti-Baha’i current in 
the construction of Shi’ite nationalism, for a nation is defined not by what it collectively 
remembers, but what it collectively forgets.  The turn against the Hojjatiyeh in the early 
1980s also demonstrates the need of Iranian Shi’ite na ionalism to hide its historical 
origins.7  In the midst of a bloody war with Iraq and bitter infighting over who would 
control the Revolution, why was the most apolitical and harmless Shi’ite organization 
targeted and seen as a threat?  The Hojjatiyeh’s threat was not to the state, but to its 
founding myths.   
Likewise, the continued presence of a few hundred thousand Baha’is in Iran after 
the Revolution has been considered, and is still considered, by the Islamic Republic to be 
a serious threat to Iran, despite the non-violent nature of the community and its 
                                                      
6 van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, p. 193. 
7 See: Vali and Zubaida, “Factionalism and Political Discourse in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
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impoverishment after the Revolution.  Since 1979, hundreds of Baha’is have been killed, 
thousands imprisoned, and tens of thousands forced to flee Iran as refugees.8  This did not 
occur because they were a threat to Iran’s security, but because they are an existential 
threat.   
Iranian Shi’ite nationalism was initially imagined in opposition to the Otherness 
of the Baha’i community. As such, any move to integrate the Baha’is threatens the reified 
limits of the nation.  In recent years, such challenges have been occurring, as prominent 
non-Baha’i Iranians have increasingly expressed public support for the citizenship rights 
of Baha’is, leading to a small, but significant discursive shift in the understanding of 
Iranian identity.9  Several threads of the opposition movement are presently imagining an 
alternate hegemony in which even the Baha’is can be reconciled within the limits of the 
Iranian nation.  Nothing may come of this, of course, but it speaks to the ongoing 
contestation over the boundaries and orientation of the Iranian nation. 
                                                      
8 For the situation of Baha’is in Iran after 1979, see Cole "The Baha'i Minority;" Afshar, “Human Rights 
Violations of Iranian Baha’is;” and Cooper, The Baha’is of Iran. 
9 In 2008, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who had worked with Borujerdi to stamp out Baha'ism as a young 
man, expressed the legal opinion that although Baha'is were not a recognized minority, and he did not 
approve of them, "they are the citizens of this country, they have the right of citizenship and to live n this 
country. Furthermore, they must benefit from the Islamic compassion which is stressed in the Quran and by 
the religious authorities"(http://www.mideastyouth.com/2008/05/22/ayatollah-montazeri-proclaims-bahais 
-citizens-of-iran/).  The following year, in a petition entitled "We Are Ashamed," distributed in early 2009, 
hundreds of prominent Iranians expressed solidarity with the plight of Iranian Baha'is and shame at their 
(collective) silence over the treatment of Baha’is in Iran (http://www.iranian.com/main/2009/feb/we-are-
ashamed).  In an open letter released in March of te same year, many of the most prominent scholars 
involved in Iranian Studies called for an end to human rights abuses against Baha’is in Iran 
(http://iran.bahai.us/2009/03/11/call-by-academics-to- top-the-persecution-of-the-bahais-in-iran/).  Later in 
2009, author Azar Nafici and actress Shohreh Aghdasloo spoke out for Iranian Baha'is 
(http://www.dcbahai.org/news-and-events/74-iranevent09).  More recently, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi has 
stood against the persecution of Iranian Baha'is and defended the Yaran (the Baha'i administrative coun il 
for Iran), who were recently sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, supposedly for spying and other 
invented crimes.  Interestingly, charges against the Baha'i leaders were expanded following the 2009 
election debacle, after the government claimed that the Baha'is were the masterminds of the opposition 
protests.  This claim is nonsense, but it suggests tha  the present regime, like that of the Shah, finds it 
impossible to fully acknowledge the grievances of the people, instead blaming “foreign” elements for 
widespread anti-regime sentiments.  By discursively shunting the opposition movement beyond the limits 
of the nation, into the realm of the Baha’is, the regime is actually exposing the artificial nature of this 




The Number of Baha’is in Iran in the 1950s 
 
The number of Baha’is in Iran during the mid-Pahlavi period is largely a matter of 
speculation.  As one American report puts it, the number varies from 50,000 to 500,000 
depending on which group you ask.1  This actually understates the problem.  The number 
of Baha’is in Iran varies from 0.0001% to 5% of thepopulation, depending on which 
source one privileges.   I suggest that about 1.5% of the population (i.e. 250,000) was 
Baha’i in 1955. 
The Iranian government claimed publicly in 1955 that t ere were “no Baha’is” in 
Iran.2  At a different point in the same year, it claimed that there were only two thousand 
Baha’is in Iran.3  In the same year, Falsafi claimed that there were a million Baha’is in 
Iran, while an anti-Baha’i editor at Tufan openly ridiculed this figure and claimed that 
there were only 20,000 Baha’is in Iran.4  Again in the same year, Western media sources 
reported 500,000 to 700,000 Baha’is in Iran.5   
In the 1950s, Baha’is made inconsistent claims about their membership.  Most 
lobbying efforts by American Baha’is involved the repetition of the numbers used by 
                                                      
1 NACPM, RG 263 / 290 / 4 / 31 / 5 / Box 165, Iran – Religion, Education, and Public Information, 1964. 
2 Fischer, Iran, p. 187. 
3 This figure was claimed publicly by the Iranian government to downplay the importance of Baha’i 
persecutions.  Its author later described this figure as fabricated.  See: TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 31 
/ 55, FO to Chancery, June 20, 1955; FO 248 / 1560 / 1786 / 44 / 55, Confidential Minutes by Wright, 
August 24, 1955. 
4 USDS, Iraq, 1955-1959, Reel 15: 150; The New York Times, May 24, 1955. 
5 The New York Times, May 24, 1955 [500,000]; The Times, May 18, 1955 [700,000]. 
 
Falsafi or in press reports.  The British N.S.A., however, rejected Falsafi’s claim and said 
that the true figure was in the hundred
2000 and Falsafi’s claim of one million
that there were a million Baha’is in Iran.
 
Table 10.1.
Bayne’s 1955 investigative report
Iran—places the number of adheren
of the population (of twenty million).
American consulates for the 
                                                      
6 The New York Times, May 24, 1955.
7 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 127139 / 
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percentages (approximately 1%).9  This percentage is also supported by the Tehran 
results from the 1956 census, in which 1.4% claimed “other” or gave inadmissible 
answers (there was, of course, no “Baha’i” category).10    
 In Bayne’s view, the true size of the Baha’i community was obscured by the 
Baha’is themselves for reasons of expediency.  He points out that the official Baha’i 
records, which were left for the government (when Baha’i properties were seized in 
1955), seem to have been deliberately misleading, presumably out of self-protection, 
given the “Holocaust” that the community feared.  In Qazvin, for example, the seized 
records claimed that there were only fifteen Baha’is, but this was contradicted by other 
evidence, such as an annual local budget of $20,000 and assets including a ten-bed hostel.  
On the other hand, when it was advantageous, Bayne felt that Baha’is would inflate their 
numbers by including many who were only loosely associated with the religion, 
sometimes even counting among their number those who had merely accepted Baha’i 
literature.  The issue of “real” membership was furthe  complicated by occasional 
“purges” in which “backsliders are asked to resign,” as occurred in the early 1950s as part 
of the preparation for the global Ten Year Crusade.11 
                                                      
9 See, for example, USDS, Iran, 1955-1959, Reel 2:175. 
10 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 133061 / EP 1821 /3, “National Census of Iran 1956: data collected for Tehran city.” 





Religion and Nation under Reza Shah 
 
The Pahlavi “dynasty” controlled Iran from 1925-79 and consisted of Reza Shah (r. 1925-
41) and his son Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941-79).  Unlike the earlier Safavid (1501-
1736) and Qajar (1794-1925) dynasties, the Pahlavis did not seize power with the 
backing of Turkic tribes, and did not justify their rule in religious terms.1  Instead, Reza 
Khan, the leader of the Persian Cossack Brigade, came to power through a 1921 military 
coup (with British support) that occurred at a time when Iran lacked a functional central 
government and faced a number of regional insurgencies.2  As he consolidated power, he 
originally wanted to transform Iran into a republic, following the Turkish model.  When 
the ulama strongly objected, he agreed to the continuation of the monarchy, taking the 
throne in 1925.3  He ruled Iran for an additional sixteen years until Iran was occupied by 
Allied forces in 1941 and he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son. 
                                                      
1 For the Safavid period, see: Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980); Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern 
Iran (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Rula Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power 
in the Safavid Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); and Sussan Babaie et al, Slaves of the Shah: New Elites 
of Safavid Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).  For the Qajar period, see: Robert Gleave, Religion and Society 
in Qajar Iran (London: Routledge, 2005); Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal; Mangol Bayat, Iran’s First 
Revolution: Shi‘ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) and Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1982); Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots 
Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminis  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996); and Nikki Keddie, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796-1925 (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1999). 
2 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, pp. 102-18. 
3 Keddie, Modern Iran, pp. 85-86. 
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During the sixteen years of his reign, Reza Shah engaged in two main national 
initiatives.  The first was the “modernization” of Iran—in the material, administrative, 
educational, and industrial sense—which most scholars consider to have been moderately 
successful, albeit with a number of caveats and the problematization of the categories and 
assumptions involved in such a project.4  The second national project, which is the one 
that concerns us, is the secularization or de-Islamicization of Iran, which is universally 
considered to have been superficial and ephemeral.5  The most commonly discussed 
aspects of this campaign are the attempt to force Muslim women to discard hijab (Islamic 
dress) and the violent clash between the clergy and the Shah over his anti-Islamic 
policies, which culminated in a bloody confrontation in Mashhad in 1935.  On this 
occasion, the protestors—who had sought refuge in the Imam Reza Shrine—were 
crushed by the Shah’s security forces.  By exercising h s famous “iron fist,” Reza Shah 
was able to suppress clerical opposition and force superficial acceptance of a number of 
policies that were thought to be anti-Islamic.  After his abdication in 1941, most “anti-
Islamic” cultural restrictions fell away, however, and there was even a move in the other 
direction, as Iran experienced a powerful Islamic revival in the 1940s.6 
 Although I agree that these efforts negatively impacted Muslims, and that this 
attempt to suppress Islamic religiosity was superficial, I propose that framing the entirety 
of this campaign as “anti-Islamic” misses its larger purpose and significance as an 
attempt to imagine Iran as nation, and to formulate and promulgate policies that sought to 
                                                      
4 See, for example, Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 
Stephanie Cronin, The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941 (London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003); and Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of 
Iran 1878-1944 (Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1975). 
5 See, for example, Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, xv-xvi.  
6 See Chapter II. 
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create a national self through habitus.7  That is to say, Reza Shah believed that Iran was a 
state without a nation, so he intended to produce this nation through the coerced behavior 
of its citizens.  This new structure would be interalized until it was taken as natural, the 
artificiality forgotten.  These embodied national dispositions would then be externalized 
and projected outwards. 
This process was sidetracked by the anti-clericalism and racial nationalism that 
came to be discursively linked to this re-imagining of Iran.  Strong clerical opposition to 
dress reform also caused the issue to be further div ted from its unifying intentions, as it 
was taken up as a rallying cry for anti-regime agitation.  As part of the authority struggle 
that followed, the governmental discourse escalated its portrayal of Shi’ism as a marked 
category, representing the inverse of the Iranian natio al self.  The ulama came to be 
increasingly treated, at an official level, as Iran’s i ternal Other, who were unpatriotic, 
“foreign,” and the scapegoats for all of Iran’s social ills and continued “backwardness.”  
The following sections explore this marking of Shi’ism as alien from Iran’s national self.   
 
The Ulama and progress  
After Reza Shah took the throne in 1925, he constantly shared his opinion that the ulama 
were, at best, the “barrier” to Iran’s development into a modern state and, at worst, the 
                                                      
7 Bourdieu claims that beliefs are socialized into culture over time until they are naturalized to the point that 
their origins are forgotten and they become part of social structures.  The habitus is a system of dispositions 
that both produces and is produced, with external structures becoming internalized and naturalized, through 
practice, and internal dispositions also becoming externalized, through practice.  See: Pierre Bourdie, 
Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977) and Distinction: A Social 
Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).  This goal is 
somewhat alluded to in a 1931 discussion of the Shah’s attempt to create a national disposition.  In his 
dissertation, Siasi (a frequent member of Cabinet) claims that the attempt to reform dress “rests on the 
principle of the reciprocal influence of the physical and the moral. The national Persian costume, constantly 
worn by a tribal man, in a distant region, will give him the sentiment of belonging to a vast national u it 
and not to a particularist clan. Also, this common trait, precisely because it is superficial and visible, will 
bring together the different groups of Persians.” A. Akbar Siasi, La Perse au Contact de l'Occident: Etude 
Historique et Sociale (Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1931), pp. 203-06.  
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“major culprit in keeping Iran backwards.”8  Reza Shah was “known to believe that it was 
the mollahs who for centuries kept the people illitera e and ignorant, and who even 
today—if they dared—would try and block all social advancement."9  This sort of anti-
religious attitude was common among many segments of the Iranian elite at the time, and 
should be thought of a contemporary milieu rather tan a peculiar characteristic of the 
Shah.  His Minister of Court, Taymurtash, for example, criticized American support of 
missionaries being sent to Iran by asking: “how we would like it if they bundled up a 
crowd of moth-eaten mullas and sent them to America to open schools.”10  Such attitudes 
were also regularly displayed in the press. Rastakhiz, for example, claimed in 1922 that 
“the corruption existing in Iran is entirely the fault of the clergy” and that, in dealing with 
them, “absolute and final steps must be taken.”11  The same paper editorialized, right 
before the coronation of Reza Shah, that  
The root of our evil is not insecurity; it is the class of the clergy.  If this root is not 
attacked soon, all the gains of the army and the army itself will vanish.  The best 
method of eradicating the clergy is to take away their means of livelihood.  The 
waqf [endowment] lands should be taken away and sol to poor peasants.12 
 It is important to differentiate between the anti-clericalism of this class of 
Western-educated intellectuals, typically grounded in positivism and Orientalism, and 
Reza Shah’s personal dislike for the ulama, which was less intellectual and instead 
amounted to an almost visceral reaction against them, largely rooted in his own 
insecurity.  At a celebration in Urmia in 1927, forexample, Reza Shah was, to his visible 
                                                      
8 NACPM, NFAC (CIA), “Islam in Iran: A Research Paper,” August 31, 1979, p. 6. 
9 Ibid., RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 15 / 840.5 Social Matters – Manners and Customs, January 21, 1937. 
10 Ibid., NFAC (CIA), “Islam in Iran,” p. 6. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. Such a program of land reform was eventually initiated by the second Pahlavi shah in the 1960s, 
also under the influence of an anti-clerical entourage who guided the monarch’s grand, but vague, 
intentions.   
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displeasure, surrounded by many clerics.  One of them, Hajji Mirza Fath Ali came before 
him and insisted on praying for his success and kinly i formed the Shah how and when 
he was to participate in the blessing.  The Shah angrily refused, saying that participation 
in these clerical shows was “no part of his business.”  The cleric, afraid of losing face, 
insisted and said that he would pray that all Iranians be obedient to the Shah.  The Shah, 
his anger growing, replied, “Damn your prayers.  I’ll burn them if they aren’t.”  When the 
cleric continued to insist, the Shah grew very angry and spit out, “pedar sukhta!” (“Your 
father burns in hell!”) and left the celebration, ordering that the cleric be punished.  
Thereupon, Mirza Fath Ali, “in great fear and distre s,” took bast (refuge) at the house of 
a prominent local merchant, but was soon found dead, after having “fallen.”13 
 
Reza Shah and the imposter complex 
The Shah’s animosity towards the clergy was generally not the result of a reasoned 
stance, but rather an emotional reaction to those who had embarrassed and frustrated him 
in the past and who represented potential sources of future criticism, especially about the 
legitimacy of his rule.  Despite his palaces and wealth, he was haunted by an imposter 
complex.  His rough exterior and reputation as a bully were largely cultivated in order to 
mask his anxiety over being “found out” and removed from his life of luxury. This fear 
ran so deep that the Shah—who slept on the ground rather than getting used to the beds in 
his palaces—would sleep uneasily, gun in hand, and wake up in terror, grabbing his 
weapon out of reflex.  This anxiety was only heightened by his growing addictions to 
araq (alcohol from aniseed) and opium.  He began to be suspicious of anyone he believed 
was smarter than he was, or who knew what he did not, a d tended to feel safer and more 
                                                      
13 TNAPRO, FO 248 / 1384, Tabriz Consulate to Tehran, September 27, 1927. 
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at ease around individuals that he considered to beless knowledgeable and capable than 
himself.14 
 Reza Shah was notorious for his “explosive, Cossack temper,” through which he 
“battered his way to the throne.”  It was reported that, “he was known to slay dogs that 
dared bark in his presence, to hurl offending subordinates bodily through windows and to 
string up enemies by their heels and kick in their teeth.”15  In most cases, however, his 
episodes of violence were not random but were instead riggered by incidents in which he 
felt threatened, embarrassed, or feared his lack of education and sophistication would be 
exposed.  His famous bursts of anger were actually primarily defensive.   
 This obsession with gloss can be seen in the Shah’s anxious concern over his 
image in the press, both at home and abroad, and with cultivating an image that would 
reflect positively on him personally.  The mainstream Iranian press, which served as 
semi-official mouthpieces of the Shah, was used to promote a positive public image, with 
criticism attacked as unpatriotic.  In an editorial in Ettela’at, for example, foreigners are 
attacked for taking pictures of “nonsense” and peasants instead of focusing exclusively 
on photographing the new and magnificent things in Ira .  Its author speculates that this 
behavior must have been done to supply unflattering p ctures of Iran to the foreign press 
and thereby embarrass or misrepresent Iran as beingless than modern.16  This hyper-
sensitivity to criticism had, for some time before, b en a topic of diplomatic concern.  
One such American analysis predicts that 
The Iranian Government will probably discover—though perhaps when it is too 
late—that not even the most alluring material benefits can in the long run 
                                                      
14 Ibid., FO 371 / 13783, Personalities report, January 23, 1929. 
15 Anderson and Whitten, "CIA Study Finds Shah Insecure," Washington Post, July 11, 1975. 
16 Ettela’at, 14 Dey 1319 [January 4, 1941]. 
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compensate a people for the loss of their freedom of speech and opinion… 
[T]here is practically no touch between the Governme t and the governed… [and] 
the most grotesque notions can be indulged in by the Government without risk of 
criticism or ridicule.17  
This defensive attitude was not a development of the latter period of his rule, but 
can be seen just as clearly in the 1920s.  In 1929, for example, when a merchant was so 
bold as to criticize his harmful policies, the Shah replied that, if he was not too busy to be 
bothered, he would replace the criticisms in his mouth with lead from his gun.18   
Whenever attention was drawn to the underside of Iran’s myth of boundless 
progress, or to the Shah’s own personal failings, the response was predictable, 
disproportionate rage.  In 1936, for example, the Sah recalled his foreign envoy in a huff 
over bad coverage in the foreign press.  In the following year, the Shah withdrew his 
representative in France to protest critical articles; he also forced an apology.  He had 
similar “tantrums” over mentions of the former dynasty in the foreign press, and over 
indirect accusations that he was a drunk.  Likewise, aft r he was embarrassed when one 
of his representatives in Washington was publicly arrested for speeding, Reza Shah 
responded by closing his embassies and consulates in America.19   
This pattern of behavior was rooted in his deep insecurity.  All of the incidents in 
the press that he reacted most strongly to shared the fact that they were true.  Within Iran, 
when his ignorance was exposed (as with Mirza Fath Ali aving to explain religious 
formalities to him) or he was confronted with difficult truths (such as the complaints of 
the merchants) he chose to either ignore what he did not wish to see, or have the problem 
expunged.  The assessment of foreigners, however, cut deeper because not only did he 
                                                      
17 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 17, 891 – “Press of Tehran,” August 3, 1937. 
18 TNAPRO, FO 371 / 13781, Tehran to FO, January 7, 1929. 
19 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 4, March 31, 1936; Box 12, 701 – January 21, 1937, and 
February 1, 1938. 
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have a higher regard for foreign opinion, but because he had no control over it and all he 
could do was lash out diplomatically in ways that proved less than effective.   
The Europeanization of dress is also related to this insecurity and fear of 
embarrassment.  Reza Shah explained his choice of Eur pean headwear by saying, 
“Previously those who wore it thought that this head-gear conferred on them superiority 
over those who weren’t wearing it. We do not want those others to think that they are 
superior to us because of a minor difference in head covering.” He further explained that 
he “wanted Iranians to become like everybody else so that they would not be made fun 
of.”20 
 
The empire’s new clothes 
Although other achievements, such as a national rail system, may be brought up when 
discussing Reza Shah’s legacy, the prohibition of Islamic dress is the issue that is 
inevitably raised and discussed while treating this period of Iranian history.21  Part of this 
is, no doubt, the product of an Orientalist fetishization of the veil, but there is more to it 
than that.  Later clerical references to Reza Shah also fixate on his clothing policies, even 
more so than Western sources, although obviously for di ferent reasons and with anger 
and emotion rather than admiration or detached criticism.22  The focus on dress reform is 
                                                      
20 Wilber, Riza Shah, p. 166; Houshang Chehabi, "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and 
Nation Building under Reza Shah," Iranian Studies vol. 26 (Summer/Fall 1993): p. 226. 
21 Chehabi refers to Reza Shah’s problematization of dress as “one of the most enduring legacies” of his 
reign and “the most unpopular of all his reforms.”  He also notes that dress reform policies “were mainly 
meant to promote nation-building.” See: Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor's New Clothes,” pp. 209, 217. 
22 Later clerical recollections show little concern with male dress reform and, instead, emotionally recall the 
removal of the veil and link this action against Muslim women to the violence done to Muslim men who 
were killed protesting Reza Shah.  See, for example, Khomeini’s angry discussion of this issue in his 
speeches on May 27, 1979 and November 5, 1979.  In his September 10, 1980 speech, Khomeini explicitly 




also justified on other grounds.  Although reforms in education, infrastructure and other 
areas were less ephemeral, they were also less ambitious, less daunting, and less personal 
for Reza Shah.  Nothing else he attempted required as much time, produced as much 
opposition, or commanded more media attention.  It was truly his defining project.   
 In the first few years of his reign, Reza Shah became involved in an already-
existing movement that sought to do away with turbans nd veils.23  As a result, he was 
known to, at receptions, urge his subjects to abandon traditional clothing and to 
modernize their dress.  Dress nationalization began to be pushed more formally in 1927 
and 1928, with the gradual removal of the turban and other forms of traditional male 
dress (with a few allowed exceptions) and their replacement with a round, peaked cap 
(later dubbed the kolah-e Pahlavi, or “Pahlavi cap”) accompanied by a short coat.24   
Those who violated the new dress code faced penaltis ranging from fines to 
imprisonment.  The policy was introduced softly at first, with policemen roaming the 
cities and “inviting” people to make the change, reserving violence for those who offered 
persistent resistance.  This strategy was very successful, with significant opposition only 
in Shiraz, Tabriz, from the Kurds, and from Arab tri es on the southern border area 
between Iraq and Iran.  These Arab tribes staged an unsuccessful revolt (which was about 
conscription and taxation in addition to the removal of traditional headwear) that was put 
down bloodily.  As enforcement intensified, the Shah forbid turbaned individuals from 
his receptions.  When “one well-known turbaned demagogue” insisted on his right to 
                                                      
23 Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor's New Clothes,” p. 210-12.  For veiling and the early women’s 
movement in Iran, see: Farzaneh Milani, Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writes 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Veiled Discourse-Unveiled Bodies,” 
Feminist Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn, 1993): pp. 487-518; and Eliz Sanasarian, The Women's Rights 
Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 
1982). 
24 Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor's New Clothes,” pp. 213-214; TNAPRO, FO 371 / 13781. 
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wear it, he was sent to jail until he changed his mind.  After a day he emerged sporting 
his Pahlavi cap.25   
 The main objection raised by Muslims was that the new cap was deliberately 
antagonistic towards them, in that its peak made it impossible to touch the forehead to the 
ground during Islam’s obligatory daily prayers.  This obstacle was easily overcome by 
simply turning the hat backwards during prayers, but the issue was not so much the 
inconvenience as it was that the peak served no purpose other than to frustrate and 
inconvenience the devout.  Because of the need to turn the cap to pray, one was forced to 
remember both Reza Shah as well as God while responding to the call to prayer.   
The less devout saw the peaked cap as military in appe rance, understood it to be 
the result of the Shah’s military background, and believed that his aim was to marshal the 
nation as he had his soldiers.  Others saw it as more like a school uniform, with the Shah 
as the edifying, but terrifying, headmaster.  It was s id that “the Shah’s presence… 
exercised a depressing influence… rather like the presence of a severe schoolmaster on a 
class of young schoolboys.”26 
 In any case, the turban and other items of religious headwear were not universally 
proscribed.  There was an exhaustive list of exceptions, including exceptions for 
mojtaheds (jurists recognized as able to make independent legal rulings), religious 
students who could pass an exam, village preachers who could pass an exam, Sunni 
jurists, certain types of preachers, teachers of theology or jurisprudence, non-Muslim 
priests, and a number of other religious positions—a  long as verification was provided.   
                                                      




Senior clerics were somewhat upset that preachers lacking formal training would 
be unable to wear turbans, but were more upset by the requirement that legitimacy had to 
be officially demonstrated to the satisfaction of the state.27  The way in which this 
authentication was achieved—insistence on exams, licenses, and other form of state-
sanctioned proofs and tests—was the real problem for the ulama, since it pulled them 
under the sphere of governmental control, regulation, and legitimization.  This was seen 
as a usurpation of clerical authority.  Previously, a turban was a sign of authority, while 
now one had to appeal to the authorities in order to wear a turban. 
Even though it was initially conceived in much broader terms, the campaign for 
national dress was reduced to the “Westernization” or “de-Islamicization” of dress.  
While it is true that there was an attempt to emulate Europe, and it is certainly true that 
the government’s most vitriolic contempt was reserved for the turbaned or veiled who 
failed to comply with the new national dress, this framing obscures the full scope of the 
project.  Dress reform was, at least initially, largely about taking the disparate and 
divided parts of Iran, united by common borders and common ruler, and transforming 
them into a somewhat homogenized mass in which differences of region, religion, and 
ethnicity would become more obscured.  A shared natio l dress was to have served as 
the first step to creating a united national identity.   
This attempt at national homogenization occurred in a society that was divided 
along ethno-linguistic lines, and in which communalism was deeply ingrained and 
habitually enforced.  Under the previous dynasty, Jews and Zoroastrians were expected to 
                                                      
27 This also had the effect of clearly bounding who was and who was not a cleric.  Whereas in earlier 
periods boundaries were more porous, with individuals splitting their priorities between religion, business 
and other pursuits, the new law and the paperwork involved in wearing the clothing of the clergy was too
burdensome for those who only partially identified themselves in this way.  See: Chehabi, “Staging the 
Emperor's New Clothes,” p.221. 
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wear distinctive dress, and this embodiment of distinction was used to prevent the 
occurrence of various taboos, such as having a non-Muslim build a house higher than his 
Muslim neighbors, or ride while a Muslim walked, or other objectionable public acts.  
Restrictions such as these rested on the idea that one could tell a Muslim from a non-
Muslim based on appearance alone.  For, “before the adv nt of Western clothing a man’s 
religious status, as well as his social class and often his profession, were proclaimed by 
the clothes he wore.”28  
Many of these restrictions were based on the belief that certain forms of contact 
with non-believers would lead to impurity, which would then need to be ritually 
removed.  It is in this context that Baha’is caused particular anxiety, in that they not only 
generally had Muslim backgrounds and traditionally Muslim names, but were also 
generally indistinguishable from Muslim Iranians in terms of their dress and physical 
appearance.29  This paranoia about the presence of an undetected, impure Other within the 
Muslim community was also directed at Jews who had converted into Islam under duress 
(the Jadid al-Islam, or “new Muslims”), who were, to outer appearances, Muslim, but 
who were feared (with some degree of truth) to be crypto-Jews.30   
With Reza Shah’s push for a new, national dress and co comitant reforms—such 
as integrating the Jewish population by attempting to end their ghettoization in their own 
quarter of the capital, and allowing non-Muslims to advance to very high positions in the 
army and civil service—there was an expansion of the paranoid fear that the Muslim 
community would be infiltrated by what was perceived as insidious cuckoos.  Over 
                                                      
28 NACPM, NFAC (CIA), “Islam in Iran,” p. 43. 
29 Sanasarian, “The Comparative Dimension,” p. 163. 
30 See: Hilda Nissimi, “Memory, Community, and the Mashhadi Jews During the Underground Period,” 
Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring - Summer, 2003): pp. 76-106. 
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decades, this fear of communal exposure to infiltration by individuals whose outer shell 
seemed Muslim while their inner identity was that of an “other,” would be slowly 
conflated with a fear of national infiltration by those who seemed and claimed to be 
Iranian but who, within this husk, were really foreign.31 
For Reza Shah, the embodiment, via dress, of the nation’s divided religious, 
linguistic, and ethnic ascribed identities was a serious barrier to creating a shared national 
identity.   In the military, this problem was address d by removing all of these markers 
before the transformation from recruit to soldier could begin.  In a sense, the particulars 
of the new, homogenized uniform are somewhat arbitrry and immaterial.  The color and 
the shape of the uniform, for example, are only really important in that they symbolize 
difference vis-à-vis rival bodies.32  By creating a national dress, Reza Shah was actually 
defining what it meant to be Persian in a way that w s independent of traditional ascribed 
identities.  The homogenization of dress did not jus affect clerics and hijab-minded 
women.  Jews that had been forced to identify their religion through their traditional 
clothing were now able to more easily integrate socially and economically.  Ethnic 
minorities like Arabs, Azeris, and Kurds, not to mention the large tribal population, all 
had to (at least theoretically) abandon some of the items of clothing that proclaimed their 
ethnic identity.  As mentioned above, it was Arabic-speaking Iranians in the south who 
were the ones who initially revolted over replacing their ethnic headwear with the Pahlavi 
cap.  Their revolt over the loss of this symbol of ethnicity was far bloodier than Muslim 
agitation over the loss of turbans. 
                                                      
31 See Chapter III. 
32See, for example, Nathan Joseph and Nicholas Alex.  “The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective,” 
American Journal of Sociology vol. 77, no. 4 (1972): pp. 719-730; and Anat Rafaeli and Michael Pratt, 
“Tailored Meaning: On the Meaning and Impact of Organizational Dress,” Academy of Management 
Review vol. 18, no. 1 (1993): pp. 32-55. 
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The idea that the new national dress was a form of national rebirth, as an 
integrated whole, was reflected in the choice of naw-ruz (New Year in the Persianate 
world) as the date on which the 1929 dress laws would take effect.33  The choice of naw-
ruz, which is more of a period than a single day in Iran, is significant in that it invokes a 
sense of liminality and involves the ritualized shedding of the old in preparation for 
accepting a new, elevated state.  This ritualized cl ansing at naw-ruz is perhaps best 
exemplified by the Zoroastrian-rooted ritual of leaping over fire on the last Wednesday 
night before the New Year (chaharshanbeh suri).  During this purification ritual, one 
says while jumping “Your fiery red color is mine, and my sickly yellow paleness is 
yours.”  The idea is that, at this liminal moment of he New Year, occurring at the vernal 
equinox, when winter gives way to spring, the jumper abandons the “yellow” (winter, 
sickness, bad fortune) and in exchange receives from the flame its “red” (warmth, spring, 
good fortune, energy, vigor).  The new national dress, inaugurated in this period of 
liminality, demanded a similar faithful leap to sacrifi e the “yellow” (Islamic 
“backwardness,” divided sub-national identities, civilizational malaise) in order to be 
cleansed and reborn through the power of the Cossack “red” (unity, efficiency, 
modernity).    
The attempt to use uniform dress and shared collective experience to remove 
deep-rooted social divisions is also reminiscent of the mati (shipmate) bond that was 
instilled in Indian indentured workers brought to the Americas.  These workers from 
different regions spoke different languages and came from different religions, genders, 
castes, and classes.  In India, social interaction between these groups operated according 
to a variety of complicated rules, but in the almost slave-like conditions of ship life and 
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plantation life in the Americas, they were forced to share the same closed, un-segregated 
space and work together as a unit, in identical clothing.  Caste and religious differences 
and gender rules fell away as a fictive kinship developed based around the shared identity 
of the mati bond, which replaced previous constructions of identity.  To support the 
construction of this new ideal, the mythical past of th se in the new collective was 
appealed to for support and legitimacy, with the new group drawing inspiration not only 
from the Ramayana (A Hindu epic in which an unlikely band of heroes develop a 
fraternal bond in a strange land), but also from the Muslim celebration of Ashura (the 
commemoration of Imam Husayn’s battle against tyrannical oppression).34  This 
forgetting of communal “ownership” of myth was based on the erasure of previous 
distinctions as the result of the homogenizing policies of an authoritarian state.  Reza 
Shah was attempting a similar project, trying to create a national identity in which 
previous distinctions could be forgotten. 
 
“This edifying spectacle” 
The “hat policy” was enforced systematically, in progressive stages.  The cities would 
make the transition first, followed later by the country areas.  Within the cities, there was 
a mixture of persuasion, coercion and prosecution.  Persuasion was the most commonly 
employed method, followed by coercion, and then prosecution.  In cities and towns, 
failure to comply resulted in a fine of up to five tomans, or up to seven days in prison.  In 
country areas, imprisonment was to be the only option.  Of course, the prescribed 
punishments were very rarely used.  Instead more informal and often severe forms of 
discipline were used to coerce obedience.  During the campaign: 
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Policemen and army men may be seen daily in the stre t tearing off the hats of 
aged sheikhs, trampling on them and otherwise destroying them, the victims 
proceeding on their way, their bared heads covered with their abas [robes].  This 
policy of violence is being carried out systematically, different quarters of the 
town being chosen on different days for this edifying spectacle.35 
The headwear nationalization project faced the most challenges in Mashhad.   
In Meshed – even more than in Qum – the bulk of the population is clothed in 
turbans and flowing abas [robes], and if the law is to be enforced strictly a 
comparatively small number of these will be able to retain their former dress… 
Meshed, after all, is in many respects very different to some other cities of Persia; 
in other towns the clergy are discredited, cynicism n respect of religious matters 
is openly displayed and views denoting skepticism rega ding ancient tenets are 
openly expressed.  In Meshed, however, this is not the case; the Shrine of Imam 
Reza is the holiest spot in Persia and from all parts of the country thousands of 
devout pilgrims come here each year confident in the belief that the visit to this 
holy place will atone for their earthly sins and ensure them bliss hereafter.36 
In other towns, the transformation was able to proceed well in advance of the law 
taking effect.  In Yazd, for example, turban-makers were “discouraged” from continuing 
this practice well in advance of the official proscription, and only Pahlavi caps were 
allowed to be made.  This ramp-up to the big event was so intense that in Yazd the cap-
makers had to use tin while constructing the Pahlavi c ps because they ran out of other 
materials.  In this preparation in Yazd, there was a pre-emptive disciplining of holdouts, 
with those still wearing turbans insulted and their headwear stripped in public, so that by 
the law’s official start date the city would have alre dy been transformed and all hold-
outs coerced into conformity before this point. 
In Mashhad, however, the city’s economy revolved around pilgrim traffic and 
although the new law would allow the senior clerics to maintain their vestures of 
authority, the “lesser ecclesiastical lights” and assorted untrained mullas and others who 
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had made a living from pilgrim charity greatly opposed the new policy for threatening 
their livelihood.  It was also very much disliked by the large number of religious Iranians 
who came to Mashhad to retire in the vicinity of the Shrine.  To these individuals, the 
Pahlavi cap and accompanying coat were not only “repugnant’ and “out of keeping with 
the atmosphere of this city,” but were “actually tain ed with heresy.”  The Pahlavi cap 
was worn willingly by cab drivers, young men with modern sensibilities and some other 
groups, but the poorer and more religious classes refu ed to participate and, just weeks 
before the official prohibition began, it was judge impossible to transform this large and 
unwilling populace in time.  Even government employees, who had no choice but to 
comply if they wished to remain employed, were generally known to remove their 
Pahlavi caps and “return” to traditional wear outside of the office.  Those who did wear 
the cap in public often did so subversively, leaving the cap permanently backwards as a 
mark of religiosity.37   
The Mashhad solution involved the use of strategic bribes and the further 
extension of the scope of religious exceptions in order to be able to claim success and 
also to “take the wind out of the sails” of those who opposed the change.  Payments were 
made, for example, to wealthy tailors and merchants who would be stuck with large 
stocks of expensive, prohibited turbans, although lesser merchants and tailors were forced 
to take the loss.  With these adaptations, it was corre tly felt that since Mashhad was by 
inclination “timid,” there would be no serious opposition from the lower classes during 
the transformation, since the compromises to benefit the religious professionals and the 




elite merchants would ensure their complicity and the traditional masses would be forced 
to comply once they lacked the support of the tradiional elite.38 
The further ambitions of the national clothing policy were scaled down because of 
the need for political maneuvering vis-à-vis the ulama, the failure of similarly bold 
reforms in Afghanistan (which gave the Shah serious pause), and fear of a potential 
Qashqai tribal rebellion. The Shah believed that Afghanistan had attempted to move too 
far too quickly and that this caused their problems.39  So, not only did he tread lighter as 
he enforced male dress reform, but he also postponed his initial plans to begin to ban the 
veil in 1929.40  He did not revive this plan until the beginning of 1936, months after the 
taming of clerical opposition through a bloody display of force in Mashhad. 
 
The “object lesson” of the Mashhad Massacre 
In the years between the nationalization of male and female attire, a number of additional 
policies were initiated that negatively impacted the ulama, including conscription and the 
nationalization of many of the functions of the clergy.  The ulama had supported the 
coronation of Reza Shah because at the time this was seen as more palatable and less 
threatening than the prospect of a republic inspired by the Turkish model.41  The 
introduction of the Pahlavi Cap damaged the Court-clergy relationship but, more than 
anything else, it was an annoyance to the ulama, since qualified clerics were allowed to 
retain the turban.  What was troubling was not so much the policy, but the way in which 
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their authority was ignored, how they were now expected to receive legitimacy from the 
state rather than grant legitimacy to the state, and the likelihood of further moves against 
them, given the unnecessary anti-Islamic elements mixed into the homogenization of 
dress (such as the peak on the cap disrupting obligatory prayer rituals).  This anxiety was 
justified by the introduction of a number of anti-clerical policies that severely restricted 
their income, spheres of authority, and autonomy.  As a result, they were “disabused” of 
their initial expectations that crown-clergy relations under Reza Shah would not be that 
dissimilar from the traditional symbiotic partnership between the clergy and the monarch 
in Iran. 
The Shah was, likewise, very anxious vis-à-vis the clergy and, almost from the 
very beginning of his reign, had his agents surveil the houses and activities of important 
clerics.  This distrust intensified after naw-ruz 1928.  The Queen and two princesses went 
to the Shrine of Fatima al-Ma’sumeh in Qom, practically unveiled, to celebrate this 
occasion, but were rebuked by Ayatollah Bafqi, the c ief cleric present.42  As a result, 
Reza Shah infamously went to Qom and “kicked the Ayatollah down the steps of his own 
mosque.” In the clerical remembrance of this confrotation, he 
surrounded the holy place of Qom with tanks and armed soldiers and intended to 
do to the holy place of those oppressed people whathe [would later do in 
Mashhad (see below)] but God was not willing and fended off his evil…That 
unclean person (Reza Shah) entered the sacred space, and Bafqi was dragged to 
the mosque.  Because of the hatred that he (Reza Shah) had felt for years toward 
him (Bafqi), he struck him with his weapon and his booted foot.  Then he ordered 
that he and several other people be taken to Tehran, where he was imprisoned for 
six months, and then he was exiled… [and] was kept under constant surveillance 
until … he either died of natural causes or was poioned.43   
                                                      
42 Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor's New Clothes,” p. 213. 
43 NACPM, NFAC (CIA), “Islam in Iran,” pp. 10-11.  
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These demonstrations of his “iron fist” and propensity for disproportionate 
responses to public embarrassment caused many among the clergy to abandon opposition 
and to instead wait for improved relations with thenext Shah.  As a result, there was very 
little organized clerical opposition on the streets.  Although there were rare protests led 
by individual clerics, most ulama confined themselves to rhetorical jabs and flourishes.  
At this time, it was remarked that  
Religion plays but an insignificant part in modern Persian life.  To the serious 
student of modern Persian history… it might appear th t Persia was a very hot 
house of creeds, which is absolutely true, and that, hence, the Persian was 
intensely religious, which is absolutely untrue… Of recent years, the systematic 
whittling down of the powers of the clergy, the growth of a national spirit, the 
influence of Western materialism, and the national apathy towards the practice as 
opposed to the beliefs of religion have tended more and more to make religion in 
Persia a “museum piece.”44 
 This attitude is reflected in periodic foreign political reports, which included 
sections on the ulama in the late 1920s, but did not consider them important enough to 
merit their own paragraph during the 1930s.  It wasfelt that the ulama had “sunk to a 
level of insignificance not far above that of their brethren in Turkey.”  Although the 
“Government’s initial policy of fostering national sentiments was accompanied by that of 
suppressing the power of the priests in various ways,” this became increasingly 
incidental, as shown by the reduction of governmental resources allocated to clerical 
discipline.45   
 Towards the end of the 1920s, the ulama’s most intense animosity was not 
directed at Reza Shah himself, but rather at Abdolhosein Taymurtash (his Minister of 
Court and the chief architect of his domestic policy), and at the New Iran Party (Iran-e 
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Naw, not to be confused with the later Iran Novin).  In Tehran and Isfahan, opposition 
reached the point that the ulama threatened to collectively abandon the city and take 
refuge in Qom.46  As a face-saving measure to prevent this, the Shah ostensibly limited 
Taymourtash’s activities.  This did not quell clerical anger at Taymurtash, who was 
singled out as the driving force behind policies to curtail clerical power and income 
through the nationalization of the legal system andthe removal of the previous system in 
which “practically every little Mollah had a miniature religious court of law where 
notarial acts were performed and where matters relating to personal status were 
arranged.”  Individuals close to both the Shah and Taymurtash confirm that it was this 
advisor who was the driving force behind the anti-Islamic undercurrents of the domestic 
nationalization policies, while Reza Shah was not par icularly concerned with this agenda 
and was personally inclined towards showing sympathy towards those “who are 
struggling for their continued existence as a power in the land.”47  
 The frequent retreats to Qom in this period, led by the clergy of Isfahan, were not 
only done as a form of political protest, but were also “to decide what steps they can 
usefully take to protect themselves.”  In the debats of those who had taken bast, the 
main issue was that the clergy “feel their influenc has waned” and were upset but unable 
to come up with a useful strategy to combat a large nd growing list of grievances against 
the regime.  The consensus was that the problem was really Taymurtash, not the Shah, 
and that if the Minister of Court were removed then their prospects of influencing the 
Shah would improve.  This approach was naively optimis ic, at best, but there was an 
overwhelming sense of frustration and helplessness that was assuaged by focusing on 
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Taymurtash.  The Minister of Court, ever-dismissive of the clergy, described the agitation 
against him as the prater of those who, out of self-interest, were “playing the fool with 
religion and national traditions.”48  
The Shah was not amused by the grandstanding of the clerics from Qom and 
Isfahan.  He ignored the bast and instead traveled to Mazandaran to demonstrate his 
supposed lack of concern for the goings on in Qom.  When a peasant from one of the 
Shah’s villages complained about the lack of rain, he replied that he too hoped for rain, 
but “let it come as far as this only, for God forbid that it should come to [Qom], Isfahan 
and Shiraz.”  Similarly, when pestered about the ned to go to Kerman, he replied that he 
would only go by plane since he refused to pass through either Qom or Isfahan, such was 
his disgust with the escalating clerical complaints from these cities.  Clerical demands 
mushroomed to include an end to the conscription of religious students, the holding of 
free elections, a return to constitutional monarchy, opposition to the New Iran Party and 
the Ministers of Court and Justice, and a desire to r vive the unenforced provision in the 
Constitution allowing for a group of ulama to have veto power over the majles 
(parliament).  The idea was even floated that all previous legislation by the majles, done 
without this group’s approval, including the recognition of the Shah’s sovereignty, was 
illegitimate.49  This idea was essentially a clerical expression of buyer’s remorse and a 
longing to undue their complicity in Reza Shah’s sovereignty, or at least return to the 
days when his power was less secure and the symbolic cap tal of their legitimization had 
more value.  





The governmental response to their demands—the possibility of nominal action 
against the New Iran party—was not seen as a satisfactory return for the investment in 
the clerical protest, since they had “spent a considerable amount of money on the strike 
and they will certainly want some proportionate result.”50  Given the money involved in 
supporting the clerical strike and retreat to Qom, Reza Shah believed that the British were 
behind the protest in order to support their clerical allies and oppose the centralization of 
power under the Shah.  British sources deny this and claim that the opposition was 
patronized by the clergy in Isfahan. 
By the early 1930s, “Reza Shah was powerful enough to ignore the clergy.”51  He 
increasingly transferred important legal functions, like certification of legal ownership, 
from the clergy to the secular courts.  Along with the conscription of religious students 
and the proscription on male Islamic dress, this natio lization of much of the clergy’s 
legal functions was seen as a direct attack on Islam and an attempt to move in the 
direction of Turkey and completely sideline the clergy.  Moreover, the removal of these 
legal functions represented not just a loss in statu  but also an often critical loss of 
income.  As a result, many lower and middling cleris gave up their turbans to seek a 
secular career in the civil service performing essentially the same tasks, albeit in a 
different uniform and authority structure.   
Most of those who stayed within the clerical fold retreated into a defensive, bitter 
quietism.  The major exception occurred in Mashhad in 1935, spurred by individual 
initiative, when a popular protest took place after a rogue cleric severely criticized the 
government’s policies.  It should be kept in mind that anti-government sentiment in 
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Mashhad was very high in some quarters not because of th  regime’s anti-Islamic 
policies, as is often read back into the episode, and not because of its reputation as “the 
least progressive city in Persia,” but because of local issues, especially attempts to reform 
the finances of the Imam Reza Shrine. 
Although the protestors chanted that “the Shah is a new Yazid,”52 they were left 
alone for several days because local security forces were unwilling to violate the sanctity 
of the Shrine.  The protests did not spread to other major cities and did not receive the 
active support of the clerical hierarchy, despite its later appropriation of this resistance.  
While Ayatollah Qomi was in favor of protest, Grand Ayatollah Hae’ri-Yazdi in Qom 
kept himself in seclusion to avoid involvement.  Security forces raided the mosque and 
the Shrine on July 13, 1935, killing some, but failing to disperse protestors.  When they 
temporarily retreated, more individuals came to join the protest.  The following day, 
security forces attacked again and crushed the protstors in a brutal massacre, shooting 
into crowds with machine guns and dumping the resulting bodies into a mass grave.  The 
details of the massacre were kept out of the press and the whole episode was blamed on 
the administrator of the Shrine, who was executed.53  After this decisive show of force, 
quietism gained even more converts among the clerica  community.  This massacre was 
later described by the British as a particularly effective “object lesson” for the clergy.54 
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Iranian nationalism in this period, as expressed in elite circles, was largely based on the 
idea that Iranians were members of the Aryan race, that—before Islam—Iranian empires 
matched or exceeded those of Europe, and that Iran has since forgotten herself and been 
brought low as the result of either Islam in general o  certain aspects of Islam (such as the 
ulama).  In order to become great again, and resist imperialism, Iran supposedly needed 
to do two things: nationalize its human and material resources under a strong central 
government, and overcome the inferiority complex and forgetfulness of self brought on 
by the Islamic period.55   
This second task involved the promotion of an Iranian national identity that was 
rooted in pre-Islamic culture.  It was for this reason that, at the same time that European 
dress was being adopted: the “pure” Persian language w s also being promoted, Reza 
Shah promoted himself as Iran’s first “pure born” shah since the pre-Islamic period, the 
mythical history of ancient Iran as recounted in the epic Shahnameh was promoted and 
celebrated by the state, Iran returned to a solar calendar (instead of the lunar Islamic 
calendar), and the Shah promoted the idea that Persia should be known as “Iran,” 
specifically for the purpose of reminding Europeans that Iranians were Aryan.56 
 The adoption of the French-styled cap in the late 1920s, and of the fedora in 1935, 
were framed not as attempts to mimic a technologically superior West (as occurred 
elsewhere in the Middle East and in other places in the world), but rather as a rediscovery 
of Iran’s roots by wearing the contemporary dress of th se who shared their race and 
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ancient origins.  Those who accepted this ideology believed that Europeanization was 
really pre-Islamicization, not de-Islamicization, as it was fundamentally an attempt to go 
back to pre-Islamic times by adopting the contemporary fashions of modern fellow 
Aryans.  This logic seems bizarre, but it is really not that different from when African-
Americans adopt “African” dress as a way to get back to their roots, although the 
“African” dress worn is that of—or inspired by—contemporary “Africa” (itself a loaded, 
modern, and problematic term) rather than the style actually worn by the ancestors with 
whom they are trying to connect.  If an African-American woman can feel more 
“African” by wearing a head wrap inspired by contemporary Africa, then Reza Shah 
could feel more “Aryan” by wearing a fedora from contemporary Europe.   
My point is that symbolic meaning is socially construc ed and, although most of 
the population perceived of the change in dress lawin terms of what was lost and saw it 
in terms of de-Islamicization, those who actively promoted these measures looked at the 
policies primarily as a return to the past instead of a rejection of the present.  This brings 
to mind Fish’s discussion of interpretive communities and how those who are socialized 
in similar ways often develop similar interpretive strategies and that, as such, there is no 
stable basis for meaning or “correct” reading, since the interpretation of the author does 
not adhere in what he produces.57  Thus, the elites and the conservative masses perceiv d 
of the same object of clothing in radically different ways.  
 The racial definition of Iranian nationhood (influenced by Reza Shah’s sensitivity 
to criticism and keeping up appearances) distracted from, and conflicted with, the desire 
to make a new Iranian nation through homogenization of dress.  In order for dress 
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nationalization to work, it needed to be consistent, bu  the push for Europeanization 
demanded that Iran stay au courant with the latest fashions.  As a result, the Pahlavi cap 
of 1927-8 was largely superseded by the enforcement of the fedora and other hat policies 
by 1935.  The loss of the nationalistic utility of the original cap is implicitly admitted in 
the reference to the “international” (bayn al-mellali) nature of later hats.  As the idea of 
male national dress was increasingly sidelined by the desire to assert a European identity, 
the plans for female national dress, in the context of the clerical opposition in Mashhad, 
were framed, almost from the beginning, in terms of the removal of supposedly harmful 
Islamic influence.  European dress for men was not primarily framed in terms of 
removing Islamic male dress, but was instead staged positively as “a return to the true 
self.”58  Female dress reform was not staged as a return to racial dress, but rather as an 
occasion for the collective rejection of Islam as the cause of national weakness. 
 
“Dressed like Iranians” 
Female national dress was originally supposed to be introduced on naw-ruz 1929, but had 
been delayed because overwhelming conservative opposition to similar policies in 
Afghanistan had forced the abdication of the king of Afghanistan, which made Reza Shah 
nervous.  The Shah was moved, however, to revive his plans for female dress reform after 
his visit to Turkey in June 1934.  In comparison with Turkey, Iran was felt to be 
comparatively “backwards” when it came to the status of women in society.  When he 
returned to Iran, the Shah felt the need to catch up with Turkey.  In many ways his rush to 
unveil Iranian women was “keeping up with the Joneses at the international level.”59 
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The banning of the veil on January 7, 1936, was in ma y respects secondary to 
the introduction of national dress for men.  Although de-veiling has received more 
attention in Iranian historiography than the removal of male headwear, it was initially 
conceived of as a complement to the initiative for male national dress, to follow shortly 
thereafter.  Several things happened as a result of the delay.  Whereas the push for the 
Pahlavi cap occurred in a largely ad hoc fashion, with an initially steep learning curve, 
the proscription of the veil occurred after several years of dialectical tension, such that 
the rhetoric and tactics of the opposition could be anticipated and preemptively 
countered.   
Like the first wave of dress nationalization, this new effort also made use of 
persuasion, coercion, and prosecution.  This time, however, there was much less 
emphasis on prosecution, while the persuasive strategies were significantly more 
sophisticated, as were the manipulations involved in forcing compliance.  The crushing of 
clerical opposition in 1935 also made the enforcement of this policy easier, since after the 
massacre in Mashhad there was no organized opposition as there had been in the period 
following the introduction of the Pahlavi Cap. 
The nationalization of female dress became increasingly pulled away from the 
original nationalist aspirations of dress reform and was instead drawn into an explicitly 
anti-Islamic discourse as a result of its conflation with the Shah’s anti-Muslim, 
Westernizing agenda.  This was also due to the extended period separating it from the 
initial rhetoric on nationalization of dress, and the way in which female dress reform was 
almost exclusively aimed at Muslim women rather than all Iranian women, in the way 
that the Pahlavi cap was imposed on all men (not exempted).   
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There had certainly been an anti-Muslim component to male headwear reform, 
and the Shah’s chief vitriol was always reserved for the turbaned rather than any other 
group.  With female headwear nationalization, however, it was harder to subsume the 
anti-Islamic aspects of the agenda under the umbrella of homogenization for the purposes 
of nationalization.  Although nationalist language was still being used, the goal was no 
longer to homogenize to create a nation, but rather to mark Muslim women as traitors to 
the newly-imagined Iranian national identity, which was rooted in nostalgia for pre-
Islamic glory and the hope of post-Islamic modernization to regain this rightful station.  
By defining Iran’s national identity in pre- and post-Islamic terms, Reza Shah 
conspicuously rejected the Islamic period as “other” to Iran, and blamed Islam for its fall 
from glory.  The attack was two-pronged, emphasizing not only Islamic responsibility for 
Iran’s “fall,” but also blaming Islam for Iran’s failure to be demonstrably resurrected as a 
modern nation, and for the limited successes that the Shah was able to deliver after a 
decade on the throne. 
Islam was made the scapegoat for all that was wrong in Iran and the veil was 
made the symbol of Islam, a demon to be exorcised from the national body so that it may 
again rise, strong and rigorous, and achieve its true potential.  As Chehabi relates, “the 
veil became a marker of backwardness for educated Iranians.”60  The major press outlets, 
all semi-official governmental organs, presented these arguments to the public as 
uncontested, scientific truths.  Iran’s most prominent paper, Ettela’at, for example, 
editorialized that it was the veil that caused women to have weak minds and bodies.  The 
case against the veil was made, without any opportunity for rebuttal, by appealing to 
every conceivable form of expertise:  Orientalists and other foreign authorities were 
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quoted at length about the supposedly retarding nature of Islam and the veil; scientists 
expounded at length on the reasons why the veil should not be used and claimed that it 
promoted poor hygiene; poets composed numerous works attacking the veil as repressive 
and unfair to women, comparing it to the shrouds for the dead, while further poems were 
solicited from the readership as part of competitions to see who could best attack the veil 
in verse; and, finally, pro-government clerics made the case that veiling was actually a 
pre-Islamic practice and that, in any case, the Qur’an itself only calls for modesty and 
never truly endorses the veil, but instead actually has many verses in support of 
unveiling.61  The overwhelming support for unveiling in the media undoubtedly managed 
to persuade many that they were justified in either acquiescing or supporting the 
proscription of the veil, in spite of the cynical lens through which Iranians took in the 
official press.   
The press deliberately avoided acknowledging veiled women and instead, through 
the image of Iran conveyed through advertisements and photographs of events with 
unveiled women, created the idea that the policy was being universally embraced.  
Glowing articles featured images of unveiled women, sometimes even in shorts, engaged 
in sports and other wholesome activities.  Unveiled women, such as eight hundred scouts 
who paraded through the streets days after the proscription, were staged by the media as 
the Iranian ideal of progress and transformation.  Veiled women, however, were marked 
as traitors to the nation and the veil itself castigated as “unhygienic,” “obsolete,” 
“contemptible,” “awkward,” “ignominious,” and “uncouth.”62 
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In theory, the unveiled Iranian woman, rather than being an imitation of the 
Western woman, was to be a citizen of the proud Iranian nation and a helpmate to her 
male counterpart in the process of nation building.  Reza Shah describes how, prior to his 
reign, women were never even counted in official reco ds, with the exception of accounts 
of rations during the Great War.  But now, he claims, women have been elevated to be 
counted and to join with men in building the nation.  While Iran was previously only half 
a nation, it would become whole when the veil is cat off and its other half emerges.63  
This new Iranian woman was not treated as a sexualized object in the anti-veiling 
rhetoric, but was rather a national subject who would practice modesty and frugality and 
dress simply.  Interestingly, the Shah says that prior to unveiling most women had been 
“outside society.”  This implies that, while the new unveiled women were now entering 
society, those conservative women who still sought to veil were marked as “outside” of 
Iran’s borders. 
Shi’ism’s founding myths were re-purposed by the state in order to promote 
unveiling.  The traditional view of the Imams, and Imam Husayn in particular, as tragic 
figures to be mourned, was re-imagined as part of the push for unveiling, which called for 
women to abandon the black shrouds of sadness and morning and instead don their caps 
and coats and draw from the kinetic and heroic aspect  of Imam Husayn and Imam Ali’s 
story.64  This kinetic reinterpretation of Shi’ism’s great tragedy, linked to a dynamic re-
imagining of the meaning of Shi’ism’s founding myths, would be taken up, generations 
                                                      




later, by Shi’ite reformists like Ali Shariati, for the service of an entirely different 
agenda.65   
The emphasis on frugality and the pre-emptive denunciation of ostentatious dress 
display a high level of planning by the state and a acute awareness of issues likely to be 
raised by the clerical opposition.  Preemptive action occurred on several other fronts as a 
result of the lessons learned in 1928.  This time, any employees were given advances 
on their salaries in order to buy new outfits for their wives, cheap clothing was ordered 
from Paris well in advance and in sufficient supply, and measures were put in place to 
prevent profiteering by tailors and merchants.66  The preparation was such that almost all 
non-religious obstacles and objections had been planned for and addressed, and there was 
not a repeat of the difficulties that hindered efforts in 1928 (such as a shortage of 
materials).  
As for religious objection, in addition to the aforementioned media blitz, this was 
dealt with through the prosecution of those who enabled resistance and through the 
coercion of both veiled women and their spouses.  The fines for non-compliance were not 
levied on the violators themselves, but rather on those who enabled their non-conformity.  
Taxis and buses were fined for offering transport t veiled women, while shops were not 
to sell to them, and they were not to be allowed to use the (major) streets, or the public 
bath, or the cinema.67  When women were discovered still wearing the veil, it was their 
husbands who would be fired from positions in the civil service, or lose their position in 
the army.  This indirect policy cleverly avoided direct action against hijab-minded 
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women, instead creating immense pressure on their male peers to ensure that “their” 
women acquiesced to the proscription. 
At the same time that the media barrage was pushing t e anti-veiling campaign, 
the Shah sought to deflate the opposition of the traditional elite by making them complicit 
in the act.  Around the country “festivals” were proclaimed in which local elites were 
forced to attend parties with their wives unveiled.  Government employees who did not 
comply risked losing their job, or worse.  These mandatory festivals took place among all 
elite and prominent groups.  They began with the women of the Shah’s own household 
appearing unveiled at key events.  Members of the majles (parliament) were subsequently 
compelled to appear at gatherings with their wives unveiled.  Across the nation, 
governors and mayors were to have similar gatherings a d compel all those under them to 
attend.  Other participants of these “festivals” included army officers, Imam Jom’ehs 
(Friday prayer leaders) and other prominent clerics, prominent merchants, and the heads 
of guilds.  Even in Qom and Mashhad, ulama were compelled to bring their wives 
unveiled, pray for the success of the Shah, and even “voluntarily” abandon their own 
turbans, despite this not being required of senior clergy.68 
Many attended these gatherings under protest only t be blindsided later as 
photographs were taken and plastered over the local papers as “proof” of their support for 
the unveiling movement.  The members of the traditional elite who were unwillingly 
shunted into the pro-unveiling camp could not then come out to forcefully call on the 
masses to remain veiled when they themselves were photographed with their unveiled 
wives.  Iranian mobs generally formed around the leadership of a powerful patron from 
the traditional elite.  By preemptively neutralizing much of the traditional elite in this 
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way, there was less chance of an organized conservative backlash, at least in the short-
term.   
To support the new policies, editorials were employed to question the morals of 
women who appeared unveiled on some occasions (i.e. the festivals) but not on others.  
This strategy involved the suggestion that the veil was a form of disguise and that a 
woman who had abandoned the veil would only later reso t to the “disguise” of a veil if 
she was using it to facilitate promiscuity or adultery.69  This was part of a larger effort to 
invert the traditional conservative claim that the veil guarded modesty and that unveiling 
was linked to sexual wantonness.  The attempt to revers  these categories was also 
supported by more tangible tactics, such as ordering prostitutes to veil while respected 
women were pressured to unveil, in order to solidify the inversion of the signposts of 
modesty.  As traditionalists were assaulted by this bizarre version of the established 
order, some were so dazed that they saw these events as part of “the chaos preceding the 
end of the world.”70 
By March of 1936, foreign reporters noted that not a single veil could be seen in 
the major cities, including the religious capital of Mashhad.71  This does not mean that 
there were no unveiled women on the back streets, or in the country areas, but it does 
speak to their systematic exclusion from the public sphere and confirm that they were 
denied entry to the avenues, public baths, carriages, taxis, buses, and cinemas.  They were 
marked as “other” and unwelcome, with shops in the bazaar refusing to sell to them.  This 
stigma carried over from the veil to Islamic markers in general.   
                                                      
69 Ibid., Box 8, January 10, 1956. 
70 NACPM, NFAC (CIA), “Islam in Iran,” p. 47. 
71 Ibid., RG 84 / 350 / 61 / 16 / 4 / Box 6, Dispatch No. 790, May 13, 1936. 
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Even foreigners in Iran were not allowed to veil unless it was part of their 
“national dress.”  If they came from a country where veiling was not practiced, then they 
were not to be allowed to veil within Iran.  The rationale for this was that veiling was 
opposed to Iran’s “national dress.”  To be unveiled was to be “dressed like an Iranian” 
and it was thus unacceptable and insulting to Iranians to veil within Iran, unless one was 
from an Arab nation where this was your “national dress.”72   This, of course, framed the 
veiled woman, employed as the symbol of Islam, as the antithesis of “Iranian,” a traitor to 
the nation and an internal “foreign” element.   
 
Conclusion 
The cultural history of the Reza Shah period is typically analyzed in connection with 
familiar tropes of Iranian historiography, such as the supposed continuity of the Court-
clergy struggle.  What is often overlooked is that Reza Shah’s attempt to upend tradition 
was, fundamentally, an attempt to imagine a new natio l identity.  This attempt was 
clouded by the anti-clerical and pro-Aryan sentiments of the Shah and his advisors, and 
by the clerical opposition and the authority struggle produced by this conflict.   
Despite the presentist tendency to see Islam as a ntural and inevitable basis for 
Iranian nationhood, there was not, in the early Reza Shah period, any strong popular 
desire or movement to stage Islam as the basis of national identity.  There were, of 
course, numerous attempts to oppose the erosion of clerical authority, to promote 
shari’ah (Islamic canon law), and to oppose specific policies that were seen as against 
Islam, but these responses were defensive, scattered, and not framed in the rhetoric of 




nationalism.  Instead, they appealed to a mixture of traditional rationales and xenophobia 
and seemed unwilling to recognize or engage the new national paradigm.   
As previously discussed, nationalism involves the re-orientation of previously 
existing cultural productions, a process that rarely occurs quickly and never occurs in a 
vacuum.  Although there was significant clerical opp sition to Reza Shah, Shi’ism did 
not undergo a significant nationalist re-orientation until the 1940s, and this did not reach 
the threshold of a developed ideology until the 1960s.  In this later discourse, the case 
against the regime is not made in terms of specific lasses, like the clergy, or in terms of 
abstract concepts like “Islam” in general.  Instead, in this later discourse, it is actively 
claimed that the state, the Shah, and even the clergy, a e all subordinate to the “Muslim 
nation.”73  During the Reza Shah period, however, the ulama were still thinking 
imperially.  By this I mean that they still believed that the paramount issue in the church-
state dynamic was that the ruler identify himself as Shi’ite, enforce the shari’ah at least 
nominally, and respect the ulama’s spheres of authority.  In other words, in a post-War 
environment defined by the emergence of nation-state , the dissolution of empires, and 
the global embrace of the idea of the self-determinatio  of each nation, the ulama in this 
period continued to maintain a top-down approach that was initially generated in, and 
was appropriate for, an imperial milieu.  
This section has explored how, due to the mutual castigation of Reza Shah and the 
ulama, the sovereign came to be marked as the oppressor of Shi’ism, rather than its 
defender, and the ulama came to be marked (in the press, the public sphere, and among 
the intelligentsia) as a foreign, vestigial class, which was comparable to an anchor 
decelerating the nation’s progressive march.   
                                                      





The Imbrie Affair 
 
American Vice Consul Robert Imbrie was murdered in Tehran on July 18, 1924.  
Supposedly, Imbrie, his associate Melvin Seymour, and their Armenian employees were 
attacked for taking photographs of women near the Saqa Khaneh (a supposedly 
miraculous public fountain at the Shaykh Hadi intersection in Tehran) by a “fanatical” 
mob, while several policemen and soldiers died protecting them.1  This story was 
promoted by the Iranian government through the semi-official press, but was contradicted 
by eyewitness account and by the physical evidence, which make it clear that Imbrie and 
Seymour were attacked because they were marked as “Baha’i.”2  To fully appreciate the 
circumstances leading to the attack, one must realize that Imbrie and Seymour 
represented several contemporary and interrelated thr ats to the ulama.  Although he had 
only been in Iran for several months, Imbrie had aroused considerable clerical ire for his 
intervention on behalf of the Baha’is, while Seymour was in the oil business and thereby 
tied to the debate over extending oil rights for nothern Iran to the Americans, threatening 
British interests in Iran.   
 
                                                      
1 See, for example, NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 7 / 1 / 1, Vol. 153, pp. 159-65. 
2 See, for example, W. Smith Murray, "Report on the Murder of U.S. Consul Imbrie in Tehran, 1924, on 
Charges of Being a Baha'i."  Documents on the Shaykhi, Babi and Baha'i Movements, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July, 
1997).  Accessed February 2, 2011.  http://www.h-net.org/~bahai/docs/imbrie.htm; and The New York 
Times, January 19, 1925. 
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 “They are going to kill Dr. Moody!" 
Anti-Baha’i sentiment and anti-American protests collided and coalesced as a result of 
plans to murder Dr. Susan Moody and her subsequent appeal to Vice Consul Imbrie for 
assistance.  Dr. Moody was an elderly American Baha’i woman who had been living and 
working in Iran for about fifteen years.  She came to Iran in 1909, several years after 
converting to the Baha’i Faith, in order to provide health care to women at a new Baha’i-
run hospital, as well as through her own private practice.  While in Iran, she also became 
involved in the education field, training several Ir nian women to become nurses and 
midwives using modern techniques.  She was also instrumental in developing one of the 
first formal schools for girls in Tehran.  This school was highly regarded and, although 
Baha’i-run, attracted a diverse student body despit the stigma associated with the Baha’i 
Faith.  She was later joined in her efforts by three other prominent American Baha’i 
women.  One of these women, Lillian Kappes, ran the girl’s school, while the other 
two—Elizabeth Stewart and Dr. Sarah Clock—joined in Dr. Moody’s medical work 
(although they were also involved in the schools).  Kappes and Clock died in 1920 and 
1922, respectively.  By 1924, only Dr. Moody and her assistant Elizabeth Stewart 
remained, and Stewart was in poor health.3 
 In Tehran, rumors circulated that on Ashura (the tenth day of Moharram—
August 12, 1924) a thousand Baha’is were to be massacred, and that the list had already 
been created.  Dr. Moody was targeted for death before then, however, perhaps to take 
advantage of the anti-American sentiment of the moment, which was said to have been 
encouraged by the British in response to American attempts to secure oil rights in 
                                                      
3 R. Jackson Armstrong-Ingram, “Susan I. Moody,” Research Notes in Shaykhi, Babi and Baha’i Studies, 
No. 2 (June, 1997). Accessed February 2, 2011.  http://www.h-net.org/~bahai/notes/ moody.htm. 
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northern Iran.  Moody was constantly harassed and was informed that she would be killed 
on July 12.  Fearing for her life, she sought the help of Vice Consul Imbrie.  She appealed 
for protection as an American citizen, and Imbrie responded by demanding that the Chief 
of Police assign sufficient troops to protect her.  As a result of his intervention, when an 
angry mob of more than two hundred descended on her residence, “demanding her 
blood” on the night of the 12th, they were met by a “flying column” of policemen who 
immediately broke up the mob before any damage could be done.  Because of his 
intervention on behalf of a prominent Baha’i, and the fact that the commanding officer of 
the troops that he had had arranged to protect her was also a Baha’i, the disappointed 
leaders of the attack came to believe that Imbrie was also himself a secret Baha’i.4 
 
“The Hue and Cry of Baha’ism” 
More needs to be said to contextualize these accusation  and conspiracies, which may 
seem paranoid and bizarre to outside observers but which carried tremendous weight at 
the time.  Negar Mottahedeh has, in her tracing of the term “Baha’i’’ in Iranian history, 
exposed the ways in which the term has evolved into a packed and multivalent term that 
does not merely imply membership in the Baha’i religion.  In her exploration, she shows 
how objects as disparate as the bold fashion choice of an Orientalist, the naturalism of a 
Qajar princess, and a disliked innovation in headwear could all be termed “Babi / Baha’i” 
with equal validity and naturalness despite the fact that none of the objects of discussion 
had any obvious relation to each other and despite the fact that none of them had any 
clear connection to the Baha’i religion.5  The word became, for non-Baha’i Iranians, an 
                                                      
4 Murray, “A consideration of the Bahai Religion,” pp. 2-3. 
5 Mottahedeh, Representing the Unpresentable, pp. 22-50. 
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umbrella-term with which to refer, in a derogatory manner, to progressive social change 
or challenges to existing authority.  The roots of the insult go back the Babi movement, 
which promoted an eclectic mixture of progressive reforms, a punk-like ethos of rebellion 
against existing authority, a focus on extreme forms of ascetic religiosity, and a 
fascination with the esoteric.  In the popular imagin tion, Babism is (falsely) associated 
with anarchy, antinomianism, drunkenness, wanton sexuality, and bloodshed.  Because of 
this perception, the term not only implies progressive change, but progressive change that 
is heretical and which will only lead to waywardness and social chaos.  The term could 
be used by the conservative or nostalgic to, with a single word, denounce a person or 
thing as heretical, anti-traditional, novel, excessive, wayward, misguided, naïve, and 
bound for failure.  It could also, simply, be used as a convenient slander against which 
there was no easy defense.  This loose bandying about of so potent an insult was the 
subject of an article in an Iranian journal at the time, which pointed out that  
The events of the time of Nasser-ed-Din Shah, when lib ral and progressive 
people were killed under the name of Bahais, are being r peated in Tehran. 
Anybody who has a grudge against another calls him a Bahai.  No person with 
clean clothes and proper looks who wears a collar and necktie can safely pass 
through the streets and the bazaars in the southern part of the city.6 
 The article goes on to relate an incident in which a six or seven-year-old girl was 
being assaulted by a boy of twelve or thirteen.  She called out to a nearby man for 
protection, so he chased the boy away.  "Thereupon the boy started to shout, 'This is a 
Bahai', and were it not for the fact that the passerby in that street knew him, a serious 
incident would have taken place."  The writer laments that although the actual number of 
                                                      
6 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 7 / 1 / 1, Vol. 153, p. 189. 
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Baha’is in Tehran was quite small, all liberal and progressive-minded intellectuals are 
targeted as “Baha’i.” 
 When used by the ulama, the term takes on an added weight and becomes more 
of a threat than a description, invoking intimations of apostasy from Islam and the need 
for the individual to be dealt with harshly.  As with accusations of witchcraft, or the 
smearing of McCarthyism, the stigma of being publicly “outed” as a Baha’i was difficult 
to remove. As such, the ulama’s use of this tactic against Reza Shah and others was 
regarded as a serious escalation.  Two years before the Imbrie episode, Prime Minister 
Ahmad Qavam was locked in a power struggle with then Minister of War, Reza Khan 
(the future Reza Shah).  The Prime Minister utilized the ulama in this struggle, initiating 
the “the recrudescence of clerical power in Persia.” As a result, at no time since the days 
of Fazlallah Nuri, during the Constitutional Revolution, "have the clergy been in 
possession of such dangerous power as is theirs today,” for “They, who had the day 
before been suppliants, now became dictators.”  This recrudescence was, in part, inspired 
by Iraqi ulama, who were in communication with their Iranian counterparts, blaming their 
weakness on internal divisions and urging them to mobilize and organize to more 
effectively leverage their power to take advantage of the moment of opportunity.7 
 One of the most effective tactics in this clerical agitation was to accuse Reza 
Khan and his allies of being secret Baha’is and enemies of Islam.  These charges from the 
clerical opposition were subsequently adopted by the opposition in general, as “Reza 
Khan's political enemies have taken advantage of the restored prestige of the clergy to 
raise the hue and cry of Bahaism against him, the danger of which accusation in present-
                                                      
7 Murray, "Report on the Murder,” pp. 9-12. 
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day densely ignorant Persia is by no means to be und restimated.”8  These charges were 
supported by doctored photos showing Reza Khan wearing the portrait and insignia of 
Baha’u’llah, which prompted him to save face through awkward and defensive public 
acts of religiosity, such as commissioning a portrait of Ali from the Atabat (Najaf and 
Karbala).9  While doctored photos may have had an effect on the less sophisticated, the 
more dangerous aspects of the polemic tried to conflate Reza Khan’s policies with those 
of the Baha’is.  Reza Khan desired a secular republic for a number of reasons, including 
his antipathy for religion and desire to emulate his hero, Ataturk (who formed a secular 
republic in Turkey), but the clerical polemic linked his desire for a republic with the 
section in The Kitab-i-Aqdas (the most holy book of the Baha’is), addressed to Iran, that 
promises “Let nothing grieve thee, O Land of Ta [Tehran]… Erelong will the state of 
affairs within thee be changed, and the reins of power fall into the hands of the people 
[i.e. a republic].”10   
 Those accusing him of Baha’ism also pointed to Reza Khan’s acceptance of 
Baha’is in the government and the military.  Reza Khan saw the army and the institutions 
of the state as homogenizing machines, where one could advance despite the 
disadvantages of birth.  As such, an American report n tes that he “has freely made use in 
the Army and the Government of the intelligent services of the Bahais.”11  This lack of 
concern for communal difference was perceived as a sign that Reza Khan was himself a 
Baha’i, or at the very least a sympathizer. 
                                                      
8 Ibid., p. 6. 
9 Murray, “A consideration of the Bahai Religion,” p. 12. 
10 Quoted in Baha’u’llah, Gleanings, p. 110. 
11 Murray, “Report,” p. 10. 
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 The attack on Imbrie and Seymour also occurred in the context of the debate 
over the future of Iran and, particularly, the contr versy over Reza Shah’s desire for a 
secular republic, on the Turkish model.  The British were opposed to the idea of a 
republic and preferred the idea of a monarchy dependent on the old elites, such as the 
ulama and the landlords, which they believed would prove more pliable and amenable to 
British interests.  The Russians were also distrustful of the idea of a republic.  Murray 
notes that the British and the Russians, for the first time since the Russian Revolution, 
“joined hands” in order to block Reza Khan’s desire to create a genuinely independent 
Republic.  American consular sources report that large sums of money were funneled to 
willing clerics for this purpose, to encourage “popular” demonstrations against the 
prospect of a republic.  Reza Shah, who was at the time known for displaying “a 
lamentable moral weakness in all the crises of his career,” dealt “badly” with the protests, 
responding with violence that only hurt his position and strengthened the popular base 
and morale of the opposition, while adding credence to the polemic regarding his 
personal religious beliefs.  He was forced to go to Qom to feign contrition before the 
leading clerics, and the push for a republic was effectively ended.  Moreover: 
The fanaticism of the crowd was so incited by the continuous preaching of the 
Mullahs that any act on his part would have been interpreted as treason to Islam 
and prima facie evidence that he was a Bahai; hence his [subsequent] unfortunate 
orders to the military and the police not to intervene under any circumstances in 
religious demonstrations and under no circumstances to fire.12  
 Clerical opposition to a republic was not based on mere patronage, but also on 
self-interest and fear of suffering the fate that Islam had suffered in Turkey after the 
establishment of Ataturk’s secular republicanism. Observers consistently note that, 
                                                      
12 Ibid., p. 12. 
480 
 
although the clergy hated the Reza Khan regime, they feared a republic far more.  As 
Murray puts it: 
To a close observer of Persian affairs it is beyond question that, had Reza Khan 
succeeded in establishing the Republic in March of t is year, it would have been 
the death knell to the power of the clergy, which the latter realized only too well. I 
furthermore know personally that it was his firm determination to have proceeded, 
immediately upon the establishment of the Republic, w th a revision of the 
Constitution which would have separated church from state and secularized the 
law.13  
 Also of deep concern for the ulama was the debate over an oil bill that would have 
extended drilling rights in northern Iran to American oil interests, specifically Sinclair 
Oil.  Clerical opposition was again utilized by the British to protect their monopoly over 
Iranian oil.  And, again, the clerics also had their own self-interest at stake. “The clergy 
immediately rose to the occasion, for, upon passage of the oil bill, all sides expected Reza 
Khan to assume dictatorial control” and “The realization of this situation on the part of 
the clerical opposition has incited them more than anything else to oppose the passage of 
the bill.”14  
The Americans, unlike the British, favored a republic and had no ties to, or 
affection for, the ulama.  American enthusiasm for republicanism, desire for access to the 
oil markets, and intervention to prevent anti-Baha’i agitation became so conflated by 
some Tehran clerics that these disparate aims and attitudes were imagined as a unified 
program of American anti-clericalism.  This assessment was not helped by American 
cultural disrespect.  There was, for example, anger at some American diplomats who 
were discovered frequenting brothels disguised (badly nd stereotypically) as mullahs.15 
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This clerical apprehension of American attitudes vis-à-vis the future role of 
Shi’ism in Iran, although exaggerated, is not totally baseless.  In an American assessment 
of religion in Iran, Baha’is are clearly favored over Muslims and are described as the 
“best solution” for Iran, short of a national return to a revived and re-imagined 
Zoroastrianism.  In Murray’s study, he notes that while Islam is a foreign religion that 
was brought into Iran and naturalized, the Baha’i religion “is the last of five purely 
Persian religious movements in the Persian Empire” (the other four being 
Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, Manichaeism, and Mazdakism).  The report goes on to speak 
with admiration of the Baha’i religion’s embrace of science and its ideals of 
internationalism, complete equality, pacifism (except for just wars), capitalism, and belief 
that religion is designed to serve the common good (rather than vice versa).  Moreover, in 
assessing character traits, the report makes mention of the intelligence and efficiency of 
the Baha’is and “the high moral qualities and ethical standards of the Bahais in contrast 
with the orthodox Mohammedans.”  The report concludes that Islam has failed in Iran 
and that “Bahaism, in which there are signs of a Protestant Reformation, and which after 
all is of purely Persian origin, may prove itself to be the best solution under the 
circumstances.”16   
The repeated use of “purely Persian” in discussing the possible future role of the 
Baha’is was based on the author’s skepticism that Si’ism could serve as an adequate 
foundation for nationalism, given its foreign origin.  The remaining options were to 
embrace a recent movement of purely Persian origin (i.e. the Baha’i Faith), or attempt a 
revival of the pre-Islamic Persian past.  Of course, it was the latter option that was to be 
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later embraced by Reza Shah and his son.  The notion that Shi’ism could serve as the 
basis of national identity was not even entertained. 
 
“To fish in troubled waters” 
Towards the end of the Qajar period, Baha’is became incr asingly resented not only for 
their heretical beliefs, but also for their disproportionate employment by foreigners in 
Iran, and the subsequent intervention of these foreign powers on their behalf.  With the 
occupation of Iran during the First World War, there was an intense need for highly-
skilled local collaboration.  Baha’is were a natural fit because their pacifism, 
internationalism, and comparatively high rates of literacy made them uniquely suited to 
work with Western powers.  Moreover, because of the ongoing and occasionally violent 
bouts of anti-Baha’ism in Iran, they were in need of p werful friends, and this need could 
be used as leverage with which to solicit loyalty to their defenders.  This disproportionate 
hiring of Baha’is, beginning in the final years of the Qajar period, formed the kernel of 
later conspiracy theories, such as the forged Political Confessions of Prince Dolgorouki, 
which greatly exaggerated the link between the Baha’is and foreign powers, and 
projected it backwards, to the religion’s origins i the previous century, as part of a 
fantastical conspiracy.17  In reality, the employment of Baha’is was a largely post-World 
War I development, and was not that dramatic.  Baha’is were disproportionately 
employed, but in mundane office work and not national sedition.  They did receive 
special assistance because of their social capital, but this was directed mostly at 
protecting themselves from persecution.   
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At the British consulate in Shiraz, for example, it was noted, in 1917, that at least 
a half dozen employees or close contacts were Baha’is, including the chairman of that 
city’s Baha’i Assembly.  The extent of dependence on Baha’i collaboration was such that 
the British had to warn their Shiraz consulate of the dangers this posed vis-à-vis the 
Muslim population, only to receive a defensive response from the consul, saying: “I am 
quite alive to the necessity of avoiding the appearance of making the Consulate the 
headquarters of [Baha’ism].”18   
By 1921, the relationship between the British and the Baha’is had matured to the 
point where it was not unusual for Baha’i Spiritual Assemblies to write British officers to 
ask for assistance with protection, safe transport, employment, and even help in removing 
government appointees believed to be anti-Baha’i.  For example, when Mirza Habibullah 
Khan and Mirza Ashraf Khan were fired from the Ministry of Public Information due to 
their Baha’i religion, the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Tehran appealed to the 
British for help.  Due to their intercession, the two individuals were able to secure new 
government appointments in Bushehr, as well as letters from the British facilitating their 
easy movement. 19 
Also in 1921, in Sultanabad, there were plans for anti-Baha’i agitation during the 
celebration of the Imam Mahdi’s birthday, which fell during the Baha’i holy period of 
Rezvan.  A similar anti-Baha’i episode the preceding year h d resulted in a “disgraceful 
fiasco” with some “regrettable incidents,” but in 1921 the British were determined to 
make sure that local authorities took “energetic measures” to prevent a repeat of such 
activity.  Baha’is followed British instructions and kept a low profile, keeping their stores 
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closed during the most dangerous period.  Meanwhile, upon British instructions, the 
governor had all roads patrolled by the gendarmerie, whose leader was given “definite 
instructions” regarding preventing the development of unruly crowds.  The governor 
himself was compelled to take to the streets with his private guard to ensure that all 
measures were carried out.  Despite the success of these protective measures, the Baha’is 
still tried to have the British force the removal of the main agitators against them.20 
Also in 1921, in Shiraz, Sheikh Jafar attacked the Baha’i monopoly over the local 
postal service, leading to violent anti-Baha’i attacks.  The British note that the Persian 
authorities intended to wait until the situation quieted and then turn the other clerics 
against Sheikh Jafar and have him arrested and deported, along with his entourage.  They 
also note that the Baha’is had been aggressively proselytizing and that a third of Shiraz 
was supposedly Baha’i.  This latter claim is, of course, not accurate but indicates that a 
very large percentage of those Iranians with whom the British interacted regularly were 
Baha’i.  This figure of one-third was said to include the many Baha’is in the SPR (South 
Persia Rifles), who were not necessarily from the area but were merely stationed there.  
The large number of Baha’is in the SPR suggests tha many Baha’is were taking 
advantage of the equalizing potential of military enrollment. 
In the campaign against Baha’i control of mail services in Shiraz, the postmaster 
was severely beaten and was subsequently exiled from the city for his own protection and 
to prevent further disruption.  The removal of the postmaster emboldened the anti-Baha’i 
activists and placed the lives of other Baha’i postal workers in danger.  The Baha’i 
Assembly in Tehran alerted the British that “immediate suppressive steps are extremely 
necessary for averting the pending danger.”  The British acted on this appeal and the 
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Shiraz consulate later reported that “agitation has been quietly struck down for the last 
ten days.”  The consulate, however, placed some blame on the Baha’is themselves for 
their “recent intensive propaganda missionaries,” and claimed that it was reasonable to 
require the main proselytizers to leave.  The Baha’i postmaster was ostensibly transferred 
for his own protection, but in reality this “timorous individual” was transferred for 
“utilizing the Post Office for propaganda.”  In any case, the British were able to further 
calm the Shiraz unrest upon the request of Munshi, a consulate employee who was also 
the chairman of the city’s Baha’i Spiritual Assembly.21   
The director of posts from Borujerd, Mirza Abu Talib Khan Bashir-i-Humayun, 
was recruited to replace the exiled Baha’i postmaster, but the Baha’is again appealed to 
the British.  They argued that this man should be denied the position on the grounds that 
he was Muslim and was ill-disposed towards the Baha’i employees at the post office and 
this “will thus result in disorder detrimental to the administration of Fars.”  The Baha’i 
Assembly claimed that the majority of the postal employees were Baha’is the British 
noted that this was an understatement and that all twelve postal employees were Baha’i.  
In response to Baha’i protests of the new appointme, the Director General of the postal 
system replied that the new postmaster was already on his way and that the Baha’i 
charges were baseless, since this replacement was specifically chosen because he was not 
fanatical, and this choice was designed to calm the wat rs by replacing the outgoing 
Baha’i postmaster with a new one who would be Muslim, but who would not be fanatical 
and who would not revive the controversy over the Baha’i monopoly, since he had been 
given clear instructions vis-à-vis his Baha’i employees.  In response to these remarks, the 
Shiraz consulate took the side of the Baha’is, and expressed the view that an ill-disposed 
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postmaster would attempt to remove the all-Baha’i st ff and again revive the controversy.  
They suggested that the Muslim appointee from Borujerd be discharged on a pretext and 
that the new postmaster should be Bashir al-Sultan, a fellow Baha’i.22 
The Baha’i Assembly in Tehran wrote to express its deep gratitude for British 
assistance with the Shiraz situation and to ask for further assistance in other regions, such 
as Isfahan, where elements in the Department of Education were campaigning for the 
removal of Baha’is from government employment and agitating for action against the 
Baha’is during the holy month of Moharram.  The British responded to this request and 
intervened as they had in Sultanabad and elsewhere.  Th y instructed the governor-
general to take precautionary measures and to reprimand anti-Baha’i employees for 
utilizing their position for “mischief making.”23   
In the same period, the Baha’is wrote and asked for assistance transferring money 
to their headquarters in British Palestine, saying that bank drafts were not currently 
available, but that they needed to transfer 4000 pounds immediately, and 50, 000 Tomans 
annually.  Although the request was eventually denied, the officer making the case for 
approving this request argues that the request should be approved, as the “Behais are very 
numerous and ever increasing in Persia… [and are] an influential and well-disposed 
section of the people.”  This note indicates recognition by local British officers of the 
mutually beneficial nature of their relationship with the Baha’is, and how a policy of 
accommodation served British interests.24 
 In Yazd, anti-Baha’i agitation also prompted British action.  Treadwell sent a 
telegraph to Tehran indicating that Baha’is were being beaten, denied access to public 
                                                      
22 Ibid. Baha’is 1, January 13, 1917; Baha’is 2, January 15, 1917; Baha'is 31-32. 
23 Ibid., Baha'is 26. 
24 Ibid., Baha'is 30, 33. 
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baths, and were facing the threat of a boycott.  He went on to “earnestly beg” that 
preventative steps again be authorized to protect th  Baha’is.  This concern prompted the 
following margin note: 
These anti-Bahai movements are getting disquieting.  It is always necessary to 
bear in mind that such movements are hardly ever mainly religious.  The Persians 
are too fundamentally political to be religiously fanatical in the genuine way.  But 
fanaticism serves as a useful pretext for the more disorderly elements to fish in 
troubled waters.  If such fanatical movements are not curbed, their scope quickly 
widens beyond purely religious matters, to the detriment of public order and 
European interests in the country.25 
Although this assessment is excessively dismissive of r ligious motivation, it 
correctly points out the political undercurrents of these supposedly spontaneous 
expressions of religious fanaticism.  As the uncertainty of the interregnum between the 
Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties increased, the boldness of anti-minority violence increased, 
as did its overt political implications.   
 
The Fountain 
In the months preceding the attack on Vice Consul Imbrie, the Saqa Khaneh fountain in 
central Tehran became the “storm center” of an anti-Baha’i movement that had compiled 
a list of about a thousand Baha’is, who were to be massacred on Ashura (August 12, 
1924).  This particular fountain gained notoriety because of reports of its miraculous 
ability to heal the Shi’ite faithful of their ailments while also inflicting blindness on 
heretical Baha’is.  One story involved a Baha’i man being struck blind after saying that 
he would not give coins at the fountain in the name of Ali, but would give any amount in 
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the name of Abdu’l-Baha (the son of the Baha’i prophet).26  As word of the Saqa 
Khaneh’s power spread, many began to come from great dist nces, some even carried on 
stretchers.  The spot developed into a rallying point for those opposed to the Baha’i 
heresy.  As growing crowds came to be healed, the fountain was, conveniently, 
“poisoned” and its miraculous powers could therefor not be tested by the faithful 
pilgrims.  The inability of the fountain to heal the pilgrims was blamed on the Baha’is, 
who were said to be behind the poisoning.27 
 Imbrie was curious about the Saqa Khaneh in part because of his involvement in 
opposing the anti-Baha’i agitation and in part because he had been given a camera by 
National Geographic with which to take photos of interesting subjects.  Imbrie and 
Seymour approached the spectacle at the fountain with their camera, but there is no 
agreement in the available sources about what exactly happened after that.  There is, 
however, general agreement that there was opposition to the taking of photographs 
followed shortly thereafter by accusations that Imbrie and Seymour were Baha’is and 
guilty of poisoning the sacred fountain.  Some sources claim that Imbrie and Seymour 
took pictures despite being warned not to, while others claim that the camera was not 
used and was immediately put away after it was found objectionable, but that the sounds 
made while closing the camera were mistaken for the sounds of photographs being 
taken.28  The claim that the photographing of unveiled women at the fountain was the 
cause of the attack was promoted by the Iranian government, which initially tried to 
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27 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 7 / 1 / 1, vol. 153, pp. 50, 274; The Baghdad Times, July 24, 1924; The New York 
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frame the attack in terms of an affront to male honor brought on by cultural 
misunderstanding.  Other sources dismiss this claim, since there would not have been 
uncovered women at this conservative rallying site. 
 There is also a strong possibility that, if photos were taken, there were no women 
in the pictures and the shots were, instead, obtained to further document the anti-Baha’i 
agitation in Iran.  The leaders of this movement were doubtless familiar with Imbrie and 
his previous involvement with protecting Dr. Moody, and knew that any photographs he 
took would likely be used against them in the foreign press in order to make them look 
fanatical, and bring pressure on the government to prevent the anti-Baha’i massacre 
planned for Moharram.  In any event, despite the official framing of the issue in terms of 
male honor, it was the claim that the two Americans were really Baha’is and had 
poisoned the fountain that prompted the mob’s advance d the anger of the masses, most 
of whom arrived on the scene well after the camera had been put away.  
 
"I Thought It Was a Dog of a Baha’i"   
Imbrie and Seymour fled the scene in a carriage while being pursued by a crowd led by 
clerics and pelted with stones from rooftops along the route.  Although the attack upon 
Imbrie and Seymour “lasted about half an hour, at a spot within a stone's throw of both 
the Police Headquarters and the Kossak Khaneh, where both police and military reserves 
were at hand, no attempt was made to intimidate the mob.”29 Instead, the Americans’ 
cries for help were ignored and, to their disbelief, soldiers and policemen actually joined 
the mob attacking them.   
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 Despite the driver’s best efforts, the fleeing carriage was stopped and Imbrie 
and Seymour were dragged out and brutally assaulted by civilians, police, and soldiers 
until other police officers finally intervened and, without using force,30 were able to bring 
the two injured men to a nearby police infirmary.  By this point the crowd, numbering 
anywhere from five hundred to several thousand, was unwilling to disperse and instead 
forced its way into the infirmary and— believing tha  Seymour had already died—fell 
upon Imbrie, assaulting him with stones and swords until they were sure that he was 
dead, his scalp severed from his skull.31         
 Later, government propaganda would put forward the claim that “fanatics” were 
responsible and that several policemen died protecting the Americans.  This claim was 
retracted after it failed to stand up to scrutiny, and the Persian government later admitted 
that the dead policemen that they had produced in support of this story were actually 
policemen who had died from unrelated events, and that the police and military did, in 
fact, participate in the attacks, with only a handful of policemen taking timid steps to 
defend the two Americans.32  In fact, the most serious wounds were made by military 
sabers.33                   
 There is no doubt that the Police and Cossack troops in the mob knew of Imbrie’s 
identity.  He was wearing his official insignias; he made his identity known to the nearby 
police and military troops earlier that same day; and he repeatedly identified himself as 
an American diplomat, as confirmed by both Seymour and other eyewitnesses.  In spite 
                                                      
30 As discussed above, Reza Khan had ordered that force not be used against religious crowds. 
31 NACPM, RG 84 / 350 / 7 / 1 / 1, vol. 153, p. 255; Murray, “Report,” p. 3. 
32 Ibid., p. 49. 
33 The Baghdad Times, July 24, 1924.   
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of this, he was given no quarter.  Rather, Imbrie’s identity served to further endanger his 
position.   
 Imbrie’s previous use of a Baha’i-led force to protect Moody had created a 
situation in which the police and soldiers on the sc ne faced a dilemma.  If they were to 
assist Imbrie, they ran the risk of being tainted as B ha’is themselves and having the mob 
turn against them as well.  Moreover, standing up against the crowd was suicidal, as Reza 
Shah had recently made it clear that clerical demonstrations were not to be fired upon, as 
this would only further assist clerical efforts to undermine him.  Given the spontaneous 
nature of the attack, and the choice between a series of unpalatable options, it is not 
difficult to understand why many officers on the scne chose to join rather than oppose 
the crowd.    
 
Investigation and Retribution 
When Imbrie’s body was examined, the extent of the brutality of the attack was 
uncovered and reported.  This led to not only an American desire for restitution, but to 
American investors’ fear of Iranian instability and anti-Americanism.  The autopsy 
revealed: a severed scalp; over twenty head wounds, mo t of which penetrated the scalp;, 
extensive epicranial hemorrhages “in every direction;" numerous fractures; missing teeth; 
broken ribs; a burst upper lip; scrotal trauma; anddozens of contusions and lacerations 
such that “the contusions over the body and limbs generally were so numerous or 
extensive that they ran into one another, and it was impossible to determine how many 
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there actually were."34  Imbrie’s body was returned home with full military honors and 
buried in Arlington National Cemetery.   
 His widow and the Department of State pressed for th se responsible to be 
brought to justice.  Although the mob was said to have been led by a cleric, the majority 
of the eyewitnesses as well as the autopsy indicate th  the police and soldiers among the 
crowd were those most directly engaged in the assault.  To the chagrin of American 
officials, most of the military officers involved were not held to account and, at most, 
received demotions for negligence or disobedience ad other nominal penalties.  Senior 
ulama were also spared.  Instead, several poor, ill-connected individuals from among the 
assailants received beatings or short periods in jail, while three were put forward as the 
scapegoats to face execution for the murder: Private Morteza (for inciting the mob to 
murder and ignoring the desist orders supposedly made by his senior officers), Sayyed 
Hussein (a civilian who had apparently hit Imbrie at one point and who had broken open 
the entrance to the police hospital), and Ali (a fourteen-year-old street youth who 
supposedly confessed to throwing a stone at Imbrie wh le he lay in the hospital).  None of 
these three were the leaders of the mob or the ones that truck the killing blows, but they 
were the individuals whom the Persian government was illing to execute to satisfy 
American pressure.  Meanwhile, those actually respon ible faced demotions, one to three 
months in jail, and 50-300 lashes, if they were punished at all.35   
 The plan for Hussein, Morteza, and Ali to take the blame satisfied neither side and 
became a drawn-out ordeal.  Since executing those actually responsible was not on the 
table, American officials were insistent that the tree who were facing execution all be 
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killed, and in an expedient fashion, to serve as an example.  The Persian authorities, 
however, were finding the executions exceedingly unpopular within Iran and tried to stall 
the proceedings or reduce the sentences.  The first delay occurred in order to wait for the 
end of Moharram, but after this Reza Khan continued to stall due to the unpopularity of 
the planned executions.  Private Morteza was not executed until October 2, and even then 
he was technically executed for disobeying orders, not murder.  After his execution, the 
Persian authorities made the case that the other two should not be executed on the 
grounds that it is against Islam to execute many for the death of one, and that Ali was a 
child.36    
 The Americans rejected these arguments.  They consulted their own Islamic 
experts to debunk these religious objections.  Later, th y discovered that Reza Khan had 
actually never consulted any religious experts and that he would not do this, as it would 
be a concession of clerical authority.  The claim that Ali was too young to be executed 
was also dismissed, on the grounds that Persians often don’t really know their true ages 
and that it is possible that the boy might be seventeen or even eighteen and, in any case, 
an “Oriental” adolescent is more mature that his Occidental counterpart and, culturally, 
the age of maturity was fifteen in Iran.  Popular opp sition to the execution of this child 
was coldly dismissed as irrelevant since the masses were “biased.”  Ali was not the only 
child of questionable guilt punished as a result of the ongoing American pressure: Jafar, 
seventeen, received two months in prison and a hundred lashes; Ismail, a sixteen-year-old 
fruit seller, received four months and a hundred lashes; and Hussein, only twelve, 
received two months in prison and fifty lashes.37   
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 American pressure and investigation resulted in an ever-growing list of those 
involved in the attack, and pressure for their hars punishment.  Even one of the few 
police officers who had actually tried to protect Imbrie and Seymour was thrown in jail 
because he did not fire on the crowd (in obedience to an earlier edict from Reza Khan not 
to fire on clerical protests).38  Eventually, Reza Khan gave in to American pressure and 
closed the matter by having Ali and the sayyed executed on November 1, 1924.39 
 
The “Hidden Hand” 
The executions were seen as tangential to the question of actual culpability.  Within Iran, 
there was widespread speculation about the British “hidden hand” that directed the mob 
in order to manipulate them “like puppets,” and about the likely motivations behind this 
orchestration.  Few Iranians shared the willingness of the Americans, to credit 
“fanaticism” or “savagery” as the driving force behind the attacks.  Most speculation 
centered on British sponsorship of the attacks in order to ruin the oil negotiations with 
Sinclair Oil, an American firm.  This speculation was based on more than just the timing 
of the attacks.  For example, when Imbrie’s wife came to see her husband’s body she was 
initially turned away because the hospital staff mistakenly believed that Imbrie was 
actually Ralph Soper, the Sinclair oil representative.  This confusion over identity was 
used to support the widespread speculation that the murder was intended to scare away 
Sinclair oil and to protect British oil interests.40  The possibility of mistaken identity is 
unlikely, however, due to the numerous eyewitness accounts that claim that the two 
American victims and their Armenian employees repeatedly identified Imbrie as the 
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American Consul, to no avail.  The crowd’s focus on Imbrie, while virtually ignoring 
Seymour, further diminishes the likelihood that the attack was intended for a 
representative of American oil interests.  Eyewitness accounts affirm that the mob was 
informed as to the identity of Imbrie and that they proceeded regardless, due to their 
belief that he was really a Baha’i.41   
 Nevertheless, the popular gossip and underground press credited the hidden hand 
of the British (and in some cases the Russians) for the attack as part of the “oil war,” 
claiming that the British again worked through their old allies the ulama in order to 
manipulate the “simple-minded fools” and scare away the proposed American investment 
through manufactured fanaticism, and that the “so-called” Saqa Khaneh Movement “had 
the earmarks from the beginning of an artificially inspired movement… in order to create 
disorder for the Government.”42 
 Reza Khan dismissed Russian involvement and did not believe the British to be 
directly responsible for the specific attack on Imbrie, but he did share the opinion that the 
British were undoubtedly the sponsors of the anti-Baha’i clerical agitation based at the 
“miracle” spring, with the aim of embarrassing him and fomenting disorder to discourage 
American investment.  The Persian authorities went so far as to try to arrest Mostafa 
Khan, the Anglo-Persian representative, in connection with Imbrie’s murder.  Khan had 
been deeply involved in bribing the majles and engaging in other efforts to prevent the oil 
deal with the Americans, and it was speculated that he was involved in sponsoring the 
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“fanatical” movement which eventually attacked Imbrie.  Khan’s arrest was blocked by 
British pressure, and the matter was dropped43 
 It was, in any case, the ulama that bore the brunt of Reza Khan’s anger over the 
murder, the resulting diplomatic problems, and the collapsed hopes of American 
investment.  He was forced to declare martial law, discipline his troops, pay hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in restitution to both Imbrie’s widow and the American government, 
and to demote, flog, imprison, or execute scapegoats t  satisfy American calls for 
retribution.  The entire episode proved a drain and  distraction, highlighting the 
continued power of the traditional elite and effectively killing what hope remained of 
breaking away from the British or pursuing a republic. 
 
“Our martyr”: The Americanization of the Baha’i Pro blem 
In one of his reports to the State Department about the Imbrie murder, W. Smith Murray 
notes that the Baha’is of Tehran repeatedly told him t at they considered Imbrie to be a 
martyr for their cause.  They believed that he died protecting the Baha’is from the Saqa 
Khaneh Movement and that the only reason that the Moharram massacre was avoided 
was the clerical crackdown and close scrutiny that followed Imbrie’s murder.  They 
believed that his death saved the lives of hundreds.  “He was our martyr,” Dr. Moody 
said, “he sacrificed his life for us!”44  Ali Akbar Rohani, writing on behalf of the national 
administrative council of the Iranian Baha’is, wrote: 
The blood of this glorious man blended with that of many thousands of Baha’i 
martyrs, who sacrificed their lives with insupportable tortures and under 
tyrannical claws for the sake of universal peace and redemption…for centuries 
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this event will never be forgotten! …The seed of permanent affection and 
sincerity between these two nations has been watered by the blood of this 
victim.45 
  The crackdown over Imbrie’s murder produced a brief respite in anti-Baha’i 
violence.  This lull did not last long, but the incident did have a profound influence on the 
contours of anti-Baha’i agitation in the decades that followed.  The episode created, in 
American diplomatic memory, the idea that the politicization of the ulama was a threat to 
order and progress and that their fetishistic obsession with the Baha’i minority now had 
potentially disastrous foreign policy implications.  
 The ghosts of the Imbrie incident can be seen, for example, in a May 1926 letter 
from the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States and Canada to 
Reza Shah, urging an end to Baha’i persecutions in Jahrom.  In this small provincial town 
near Shiraz, many Baha’is were wounded, twenty houses looted or burned, and eight 
Baha’is tortured and killed.  Among the dead was a child cut into pieces and Baha’i 
women murdered “in the most shameful manner.”  As tragic as this provincial incident 
was, what is relevant for our study is the manner i which the appeal was staged.  It was 
the American Baha’is whose lobbying efforts were usd on the Shah, rather than Iranian 
believers, and the appeal was made by making strong reference to the Imbrie incident and 
drawing a thread connecting the fanaticism that result d in Imbrie’s death with the 
fanaticism on display in Jahrom.  Horace Holley, writing on behalf of the Assembly, 
lavishes praise on the Shah and his reforms and claims that Baha’is share the Shah’s 
progressive and hopeful vision of the world, while in contrast the ulama took joy in 
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murder and represented only anarchy, retrogression, and obstacles to Iran’s progress.46  
The memory of Imbrie is invoked to draw a rhetorical line in the sand, on one side of 
which Holley placed the Baha’is, the Americans, and progressive future for Iran, while 
on the other side he placed the ulama, hopelessness, and a slide back to medievalism.  
The Shah is challenged to choose sides.   
 The legacy of the Imbrie episode, and other less dramatic interventions, including 
those by the British on behalf of their Baha’i employees, served to create a sense that the 
welfare of Iran’s Baha’i population was no longer a purely domestic concern.  The 
possibility of foreign intervention over Baha’ism was used by the Baha’is to lobby for 
better treatment, as Holley was doing by invoking Imbrie, and was used by their enemies 
to promote the idea that Baha’ism was “foreign.”   
 In the anti-Baha’i pogrom of 1955, the diplomatic re ord contains hundreds of 
references to the Imbrie affair, and there was constant speculation in educated Iranian 
circles that the pogrom of 1955, like the attacks on Imbrie, were the result of clerical 
agitation sponsored by the British to scare away American involvement in Iran and to 
retain Britain’s place as the preeminent Power exerting influence over Iran.  This constant 
invocation of Imbrie, more than a generation later, speaks to the importance of the 
episode in the history of American involvement in Iran. 
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